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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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[2025] ZAGPJHC 796
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## Lembore and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (Leave to Appeal) (2023/097427; 2023/097292; 2023/097111; 2023/097076; 2023/100081; 2023/100526)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 796 (13 August 2025)
Lembore and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (Leave to Appeal) (2023/097427; 2023/097292; 2023/097111; 2023/097076; 2023/100081; 2023/100526)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 796 (13 August 2025)
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sino date 13 August 2025
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 2023-097427,
2023-097292,
2023-097111,
2023-097076,
2023-100081,
and
2023-100526
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3)
REVISED: NO
13
AUGUST 2025
In
the matter between:
DEGEFA
SUGEBO LEMBORE
First Applicant
TEKETEL
TUMIRE HAJISO
Second Applicant
ADEN
AHMED OSMAN
Third Applicant
ABI
OSMAN
YUSUF
Fourth Applicant
TEMESGEN
MATIWOS
Fifth Applicant
THOMAS
GODISO
Sixth Applicant
and
MINISTER
OF HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
DIRECTOR
GENERAL: HOME AFFAIRS
Second Respondent
NATIONAL
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Third Respondent
MINISTER
OF JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES
Fourth Respondent
HEAD:
BOKSBURG CORRECTIONAL SERVICE
CENTRE,
BENONI
Fifth Respondent
HEAD:
MODDERBEE CORRECTIONAL SERVICE
CENTRE,
BENONI
Sixth Respondent
Coram:
Mlambo JP, Twala J and Collis J
Delivered:
This Judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by email and
by uploading onto
CaseLines/ CourtOnline. The date and time for hand down is deemed to
be 10:00 am on 13 August 2025.
Summary:
This Judgment concerns a leave to appeal application by the
applicants, Mr Manamela and Advocate Vobi. They sought leave to
appeal
this Court’s Costs Judgment and Order. The Costs
Judgment followed the Court’s Main Judgment and Order in which
the
Court, dissatisfied with the way the applicants handled the main
application, made an order postponing the issue of costs until
representations were made in terms of the Court’s directive. In
the Main Judgment, the Court found that the applicants’
abused
Court processes by using a “cut and paste” method in
their papers. The Court directed the applicants to address
the Court
on this issue; however, they failed to comply with this directive. As
a result, the Court handed down the Costs Judgment
in which the Court
found that the applicants’ behaviour warranted a Costs order de
bonis propriis on scale A.
The
applicants sought leave to appeal on the grounds that the Court erred
by handing down the Costs Judgment as section 18 of the
Superior
Courts Act was applicable and that the audi alteram partem was not
extended to them.
The
Court dismissed their application on the grounds that audi alteram
partem was extended to them, but they failed to comply with
the
directive to address the Court before the Judgment was handed down.
Furthermore, the Court dismissed their submission that
section 18 was
applicable based on the principle of judicial finality. The Court was
further of the view that there were no prospects
of success at the
Supreme Court of Appeal. Due to these reasons, their application was
dismissed.
ORDER
The
application for leave to appeal is dismissed, with costs on scale A.
JUDGMENT (ON COSTS)
[LEAVE TO APPEAL]
MLAMBO JP (concurring
Twala and Collis JJ)
Introduction
[1]
Before this
court is an application for leave to appeal brought in terms of
section 17
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
.
[1]
The applicants, Mr Manamela of MA Manamela Attorneys and Advocate
Vobi, seek leave to appeal against this Court’s Judgment
and
Order of 29 July 2024. For convenience they will be referred to as
the applicants in this Judgment.
[2]
The genesis
of this application stems from this Court’s Judgment of 8
February 2024 (the Main Judgment)
[2]
in which this court dismissed the applicants’ clients’
application. In that Judgment, this Court ordered that the issue
of
costs be postponed and be dealt with separately, that is, after the
parties and the applicants, have filed representations on
the issues
mentioned in paragraphs 92 to 94 of the Main Judgment.
[3]
In those paragraphs, this Court expressed concerns regarding the way
the litigation had been conducted. The Main Judgment
details the
basis for these concerns, and it is not necessary to traverse those
in this Judgment. Suffice to mention that this
Court had formed the
view that separate applications had initially been initiated which
were identical save for names and some
minor personal details of the
applicants’ clients. We decided that this issue required
further consideration and directed
the applicants and their clients
to file affidavits to explain why a finding should not be made that
their conduct amounted to
an abuse of the judicial process and
further why a punitive order as to costs should not be made against
them. We directed the
applicants and/or their lawyers to file these
representations within fourteen days from the date of the Judgment
and the respondents
within fourteen days thereafter.
[4]
Subsequent
to the handing down of the Main Judgment, an application for leave to
appeal was filed by the applicants on behalf of
their clients. This
Court dismissed it on grounds that there were no reasonable prospects
that the Supreme Court of Appeal would
reach a different conclusion
to this Court’s reasoning and findings.
