Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 1102South Africa
Kopanang Africa Against Xenophobia and Others v Operation Dudula and Others (2023/044685) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1102 (4 November 2025)
Headnotes
Summary: Application for interdictory and declaratory relief against Operation Dudula and against the Government of South Africa – section 41 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 – application for declarator that only Immigration Officials and Police Officers have the power to demand identification from persons – Operation Dudula interdicted from demanding that any private person produce identification – application for declarator that SAPS breached its constitutional duties to combat and investigate crime and to uphold and enforce the law refused – Operation Dudula also interdicted from unlawful conduct and conduct which amounts to them taking the law into their own hands and hate speech –
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Kopanang Africa Against Xenophobia and Others v Operation Dudula and Others (2023/044685) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1102 (4 November 2025)
Kopanang Africa Against Xenophobia and Others v Operation Dudula and Others (2023/044685) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1102 (4 November 2025)
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FLYNOTES:
IMMIGRATION – Warrantless searches –
Requests
for identification
–
Immigration
and police officers permitted to request identification –
Does not extend to private individuals –
Must be exercised
with reasonable suspicion and only in public spaces –
Warrantless searches of private homes, workplaces,
and schools
excluded – Conduct violated multiple constitutional rights –
Failure to implement national action
plan – Breach of
constitutional obligations –
Immigration Act 13 of 2002
,
s
41.
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO
:
2023-044685
DATE
:
4
November
2025
(1)
NOT REPORTABLE
(2)
NOT OF INTREST TO OTHER JUDGES
In the matter between:
KOPANANG
AFRICA AGAINST XENOPHOBIA
First Applicant
SOUTH
AFRICAN INFORMAL TRADERS FORUM
Second Applicant
INNER
CITY
FEDERATION
Third Applicant
ABAHLALI
BASEMJONDOLO MOVEMENT SA
Fourth Applicant
and
OPERATION
DUDULA
First Respondent
GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Second Respondent
MINISTER
OF
POLICE
Third Respondent
NATIONAL COMMISSIONER
OF THE
SOUTH
AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
Fourth Respondent
MINISTER
OF HOME
AFFAIRS
Fifth Respondent
MINISTER
OF JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES
Sixth Respondent
MEMBER OF THE
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL:
GAUTENG
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Seventh Respondent
MINISTER
OF
HEALTH
Eighth Respondent
MINISTER
OF BASIC EDUCATION
Ninth Respondent
MEMBER OF THE
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL:
GAUTENG
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Tenth Respondent
ZANDILE
DABULA
Eleventh Respondent
DAN
RADEBE
Twelfth Respondent
THE
SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Thirteenth Respondent
SECTION
27
First
Amicus Curiae
THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS
Second
Amicus Curiae
MEDIA
MONITORING AFRICA (‘MMA’)
Third
Amicus Curiae
THE UNITED NATIONS
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR
ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
DEFENDERS
Fourth
Amicus Curiae
Neutral
Citation
:
Kopanong Africa against Xenophobia and others
v Operation Dudula and Others (2023-044685)
[2025] ZAGPJHC ---
(4 November 2025)
Coram:
Adams J
Heard
:
10 and 11 June 2025
Delivered:
4 November 2025 – This judgment was handed down
electronically by circulation to the parties' representatives by
email, by
being uploaded to
CaseLines
and by release to
SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10:00 on
4 November 2025.
Summary:
Application for interdictory and declaratory
relief against Operation Dudula and against the Government of South
Africa –
section 41
of the
Immigration Act 13 of 2002
–
application for declarator that only Immigration Officials and Police
Officers have the power to demand identification
from persons –
Operation Dudula interdicted from demanding that any private person
produce identification – application
for declarator that SAPS
breached its constitutional duties to combat and investigate crime
and to uphold and enforce the law refused
– Operation Dudula
also interdicted from unlawful conduct and conduct which amounts to
them taking the law into their own
hands and hate speech –
The
National Action
Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and related
intolerance
– the Government is directed to implement the
said plan –
Applicants’ claim
that the SAPS and the DHA support or collude with Operation Dudula
not accepted – interdictory and
declaratory relief sought in
that regard not granted by the court – held that the applicants
have failed to present credible
evidence in support of the claim –
Section 41
of the
Immigration Act 13 of 2002
– to be interpreted such that it
authorises warrantless searches only in public spaces and not in
private places that include
the home and places of study, work or
business – also to be interpreted in a way which requires the
immigration officer or
police officer to hold a reasonable suspicion
that a person is unlawfully in South Africa in order to request them
to identify
themselves as a citizen, permanent resident or foreigner
– lastly, the court held that the said section is to be
interpreted
in such a manner that the interest of minor children is
safeguarded –
Application succeeds –
applicants granted some relief sought in their application, others
refused.
ORDER
(1)
It be and is hereby declared that only an
immigration officer or a police officer has the power in terms of
section 41
of the
Immigration Act 13 of 2002
to demand that another
private person produce her / his passport or other identity documents
to demonstrate her / his right to
be in the Republic of South Africa
and that no private person has the power to do so unless expressly so
authorised by law.
(2)
The first respondent, the eleventh and twelfth
respondents be and are hereby interdicted and restrained from
demanding that any
private person produce her / his passport or other
identity documents to demonstrate her / his right to be in the
Republic.
