Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 531South Africa
Seven and Twelve on Houghton (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for time being Ms Property Trust (2024/077412) [2025] ZAGPJHC 531 (28 May 2025)
Headnotes
if either of the parties take the arbitrable issues straight to court, and the other does not protest,
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Seven and Twelve on Houghton (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for time being Ms Property Trust (2024/077412) [2025] ZAGPJHC 531 (28 May 2025)
Seven and Twelve on Houghton (Pty) Ltd v Trustees for time being Ms Property Trust (2024/077412) [2025] ZAGPJHC 531 (28 May 2025)
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sino date 28 May 2025
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number:
2024-077412
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES /
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES/NO
(3)
REVISED:
YES/NO
In
the matter between:
SEVEN AND TWELVE ON
HOUGHTON (PTY) LTD
Applicant
(REGISTRATION
NUMBER: 2001/029787/07)
and
THE TRUSTEES FOR THE TIME
BEING OF THE
Respondent
MS PROPERTY TRUST
(REGISTRATION NUMBER:
IT002916/2015(G)0
JUDGMENT
Wijnbeek, AJ
[a] The
application before court
1.
The applicant is owner of units 8557,
12233, 12433 and 12432 of Sectional Title Scheme SS, the Houghton
(“the properties”).
The respondent occupies the
properties and retains all occupational rental.
2.
The applicant seeks in the main a
declaration that the respondent has no right to occupy the
properties, coupled to some ancillary
relief.
3.
The respondent asserts its right to occupy
on the following, namely that:
3.1.
The respondent had lent money to the
applicant, and the full amount of the loan has not been repaid;
3.2.
The applicant is owing interest on the
loan;
3.3.
The occupational rental currently received
is set off against the claim for interest; and
3.4.
The parties agreed to an ‘upside’,
an additional R1,5m payment to be made by the applicant to the
respondent once the
aforesaid properties are sold. These payments
have not been made to date.
4.
The respondent has also instituted a
conditional counter application seeking payment of R44 369 030.40
plus interest if the court
finds in favour of the applicant in the
main application.
5.
The respondent further argues that –
5.1.
There is a material dispute of fact that
cannot be resolved on the papers; and
5.2.
The parties bound themselves to arbitration
to resolve their disputes; the court must refuse to deal with the
matter by referring
same to arbitration.
6.
There is broad consensus between the
parties about the relevant properties and the written documents
constituting the contractual
nexus comprising of agreements of sale,
addenda to the agreements of sale and Heads of Agreement.
6.1.
In addition, the respondent alleges that
there were further oral agreements that must be considered.
7.
Arguing the matter, the applicant was
represented by Advocates Antonie SC and Laher and the respondent by
Advocates Stais SC and
Acker. The court found their argument helpful.
8.
I will accordingly deal with the
arbitration clause before the disputes of fact are addressed.
[b] The
arbitration issue
9.
Clause
21 of the agreement(s) of sale between the parties prescribes that
any matter arising out of the agreement or termination
thereof must
be referred to arbitration.
[1]
10.
The
respondents argue that the court is bound to enforce an agreement to
arbitrate unless there are compelling reasons to order
otherwise
[2]
,
and that the applicant must show there is sufficient reason not to be
bound by the arbitration agreement and must make out a very
strong
case based on compelling reasons.
[3]
11.
Although the respondent’s argument in
respect of arbitration and disputes of fact represent a lucrative
basis with which to
kick for touch, on a preponderance, the court
cannot accede thereto.
12.
The
court referred the parties to Parekh v Shah Jehan Cinemas (Pty) Ltd
and Others
1980 (1) SA 301
(D&CLD)
[4]
where Didcott J held that if either of the parties take the
arbitrable issues straight to court, and the other does not protest,
the litigation follows its normal course, without a pause.
Protesting, as in this case, a party must actively request a stay of
the proceedings. The court has a discretion whether to call a halt
for arbitration or to tackle the disputes self. ‘Throughout,
its jurisdiction, though sometimes latent, thus remains intact.’
13.
The applicant seeks declaratory relief.
13.1.
The
power to issue declaratory relief orders in respect of anticipated or
ongoing arbitration proceedings is consistent
with section
21(1)(c) of the Superior Courts Act (Act 10 of 2013) which deals with
the power of the court to grant declaratory
orders.
