Aircraft Asset Finance Corporation (Pty) Limited v Deymine (Pty) Limited and Others (114305/2023) [2025] ZAGPJHC 336 (27 March 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPJHC 336 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Aircraft Asset Finance Corporation (Pty) Limited v Deymine (Pty) Limited and Others (114305/2023) [2025] ZAGPJHC 336 (27 March 2025) Aircraft Asset Finance Corporation (Pty) Limited v Deymine (Pty) Limited and Others (114305/2023) [2025] ZAGPJHC 336 (27 March 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_336.html sino date 27 March 2025 SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG) REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA CASE NO : 114305/2023 (1) REPORTABLE: NO (2) OF INTREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3) REVISED: NP 27/03/2025 In the application between: AIRCRAFT ASSET FINANCE CORPORATION (PTY) LIMITED (Registration No: 2003/029134/07)                          Applicant And DEYMINE (PTY) LIMITED (Registration No: 2017/304226/07)                          First Respondent CORNELIUS JOHANNES DEYSEL (Identity No: 8[...])                                                     Second Respondent EVERT PHILIP SERFONTEIN (Identity No: 8[...])                                                     Third Respondent EPS COURIER SERVICES CC (Registration No: 1996/052772/23)                          Fourth Respondent EPS LOGISTICS CC (Registration No: 2010/005466/23)                          Fifth Respondent Neutral Citation : Delivered: By transmission to the parties via email and uploading onto Case Lines the Judgment is deemed to be delivered. JUDGMENT (Leave to Appeal) SENYATSI J Introduction [1]   This is an application for leave to appeal the judgment I handed down on 11 February 2025. The applicants, who are the respondents in the main application, criticise the judgment on eleven grounds. I will not repeat all eleven grounds of appeal raised by the applicants but will illustrate few of those grounds by way of example. [2]   They contend for instance, that the Court should have found that the denial of the amount owed raised a dispute of fact that should have been referred to oral evidence. They contend furthermore, by way of example, that the Court erred in finding that where the benefit of excursion has been waived, it is required that the creditor of the estate of the first respondent (in liquidation), should first file a claim with the estate of the liquidated company before it can enforce its rights embodied in the deed of surety. [3]   Advocate Botes SC for the applicant, pointed out that of the eleven grounds, he would put his emphasis on five. I will give an example of the two of out five as those are on record. Firstly, he submitted that on the issue of the amount claimed which was in dispute, the Court ought to have ordered oral evidence instead of making a finding on the papers. This submission, in my view, ignores the fact that the certificate of balance which the parties agreed to in the main agreement was agreed to be used to determine the balance. [4]   Secondly, Advocate Botes SC, also contended furthermore that the deed of surety in terms of which the common law benefits were renounced by the respondents should have been ignored because of fairness to the sureties and that accordingly and that another court would conclude differently. I fail to fathom how that could possibly be the correct proposition because the law on this point is trite and uncontroversial. [5] The requirement and the test for granting leave to appeal are regulated by section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act No. 10 of 2013 which states as follows: “ (1)     Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are the opinion that – (a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or (ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration.” [6]  In Mont Chevaux Trust v Goosen and Others [1] Bertelsman J interpreted the test as follows: “ It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment of a High Court has been raised in the new Act. The former test whether leave to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another court might come to a different conclusion…The use of the word ‘would’ in the new statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against.” [7]  In Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Democratic Alliance: In re: Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions [2] the court acknowledged the test by Bestertsman J and said the following: “ T he Superior Courts Act has raised the bar for granting leave to appeal in The Mont Chevaux Trust (IT2012/28) v Tina Goosen & 18 Others , Bertelsmann J held as follow: ‘ It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment of a High Court has been raised in the new Act. The former test whether leave to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another court might come to a different conclusion, see Van Heerden v Cronwright & Others 1985 (2) SA 342 (T) at 343H . The use of the word "would" in the new statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against.’” [8]  In Mothule Inc Attorneys v The Law Society of the Northern Provinces and Another [3] , the Supreme Court of Appeal stated as follows regarding the trial court’s liberal approach on granting leave to appeal: “ It is important to mention my dissatisfaction with the court a quo’s granting of leave to appeal to this court. The test is simply whether there are any reasonably prospects of success in an appeal. It is not whether a litigant has an arguable case or mere possible of success.” [9]   Having heard the submissions made by counsel on behalf of the applicants, I am not persuaded that the appeal would succeed. Furthermore, I am not convinced that it is in the interests of justice based on the facts of this case that leave to appeal application should be favourably considered. The application for leave to appeal must therefore be declined. Order [10]     The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs on scale B. ML SENYATSI JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBUR G DATE APPLICATION HEARD :    25 March 2025 DATE JUDGMENT HANDED DOWN : 27 March 2025 APPEARANCES Counsel for the Applicant: Adv Clive van der Spuy Instructed by: Lanham-Love Galbraith-van Reenen In Counsel for the first Respondent: Instructed by: Counsel for the 2 nd to 5 th Respondents: Adv FW Botes SC Instructed by: Macintosh Cross & Farquharson [1] 2014 2325 (LCC) [2] (Case no: 19577/09) ZAGPPHC 489 at para 25 [3] (213/16) [2017] ZASCA 17 (22 March 2017) sino noindex make_database footer start