(3)
The first respondent, the eleventh and the twelfth
respondents be and are hereby interdicted and restrained from: -
(a)
Intimidating, harassing and/or assaulting any
individuals that they identify as being foreign nationals;
(b)
Making public statements that constitute hate
speech on the grounds of nationality, social origin or ethnicity at
public gatherings,
on social media platforms or in any other way;
(c)
Interfering with the access of foreign nationals
to health care services and/or their right to such access;
(d)
Interfering with access to, or the operations of,
schools and intimidating or harassing learners, teachers or parents
at schools;
(e)
Unlawfully evicting foreign nationals from their
homes;
(f)
Unlawfully removing foreign nationals from their
trading stalls or interfering with the employment of foreign
nationals in shops
and businesses;
(g)
Instigating, encouraging or inciting any other
person to perform any of the acts prohibited by this order, on social
media, at gatherings
in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205
of 1993, or in any other way;
(4)
The first respondent be and is hereby ordered and
directed to communicate this order to any and/or all of its
office-bearers and
members.
(5)
The second respondent be and is hereby directed
and ordered to take reasonable steps to implement the National Action
Plan to Combat
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance, including by: -
(a)
taking steps to establish an early warning and
rapid response mechanism regarding threats of xenophobic hate speech
and hate crimes;
(b)
collating and publishing disaggregated data in
respect of xenophobic hate speech and hate crimes, including the
prosecution and
conviction of persons who commit such offences.
(6)
It be and is hereby declared that on a proper
interpretation of section 41 of
Immigration Act 13 of 2002
, the
powers conferred on an immigration officer or police officer:
(a)
are confined to public places and do not authorise
warrantless searches in private places that include the home and
places of study,
work or business;
(b)
require that an immigration officer or police
officer hold a reasonable suspicion that a person is unlawfully in
South Africa in
order to request them to identify themselves as a
citizen, permanent resident or foreigner; and
(c)
do not permit the interrogation, arrest and
detention of children under the age of 18, except as a measure of
last resort and in
a manner that is consistent with section 28(1)(g)
of the Constitution.
(7)
The first, second, third, fourth, sixth, eleventh
and twelfth respondents, jointly and severally, the one paying the
other to be
absolved, shall pay the applicants costs of their opposed
Special Motion, such cost to include the costs of three Counsel,
where
so employed, and in regard to Counsel’s costs incurred
after 12 April 2024, same shall be on scale ‘C’ of the
tariff applicable in terms of Uniform Rule of Court 67A.
JUDGMENT
Adams J:
[1].
As was held by the
Constitutional Court in
Residents
of Industry House
[1]
,
the rights to privacy and dignity in the Constitution attach to
‘everyone’ and not just to citizens. Human dignity
has no
nationality. The fact that an individual is a non-citizen or
undocumented does not mean that her / his basic human rights
can be
violated without consequences. That flies in the face of the founding
provisions and values of our constitution. This matter
implicates the
foregoing principles.
[2].
The applicants are all voluntary public benefit associations. They
promote and fight for human rights in general and
for the individual
rights of their members. So, for example, the first applicant
(‘Kopanang Africa’) is a voluntary
association
established to fight against xenophobia in South Africa. The second
applicant (‘SAITF’) is an association
of informal
traders, which promotes and fights for the rights of its members, who
consist, as the name suggests, of informal traders.
The third
applicant (‘ICF’) is a voluntary association, which has
as its objectives the improvement of the lives and
living conditions
of the residents of the Johannesburg inner city. It also defends
unlawful evictions on behalf of its members.
The fourth applicant
(‘Abahlali’) is a national association of shack dwellers,
based in Durban, with branches in Johannesburg
and Cape Town. It
works to improve the living conditions of people living in informal
settlements by protecting informal settlement
residents from unlawful
eviction. They also advocate and fight for the provision of basic
services for shack dwellers and has,
as one of their objectives, the
facilitation of transparent, fair and participatory informal
settlement upgrading processes.
[3].
The first respondent (Operation Dudula) is a voluntary association
that is registered as a non-profit company, with the
stated objective
of expelling foreign nationals from South Africa. The eleventh and
twelfth respondents are executive members of
Operation Dudula. I
shall refer to these two respondents and the first respondent
collectively as the ‘Operation Dudula respondents’.
The
second to the tenth respondents are the Government of the Republic of
South Africa and various national and provincial departments
of the
government. Only the third and fourth respondents (collectively
referred to as ‘the South African Police Service’
or ‘the
SAPS’) and the fifth respondent (‘Department of Home
Affairs’ or ‘DHA’) are opposing
some of the relief
sought on behalf of the applicants. The other government respondents
have indicated their intention to abide
the decision of this court.
[4].
In total four
amici curiae
have been admitted and have
participated fully in these proceedings. In the main, the
amici
curiae
have made submissions with a view to assisting the court
in the adjudication of this matter, which submissions align with the
case
on behalf of the applicants. The South African Human Rights
Commission (‘the SAHRC’), although cited by the
applicants
in their application as the thirteenth respondent, has
adopted the same approach and presented evidence and made submissions
in
support of and which aligns with the applicants’ case.
[5].
