Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 356South Africa
L.M.T v Matodzi Neluhleni Attorneys and Others (038394/2025) [2025] ZAGPJHC 356 (26 March 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
26 March 2025
Headnotes
no instructions. He then attempts to justify the urgency again by emphasising the Applicants financial hardships, the Respondent withholding her funds and their lack of mandate and fee agreement. He accuses them of misleading the court and that they must in fact bare the costs, whilst stating if the court doesn’t rule against them, it will be condoning their misconduct. He repeats his argument for costs in the cause and submits no punitive order should befall him.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## L.M.T v Matodzi Neluhleni Attorneys and Others (038394/2025) [2025] ZAGPJHC 356 (26 March 2025)
L.M.T v Matodzi Neluhleni Attorneys and Others (038394/2025) [2025] ZAGPJHC 356 (26 March 2025)
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sino date 26 March 2025
SAFLII
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number:
038394/2025
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
In
the matter between:
L[…]
M[…]
T[…]
Applicant
and
MATODZI
NELUHLENI ATTORNEYS
First Respondent
MATODZI
NELUHLENI
Second Respondent
LEGAL
PRACTICE COUNIL
Third Respondent
JUDGMENT – COSTS
PJ DU PLESSIS AJ
[1]
The matter came before me on the Urgent roll on 25
March 2025. It was apparent on the papers that this matter being
enrolled on
the urgent roll was an abuse of process,
ab
initio
. There was a request it be
removed from the roll by the Applicant in court, which was granted.
The order as to costs however was
reserved and therefore this
judgment.
[2]
High court rule 6(12) deals with urgent
applications and have specific requirements for Urgency. This entails
that an Applicant
MUST demonstrate that a matter is genuinely urgent
and that they'll suffer significant prejudice if not heard urgently.
[3]
In this matter the Applicant was demanding payment
of RAF money due to her from a claim instituted by the first
Respondent on behalf
of her late father’s estate when she was
just 2 years old. Her father passed in 2004 after a fatal motor
vehicle accident
and she sadly lost her mother 3 years later. She was
brought up by a guardian and from the papers had a difficult life.
[4]
She herself now has an infant child and is in an
abusive relationship which seems to have ended. Although not
unsympathetic to her
personal circumstances, these circumstances are
of such where her attorney Mr Gaju should have informed her of her
recourse to
approach the Domestic Violence court as well as the
Maintenance court for relief. The only “urgency”
reflected in the
papers seem to be her current personal circumstances
which have avenues of redress, not pursued, but “abused”
in affidavit
to attempt in fuelling the fire of urgency where there
is none.
[5]
In order to promote this current application, the
Applicant terminated the mandate of the First respondent. They dealt
with the
matter for 20 Years to get the RAF claim liquidated for the
late estate. The First respondent on 9 July 2024 received an amount
of R371 246, 25 paid into his trust account in respect of the RAF
claim. The Applicant was informed thereof the next day and later
upon
her continuous demand an advance of R30 000 was given. This was not
enough, and when she demanded more, which was refused
due to pending
taxation, the Applicant secured the services of Mr Gaju, who
continued with demands to the first two respondents,
on her behalf.
[6]
Mr Gaju was informed by email on Wednesday 19
March 2025 at 13h21, MN 6 of respondents answering affidavit, that
“
we will revert to you with our
bill of costs for work done and our disbursements.
All
the documents and everything will be submitted to you next week
including the balance of
the funds
”
This was in
reply to Mr Gaju’s URGENT COURT ACTION threat per e-mail MN 5
of the previous morning.
[7]
I mention these dates and times and emphasise
them, as the URGENT ROLL closes at 12h00 on a Thursday - almost 24
hours, AFTER Mr
Gaju had the above undertaking
in
writing
. There was therefore a FULL DAY
almost for him (and the Applicant) to reflect and reconsider, yet
they persisted. I can only imagine
this dubious decision was taken as
he had assurances of money coming to his trust account from the
defendants, so payment is assured
and an urgent application is not
free, especially if there is guaranteed money.
[8]
I refer to my opening paragraph in this judgment,
and the above is just to fortify the believe I hold. It is however
not the end
of events as there was (usually uncommon in urgent
applications) a supplementary affidavit filed at 14h03 Monday 24
March 2024.
