Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 710South Africa
L.N v Minister of Police and Another (22/19815) [2025] ZAGPJHC 710 (22 July 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
22 July 2025
Headnotes
at Boksburg Correctional Centre for 184 days, from 18 January to 26 July 2021, until the charge against him was withdrawn. Prior to the withdrawal of the charge, he attended court several times as the case was remanded, remaining in custody throughout.
Judgment
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## L.N v Minister of Police and Another (22/19815) [2025] ZAGPJHC 710 (22 July 2025)
L.N v Minister of Police and Another (22/19815) [2025] ZAGPJHC 710 (22 July 2025)
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sino date 22 July 2025
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number: 22/19815
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
22
July 2025
In
the matter between:
L[…]
N[…]
Plaintiff
and
MINISTER
OF
POLICE
1
st
Defendant
THE
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
2
nd
Defendant
JUDGMENT
Mahlangu AJ
Introduction
[1]
The second defendant applies for absolution
from the instance under Rule 39(6) of the Uniform Rules following the
close of the plaintiff’s
case. For clarity, parties retain
their original designations. The plaintiff opposes the application.
Both merits and quantum were
agreed to be heard together.
[2]
The application is based on the claim that,
after the plaintiff’s evidence, no prima facie case exists
against the Director
of Public Prosecutions, the second defendant.
Background
[3]
The plaintiff, Mr L[…] N[…],
has initiated action proceedings against the first defendant, the
Minister of Police,
and the second defendant, the Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP), seeking compensation for damages arising from his
alleged
unlawful arrest, detention, and malicious prosecution by
agents of the Defendants.
[4]
The defendants denied responsibility for
the alleged unlawful arrest and detention. They further stated in
their pleadings that
the plaintiff was neither detained nor
maliciously prosecuted. The plaintiff supported his claim with
testimony from a single witness,
himself, while the defendants did
not present any witnesses. According to the plaintiff, on 14 January
2021, at or near Enconchoyini
Primary School in Johannesburg,
Gauteng, he was arrested without a warrant by police officers who
were acting within the scope
of their employment with the first
defendant, on a charge of rape.
[5]
The plaintiff testified that bail was not
granted, and he was held at Boksburg Correctional Centre for 184
days, from 18 January
to 26 July 2021, until the charge against him
was withdrawn. Prior to the withdrawal of the charge, he attended
court several times
as the case was remanded, remaining in custody
throughout.
[6]
The plaintiff stated that he was detained
on the same day as his arrest in conditions he regarded as
inconsistent with human dignity
and self-respect and remained in
detention until 26 July 2021 when the charges were withdrawn. After
this date, he reported no
further contact from the police officers.
[7]
The defendants denied liability for
unlawful arrest and detention and further denied in their pleadings
that the plaintiff was detained
or maliciously prosecuted.
[8]
After the plaintiff’s case closed,
the second defendant applied for absolution from the instance under
Rule 39(6), which allows
the defendant or counsel to address the
court, followed by a reply from the plaintiff or counsel, and a final
response from the
defendant on new matters raised.
[9]
The basis of the application was an error
in the particulars of claim, which was explained in chambers. The
error concerned a statement
indicating that the alleged wrongful
arrest pertained to a false charge of possession of a dangerous
weapon, whereas the actual
charge was rape. Both counsels
acknowledged this error. The plaintiff’s counsel, Advocate T.V
Tshifhango, was given the opportunity
for her client to consider
amending the particulars to accurately reference the charge of rape
instead of the alleged possession
of a dangerous weapon.
[10]
The plaintiff, via counsel, declined to
amend the summons. I agree as it is irrelevant whether the withdrawn
charge was for possession
of a dangerous weapon or rape – the
withdrawal’s effect is the same. Prima facie, the plaintiff has
shown he was wrongfully
detained for 184 days on an unstainable
charge. Accordingly, the application for absolution from the instance
fails.
Evidence
[11]
The plaintiff, aged 40, lives in Thokoza,
Polopark with his children’s mother since 2005. He has five
children: B[…]
(7); Z[…] (4); L[…] (2); A[…]
(17) and I[…] (13). Currently, B[…], L[…] and
Z[…]
live with him, while A[…] resides in Turffontein
and I[…] in rural areas.