The application was duly served on the first respondent and the
twelfth respondent on 18 May 2023. Subsequently, Operation
Dudula in
social media and on other platforms confirmed that it had received
service of the application but indicated that they
would not be
opposing the application. It is mainly for this reason that I refused
an application for a postponement of the matter
by Operation Dudula
at the commencement of the hearing before me on 10 June 2025. The
matter accordingly proceeded on an unopposed
basis as against the
Operation Dudula respondents.
[6]. In this
opposed application, which came before me as a Special Motion on 10
and 11 June 2025, the applicants apply
for
wide ranging relief against the Operation Dudula respondents, as well
as against the Government respondents.
The relief
sought is in the form of interdictory relief, as well as for
declaratory orders directed mainly at the conduct of Operation
Dudula. There are also ancillary relief prayed for by the applicants,
and it may be apposite, in the interest of crystallizing
the issues
in the matter, to cite from the amended notice of motion, which
reads, in the relevant part, that the applicants apply
for an order
in the following terms: -
‘
1.
Declaring
that only an immigration officer or police officer has the power in
terms of
section 41
of the
Immigration Act 13 of 2002
to demand that
another private person produce their passport or other identity
documents to demonstrate their right to be in the
Republic and that
no private person has the power to do so unless expressly so
authorised by law;
2.
Interdicting and restraining the first respondent,
the eleventh and twelfth respondents from demanding that any private
person produce
their passport or other identity documents to
demonstrate their right to be in the Republic;
3.
Declaring that members of the first respondent who
publicly wore clothing resembling the uniform of the South African
Defence Force
without authorisation in terms of the
Defence Act 42 of
2002
have contravened
section 8(8)
of the Regulation of Gatherings
Act 205 of 1993 and
section 104(5)
of the
Defence Act 42 of 2002
.
4.
Declaring that the South African Police Service
breached its constitutional duties to combat and investigate crime
and to uphold
and enforce the law by failing to reasonably
investigate and/or charge members of the first respondent, who
publicly, and in some
instances in the presence of members of the
South African Police Service, wore clothing resembling the uniform of
the South African
Defence Force in contravention of the
section 8(8)
of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 and
section 104(5)
of
the
Defence Act 42 of 2002
.
5.
Interdicting and restraining the first respondent
and the eleventh and twelfth respondents from:
5.1.
Intimidating, harassing or assaulting any and/or
all individuals that they identify as being foreign nationals;
5.2.
Making public statements that constitute hate
speech on the grounds of nationality, social origin or ethnicity at
public gatherings,
on social media platforms or in any other way;
5.3.
Wearing or authorising office-bearers or members
of the first respondent to wear apparel that resembles the uniforms
worn by members
of the security forces, including the South Police
Service and the South African National Defence Force, in public;
5.4.
Interfering with the access of foreign nationals
to health care services;
5.5.
Interfering with access to, or the operations of,
schools and intimidating or harassing learners, teachers or parents
at schools;
5.6.
Unlawfully evicting foreign nationals from their
homes;
5.7.
Unlawfully removing foreign nationals from their
trading stalls or interfering with the employment of foreign
nationals in shops
and businesses;
5.8.
Instigating, encouraging or inciting any other
person to perform any of the acts prohibited by this order, on social
media, at gatherings
in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205
of 1993, or in any other way;
6.
Directing the first respondent to communicate this
order to all of its office-bearers and members;
7.
Directing the second respondent to take reasonable
steps to implement the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial
Discrimination,
Xenophobia and related intolerance, including by:
7.1.
taking steps to establish an early warning and
rapid response mechanism regarding threats of xenophobic hate speech
and hate crimes;
7.2.
collating and publishing disaggregated data in
respect of xenophobic hate speech and hate crimes, including the
prosecution and
conviction of persons who commit such offences.
8.
Declaring that the South African Police Service,
by failing to reasonably investigate complaints against members of
the first respondent
arising from allegations of criminal conduct
aimed at foreign nationals, has breached its constitutional duties to
combat and investigate
crime, to protect and secure the inhabitants
of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the
law.
9.
Interdicting and restraining the South African
Police Service from supporting or colluding with Operation Dudula,
its office-bearers
and members, including in particular (but without
limiting the generality of this order) conducting police raids
targeting whole
communities at the instigation of the first
respondent or any of its office-bearers or members in the absence of
a warrant or a
reasonable suspicion that identified individuals have
committed a criminal offence;
10.
Interdicting and restraining the Minister of Home
Affairs and the Department of Home Affairs from supporting or
colluding with the
first respondent, its office-bearers and members,
including in particular (but without limiting the generality of this
order) conducting
raids, with or without the police, targeting whole
communities at the instigation of the first respondent or any of its
office-bearers
or members in the absence of a warrant or a reasonable
suspicion that identified individuals have committed a criminal
offence;
11.
Declaring
section 41
of the
Immigration Act 13 of
2002
inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent
that:
11.1.
It is not confined to public places, but
authorises warrantless searches in private places that include the
home and places of study,
work or business; and,
11.2.
that the provision does not require that an
immigration officer or police officer hold a reasonable suspicion
that a person is unlawfully
in South Africa in order to request them
to identify themselves as a citizen, permanent resident or foreigner.
11.3.
It authorises the interrogation, arrest and
detention of children under the age of 18, without adequate
safeguards consistent with
section 28(1)(g) and 28(2) of the
Constitution.
12.
Suspending the order of invalidity in paragraph 11
for a period of twenty-four (24) months to enable Parliament to
remedy the unconstitutionality;
13.
