Krejcir v Head of Prison, Kgosi Mampuru Maximum Correctional Facility and Others (Leave to Appeal Application) (2025/00035) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1010 (8 October 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPJHC 1010 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Krejcir v Head of Prison, Kgosi Mampuru Maximum Correctional Facility and Others (Leave to Appeal Application) (2025/00035) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1010 (8 October 2025) Krejcir v Head of Prison, Kgosi Mampuru Maximum Correctional Facility and Others (Leave to Appeal Application) (2025/00035) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1010 (8 October 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_1010.html sino date 8 October 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG Case no:  2025/00035 (1)  REPORTABLE:  NO (2)  OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3)  REVISED: YES 8 October 2025 In the matter between RADOVAN KREJCIR Applicant And HEAD OF PRISON, KGOSI MAMPURU MAXIMUM CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 1 st Respondent AREA COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 2 nd Respondent REGIONAL COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 3 rd Respondent NATIONAL COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 4 th Respondent MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 5 th Respondent JUDICIAL INSPECTORATE FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 6 th Respondent EX TEMPORE RULING ON A LEAVE TO APPEAL APPLICATION Mdalana-Mayisela J [1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the court order that I granted on 1 October 2025. On 30 September 2025, the respondent, Mr Krejcir, brought an urgent application for contempt of court orders granted by Strydom J on 3 June 2025 and Oosthuizen-Senekal AJ on 7 August 2025. On 1 October 2025, I delivered my contempt order without the reasons. I gave the reasons for my contempt order on 3 October 2025. On the same day, the respondents applied for leave to appeal my order. The respondent opposed the application. [2] The background for this application is stated in the reasons for the contempt order. I do not intend to repeat the same herein. [3] The grounds for the application for leave to appeal are as follows. [3.1] The court erred in finding that the first applicant failed to comply with Strydom J’s court order dated 3 June 2025, because the respondent was provided with study material and a personal laptop. [3.2] The court erred in not considering the applicants’ answering affidavit filed on 30 June 2025 in conjunction with the supplementary answering affidavit filed on 22 August 2025. [3.3] The court erred in not considering that the urgent application brought by the respondent had been determined by another court. [3.4] The court erred by granting the order under extreme urgency without considering the irreparable harm to be suffered by the applicants if the order is executed. [3.5] The court erred in not considering that the respondent is a high-risk sentenced prisoner kept in custody at the Maximum prison, which does not have study facilities. [4] The applicants have not specified which court they want their appeal to be heard in the application for leave to appeal. The test for granting leave to appeal is provided in Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 as follows: “ (1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that – (a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or (ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration.” [5] I now turn to consider the grounds for leave to appeal to determine if the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success. The applicants contended that the respondent brought the application on an extremely urgent basis, and that I did not consider the prejudice to be suffered as a result. That is not correct. The urgent application was set down on Thursday to be heard next Tuesday in accordance with the practice directive of this Division. It was not brought and heard on an extremely urgent basis. During the hearing of the urgent application, I considered the prejudice suffered by the respondent because of non-compliance with the court orders and the nature of the sanction for civil contempt. I invited the parties to talk and resolve the issues amicably. Counsel for the applicants said that there were no prospects of resolving the issues amicably. She conceded that there was partial compliance with the court orders, and she stated that there would be no further compliance with the aforesaid court orders because the applicants are not in agreement with them. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the non-compliance with the court orders, I had to determine the issues on an urgent basis. This ground for leave to appeal has no merit. [6] The applicants also contended that the urgent application had been determined by another court. The non-compliance with the court orders of Strydom J and Oosthuizen-Senekal AJ pleaded in the supplementary affidavit dated 20 August 2025, occurred after the court orders were granted. Oosthuizen-Senekal’s order made provision for the respondent to supplement his papers and reinstate the contempt of court application, in the event of non-compliance with her court order. This ground for leave to appeal is also without merit. [7] Further, the applicants contended that I did not consider their opposing papers. I have considered the relevant opposing papers. I have also referred to their version in the reasons for my court order. The fact that I did not repeat the entire contents of their opposing papers in the