[12]
He is not employed full-time but does
occasional piece work. At the time of his arrest, he was working, but
after the charges was
withdrawn and he was released, his job had been
filled by someone else. He brought a civil action against the
defendant for wrongful
arrest and prosecution.
[13]
He testified that his community sees him as
a criminal despite never being convicted.
[14]
During cross-examination, it was put to the
plaintiff that the charges had not been withdrawn but rather that the
case had been
struck from the roll. Subsequent questions addressed
matters that are not pertinent to the determination of this
application for
absolution.
[15]
He testified that he was accused of raping
a child called I[…]. He was summoned to a community meeting at
a school and he
was treated with death by being set on fire because
petrol and tyres were bought for that purpose. His partner was in
labour for
the birth of one their children on 14 January 2021 and
expected the baby to be born the following day. Whilst the community
meeting,
the police arrived, and he denied the charge against him. He
was arrested and before being taken to Thokoza police station, he was
taken to hospital where a person known as Xolisa Taliwe told the
police, upon being asked, he was the person who committed rape.
He
was detained from 18 January 2021.
[16]
At Thokoza police stations, his
fingerprints were taken, and he was made to sign the warning
statement.
The issue for
determination
[17]
The issue for determination is whether the
application for absolution by the second defendant can be sustained
under these circumstances.
The legal principles
[18]
The
test for absolution from the instance as stated in
Gordon
Lloyd Page & Associates v Rivera
[1]
is not whether the evidence established what would finally be
required to be established, but whether there is evidence upon which
a court, applying its mind reasonably to such evidence, could or
might (not should, or ought to) find in favour for the plaintiff.
This is the law in our Republic.
[19]
This
implied that a plaintiff has to make out a
prima
facie
case
– in the sense that thee is evidence relating to all the
elements of the claims to survive absolution, because without
such
evidence no court could find for the plaintiff.
[2]
Differently put, the Court will be required in such cases to assess
whether a
prima
facie
case
has been made for the plaintiff.
[3]
In deciding on an application for absolution from the instance,
whether the evidence is sufficient enough to find for the plaintiff,
the Court is not called upon to make a determination on a witnesses’
credibility.
[4]
[20]
The
test has from time to time been formulated in different terms,
especially it has been said that the court must consider whether
there is “evidence upon which a reasonable man might find for
the “plaintiff” – a test which had its origin
in
jury trials when the “reasonable man” was a reasonable
member of the jury. Such a formulation tends to cloud the
issue. The
court ought not to be concerned with what someone else might think;
it should rather be concerned with its own judgment
and not that of
another “reasonable” person or court. Having said this,
absolution at the end of a plaintiff’s
case, in the ordinary
course of events, will nevertheless be granted sparingly but when the
occasion arises, a court should order
it in the interests of
justice.
[5]
[21]
If the test is applied, it is incumbent
upon the plaintiff to have delivered evidence relating to all the
elements of the claim.
In deciding whether absolution should be
granted, it is not required of a court to critically look at all
evidence, as would be
required of a court at the end of a trial to
deliver judgment.
[22]
Pete
et al
[6]
state that absolution
from the instance should not be granted lightly by the courts and
should not only be granted in circumstances
where the plaintiff’s
case is so weak that no reasonable court could find for the
plaintiff.
[23]
It
has been stated by the SCA in the
Minister
of Justice and Constitutional Development & Others v Moleko
[7]
that
in order to succeed with a claim for malicious prosecution, a
claimant must allege and prove the four requirements that: (i)
the
defendants set the law in motion (instituted the proceedings); (ii)
the defendants set the law in motion (instituted the proceedings);
(iii) the defendants acted with “malice” or
amino
injuriandi)
;
and (iv) the prosecution has failed.
[24]
If
a
prima
facie
case
has been made, the defendant will be required to meet the case, and
if there is none, then the Court will grant absolution
from the
instance.
[8]
Each case will, of
course, depend on its own facts. The plaintiff bears the onus to
prove its case.