Directing that, during the period of suspension
referred to in paragraph 12, the words ‘on reasonable
suspicion’ and
‘in a public place’ be read into
section 41
of the
Immigration Act, so
that it shall provide:
‘
When
so requested on reasonable suspicion by an immigration officer or a
police officer in a public place, any person over the age
of 18 shall
identify himself or herself as a citizen, permanent resident or
foreigner, and if on reasonable grounds such immigration
officer or
police officer is not satisfied that such person is entitled to be in
the Republic, such person may be interviewed by
an immigration
officer or a police officer about his or her identity or status, and
such immigration officer or police officer
may take such person into
custody without a warrant, and shall take reasonable steps, as may be
prescribed, to assist the person
in verifying his or her identity or
status, and thereafter, if necessary detain him or her in terms of
section 34.
’
1.25cm; margin-bottom: 0cm; line-height: 150%">
14.
Referring the order in paragraphs 11 to 13 to the
Constitutional Court for confirmation.
14A. In the
alternative to paragraphs 11 to 14 above, it is declared that on a
proper interpretation of
section 41
of
Immigration Act 13 of 2002
,
the powers conferred on an immigration officer or police officer:
14A.1.
are confined to public places and do not authorise warrantless
searches in private places that include
the home and places of
study, work or business; and
14A.2.
require that an immigration officer or police officer hold a
reasonable suspicion that a person is unlawfully
in South Africa in
order to request them to identify themselves as a citizen, permanent
resident or foreigner.
14A.3. do
not permit the interrogation, arrest and detention of children under
the age of 18, except as a measure of
last resort and in a manner
that is consistent with section 28(1)(g) of the Constitution.
14B. The National
Commissioner of the South African Police Service is directed to
effect appropriate amendments
to or supplementation of the National
Instruction 12 of 2019, titled ‘Arrest and Treatment of illegal
foreigner’, to
ensure that the guidance provided to members of
the SAPS on the application of
section 41
of the
Immigration Act is
aligned with this Court’s order within 60 days of the date of
this order.’
15. Directing the
first to thirteenth respondents and any of the other respondents that
oppose the application, jointly and
severally, to pay the applicants'
costs.
16. Granting such
further and/or alternative relief that the court may deem
appropriate.’
[6].
The case on behalf of the
applicants in a nutshell is that Operation Dudula and its members
have, on a constant and continuous basis,
made themselves guilty of
unlawful conduct, which falls foul of the Constitution.
Such
conduct is alleged to include: intimidation, harassment and assault
of certain individuals, notably foreigners; the making
of public
statements that constitute hate speech; wearing apparel that closely
resembles the official uniforms of the security
forces; interfering
with public access to and the public’s right to access health
care services; interfering with access
to, or the operations of,
schools or harassing learners, teachers or parents; unlawfully
evicting people from their homes; and
unlawfully removing informal
traders from their stalls or interfering with the employment of
persons in shops and businesses.
[7].
The applicants therefore seek interdictory relief against Operation
Dudula and its named office-bearers, coupled with
declaratory orders,
to address its pattern of unlawful conduct.
[8].
The applicants also contend that the South African Government is
complicit in such unlawful conduct. At the very least,
so the case on
behalf of the applicants goes, the Government has woefully failed in
its constitutional and legal obligations to
take reasonable and
effective steps to address Operation Dudula's unlawful conduct and
the broader threat of xenophobia in our
society. The applicants
therefore apply for an order
inter alia
compelling the
government to take reasonable and effective steps to implement its
National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial
Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (‘the National Action
Plan’). As against the SAPS, the applicants
seek relief
requiring it to fulfil its constitutional obligations to prevent,
combat and investigate criminal conduct, as well
as interdictory
relief against both the SAPS and the DHA to prevent these two
government departments colluding with or supporting
Operation Dudula.
[9].
As already indicated, the Operation Dudula respondents have failed to
deliver notice of intention to oppose and the application
for
interdictory and declaratory relief sought against them is unopposed.
[10].
The SAPS denies that it breached its constitutional or legislative
obligations and accordingly contends that the applicants
are not
entitled to the relief sought against the SAPS. It does, however,
agree and accept that only an immigration or police officer
has the
power in terms of
section 41
of the
Immigration Act 13 of 2002
to
demand that another person produce her / his passport or any other
identity documents to demonstrate her / his right to be in
the
Republic and that no private person has the power to do so unless
expressly authorised by law. The relief sought in prayer
1 of the
notice of motion is therefore not disputed by the SAPS and can and
should be granted.
[11].
The DHA denies the serious allegations of possible breaches on its
part of its constitutional and legislative duties
and obligations and
of the applicable law. The applicants have not, so the contention on
behalf of the DHA goes, produced any evidence
in support of their
allegations against the DHA, who submits that a factual basis has not
been established in these proceedings
for the relief sought against
it. As regards the relief sought by the applicants relating to the
implementation of the National
Action Plan (‘NAP’), the
DHA’s case is that, on a proper interpretation of the NAP, it
has to be accepted that
the Government is not solely responsible for
the implementation of the said plan and it, therefore, cannot be
compelled to unilaterally
implement same. The DHA also contends that
there is no justifiable need to either amend
s 41
or a declaring it
inconsistent with the Constitution. Section 41, so the contention
goes, operates within the compendium of laws
including, among others,
other provisions of the
Immigration Act, the
Criminal Procedure Act
and the Identification Act. Concerning any arrest of a minor for a
criminal offence, the relevant provisions
of the Children’s Act
also come into play. From the outset, so the argument is concluded,
when dealing with issues relating
to immigration, it should be borne
in mind that any person who is not authorised to be within the
Republic breaks the law and commits
a criminal offence.