[5]
13.2.
In Baleni
and Others v Minister of Mineral Resources and Others
[6]
at
paragraph [30], Basson J said:
“
Declaratory
orders are discretionary and flexible as the court pointed out in
Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet
Ltd t/a Metrorail
and Others:
'[107]
It is quite clear that before it makes a declaratory order a court
must consider all the relevant circumstances. A declaratory
order is
a flexible remedy which can assist in clarifying legal and
constitutional obligations in a manner which promotes the protection
and enforcement of our Constitution and its values. Declaratory
orders, of course, may be accompanied by other forms of relief,
such
as mandatory or prohibitory orders, but they may also stand on their
own. In considering whether it is desirable to order
mandatory or
prohibitory relief in addition to the declarator, a court will
consider all the relevant circumstances.'”
14.
The court formed the view that it has
jurisdiction and that it was at liberty to establish whether there
were any real disputes
of fact closing the door on the application.
Untying the knot on the perceived disputes of fact, there remain no
arbitrable disputes
disentitling the court from granting the
declaratory relief sought herein.
14.1.
In Body
Corporate Pinewood Park v Dellis (Pty) Ltd
[7]
,
Mpati P writing on behalf of the Court summarised the judgment of
Plewman JA in
Telecall
(Pty) Ltd v Logan
[8]
as
follows:
“…
in
Telecall (Pty) Ltd v Logan this court (per Plewman JA) said that
before there can be a reference to arbitration, a dispute which
is capable of proper formulation at the time when an arbitrator is
to be appointed must exist and there cannot be an arbitration,
and therefore no appointment of an arbitrator can be made,
in the absence of such a dispute. Thus, if the word 'dispute'
is
used in a context which indicates that what is intended 'is merely an
expression of dissatisfaction not founded upon competing
contentions
no arbitration can be entered into'.”
15.
In
any event, it seems as if the respondent’s reliance on
arbitration is fluid, having regard to the respondent’s
attorney’s
email of 19 April 2024 wherein the view was formed
that the issues of occupation/possession of the relevant units is not
subject
to arbitration.
[9]
[c] On the
perceived disputes
16.
The
court accepts that it must take a robust, common-sense approach to
the alleged disputes of fact.
[10]
[i] Basic
overview
17.
It seems, in the main, that the respondent
purchased certain properties from the applicant in a scheme (from a
plan before the construction
work was complete). The respondent
initially paid a deposit of R700 000 per unit, but later paid the
remainder of the purchase
price per unit to the applicant, before the
development was complete.
18.
Making payment as it did, the respondent
had an option to take transfer of the properties once completed, and
if decided not to
take transfer, that the money paid in lieu of such
properties would constitute a loan that the applicant was required to
settle.
19.
To further compensate the respondent making
payment upfront, there are allegations of an upside that was to be
paid on some units
of R1,5m per unit when such units are sold. The
upside represents payment in addition to the loan amount and becomes
payable once
the said units are sold to third parties.
20.
By 2023, the respondent demanded repayment
of the loan. The parties eventually concluded a Heads of Agreement
(“Heads”)
that would settle payment of the loan with
transfer of two units (12532 & 12533) and agreeing to a transfer
of shares in Houghton
Home from Home (Pty) Ltd (“HHH”) to
the value of R31 465 000.
21.
The respondent admits that the two units
were transferred but denies that the shares were transferred. The
respondent also says
that interest is due to it on the loan.
[ii] Chronology
of agreements
22.
On each of the relevant properties the
parties concluded separate agreements of sale. On 17 February 2021 in
respect of unit 8557,
on 22 February 2021 in respect of unit 12433
and on 15 May 2021 in respect of units 1233 and 12432. Units 12532
and 12533 (“the
additional units”) were also purchased in
2021.
22.1.
The respondent took transfer of additional
units, and the additional units do not form part of the current issue
between the parties.
The combined purchase price for all six units
was R44,1m.
23.
By
or about 2 April 2021 the parties concluded what is styled as
‘Addendum to Agreement of Sale – Sectional Title. The
addendum relevant to unit or section 8557 is found as annexure
FA11.