Considerations:
Setting
the law in motion
[25]
The law is set in motion when a criminal
complaint is formally reported to the South African Police Services
(SAPS), which would
initiate an investigation and leading to charged
being brought against the suspect, and the police begin to actively
investigate
it. The act of reporting a crime is the primary important
act that start the legal process. Criminal proceedings are instituted
on behalf of the state against the suspect, as stated in the Moleko
case.
[26]
In casu,
prosecutors
can be said to have set the law in motion as they, in criminal
proceedings on behalf of the state, make decisions about
whether to
prosecute or not, and their decision to file charges begins the legal
process.
[27]
It was not disputed that the plaintiff was
arrested on a charged of rape on the 14
th
of January 2021. A docker was opened at the police station under CAS
no. 102/01/2021. He was subsequently detained at the Thokoza
SAPS
cells until the 18
th
of January 2021, when he appeared before the Palmridge Magistrates
Court for his first appearance. He was denied bail and further
detained at Boksburg until the 26
th
of July 2021, when the charges against him were withdrawn. I agree
with the counsel for the plaintiff that the law was set in motion,
and this requirement has been satisfied.
The Defendant acted
without reasonable and probable cause
[28]
It is common cause that every time the
plaintiff reached the court, he was not informed what was happening.
He had only been informed
that his case had been remanded and then
was taken to Boksburg Prison. It is the plaintiff’s testimony
that when he went
back to court for further appearances,
approximately four to six times, he was not told what was going on or
why his case was being
remanded. He was told that the case was being
remanded for further investigations. He was not told the reasons for
said investigations
or what needed to be investigated further. The
plaintiff testified that he was not granted bail, and no reasons were
advanced.
[29]
It was further concerning that plaintiff
was detained for further investigations when the J88 medico-legal
report was already prepared
and finalised on 14 January 2021 at
14h50. The plaintiff testified that it was not until the 26
th
of July 2021 that his matter was withdrawn, though the plaintiff was
not told the reasons for the withdrawal.
[30]
In the circumstances, it is evident that
the prosecutor’s conduct was unreasonable and without just
cause as he/she knew or
ought to have known that there was no
tangible case to show on against the plaintiff then, when the docket
was handed down to whoever,
but he/she proceeded anyway. The
plaintiff has satisfied this requirement.
That the Defendant
acted with malice
[31]
It must be noted that “
animus
injuriandi”
includes not only
the intention to injure, but also the consciousness of wrongfulness.
The plaintiff’s version was that it
was malicious for members
of the second defendant to have kept him in detention without bail
while the case was still under investigation.
It has not been pleased
why the plaintiff could not be granted bail. Has the prosecutor not
acted with malice, the plaintiff would
not have been detained at the
Boksburg Prison for approximately 184 (one hundred and eighty-four)
days only for the charged against
him to be withdrawn on the 26
TH
of July 2021.
[32]
I am of the view that the
abandonment
of amending all those paragraphs
,
including
11.1.3
,
does not in any way, manner or form
recuse or exclude the second defendant from liability for having
acted with malice. It is further
the court’s view that none of
those paragraphs suggest that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy any
of the requirements for
malicious prosecution.
[33]
It was malicious for the prosecution to
have kept the plaintiff in detention with no bail while the matter
was still under investigation.
I agree with the plaintiff that the
prosecution acted with malice for having the case remanded for
further investigation when he
knew that the J88 medico-legal report
had been completed and submitted to the police the day the plaintiff
had been arrested. It
is also noteworthy to mention that all this
evidence was also presented in the plaintiff’s
evidence-in-chief.
[34]
The court agrees with the plaintiff that
the prosecutor acted with malice when they failed to grant the
plaintiff bail and further
recommended that the plaintiff be detained
pending finalisation of the matter.
[35]
Furthermore, it is the court’s view
that the plaintiff did prove
aminus
injuriandi
on the part of the second
defendant. The second defendant clearly intended not to investigate
this matter to finality and was fully
aware of the consequences of
his actions, injuring the dignity and the well-being of the
plaintiff, being detained in those inhumane
conditions. He was aware
that in all probability, those inhumane conditions would affect the
plaintiff negatively. Despite this
knowledge, the second defendant
decided to remand the case for more months without making any of the
enquiries, thus acting in
a manner that showed recklessness as to the
possible consequences of his conduct.