[12].
Therefore, in issue in this
application is whether the applicants have made out a case for the
wide-ranging relief sought by them.
In that regard, the
applicants seek five categories of relief, as reflected in the
amended notice of motion. I intend dealing with
those five categories
separately and in turn, whilst at the same time dealing with the
facts relevant to the adjudication of these
issues.
[13].
As already indicated, the Operation Dudula respondents have elected
not to oppose the application. In public statements
following the
issue and service of the application, they confirmed that they were
aware of it and had decided to ignore the court
proceedings. As a
result, the core of the interdictory relief against the Operation
Dudula respondents, as reflected in prayers
2, 5 (excepting the
prayer relating to wearing by its members of apparel that resembles
the uniforms worn by members of the security
forces – dealt
with later on in this judgment) and 6 of the amended notice of
motion, is unopposed.
[14].
Xenophobia, according to
the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (‘NAP’)
[2]
,
‘is an unreasonable fear, distrust or hatred of strangers,
foreigners or anything perceived as foreign or different and
is often
based on unfounded reasons and stereotypes. It can manifest itself in
several ways in a country. For example, it can be
through
victimisation on the basis of one’s nationality or appearance,
brutal assaults, murders, ethnic cleansing in an area
and mass
expulsion from the country’.
[15].
This is a complex form of unfair discrimination that targets
individuals based on intersecting protected characteristics,
including actual or perceived citizenship, race, colour, language and
ethnic or social origin, among other grounds. Xenophobia
is linked to
racism. International instruments and government's own 2019 NAP deal
with xenophobia as a form of discrimination associated
with racism.
The form of xenophobia experienced in South Africa, and with which
this application is concerned, is best understood
as xeno-racism, as
it is directed predominantly at black African foreign nationals.
[16].
The government's NAP acknowledges the scourge of xenophobia in South
African society in the following terms: -
‘
South Africa has,
in the past and more recently, experienced widespread and violent
forms of xenophobia resulting in the deaths
and injuries to people as
well as looting and destruction of property.’
[17].
The NAP further acknowledges that xenophobia is largely directed at
fellow Africans, which has deep roots in South Africa's
history of
anti-black racism during the colonial and apartheid periods. The
National Action Plan notes that:
‘
The many years of
a racist and isolationist policy of apartheid have planted seeds of
xenophobia, particularly towards Africans,
undoing centuries of
brotherhood and sisterhood among Africans in South Africa and those
from other parts of the continent. This
is how Africans have come to
be the worst victims of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa.’
[18].
The country has experienced successive waves of xenophobic violence
in the last two decades. A report by an independent
monitor,
Xenowatch, finds that from 2008 to 2021, xenophobic violence had
resulted in at least 612 deaths, the displacement of
122 298 persons
and looting or damage to 6 306 shops or properties. The report notes
that ‘Gauteng is by far the most affected
by the violence. With
329 incidents, it accounts for almost 40% of all incidents recorded
in the county’. These figures are
likely a significant
underestimation due, in large part, to reluctance on the part of
victims to report criminal conduct, out of
fear of further
victimisation and a lack of confidence in the state authorities.
[19].
Xenophobia presents a serious threat to human rights, as acknowledged
in the government's NAP. The state is subject
to both constitutional
and international law obligations to address this threat. The rights
afforded by the Bill of Rights apply
to all persons within South
Africa's borders, regardless of their nationality or immigration
status. These protections include
the rights to life, dignity,
equality, freedom and security of the person, education, housing, and
healthcare, which are afforded
to ‘everyone’, without
distinction. The state has corresponding obligations, under section
7(2) of the Constitution,
to respect, protect, promote and fulfil
these rights, requiring the state to take ‘reasonable and
effective’ measures
to prevent and address rights violations.
[20].
These constitutional
duties are reinforced by South Africa's international law
commitments. Sections 39(1)
[3]
and 233
[4]
of the Constitution
require courts to draw guidance from international law in giving
content to constitutional rights and obligations,
an obligation that
extends to both binding (‘hard’) and non-binding (‘soft’)
international instruments
[5]
.
[21].
South Africa is party to, and is bound by, a range of international
treaties that impose relevant obligations, including:
(a) the
International Covenant on Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination; (b) the International Covenant on Economic,
Social
and Cultural Rights; (c) the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; and (d) the African Charter on Human
and Peoples'
Rights.
[22].
While xenophobia is not
mentioned by name in these instruments, the rights and protections
they contain all impose obligations to
combat and address
xenophobia
[6]
. South Africa has
committed itself to implementing the Durban Declaration and Programme
of Action, adopted at the 2002 United Nations
World Conference
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance
[7]
. That declaration
recognises that ‘xenophobia against non-nationals, particularly
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers,
constitutes one of the main
sources of contemporary racism’ and commits states to concrete
action to combat xenophobia and
related discrimination.
[23].