[11]
The scheme applied
across the board.
23.1.
Save to the extent that the addenda
expressly varied terms, the remainder of the respective agreements of
sale remained binding.
23.2.
The purchaser (i.e. respondent) agreed to
make payment of the deposit and the balance of the purchase price to
the seller in advance
of registration and transfer of the section.
23.3.
The respondent accordingly paid about R7m
per section to the applicant in lieu of the deposit and balance of
the purchase price.
24.
By
September 2021 the parties entered into a further addendum
[12]
wherein it was inter alia agreed that:
24.1.
The purchase price may be released to the
applicant prior to transfer of the properties;
24.2.
The respondent had, for a period of 12
months after the approval of the sectional plan, an option not to
proceed in terms of the
agreements of sale, and that it does not need
to take transfer of the units despite making payment thereof.
24.3.
When the respondent exercises the option
(that is not to take transfer), the money paid shall be deemed a
loan. When such units
are sold to third parties, the applicant
becomes obliged to settle the loan amount by paying the proceeds of
such sale less sales
commission at a rate of 3%.
25.
The respondent took occupation of the units
when the conveyancing attorneys released the aforesaid funds to the
applicant.
26.
In early 2023 the respondent elected not to
take transfer of the property in dispute in this application and
sought to be repaid
the loan.
27.
The verbal agreements introduced by the
respondent seem to deal with the discussions before the conclusion of
the Heads, laying
the table for the election not to take transfer and
requiring repayment of the loan.
27.1.
The
first verbal agreement
[13]
ostensibly agreed to on 10 January 2023, is styled “Disinvestment
Rosebank1, Upside and Interest. Deal between MS Prop Trust
and
Houghton Seven and Twelve on Houghton Pty Ltd. Six properties are
identified that are held as security in lieu of a loan to
the
applicant. The properties include the two properties transferred to
respondent and the four claimed by the applicant in the
notice of
motion. There is also speak of upside and interest at bank rate.
27.2.
The
second verbal agreement purports to record the outcome of a meeting
of 4 March 2023
[14]
addressing
the loan should there be a shortfall in the sales of the relevant
units. Provision is also made for the upside and interest
to be paid
independently.
27.3.
The
third verbal agreement relates to 9 March 2023
[15]
with the parties ostensibly agreeing to interest and upside.
28.
However,
by 28 April 2023 the parties concluded a further agreement styled
‘Heads of Agreement’ (“the Heads”)
[16]
.
The Green Trust that is not before the court, formed part of the
Heads. The following is material from the Heads:
28.1.
The applicant admitted that it was indebted
to the respondent for payment of R46,4m arising from a loan. (The
loan follows from
the earlier addenda and option to the respondent
not to take transfer of specific sections.)
28.2.
The aforementioned indebtedness was to be
settled by transferring two sections or units to the respondent, and
with the Green Trust
agreeing to transfer 10,85% of its shares held
in Houghton Home from Home (Pty) Ltd (“HHH”).
28.3.
The
Heads includes a typical Shifren-clause.
[17]
[iii] Was the loan
settled?
29.
The respondent agrees that two units were
transferred but denies that the loan was settled, inter alia as:
29.1.
The shares in HHH were not transferred;
29.2.
Interest on the loan was not paid in
full; and
29.3.
‘
Upside’ was not paid to date.
30.
However,
in an email from respondent’s attorneys dated 2 November
2023
[18]
, the respondent
records that the loan of R46,4m was settled. Apart from the admission
that the loan capital amount was paid, the
respondent claimed an
additional R9 771 020.00 as interest. The email and its contents are
not in dispute.
30.1.
Common cause is thus that the capital
amount of R46,4m was settled. This puts paid to the conditional
counterclaim of the respondent.
30.2.
It is accepted that to raise or claim
interest makes business sense. I was, other than the alleged verbal
agreements that preceded
the Heads, not taken to specific clauses in
support of the respondent’s claim for interest. (Interest is
dealt with in more
detail later in the judgment.)
[iv] Was the shares
transferred?
31.
The court accepts that the respondent’s
attorney would not write that the capital amount of the loan was
settled if a substantial
portion thereof that was to be secured by a
share transfer had not happened.
32.
