Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 1109South Africa
R.W.K v K.A.M and Others (181093/2025) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1109 (3 November 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
3 November 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## R.W.K v K.A.M and Others (181093/2025) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1109 (3 November 2025)
R.W.K v K.A.M and Others (181093/2025) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1109 (3 November 2025)
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# IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
# GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO
: 181093/2025
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES : YES / NO
(3)
REVISED
In the matter between
R[…] W[…]
K[…]
APPLICANT
and
K[…] A[…]
M[…] FIRST
RESPONDENT
(PREVIOUSLY M[…])
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
DEPT OF HOME
AFFAIRS
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
MAKUME
,
J
: This matter commenced before me as
an urgent application on the 14
th
of October 2025. On the 15
th
of October 2025 I made an order which is annexed hereto as annexure X
which has been uploaded on CaseLines. What follows
hereunder
are my reasons for that order.
In the
application, the applicant sought an order that the requirements
contained in
Section 18(3)(iii)
of the
Children's Act 38 of 2005
, in
terms of which the first respondent's consent is required to
remove the minor child T[…] W[..] K[…], born
on the 8th
of January 2012, (the minor child) is dispensed with.
The
other ancillary prayers are that the requirements set out in
Regulation GNR784/1986 which requires a minor child to produce
written consent from both parents so that the minor child be granted
a passport, also be dispensed with, and lastly, that applicant
be
permitted to apply for any Visa for the minor child to enable the
minor child to travel with applicant outside the Republic
of South
Africa.
Background facts
I deal first with the
exposition of the background facts and circumstances leading up to
this application, including a chronology
of events and correspondence
exchanged.
The minor child was born
on the 8th of January 2012 from a romantic relationship that existed
then between the applicant and the
first respondent. When the
relationship soured, the parties concluded a parenting plan in
respect of the minor child.
The parenting plan, which
was made an interim court order by the Children's Court on the 7th of
June 2023, was confirmed by the
family advocate in her report dated
the 30th of November 2023. The final details of that plan are
not necessary, save to
indicate that both parties retained full
parental rights and responsibilities in respect of the minor child,
as contemplated in
Section 18
of the
Children's Act. Also
that
the applicant was granted primary residence of the minor child.
The
parenting plan was concluded as a result of the fact that the first
respondent had already relocated
permanently
to Ballito in Kwa Zulu Natal. The minor child had been in the
care of the applicant since about January 2022,
when the respondent
relocated.
In the court order
supported by the parenting plan, the respondent has contact rights to
the minor child at varying times and periods,
which includes school
holidays as well as telephonic and WhatsApp correspondence.
The issue about applying
for a passport for the minor child commenced with WhatsApp
correspondence on 9 June 2025 between the parties.
The applicant requested
the first respondent to send to him a copy of her identity document.
The first respondent had no difficulty
and said “I will send a
copy of it as soon as I am home.” This was at 18H24 on the 9th
of June 2025.
On the 13th of June 2025,
at 11H15, the first respondent sent a copy of her identity document
to the applicant with the following
message: “Please use
it only for the passport application. Anything else I do not
give you consent to use it.”
The first respondent
confirmed that on the 24th of September 2025, the applicant contacted
her telephonically and told her that
he intends traveling to Germany
with the minor child during January 2026. The first respondent says
that she needed time to consider
the request and information and
would revert.
On the 25th of September
2025, discussions took place involving the applicant, the respondent,
as well as the minor child.
The applicant informed the
respondent that he had made arrangements that the two of them meet at
the Standard Bank in Johannesburg
on the 3rd of October 2025 and
inquired when the respondent would come up to Johannesburg. It is at
that meeting also as per the
respondent's answering affidavit where
the minor child asked her if he can go on holiday in Germany with his
father. The respondent
did not respond positively. She instead
told the minor child that she is still in discussions with the
applicant and will
get back to him.
The respondent reneged on
her earlier agreement to come up to Johannesburg so as to complete
the necessary documents to enable the
minor child to be issued with a
passport. Instead the respondent sent a WhatsApp message to the
applicant which reads as
follows:
“
The
only way I will sign or do anything is if he comes to live with me
permanently from 1
st
of January 2026.”
