Case Law[2026] ZAGPJHC 35South Africa
VIP Steel Construction CC v Made with Rural 1 (Pty) Ltd (2024/034960) [2026] ZAGPJHC 35 (23 January 2026)
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## VIP Steel Construction CC v Made with Rural 1 (Pty) Ltd (2024/034960) [2026] ZAGPJHC 35 (23 January 2026)
VIP Steel Construction CC v Made with Rural 1 (Pty) Ltd (2024/034960) [2026] ZAGPJHC 35 (23 January 2026)
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sino date 23 January 2026
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number:
2024/034960
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED: YES/NO
In
the matter between:
VIP
STEEL CONSTRUCTION CC
Applicant
and
MADE
WITH RURAL 1 (PTY) LTD
Respondent
JUDGMENT
P F LOUW, AJ
[1]
This is the extended return day of a rule
nisi that was issued on 4 June 2024 placing the respondent in
provisional liquidation.
The respondent delivered a notice of
intention to oppose on 18 July 2024 and then filed an answering
affidavit on the 31
st
of July 2024.
[2]
The applicant argued that the answering
affidavit was delivered out of the time limit set by the Uniform
Rules of Court and that
the respondent accordingly must seek
condonation to which it is not entitled. For this reason, the
applicant argued, the
court may not consider the answering affidavit
and the affidavits consequential thereon. It was pointed out
that the answering
affidavit is a response to the rule nisi and that
anyone, including the respondent, had the right to provide reasons
why the provisional
order should not be made final on the return day,
which is precisely what the respondent did by delivering the
answering affidavit.
The applicant did not persist with its
argument that the respondent required condonation. I therefore do not
have to consider this
aspect of the case. Insofar as it may be
necessary to do so, I allow the answering, replying and supplementary
answering
affidavits into evidence.
[3]
The application was brought on the basis
that the respondent is indebted to the applicant in a sum of some
R1,1 million. The
sum is reflected in an invoice annexed to the
founding affidavit. The application is also based on a letter
of demand under
section 345(1)(a)(i) of the Companies Act 61 of
1973. Given the conclusions to which I have come, it is not
necessary for
me to consider the validity of the letter of demand.
[4]
The respondent’s answer to the case
made out in the founding affidavit is that it is not the respondent
who is indebted to
the applicant for the payment of the sum reflected
in the invoice. The debtor is another entity, namely Retail
Market Farm
(Pty) Ltd. The only issue in the case is whether
the applicant has established on a balance of probabilities that the
respondent
is the entity indebted to the applicant. Given the
nature of the relief sought (i.e. that it is final), the
Plascon-Evans
methodology must be applied. I must consequently
consider whether the applicant can succeed on the respondent’s
version
on the crucial issue or whether the respondent’s
version can be rejected as patently improbable. In my view the
respondent
has provided a cogent answer to the applicant’s
assertion that the respondent is liable for the debt. The
respondent’s
version is in my view not improbable and does not
stand to be rejected.
[5]
The facts that cannot be disputed as they
appear from the answering affidavit are that the company to which I
referred above, Retail
Market Farm, had two directors namely the
deponent to the answering affidavit, Ms Leeko Lynette Mokoene (to
whom I refer as Ms
Mokoene) and a Mr Ronnie McKenzie. Ms
Mokoene referred to Mr McKenzie as her erstwhile partner. The
respondent had,
and has, one director namely Ms Mokoene. Retail
Market Farm had (and still has) a funding relationship with the
National
Empowerment Fund, referred to as the NEF in her affidavit.
Turning to the applicant, its business is to construct steel
structures.
What happened was that Ms Mokoene saw the applicant
erecting a structure on a property in the vicinity of a piece of land
owned
by Retail Market Farm. She requested the applicant to give a
quotation for a steel structure on Retail Market Farm's property,
which the applicant did. The quotation was made out for Ms
Mokoene but she required the applicant to issue the quotation to
Retail Market Farm because the name on the invoice had to correspond
to that of the NEF lender (evidently because the NEF would
provide
funds for the improvement). The applicant obliged and it issued a
second quotation to Retail Market Farm. Ms Mokoene
accepted the
quotation on behalf of Retail Market Farm. Ms Mokoene then paid
a deposit on behalf of Retail Market Farm and
the applicant commenced
with the construction which it completed at some point before 24 May
2023. The applicant issued a
tax invoice to Retail Market Farm
on this day for the outstanding balance (i.e., the amount referred to
in the third paragraph
hereof). The invoice was not paid. The
applicant's version of what happened next (which the respondent
cannot dispute) is
that during July 2023 Mr McKenzie instructed the
applicant to amend the tax invoice to show the respondent as the
party liable
for payment. Neither party delivered an affidavit
by Mr McKenzie. The only proof of Mr McKenzie’s
instruction
is a WhatsApp message which was sent to Ms Mokoene
attaching the invoice reflecting the respondent as the party liable
for payment
together with the following text: “As per
conversation with Ronnie [i.e. Mr McKenzie] today he asked me to
change the name
of the company. I did send the invoice to your
email address. He also said that he will release payment.