In
respect of the transfer of shares, the respondent introduced a
document styled as “Share Subscription Agreement”
that
was concluded amongst HHH, the respondent and two other entities.
[19]
Although the contention is that the applicant had not complied with
the agreement strictly, it is not said that there was no compliance.
32.1.
It
is recorded that following the issuance and allotment of shares in
HHH, the Green Trusts percentage of shareholding decreased
from 33%
to 7,68%, with the respondent becoming the owner of the difference in
shares, namely 25,32% or 1 087 ordinary shares.
[20]
32.2.
A
share certificate and register of share accounts, underscore the
issuing of the 1 087 shares to the respondent.
[21]
33.
I find that the requisite shares in HHH
were transferred to the respondent towards settlement of the loan, as
confirmed in the respondent’s
attorneys’ letter stating
that the capital amount of the loan was paid.
[v]
More on interest on the loan
34.
Enquiring
from the respondent about the basis for its conditional counterclaim
of R44,369,030.40, and its entitlement to hold onto
the units claimed
by the applicant and the occupational rental on such units, the court
was referred to paragraph 27 of the answering
affidavit.
[22]
Paragraph 27 embodies the alleged indebtedness of the applicant to
the respondent and reads as follows:
“
In
this context, the applicant remains indebted to the respondent as
follows:
27.1 The upside in the
sum of R9,000,000 being R1,500,000 per unit (there being 6 units)
27.2 The sum of
R31,465,000.00 being the balance of the combined purchase price.
27.3 The sum of
R9,160,657.37 being the interest on the outstanding loan amount as of
September 2023.
27.4 Less the
occupational rental received in the sum of R5, 256,627.00 leased to
third parties, as of September 2024.”
35.
The calculation of the indebtedness is thus
as follows:
35.1.
A claim for R9m as upside, although it is
common cause that the units were not sold to third parties yet. Such
claims are premature,
at best.
35.2.
R31 465 000 as balance of the combined
purchase price. This claim cannot be reconciled with the respondent’s
attorney’s
email that confirms that full payment was made of
the capital sum of the loan, and having regard to the transfer of
shares discussed
above.
35.3.
R9 160 657.37 as interest on the
outstanding loan amount as of September 2023. There is no document
attached to the answering papers
setting out how the interest is
calculated. I fail to reconcile this claim for arrear rental with the
respondent’s attorney’s
calculation claiming that
interest of R9 771 020.00 was due on 2 November 2023.
35.4.
The respondent says that R5 256 627.00 was
received as occupational rental to September 2024 and that same must
be deducted from
the interest of about R9,16m in September 2023.
36.
Analysing
the calculation of interest further, the court also took note of
Annexure RA10, ostensibly an attachment to the respondent’s
attorney’s email of 13 November 2023
[23]
wherein the interest at 1 September 2023 is set at R5 347 020.00 and
the value of the loan plus interest on 1 September 2023 as
R56 271
010.00.
36.1.
The
share certificate wherein the respondent is holding 1087 shares in
HHH is dated 23 August 2023.
[24]
36.2.
The
‘Register of Share Accounts’
[25]
records the transaction date of the shares as 1 August 2023 and the
registration date as 7 August 2023.
36.3.
To therefore calculate interest on an
alleged balance of the purchase price of R31 465 000.00 recorded in
paragraph 27 of the answering
affidavit cannot be sustained. On the
respondent’s own admission of 2 November 2023, the capital
amount of the loan was settled
in accordance with the Heads.
36.4.
The court found it impossible to reconcile
the figures recorded in paragraph 27 of the answering affidavit with
the recordal of
1 September 2023 and 13 November 2023.
37.
And, furthermore, this application was
issued in July 2024. The respondent presented its answering affidavit
on 13 September 2024.
Days before the hearing in May 2025, both sides
filed further affidavits. All the affidavits were admitted into
evidence. Yet,
the respondent did not update the court on
occupational interest received to date, whether there was any
escalation and/or, even
on its version, whether any portion of
interest remained outstanding.
37.1.
If the court does the sums on the interest
claimed to September 2023 from which the occupational rental up to
September 2024 must
be deducted (as advised in paragraph 27 of the
answer), it seems as if occupational rental amounts to about R440 000
per month.
