Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 271South Africa
Masebebalo v Matenji (53948/21) [2025] ZAGPJHC 271 (13 March 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
13 March 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Masebebalo v Matenji (53948/21) [2025] ZAGPJHC 271 (13 March 2025)
Masebebalo v Matenji (53948/21) [2025] ZAGPJHC 271 (13 March 2025)
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sino date 13 March 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO
: 53948/21
DATE
:
18-02-2025
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES / NO.
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / NO.
(3)
REVISED.
In
the matter between
FLORA
MASEBEBALO
Applicant
and
LERATO
MATENJI
Respondent
JUDGMENT
KOOVERJIE,
J
: The applicant has instituted the
rescission application in terms of Rule 42(1)(a) of the Rules of
Court, on the premises that
the judgment was erroneously sought or
erroneously granted in their absence. In the alternative, the
rescission application was
instituted in terms of the common law.
The dispute between
the parties concerns an immovable property. The respondents were
given access to the property in terms of the
court order which is the
subject matter of this rescission. The applicants now seek to regain
access to such property.
It is common cause
that the property forms part of the estate of the late Johannes
Tlaka. Both the applicants, as well as the respondent
were related to
the deceased. The respondents are the daughters of the deceased, and
the second applicant was the surviving son
of the deceased. The first
applicant is the grandson of the deceased. The first applicant’s
mother was also a daughter of
the deceased.
The applicants wish
to rescind the court order which granted the respondents exclusive
use of the property. The applicants allege
that the order was granted
in their absence, and more so, had the court been aware of all the
material facts, it would not have
granted the order in the
respondents favour.
It is common cause
that the deceased’s estate has not as yet been finalised. The
deceased died intestate and their remains
a dispute regarding the
claims to his estate, more particularly the property. Both the
applicants as well as the respondents claim
they have a right of
access to the property.
The applicants
particularly allege that they were residing on the property since
2019. They also pointed out that there is a Deed
of Donation that was
not disclosed to the court, whereby the property was donated to the
second applicant before the deceased’s
death. I have noted that
the Deed of Donation is dated in 2002.
It is settled law
that, in order for the applicants to succeed in terms of Rule
42(1)(a) three requirements have to be met, namely
that the judgment
must have been erroneously sought or erroneously granted. The second
requirement is that the judgment must have
been granted in the
absence of the applicant, and the third requirement, the applicant’s
right or interested must be affected
by the judgment.
The applicant’s
version is as follows. The applicant argued that the court would not
have granted an order if it was made
aware of all the relevant
material facts, which were presented before this court. Furthermore,
the respondents, when obtaining
the order in their favour, made
various misrepresentations, thus misleading the court. For instance,
they alleged that they were
the only surviving children of the
deceased. I have noted the applicants’ explanation for not
opposing the application instituted
by the respondents as well as
their reasons for not filing their answering affidavit.
The applicant gave
a detailed explanation, namely that their first attorney Githiri
failed to attend to their matter timeously and
with due diligence
expected her in her position as their legal representative. They
entrusted the application to her and had even
contacted her on
various occasions for a follow up. She not only failed to file their
answering affidavit but failed to carry out
their instructions. I
have noted that the applicants prepared a draft response, to the
answering affidavit and same was sent to
her to finalize.
It was only on 6
May that they learned that a court order had already been obtained in
their absence. At that time they attempted
to contact Githiri. As she
failed to respond, they proceeded to instruct another attorney. Due
to them not having sufficient funds
to pay fees they eventually
received assistance from Legal Wise.
It took some time
until a firm of attorneys on Legal Wise’s panel assisted them.
The applicant argued that this caused the
delay in bringing this
application, and it was not wilful on their part. I am satisfied that
a full explanation for the delay was
furnished. The applicant dealt
with the events prior to the order being granted as well as the
events that followed after.
The applicants have
alleged there were various misrepresentations and possibly fraud that
had been committed by the respondents.
The applicants submitted that
upon receipt of the court order the applicants went to inspect the
file at the Master’s office
and noted certain alterations which
were unlawful. In particular that Mr Da Silva was no longer
the executor of the estate
and the new death notice contained false
information, which recorded the respondents as the remaining children
of the deceased.
At this point in
time, the said allegations remain untested and should be proven. The
respondents deny the applicant’s version
and placed a different
version before the court. The first applicant explained that prior to
him occupying the property, the respondents
were not residing at the
property. He further alleged that he resided on the property most of
his life, except for a period where
he was working elsewhere. Since
2019, he has been residing on the property, together with his family
and the second applicant (his
uncle).
The respondent’s
case essentially is that no fraud was perpetrated on their part. It
was explained that the letter of executorship
was cancelled by the
Master and currently no executor was appointed. The Master in fact,
appointed an interim curator for the time
being.
They further
contended that the Deed of Donation was fabricated and according to
their recollection no such document existed prior
to it surfacing in
these papers. They argued that if such Deed of Donation was in
existence in 2002, it would have formed part
of the papers of the
deceased’s estate that was before the Master.
The respondents
further persisted with the argument that the applicants remain in
wilful default, as they were aware of the application
and there was
no reason for them not to have filed the answering papers. They were
also aware of the date on which the matter was
to be heard.
I am satisfied with
the explanation of the applicant and noted that the notice of
set-down for the hearing and the papers was served
on the attorney,
Githiri at the time. Hence the applicant’s would not have
received notice directly since Githiri was instructed
at the time.
Having considered
both parties versions I am satisfied that all three requirements has
been met in terms of Rule 42(1)(a) has been
met.
I particularly wish to spend more time
on the third requirement, namely that the judgment was erroneously
granted or sought.
In this regard it
was alleged that a Deed of Donation was in existence. Same was not
before the court at the time. Whether or not
this Deed of Donation is
genuine was not an issue for determination before the court. I have
also been advised that the applicants
had launched an application
where the court was seized with issues concerning the Deed of
Donation and had in fact furnished an
order and a judgment.
The findings of the
court will thus have to be presented before the court hearing this
matter. For the purpose of this judgment,
what is necessary for me at
this point is to determine whether the three grounds in terms of Rule
42(1)(a) had been met.
It cannot be
disputed that the new facts alleged were not before the court at the
time and the respondent’s version has to
be tested before the
court. A court hearing the matter in future would have the benefit of
all the facts as well as the documentation.
I am therefore of
the view that a rescission order should be granted in terms of Rule
42(1)(a) of the Rules of Court. Insofar as
costs are concerned. The
issue of costs are in the discretion of this court, and in exercising
my judicial discretion, there is
no reason why the general principle,
that costs follow the result, should not be applied. I therefore
grant an order that the application
for rescission is to succeed with
costs. The order read as follows:
Prayer 1: The judgment granted under
case number 53984/21 on 25 April 2022 is hereby rescinded.
Prayer 2: The first and second
respondents are to pay the costs hereof jointly and severally, the
one to pay the other to be absolved.
Prayer 3: The applicants and the
respondents both have the right to access the property until the
dispute regarding the entitlement
to the property is resolved.
KOOVERJIE, J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
DATE
:
……………….
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