Thank
you.” The WhatsApp message was sent on 17 July 2023.
Ms Mokoene said she received it but did not respond thereto.
She did not deal with what appears to be the next message: “Can
you put the 1 after Made With Rural. Made With Rural
1 (Pty)
Ltd.” The respondent’s name is indeed Made With
Rural
1
(Pty) Ltd and not Made With Rural (Pty) Ltd, without the number 1.
In an affidavit dealing with the applicant’s replying
affidavit, Ms Mokoene made it plain that Mr McKenzie did not act on
behalf of the respondent – he was after all not a director
thereof – and that the respondent did not agree to pay the debt
of Retail Market Farm. Ms Mokoena also said that she
and Mr
McKenzie separated (which I understand to be a reference to their
partnership having terminated and not, as the applicant
suggested,
that they were married and separated as spouses). She annexed a
letter by Mr McKenzie dated 17 March 2024 addressed
to the NEF in
which he inter alia stated that Retail Market Farm was indebted to
the applicant. The purpose of the letter
was to ask for
financial assistance for Retail Market Farm. The letter flat
out contradicts that the respondent replaced
Retail Market Farm as
debtor. Ms Mokoene made clear in her supplementary affidavit
that the lending relationship was between
Retail Market Farm and the
NEF. Moreover, Retail Market Farm is the owner of the land on
which the structure was constructed
by the applicant, and it was
enriched by the improvement. It is highly improbable that the
respondent would stand in for another
company’s debt. Ms
Mokoene did not deal expressly with the response to the WhatsApp
message and the question for decision
is whether the response
(assuming that Ms Mokoene wrote it) ineluctably implies that the
respondent substituted itself for Retail
Market Farm as the
applicant’s debtor.
[6]
In my view the WhatsApp response of Ms
Mokoene (if she was indeed the author thereof) does not lead to the
conclusion that the respondent
substituted itself as debtor. Ms
Mokoene’s version is that Retail Market Farm was always the
debtor. That it was the
original debtor is common ground.
That Mr McKenzie could not bind the respondent is common ground.
That only Ms Mokoene
could do so is also a common cause fact.
Whether she in fact did so cannot in my estimation be deducted from
the enigmatic
WhatsApp response. It was not even purported to
be written on behalf of the respondent.
[7]
The applicant’s frustration with the
situation is understandable. But the applicant decided to
proceed against respondent
when the applicant was fully aware that
the respondent denied liability (the respondent’s attorneys set
out the facts in
a letter sent on 15 April 2024, a month before the
application was issued). This appears from a comprehensive
response which
the respondent’s attorneys addressed to the
applicant after the demand to which I referred above was made.
The respondent’s
denial of liability is not bold,
unsubstantiated or untethered. There is no indication that the
respondent as legal entity resolved
to be bound in the place of
Retail Market Farm, and on the facts set out in Ms Mokoene’s
affidavits it would make no commercial
sense for it to do so.
Perhaps Mr McKenzie mendaciously attempted to pass the buck from
Retail Market Farms of which he was
a “partner” and
perhaps faced ultimate liability to the respondent where he faced no
potential liability.
[8]
For these reasons I have concluded that the
respondent is not proven to be a creditor of the applicant and that
the latter cannot
seek the liquidation of the respondent as a
creditor. The rule should accordingly be discharged. I can see
no reason why
the normal rule that cost should follow the event
should not apply. In my view the case is uncomplicated
and I consequently
do not order that the costs be on scale C.
[9]
The following order is made:
a.
The rule issued by this court on 4 June
2024 is discharged.
b.
The applicant is ordered to pay the
respondent’s costs.
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Heard
on:
20 January 2026
Delivered
on:
23 January
2026
Appearances:
For the
Applicant:
R. Robinson (adv)
Instructed
by:
Paul Barnard
Inc 011 375-4052
admin@phlaw.co.za
For the Respondent:
R. Erasmus (att)
Instructed by:
Riekie Erasmus Attorneys
082 775 8028
Office@riekieerasmus.co.za
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