reasons for my court order does not mean that I did not consider them in determining the issues before me [1] . This ground for leave to appeal is without substance. [8] The applicants also argued that I did not consider the fact that the respondent is a high-risk sentenced prisoner held in custody at the Maximum prison, which lacks study facilities. The court orders from Strydom J and Oosthuizen-Senekal AJ are executable. There was no evidence before me indicating that the execution of these court orders is impossible. The respondent requested compliance with paragraph 2 of Strydom J’s court order, which permits him “to study” using his personal laptop and charge it while in his control, as he had signed an indemnity form. The applicants claimed that the policies of the Correctional Services Department do not allow Maximum prison inmates to study. This argument was presented before Strydom J, who addressed it and referenced the Constitutional Court decision in Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others v Ntuli [2] . I agree with his interpretation of the principle outlined in the Ntuli case. I will not further address this argument. [9] The respondent also sought compliance with Oosthuizen-Senekal AJ’s court order to be provided with a fully functional laptop for his studies. Advocates Jara and Mahlangu for applicants conceded that a laptop device with a flat or depleted battery is not fully functional. Therefore, there has not been compliance with paragraph 4 of Oosthuizen-Senekal’s court order. The respondent also sought access to the internet to download programs relevant to his registered course as per Oosthuizen-Senekal’s court order. There was no evidence before me that Kgosi Mampuru Maximum Prison has no internet. Oosthuizen-Senekal AJ’s court order was made by agreement between the parties. The applicants agreed to the court order because it is possible to execute. This ground for the leave to appeal has no merit. [10] The applicants contended that I erred in finding the first respondent in contempt of Strydom J’s court order because the respondent was provided with the study material and a personal laptop. This was not the basis for my findings. The respondent stated in his supplementary affidavit and confirmed during the hearing of the urgent application that he was provided with the study material and a personal laptop. I have provided the reasons for my order, and I do not intend to repeat the same herein. This ground for the leave to appeal is without substance. [11] The applicants handed up the supplementary grounds for the leave to appeal application during the hearing. This document is not dated. It was served on the respondent yesterday. In this document, the applicants contended that Oosthuizen-Senekal AJ’s court order did not provide that the respondent and his IT specialist must be given internet access. This contention is not correct. In my reasons for the order, I have referenced paragraph 6 of Oosthuizen-Senekal AJ’s court order, which provides that the respondent must be allowed internet access from Mondays to Fridays from 12:00 to 3:30 pm. Paragraph 4 of her court order provides that all software or programs required for the respondent’s studies must be installed and uploaded to the laptop device. The respondent contends that some of the programs necessary for his studies have not been installed and uploaded to his laptop device because he does not have internet access. He has not submitted 8 assignments, which require internet access. It was a common cause during the hearing of the urgent application that the first respondent had failed to comply with paragraph 6 of Oosthuizen-Senekal AJ’s court order. This ground of appeal must also fail. [12] Furthermore, the applicants argued that the rescission application was filed before I granted the urgent application order. I examined the documents uploaded on Caselines, looking for the rescission application and leave to appeal application before delivering the urgent application order. They were not uploaded to Caselines. My registrar called the office of the State Attorney enquiring about those applications. There was no concrete response. During the hearing of this application, after I had perused supplementary grounds for the application, I re-examined the documents uploaded to Caselines. I noticed that the applicants have rearranged them. They have removed some sections and created new sections. Advocate Mahlangu also advised me that a duplicate file was created after I delivered the urgent application order. In any event, whether the rescission application was filed before the hearing of the urgent application or not, it does not automatically stay the execution of Strydom J and Oosthuizen-Senekal AJ’s court orders. This ground of appeal is also without merit. [13] In conclusion, I have considered all the grounds for the leave to appeal application and the oral submissions made in court. I believe that the appeal would have no reasonable prospect of success. There is no compelling reason why it should be heard. ORDER In the premises, the following order is made: 1.  The application for leave to appeal against the court order granted on 1 October 2025 is dismissed. MMP Mdalana-Mayisela J Judge of the High Court Gauteng Division Heard:                                  8 October 2025 Delivered:                             8 October 2025 Appearances: Applicant:                             In person Respondents:                       Adv Y Mahlangu Instructed by:                       State Attorney's Office Johannesburg [1] R v Dhlumayo and Another 1948 (2) SA 677 (A). [2] 2025 JDR 1814 (CC). sino noindex make_database footer start