It
is that response that prompted the applicant’s attorneys to
address a letter to the respondent on the 30
th
September 2025. In that letter the attorneys had attached a
consent form which the respondent was required to sign
and send back
to, to them by the 1
st
of October 2025.
The
applicants attorneys warned the respondent that if no response is
received then the applicant will launch an urgent application
and
seek necessary relief in terms of the Children’s Act.
That
letter was followed by numerous calls and WhatsApp messages which the
respondent ignored and ultimately sent the following
message on
WhatsApp:
“
Good
morning.
I will lay a charge of
harassment if I continue getting calls and messages whilst I am
trying to work. My lawyer and I will get
back to you as soon as we
have gone through everything.”
The response from the
first respondent clearly indicated that she had now changed her mind
and was no longer prepared to join the
applicant in applying for a
passport for the minor child.
On the 3rd of October
2025 the applicant launched this urgent application in terms of Rule
6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court and
set same down for hearing on
the 14th of October 2025 at 10 in the morning.
On the 7th of October
2025, the respondent's attorneys Mrs NLA Inc, addressed a letter to
the applicant's attorney raising a number
of issues that had nothing
to do with the request for consent but ended up in paragraph 5 of
that letter by informing the applicant's
attorney that their client
is now prepared to consent to the minor child travelling to Germany
and said nothing about consent to
travel to Australia.
The applicant’s
attorneys then informed the respondent’s attorneys that they
will not ask for costs if the respondent
consent to the order as set
out in the notice of motion. Instead of responding to that the
respondent then filed a notice
to oppose the application and then
followed it up with a lengthy answering affidavit on the 10
th
of October 2025.
In the
answering affidavit the respondent took issue with the aspect of
urgency at length and then dealt with the merits, ending
up in
paragraph 78.14 of her affidavit, by saying the following:
“
The
applicant’s attorneys was informed formally by my attorney
telephonically, and in writing, on the 6th and 7th of October
2025,
respectively, that I would consent to the travel of the minor child.
Despite this, an urgent application was launched, on
abusive time
periods and for completely different relief.”
The
respondent only indicated her consent after the urgent application
had been launched and served, besides having been warned
of that on
the 30th of September 2025.
I am
satisfied that the application is urgent, hence I allowed the parties
to address the court on the merits, which both parties
did fully,
after having exchanged, answering and replying affidavits. The
applicant complied fully with the practice directive
and afforded the
respondent
ample time to respond.
In the heads of arguments
supported by the draft order, the first respondent asked in the
alternative that the application be dismissed
and yet follows up with
a tender that mirrors to a large extent the applicant's notice of
motion. I think this is nothing
but an abuse of the process.
In dealing with the
merits of the application, the first respondent blows hot and cold.
She says that it is not in the best interest
of T[…] to travel
overseas, she says that it is not in the best interest of T[…]
to travel overseas with the applicant,
because she views this as a
disguised permanent relocation, and yet confirms that her attorney,
when speaking to the applicant's
attorneys, conceded that it is not
correct to suspect that the intended holiday is a disguised
relocation.
Is it in the best
interest that the minor child travels to Germany and Australia with
the applicant for the period of 4
th
to 11
th
January 2026
Having dismissed the
point that the application is not urgent, I now deal with the number
one requirement which is anchored both
in Section 28 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, as well as in various
sections of the
Children's Act, which
is the best interest of the
minor child.
Once again, the first
Respondent, in dealing with this aspect in her short heads, says the
following in paragraph 9 thereof:
“
Besides
the factors of
Section 7
in the
Children's Act, for
a final order of
this kind,
Sections 9
and
10
need to be followed. To date, this has
not been done and there is no voice of the child's assessment for
such relief.”
It is common cause that
both
Sections 7
and
9
emphasize the principle of the best interest of
the child. On the other hand,
Section 10
, which deals with the
child's participation, reads as follows:
“
Every
child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to
be able to participate in any matter concerning that
child has the
right to participate in an appropriate way and views expressed by the
child must be given due consideration.”