There is accordingly another R3m to R3,5m that ought to be
deducted from October 2024 to the date of the hearing. Adding this
amount
to the amount in paragraph 27.4 and deducting that from the
amount of R9,16m recorded in paragraph 27.3, results in a sum
suggesting
that any claim for interest is settled.
[vi] Assessment of the
alleged material disputes of fact
38.
Having regard to the assessment above, I am
of the view that:
38.1.
The applicant settled the capital sum to
the respondent in the amount of R46,4m with transfer of two units and
transfer of shares
in HHH.
38.2.
The claim for the “Upside” is
premature – only once the relevant units is sold, may the
respondent become entitled
to any such payment. The respondent has no
right premised on the ‘Upside” to retain occupation of
the relevant units
in the interim until the units are sold.
38.3.
The respondent fails to create a real
dispute of fact in relation to interest, entitling it to hold onto
any of the units claimed
by the applicant in these proceedings.
[d] Order
39.
In the premises, the applicant
succeeds in the main application and the conditional counterclaim is
dismissed. However, because
of the findings above, I do not deem it
necessary to order the declarations sought in prayers 1 and 2 of the
notice of motion dated
11 July 2024.
40.
Both parties were
ad
idem
that the court ought to order
costs on Scale C, inclusive of the costs of two counsel.
41.
I accordingly make the following order:
41.1.
It is declared that the respondent
has no right of occupation over, and no right to sub-let to any third
party, any of the following
properties, namely:
Units 8557, 12233, 12433
and 12432 of the Sectional Title Scheme SS the Houghton,
situate at:
The Houghton, Osborn
Road, Houghton Estate,
Johannesburg, 2041.
41.2.
The conditional counterclaim lodged by the
respondent is dismissed.
41.3.
The respondent is to pay the costs of the
application and conditional counter application on Scale C, inclusive
of the costs of
two counsel.
DH WIJNBEEK
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
For the applicant:
Counsel: Adv MM Antonie
SC (with Adv A Laher)
Instructing attorney:
Vermaak Marshall Wellbeloved Inc.
For the respondent:
Counsel: Adv. P Stais SC
(with Adv L Acker)
Instructing attorney: KWA
Attorney
[1]
See inter alia Case lines 02-83
[2]
Stieler Properties CC v Shaik Prop Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2014 JDR 2393
(GJ) at paras 49 - 54
[3]
Universiteit
van Stellenbosch v JA Louw (Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 321 (A) 334A
[4]
At 305F-H
[5]
Section
21(1)(c) provides: “'A Division has jurisdiction over all
persons residing or being in, and in relation to all causes
arising
and all offences triable within, its area of jurisdiction and all
other matters of which it may according to law take
cognisance, and
has the power … in its discretion, and at the instance of any
interested person, to enquire into and determine
any existing,
future or contingent right or obligation, notwithstanding that such
person cannot claim any relief consequential
upon the
determination.'”
[6]
Baleni
and Others v Minister of Mineral Resources and Others
2019
(2) SA 453
(GP)
at paragraph [30], referring also to JT Publishing (Pty) Ltd and
Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others
[1996] ZACC 23
;
1997
(3) SA 514
(CC)
at para 15
[7]
Body
Corporate Pinewood Park v Dellis (Pty) Ltd
2013
(1) SA 296
(SCA)
at para 8
[8]
Telecall (Pty) Ltd v Logan 2000 (2) SA 782 (SCA)
[9]
Case lines 02-274
[10]
Soffiatini
v Mould
1956 (4) SA 150
(E) at 154G
[11]
Case lines 02-175
[12]
FA15, Case lines 02-187 – 02-188
[13]
AA1, Case lines 04-29
[14]
[14]
AA2, Case lines 04-30
[15]
AA3, Case lines 03-31
[16]
FA16, Case lines 02-190 and further
[17]
Read clauses 8.1 and 9.1, Case lines 02-195
[18]
FA29, Case lines 02-242
[19]
AA5, Case lines 04-33 and further
[20]
Case lines 04-40.
[21]
Annexure RA12, Case lines 06-64 and 06-65
[22]
Case lines 04-13
[23]
Case lines 06062
[24]
RA12, Case lines 06-64
[25]
Case lines 06-65
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