The prosecution has
failed
[36]
It is not in dispute that the plaintiff’s
charges were withdrawn on the 26
th
of July 2021, almost four years ago. The plaintiff testified that he
has not appeared in court again since the charges were withdrawn
in
July 2021 and has never been contacted to come and appear in court.
The plaintiff submits that the charged sheet depicting the
plaintiff’s withdrawal of charges with a stamp date 26 July
2021 as well as an entry of “withdrawal” towards
the
bottom of the charge sheet, is a document that was discovered by the
defendants.
[37]
I agree with the plaintiff that he has
satisfied this requirement.
[38]
In the instant case, it is common cause
that the plaintiff was arrested and charged with rape of a child. The
second defendant does
not deny this. It is also common cause that the
case was remanded on several occasions at the instance of the second
defendant.
The error committed in crafting the particulars of claim
about being falsely accused of possession of a dangerous weapon as
opposed
to rape offer no shield to the second defendant. The court
is, in fact, surprised that at the commencement of the proceedings,
the parties agreed that the plaintiff bore the onus to lead evidence
first. It should have been the other way around. The first
defendant
ought to have started first to show that the arrest was justified
under the circumstances.
[39]
The fact of the matter is that the
plaintiff was unlawfully arrested, detained and ultimately
maliciously prosecuted irrespective
of the charge he faced. Whether
it is a charge of rape or possession of a dangerous weapon, at the
end of the day, what remains
is the fact that the plaintiff was
unlawfully arrested, detained and maliciously prosecuted.
[40]
There was overwhelming evidence which was
adduced by the plaintiff in his evidence-in-chief, which was not
rebutted by the first
and second defendants and no witnesses were
called, even though the counsel for the first and second defendant
under cross-examination
promised the court to call witnesses, but
none were called.
[41]
The second defendant does not persuade the
court that no prima facie evidence was led against it. Instead, the
record shows that
the case was remanded on several occasions for
further investigations until it was withdrawn. There has not been any
further investigations
until it was withdrawn. There has not been any
further prosecution of the matter since the plaintiff was released
from custody.
Accordingly, both defendants must show by way of
evidence why the court should not find for the plaintiff at the end
of his case.
Conclusion
[42]
Having considered the submissions by the
second defendant’s counsel, I am not convinced that a good case
has been made for
a favourable consideration of the application for
absolution from the instance. Consequently, the application must
fail.
Order
[43]
Having considered the papers and the
submissions by both counsel, the following order is made: -
a.
The second defendant’s application
for absolution from the instance is dismissed.
b.
The costs will be determined at the end of
the trial.
K MAHLANGU
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
For
the Plaintiff:
Adv
T.I Tshifhango instructed by N.J Belcher Attorneys
For
the Defendants:
Adv
R.C Netsianda instructed by The State Attorney South Africa
Date
of hearing/trial: 13 April 2025
Plaintiff’s
Heads of Argument: 24 April 2025
Defendants’
Heads of Argument: 24 April 2025
Date
of Judgment: 22 July 2025
[1]
2001
(1) SA 88
(SCA) at 92 G
[2]
Marine
& Trade Insurance Co Ltd v Van der Schyff
1972 (1) SA 26
(A)
37G- 38A; Schmidt-Bewysreg 4
th
ed 91-92.
[3]
Sinqobile
Equestrian Security Services (Pty) Ltd v Marks Koko Latha
[2023]
ZANWHC 12
(6 February 2023) para 41-42; Gordon Lloyed Page &
Associates v Riveria and Another
2001 (1) SA 88
(SCA) para 2.
[4]
Sinqobile
Equestrian (n3 above) para 45.
[5]
Gordon
Lloyd Page (n1 above) para 2.
[6]
(Civil
Prodecure, A Practical Guide, 2
nd
Ed. 2012)
[7]
2008
3 ALL SA 47 (SCA).
[8]
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