In bringing this application, the applicants sought to give effect to
these constitutional and international commitments.
[24].
With that legal and legislative framework in mind, I now proceed to
deal with the case of the applicants against the
Operation Dudula
respondents,
[25].
The undisputed evidence before me indicates that since 2021 Operation
Dudula has emerged as one of the most visible
and violent proponents
of xenophobia, targeting foreign nationals and those perceived to be
foreign. In isiZulu ‘Dudula’
means ‘to force out’.
The name therefore refers to Operation Dudula's stated objective of
expelling foreign nationals
from South Africa, regardless of their
immigration status.
[26].
Operation Dudula was formed in June 2021 when a group of people
marched through Soweto on a ‘clean-up mission’
to shut
down businesses run by foreign nationals. This group formalised as a
voluntary association that is registered as a non-profit
company. It
has office bearers, social media accounts and it stages highly
organised gatherings, attended by members wearing branded
t-shirts
and military style uniforms, displaying Operation Dudula banners and
slogans.
[27].
Operation Dudula and its members have engaged in violent and unlawful
activities across the Gauteng Province. The undisputed
and
uncontested evidence of these activities is extensively documented in
the applicants’ founding papers, with over thirty
supporting
and confirmatory affidavits from victims and witnesses. Some of
the undisputed incidents are set out in the paragraphs
which follow.
[28].
On 6 April 2022, Operation Dudula's then leader, Mr Nhlanhla ‘Lux’
Dlamini, addressed a crowd in Diepsloot,
blaming foreigners for high
crime rates and calling for those present to deal with foreign
nationals. Later that evening, a mob
formed and went from
house-to-house demanding passports or money from people suspected of
being foreign nationals. The mob beat,
stoned and burnt to death a
Zimbabwean national, Mr Elvis Nyathi, with some bystanders laughing
and recording the attack on their
mobile phones.
[29].
Operation Dudula has conducted unlawful raids on buildings in
Johannesburg, involving threats, intimidation, assaults
and the
eviction or attempted eviction of residents. For example, on 6
February 2022, members of Operation Dudula, led by Mr Dlamini,
raided
a church-run shelter, the Tsietsi Mashinini Centre in Jabavu, Soweto.
They went door-to-door, demanding that residents provide
their
identification documents. Operation Dudula members became violent and
started harassing the residents and damaging their
goods. During
August 2022, Operation Dudula issued eviction notices to residents of
Msibi House in New Doornfontein, giving them
five days to vacate the
building. In December 2022, men in military-style uniforms and
Operation Dudula t-shirts returned to the
building, wielding machetes
and whips. They assaulted the residents and evicted them from the
building. And on 30 November 2023,
Operation Dudula arrived at
Eastleigh Court in Hillbrow and demanded, by way of a loudhailer that
all foreign nationals in the
building must vacate with immediate
effect or will be forcibly removed. This group returned on 7 December
2022, evicted people
and put their own tenants in the building.
[30].
Operation Dudula has repeatedly threatened and attacked informal
traders and businesses that are perceived to be owned
and run by
non-South Africans. In January 2022, Operation Dudula members
attacked and threatened informal traders at the Chris
Hani
Baragwanath Taxi Rank in Soweto. These attacks took place almost
every day for approximately a week. On 30 January 2022, Operation
Dudula marched in Rosettenville, delivering notices to shop owners,
warning them to hire South Africans only or close their shops,
otherwise they would be forcefully removed. Throughout 2022,
Operation Dudula targeted traders in Orange Grove, and during March
2022, an Operation Dudula member attacked a pregnant Zimbabwean
informal trader. When members of the public intervened, Operation
Dudula members threatened them with assault. During June 2022,
Operation Dudula members went door-to-door in Orange Grove issuing
‘shut down’ notices to businesses, demanding that all
businesses owned by non-South Africans close their doors within
seven
days. These notices were printed on an official Operation Dudula
letterhead, bearing its non-profit company registration
number. And
on 21 June 2022, a fire broke out at the Yeoville Market involving a
suspected arson attack, which gutted about a third
of the market.
This incident took place a week after Operation Dudula had marched to
the market and threatened informal traders,
telling them to leave the
market. The traders resisted and refused to leave. The arson attack
followed shortly after this march.
[31].
Operation Dudula has also targeted public healthcare facilities,
using threats and violence to prevent foreign nationals
from
accessing healthcare. In August and September 2022, Operation Dudula
picketed outside the Kalafong Hospital and the Hillbrow
clinic,
refusing access to those they deemed to be foreign nationals. During
January 2023, Operation Dudula picketed at the Jeppe
Clinic,
resulting in many patients being turned away, including pregnant
women. As a result, at least two women were forced to
give birth at
home, without any proper health care.
[32].
Operation Dudula has also targeted schools, demanding the removal of
non-South African teachers and undocumented learners.
Operation
Dudula's conduct resulted in the permanent closure of at least one
school in Jeppestown, which had 300 learners and 40
staff. The school
was forced to close after concluding that it could not guarantee the
safety of its staff and learners, following
threats by Operation
Dudula and the intimidation of its employees.
[33].