[3]
The applicants leave to appeal put the process in paragraph four
above on hold.
[5]
The leave to appeal Judgment was handed down on 21 May 2024, but
neither the applicants and/or the respondents filed any
representations thereafter in compliance with the invitation to file
representations specified in the Main Judgment.
[6] On 29 July
2024, we handed down our Judgment on the issue of costs as specified
in the order in the Main Judgment. We
refer to this Judgment as the
“Costs Judgment.” In that Judgment we ordered that Mr
Manamela and Advocate Vobi pay
the costs of the main application
de
bonis propriis
on scale A and directed the Registrar of this
Court to send a copy of this Judgment to the Legal Practice Council,
the Minister
of Justice and Constitutional Development and to the
National Director of Public Prosecutions, for their information and
consideration.
[7]
The Costs Judgment is a fully reasoned Judgment with an elaborate
exposition of the factual matrix in this matter and
other matters in
which the applicants were involved in this Court. In sum, we made a
finding that the applicants had involved themselves
in what is
colloquially called a cottage industry practice. This in our view
amounted to an abuse of the judicial process, hence
the decision to
order the applicants to pay costs
de bonis propriis
.
The
applicants’ submissions
[8]
The applicants have filed separate heads of argument, but central to
their submissions is that leave to appeal should
be granted as this
Court erred in its findings and that there are prospects of success
that a different court will arrive at a
different conclusion. I deal
with their submissions separately.
[9]
Advocate Vobi submits that this court erred on several grounds.
First, he submits that the court erred in ordering
him to pay costs
de bonis propriis
. This submission is based on the
premise that paragraphs 92 to 94 of the Main Judgment did not name or
invite him to file
an affidavit but rather only invited the parties
(their clients) and not him. He additionally submits that this
court was
compelled to apply the
audi alteram partem
rule and
invite him to make those submissions. The further submission is
that as they had lodged an application for leave
to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeal, this Court was barred from doing anything
until that leave process was concluded.
[10]
Manamela MA
Attorneys makes four submissions for their leave to appeal. These
submissions are divided on the following: the powers
of a court to
meri
motu
review pending cases, the importance of the applicants’ right
to the
audi
alteram partem
rule, the importance of the
Biowatch
[4]
principle and the effect of a pending appeal on a Judgment.
[11]
On the first ground, the applicants submits that this Court failed to
provide them with the right to
audi alteram partem
as the
court did not afford them the opportunity to submit affidavits as to
why an adverse costs order should not be granted against
them. The
submission is that this failure breached this fundamental principle
of natural justice. It is further submitted that
in light of the
Biowatch
principle, when dealing with the issue of costs,
Courts are required to consider the conduct of the parties and legal
representatives,
the presence or absence of technical success and the
nature of litigants and the proceedings which this court did not. The
submission
is that the general rule in the awarding of costs is that
parties seeking to assert constitutional rights should not be
burdened
with costs whether successful or not. Lastly, the submission
is that
section 18
of the
Superior Courts Act suspends
the operation
of a Court order when there is an application for leave to appeal.
Thus, the filing of the application for leave
to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeal suspended the operation of the Main Judgment,
so the argument goes.
Analysis
[12]
Section 17(1)
of the
Superior Courts Act governs
leave to appeal
applications. In the leave to appeal Judgment dealing with the Main
Judgment, we exhaustively dealt with the full
ambit of
section 17.
We
do not deem it necessary to cover the same ground in this Judgment.
Our view is that this is essentially a separate aspect of
the same
matter.
[13]
In so far
as the law is concerned regarding these applications, we refer to
MEC
for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha
,
[5]
where it was stated that:
“
An applicant for
leave to appeal must convince the court on proper grounds that there
is a reasonable prospect or realistic chance
of success on appeal.
A mere possibility of success, an arguable case or one that is not
hopeless, is not enough. There must
be a sound, rational basis to
conclude that there is a reasonable prospect of success on appeal.”
[14]
Therefore, to prevail in an application for leave to appeal, the
applicants must demonstrate a reasonable prospect or
realistic chance
of success on appeal. To reach that determination, this Court must
first examine two crucial issues. First, whether
this court neglected
to provide the applicants with
audi
, and whether
section 18
of
the
Superior Courts Act was
applicable.
[15]
The
audi alteram partem
principle is an important principle in
our constitutional dispensation. It serves as the foundation for
natural justice and ensures
that fair processes take place.
[16]
The applicants’ submission is that this court did not give them
an opportunity to make submissions before adverse
findings were made
against them. This is patently incorrect. In the Main Judgment, this
court recognising and giving effect to
the
audi alteram partem
principle, directed the applicants and the respondents to address
this Court on the issue of costs and the concerns it raised.