I can but only deduct from it that it was a last-ditch
effort by the applicant to manipulate the court into finding urgency,
where
there is none. This by involving Applicant’s minor child
in the manipulation and stating the following in par 16 “I
submit that my circumstances are a reminder of my past which past
includes to attempted suicide that I survived due to physically,
emotionally and financially abuse and ill-treatment from my family”
– Quoted, as badly as it was written.
[9]
Then to cap everything when entertaining the
matter in court and inquiring from the Respondents Adv Tshigomala
what the taxation
date was, I was informed the Applicants legal
representative Mr Gaju would like to address me regarding removing
the matter from
the roll. This was indeed
eventually
articulated by him as he started with the merits
of the matter whilst I wanted to hear if there is a request for
removing the matter
and whether costs will be tendered. This is
because my initial view, even if the matter proceeded, was that it
had no urgency.
[10]
When the above removal was eventually articulated
I inquire if costs were being tendered upon which Mr Gaju indicated
it should
be awarded in the cause. I am unclear what cause that would
be, as he has an undertaking in writing from the second defendant
that,
“
All the documents and
everything will be submitted to you next week
including
the balance of the funds
”
He
however indicated costs are not tendered and I indicated to him that
I was considering punitive cost -
de
bonis propriis
.
[11]
Adv. Tshigomala for the first two respondents
indicated that they want cost awarded on “an attorney own
client” basis.
My issue was that if so, the Applicant, who was
clearly ill advised by Mr Gaju, would have to pay. Mr Gaju was
arguing against
any cost order and as I was considering costs
de
bonis propriis,
I directed he could
upload heads of argument on the issue of costs (which I reserved)
before 12h00 on 26 March 2025. These heads
were received on Caselines
at 00h31 early morning.
[12]
In his heads of argument on costs Mr Gaju states
there was no negligence or misconduct on his part and he was acting
on instructions.
He shifts the blame to the first and second
respondents for not informing the Applicant properly of crucial
dates, whilst at the
same time stating they held no instructions. He
then attempts to justify the urgency again by emphasising the
Applicants financial
hardships, the Respondent withholding her funds
and their lack of mandate and fee agreement. He accuses them of
misleading the
court and that they must in fact bare the costs,
whilst stating if the court doesn’t rule against them, it will
be condoning
their misconduct. He repeats his argument for costs in
the cause and submits no punitive order should befall him.
[13]
Urgency is not a preference, it's a legal
threshold that must be met as courts prioritise genuine urgent cases
where immediate action
is essential to prevent irreparable harm or
address situations where delaying the matter would render justice
ineffective. It has
been held numerous times that the Sanctity of the
Urgent Court has to be preserved for deserving matters, lest the
Urgent Court
would the flooded with cases that can find redress in
the normal course.
[14]
What is Costs de bonis propriis? It is a Latin
phrase that means from one’s own goods / property. So, it
entails the individual
penalised must pay the costs from his / her
own pocket. This avenue isn’t easily pursued by a court and is
appropriate where
there was improper conduct through, gross
negligence; mala fide (bad faith) conduct; unreasonable or reckless
behaviour; abuse
of court processes; dishonesty (not a closed list).
In the case of legal practitioners, it serves as a sanction for
conduct that
significantly deviates from the expected standards of
professional behaviour.
[15]
The purpose of such an order is amongst others to
hold accountable legal practitioners that caused the occurrence of
unnecessary
legal cost where there was misconduct and now their
clients are responsible for the cost. I include in the term
“misconduct”
bad and or wrong advise to self serve, which
is applicable in this case.
[16]
I find this because Mr Gaju had a written
undertaking basically a day before the urgent court roll closed that
the trust money would
be paid over to his trust account. There was no
urgency at all in the application he was launching on behalf of the
Applicant (despite
his belief held to the contrary)
[17]
I find this because the urgency in wanting the RAF
money, kept it trust paid to his trust as the new attorney, should
surely have
been based on evidence of misappropriation of funds or
some other gross infraction that can be placed at the door of the
Respondent(s).