The aforegoing incidents follow a common pattern, revealing a
modus
operandi
. It routinely incites hatred against foreign nationals
on public platforms, particularly through social media, blaming
foreigners
for all manner of social ills. It then leads unauthorised
gatherings and raids directed at threatening and harassing foreign
nationals
and those who are perceived to be foreign. Operation
Dudula's conduct has included chasing patients out of public
hospitals and
clinics, targeting schools, evicting people from their
homes, removing traders from stalls, and further acts of violence,
intimidation,
harassment and incitement.
[34].
The interdictory relief sought against the Operation Dudula
respondents is unopposed, with the only exception being
the relief
relating to the wearing of military uniforms. I am satisfied that a
case is made out on behalf of the applicants for
the relief sought
against Operation Dudula. The simple point about this portion of the
application is that it can safely be said
the applicants have
satisfied the trite requirements for a final interdict, that being
that (a) a clear right must be demonstrated;
(b) there must be an
injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and (c) the
absence of suitable alternative remedies.
[35].
In
Commercial
Stevedoring Agricultural and Allied Workers' Union and Others v Oak
Valley Estates (Pty) Ltd and Another (Oak Valley)
[8]
,
the Constitutional Court explained the importance of interdicts in
the constitutional dispensation as follows.
‘
In a
constitutional order, interdicts occupy a place of importance. In
granting an interdict a court enforces “the principle
of
legality that obliges courts to give effect to legally recognised
rights". The purpose of injunctive relief is to "put
an end
to conduct in breach of the applicant's rights". An interdict is
intended to protect an applicant from the actual or
threatened
unlawful conduct of the person sought to be interdicted.’
[36].
The applicants rely on a range of clear rights which, if not
protected by an interdict, will continue to be violated
and
threatened by Operation Dudula, including the rights to equality,
human dignity, life, freedom and security of the person,
education,
housing and healthcare. Importantly, Operation Dudula's vigilante
conduct also constitutes a clear violation of the
rule of law.
[37].
In
Chief
Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another
[9]
,
the Constitutional Court emphasised that:
‘
No one is entitled
to take the law into her or his own hands. Self-help, in this sense,
is inimical to a society in which the rule
of law prevails, as
envisioned by section 1(c) of our Constitution, which provides:
"The Republic of
South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the
following values:
(c)
Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law”.’
[38].
Taking the law into one's own hands is thus inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of our law.
[39].
As regards actual harm, the undisputed evidence reveals a clear
pattern of unlawful acts perpetrated by Operation Dudula,
its public
representatives, and its members, including incitement of violence
and hate speech. It has engaged in the incitement
of violence, the
propagation of hate speech and other unlawful conduct both at
gatherings and on its social media platforms. This
is in clear
contravention of section 8(6) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205
of 1993 (Gatherings Act). Section 10 of
the Promotion of
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000
(Equality Act) further prohibits speech that incites
harm on grounds
that include nationality, social origin, race and ethnicity.
[40].
Operation Dudula has, in a sustained pattern of activity, targeted
informal traders, shopkeepers and employees, by attacking
traders and
unlawfully directing businesses and traders to cease to operate, or
directing businesses to dismiss foreign employees.
This is in clear
violation of the right to dignity. Operation Dudula's conduct is also
in breach of the right to freedom and security
of the person, which
includes the right to be free from all forms of violence, from both
public and private sources. Moreover,
Operation Dudula has evicted
foreign nationals (and South African nationals living with them) from
their homes or has attempted
to do so. This is in clear violation of
section 26(3) of the Constitution and the Prevention of Illegal
Eviction from and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE
Act), which provide that no person may be evicted from their home
without an order of court,
in addition to other substantive and
procedural requirements.
[41].
Operation Dudula has interfered with access to health care at public
health facilities, including threatening and forcibly
removing
foreign nationals from facilities. This is in violation of the
section 27(1)(a) right of access to health care services
and
reproductive health care, which imposes an obligation on private
persons to desist from preventing or impairing this right
of access.
Similarly, Operation Dudula has interfered with access to education,
including by threatening foreign teachers and learners
at public
schools, resulting in the closure of at least one school in
Jeppestown, Johannesburg. This is in direct breach of the
right to
basic education under section 29(1)(a) of the Constitution, which
imposes a ‘negative obligation’ on private
persons to
refrain from impairing the existing enjoyment of this right. The
right to a basic education is afforded to all children,
regardless of
their immigration status. This conduct is further in breach of the
compulsory school attendance requirements under
section 3(6)(b) of
the Schools Act 84 of 1996, which prohibits any person ‘…
, without just cause, [from] prevent[ing]
a learner who is subject to
compulsory attendance from attending a school’. This conduct is
an offence, which is subject
to a fine or imprisonment for a period
not exceeding six months.
[42].
Importantly, Operation Dudula has routinely demanded that private
persons produce their personal identity documents
establishing legal
status in South Africa and inciting other private persons to so
demand personal identity documents.
[43].
As for the requirement of
reasonable apprehension of ongoing and future harm, there is no doubt
in my mind that the applicants have
established a reasonable
apprehension of future injuries if interdictory relief is not
granted. The requirement of
a ‘reasonable
apprehension’ was explained by the Appellate Division in
Minister
of Law and Order v Nordien
[10]
as follows.
‘
A reasonable
apprehension of injury has been held to be one which a reasonable man
might entertain on being faced with certain facts.
The applicant for
an interdict is not required to establish that, on a balance of
probabilities flowing from the undisputed facts,
injury will follow:
he has only to show that it is reasonable to apprehend that injury
will result. However, the test for apprehension
is an objective one.