In
paragraph 94 of the judgment this Court said the following:
“
We have therefore
decided to suspend making an order as to costs and direct that the
parties file further affidavits addressing
this matter. The
applicants are directed to file an affidavit to explain why a finding
shouldn’t be made that their
conduct amounted to an abuse of
the judicial process and further why a punitive order as to costs
shouldn’t be made against
them and/or their lawyers. The
applicants and/or their lawyers are to file these further
representations within fourteen
days from the date of this Judgment
and the respondents must file their representations within fourteen
days thereafter.”
[17]
However, instead of complying with this invitation, they filed an
application for leave to appeal. As already pointed
out, that
application was dismissed by this Court and instead of complying with
the invitation to file representations regarding
the costs aspect,
the applicants decided to petition the Supreme Court of Appeal for
leave to appeal. The simple truth of the matter
is that the
applicants, ignored the invitation to make representations regarding
the costs aspect which was still pending.
[18]
Furthermore, the submission made by Advocate Vobi that this court did
not name him or specified who is supposed to file
the affidavits or
representations is also incorrect. In the Main Judgment this court
made it clear that:
“
The applicants
and/or their lawyers are to file these further representations within
fourteen days from the date of this Judgment
and the respondents must
file their representations within fourteen days thereafter.”
[19]
Coming back to the second issue. Section 18 of the Superior Court Act
which governs the suspension of court decisions
pending appeal states
in section 18(1) read with subsection 5 that:
“
(1) Subject to
subsections (2) and (3), and unless the court under exceptional
circumstances orders otherwise, the operation and
execution of a
decision which is the subject of an application for leave to appeal
or of an appeal, is suspended pending the decision
of the application
or appeal.”
“
(5) For the
purposes of subsections (1) and (2), a decision becomes the subject
of an application for leave to appeal or of an appeal,
as soon as an
application for leave to appeal or a notice of appeal is lodged with
the registrar in terms of the rules.”
[20]
The Supreme
Court of Appeal outlined the purpose of this section and acknowledged
that it exists to protect litigants. The Court,
in
Ntlemeza
v Helen Suzman Foundation
[6]
explained
that:
“
The primary
purpose of s 18(1) is to reiterate the common-law position in
relation to the ordinary effect of appeal processes —
the
suspension of the order being appealed, not to nullify it. It was
designed to protect the rights of litigants who find themselves
in
the position of General Ntlemeza, by ensuring that, in the ordinary
course, the orders granted against them are suspended while
they are
in the process of attempting, by way of the appeal process, to have
them overturned. The suspension contemplated
in s 18(1) would
thus continue to operate in the event of a further application for
leave to appeal to this court and, in the event
of that being
successful, in relation to the outcome of a decision by this court in
respect of the principal order. Section 18(1)
also sets the basis for
when the power to depart from the default position comes into play,
namely, exceptional circumstances which
must be read in conjunction
with the further requirements set by s 18(3). As already stated and
as will become clear later, the
legislature has set the bar fairly
high.”
[7]
[21]
Our view is that this Court was not barred from issuing the Costs
Judgment when it did. The application for leave to
the Supreme Court
of Appeal was in relation to the merits part of the matter and the
costs part remained pending. That being the
case, after finalising
the leave to appeal Judgment of the merits (Main Judgment), this
Court was duty bound to finalise the matter
and issue the Costs
Judgment. That aspect could not be left in abeyance indefinitely. The
principle of finality of matters is foundational.
[22]
This Court is therefore of the view that this application lacks merit
and must be dismissed.
[23]
In the circumstances the following order is made –
The
application for leave to appeal is dismissed, with costs on scale A.
D
MLAMBO
Deputy
Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa
(Formerly
the Judge President of the Gauteng Division of the High Court)
Hearing
:
(Dealt with on the Papers)
Judgment
:
13 August 2025
Appearances
For
Mr Moribolla Andrew Manamela
: Manamela MA Attorneys,
Pretoria
For
Mr Sinethemba Isaac Vobi
: Oni & Company Inc.
For
First to Third Respondents
: Hephzibah Rajah
instructed
by
State Attorney, Pretoria
[1]
Superior Courts Act.
[2
]
Lembore
v Minister of Home
Affairs (2023-097427, 2023-097292, 2023-097111,
2023-097076,2023-100081, 2023-100526)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 102; [2024] 2
All SA 113
(GJ);
2024 (5) SA 251 (GJ).
[3]
Lembore
and Others v Minister of Home Affairs
(Leave
to Appeal)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 502.
[4]
Biowatch
Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources
[2009] ZACC 14;
2009 (6) SA 232 (CC);
2009 (10) BCLR 1014 (CC).
[5]
[2016]
ZASCA 176.
[6]
[2017]
ZASCA 93; [2017] 3 All SA 589 (SCA);
2017 (5) SA 402 (SCA).
[7]
Id
at
para 28.
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