This was not the case. His urgency was based on the
Applicants dire personal circumstances with which the respondent had
nothing
to do.
[18]
The only urgency demonstrated in his papers was,
the urgent need for advice from him to the Applicant, to approach a
domestic violence
and maintenance court, and his assistance in doing
so.
[19]
As an
officer of the court, he should have realised, that an averment made
in Par. 8 supra would trigger a courts attention. This
because,
courts are the guardians of all minor children, and will only act in
their best interest. Mr Gaju used this (suicide allegation)
as a
manipulation tactic rather than realising he (although discretionary
due to the use of the word, may) as an officer of the
court, should
have given serious consideration to the provisions of Section 110 (2)
of The Children’s Act
[1]
.
This as a suicidal mother may be a real threat to her infant.
[20]
On the issue of the infant, his papers drawn in
the Notice of Motion is also muddled as it indicates the child is one
year old (Par
36) and in the supplementary affidavit (par 15) the son
of the Applicant is 6 months old. There isn’t even clarity on
this
aspect.
[21]
The final insult was the fact that when the matter
was called, the eventual request was for it to be struck from the
roll without
tendering costs. This realisation should have been
present with Mr Gaju already at the latest on Wednesday at 13h21 when
he got
the written undertaking of the Respondent. The realisation at
a minimum should have been to, not even launch this unnecessary and
non-urgent application.
[22]
Practitioners are warned by the Consolidated
Practice Directives 1 / 2024 as follows under 28 where URGENT COURTS
is the heading
at 28.8: “
The
enrolment of an allegedly urgent matter found not to warrant a
hearing on this roll may, at the discretion of the Judge seized
with
the matter, result in punitive costs being awarded and the culpable
counsel and attorney being ordered not to be paid any
fees arising
from the prosecution of such matter(s)”.
[23]
Our
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) held in
Chithi
and others; In re Luhlwini Mchunu Community v Hancock and others
[2]
at par
14 “
The
principle that the courts should not grant adverse court orders,
without providing the affected parties an opportunity to be
heard, is
trite and sacrosanct.” Mr Gaju was provided with this
opportunity.
[24]
In
SA
Liquor Traders Association and others v Chairperson, Gauteng Liquor
Board and Others
[3]
held:
“
An
order of costs de bonis propriis is made against attorneys where a
court is satisfied that there has been negligence in a serious
degree
which warrants an order of costs being made as a mark of the court’s
displeasure. An attorney is an officer of the
court and owes a court
an appropriate level of professionalism and courtesy….”.
[25]
In
Multi-Links
Telecommunications Limited v Africa Prepaid Services Nigeria
Limited
[4]
Fabricius J held: “
It
is true that legal representatives sometimes make errors of law, omit
to comply fully with the Rules of Court or err in other
ways related
to the conduct of the proceedings. This is an everyday occurrence.
This does not however per se ordinarily result
in the court showing
its displeasure by ordering the particular legal practitioner to pay
the costs from his own pocket. Such an
order is reserved for conduct
which substantially and materially deviates from the standard
expected of the legal practitioners,
such that their clients, the
actual parties to the litigation, cannot be expected to bear the
costs, or because the court feels
compelled to mark its profound
displeasure at the conduct of an attorney in any particular context”.
[26]
For the reasons above I indicate the courts
“profound displeasure” at the conduct of Mr Gaju. The
impression left with
this court is that there was a realisation with
him that trust money was coming so legal action (even unnecessary)
can be pursued,
as payment is guaranteed. In the result I make the
following order as to costs.
Order
Costs
are ordered
de
bonis propriis
against
Mr Gaju on an attorney and client scale in favour of the First and
Second Respondent who was represented at the matter.
PJ DU PLESSIS AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
For
the Applicant: Mr Simphiwe Gaju
For
the Respondent: Adv Tshigomala instructed by Mathodzi Neluheni
Attorneys
Delivered
14h00
26 March 2025
[1]
.38
of 2005
[2]
(Case
no 423/2020)
[2021] ZASCA 123
(23 September 2021)
[3]
2009
(1) SA 565
(CC) par 54
[4]
2014
(3) SA 265
(GP) (6 September 2013) at par 35
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