The first respondent, in
her own words, at paragraph 24 of her answering affidavit confirms
that the minor child did ask her if
he can go on holiday to Germany
in January and she responded that she is still thinking about it. It
is therefore clear that the
minor child expressed a view and a desire
to travel on holiday to Germany with his father.” This,
in my view,
was in compliance with
Section 10
to which he got no
response until after this application was launched.
I agree with the
applicant's submission that the relief sought by the applicant does
not impact the respondent's relationship with
the minor child.
It pertains solely to the waiver of the respondent's consent and
cooperation in respect to the passport,
in respect to the passport.
The passport, Visa and travel abroad. The relief is designed to
promote the interest of the minor
child.
The respondent, in her
own affidavit, once more at paragraph 40 exposes her dilatory conduct
in addressing the issue of consent.
In paragraph 40, she says
that it was only after consulting with her attorneys that she became
convinced that it would be good
for T[..] to travel to Germany with
his father to experience another culture. It is clear that up until
that time, she was withholding
consent on the basis that this was a
disguised relocation for which she had no proof.
Paragraphs 7.1.1 up to
7.1.1.6 of the notice of motion, provided, provided sufficient
proof and reassurance that there was
no intention to relocate
overseas permanently with the minor child.
In the matter of In re:
X.S (7265/2024) a decision by GAISA AJ, delivered on the 18th of July
2024, by the Limpopo Division of the
High Court, the following was
said at paragraph 55:
“
In
Bailey (supra) the Court reaffirmed that the child's best interests
are paramount in relocation cases. While this is not a relocation
case, the principle directly applies to it, as the Court must
consider whether allowing X.S. to travel to USA for the academic
achievers' tour within the mentioned period is in her best interest.”
The
first respondent has been acting
malefide
by initially agreeing to the passport application, and to that extent
even sending a copy of her identity document to the applicant,
only
to later withhold, same and requiring that the applicant should agree
to the minor child staying with her permanently from
January 2026.
The
minor child asked her directly. She did not say no or yes. She
said: “I will come back to you”, as she
is still
thinking about that. She knows that time was not on the side of
the applicant, as applications for passports and
Visas take some
time, and yet she still had the luxury to put things on hold.
In my view, her intention was to frustrate
and delay as much as
possible, so that the trip does not take place, as she wants T[…]
to come and stay with her permanently.
The
Supreme Court of Appeal, Scott J A. in
Jackson
v. Jackson
[2001] ZA SCA 139
, held
that:
“
The
fact that a decision has been made by the custodian parent does not
give rise to some sort of rebuttable presumption that such
decision
is correct. The reason why a Court is reluctant to interfere with a
decision is correct. The reason why a court
is reluctant to
interfere with a decision for a custodian parent is not only because
the custodian parent may, as a matter of fact,
be in a better
position than the non-custodian parent. In some cases, to
evaluate what is in the best interest of a child,
but more
importantly, because the parent bears the primary responsibility of
bringing up the child should, as far as possible,
be left to do just
that. It is, however, a constitutional imperative that the interest
of children remain paramount. That is a
central and constant
consideration.”
In the
result I am satisfied that a proper case has been made by the
applicant in the best interest of the minor child, not the
best
interest of the parties. The draft order, marked X, which has already
been made an order of court, is annexed hereto.
MAKUME, J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT,
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Date of
hearing
14
th
October 2025
Date of
Judgment
3
rd
November 2025
For the
Applicant
Adv Lizzelle Venter
For the
respondent
Adv S J Martin
TRANSCRIBER’S
CERTIFICATE
R[…] W[…]
K[…]// LESLEY ANN MATTHIESEN
I,
the undersigned, hereby certify that
so far as it is audible to
me
, the aforegoing is a true and correct transcript of the
proceedings recorded by means of a digital recorder in the matter
between
the parties stated above:
CASE
NUMBER:
181093/2025
RECORDED
AT:
PRETORIA
DATE
HELD:
2025-10-28
NUMBER
OF pages:
13
TRANSCRIBER:
MRS F VAN SCHALKWYK
DATE
COMPLETED:
2025-10-30
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