This means that, on the basis of the facts presented to him, the
Judge must decide whether there is any basis
for the entertainment of
a reasonable apprehension by the applicant.’
[44].
The reasonable apprehension of further harm in this case is supported
by undisputed facts. First, when served with a
formal letter of
demand, Operation Dudula failed to provide any undertaking to desist
from this unlawful conduct and it has persisted
with that unlawful
conduct. Second, the evidence presented in the supplementary founding
affidavit demonstrates that, since launching
these proceedings,
Operation Dudula and its members have continued to act unlawfully and
have engaged in the very conduct impugned
in these proceedings. The
supplementary founding affidavit details further and persisting
incidents of incitement and hate speech,
unlawful demands for
personal identity documents, directing traders to cease to operate,
unlawful evictions and acts of vigilantism.
Third, the unlawful
conduct documented in the founding papers demonstrates a repeated
pattern, involving a clear
modus operandi
, that is consistent
with Operation Dudula's publicly stated aims. Following the launch of
the proceedings, Operation Dudula confirmed
that it intends to ignore
the court proceedings.
[45].
Lastly, it is so, as contended on behalf of the applicants, that
there is no suitable alternative to interdictory relief,
as it would
be impossible for the applicants or affected persons to approach a
court for a discrete order in response to every
single separate
incident of harassment or unlawful conduct, nor would that be an
appropriate use of judicial resources. Alternative
relief refers to
suitable alternative judicial remedies. Criminal procedures are not,
in general, an effective alternative to the
grant of an interdict
restraining unlawful conduct. In any event, interdictory relief and
further action by SAPS are not mutually
exclusive. The interdictory
relief sought by the applicants would empower the SAPS to take
effective action in future to address
Operation Dudula's unlawful
conduct, by providing the SAPS with clear guidance on the type of
activities that are prohibited.
[46].
All of the aforegoing translate into a proper case having been made
out on behalf of the applicants for the declaratory
and interdictory
relief against the Operation Dudula respondents. I therefore intend
granting the applicants that relief.
[47].
That brings me to the applicants’ case relating to the wearing
by Operation Dudula members of clothing resembling
South African
National Defence Force (‘SANDF’) uniforms.
Clothing
Resembling Military Uniforms
[48].
The only portion of the interdictory relief against Operation Dudula
that is opposed concerns Operation Dudula members
wearing clothing
resembling military uniforms. The SAPS and the DHA contest this
relief.
[49].
The applicants submit that the wearing of the military style attire
by members of Operation Dudula contravenes the provisions
of s 8(6)
and (8) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 (‘Gatherings
Act’) and s 104(5) of the Defence Act
42 of 2002 (‘
Defence
Act&rsquo
;), which, according to the applicants, contain separate
prohibitions on such activities.
[50].
Section 8(8) of the Gatherings Act prohibits the wearing of ‘any
form of apparel' that ‘resembles’
the uniform worn by
inter alia
the SANDF. Section 12(1)(c), read with s 12(1)(j),
of the Gatherings Act makes it a criminal offence to contravene
section 8 and
empowers the SAPS to ensure compliance with the
Gatherings Act.
Section 104(5)
of the
Defence Act prohibits
‘[a]ny
person who, without authority, possesses or wears prescribed uniforms
distinctive marks or crests, or performs any
prohibited act while
wearing such uniform or with such uniform, distinctive marks or
crests’. Contravening that provision
is an offence carrying a
fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years.
[51].
Whilst the facts in relation to the wearing of military style attire
by Operation Dudula members are not in dispute,
the SAPS and the DHA
contend that there is no legal basis to take steps to prevent or
arrest Operation Dudula members wearing the
said clothing at
gatherings. The applicants claim that the SAPS failed to investigate
and charge member of operation Dudula who
wore clothing resembling
the uniform of the SANDF in contravention of the
section 8
(6) of the
Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 and
section 104(5)
of the
Defence Act 42 of 2002
.
[52].
Section 104
(5) of the
Defence Act 42 of 2002
provides as follows: -
‘
(5) Any
person who, without the written authority of the Chief of the Defence
Force, possesses or wears any uniform or part
thereof, distinctive
mark or crest that has been determined by the Chief of the Defence
Force as official attire in the Defence
Force, or performs any
prohibited act while wearing such uniform or with such uniform,
distinctive mark or crest, is guilty of
an offence and liable on
conviction to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five
years.’
[53].
It was submitted on behalf of the SAPS that a plain reading of this
section clearly speaks to the possession and wearing
of an actual
SANDF uniform with its distinctive mark or crest. This section does
not make mention of ‘resemblance’
or ‘likeness’
to an SANDF uniform. It is therefore contended by the SAPS that this
section is not applicable to the
complaint by the applicants.
[54].
I agree with this submission. In my view, the section, interpreted
textually, contextually and purposively, only prohibits
the wearing
of actual SANDF unforms with the distinctive mark or crest. The
provision says so in as many words. Moreover, the purpose
of the
provision is clearly aimed at a prohibition against holding oneself
out as a member of the SANDF.
[55].
Section 8
(8) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act provides as
follows: -
‘
(8)
No person shall at any gathering or demonstration wear any form of
apparel that resembles
any of the uniforms worn by members of the
security forces, including the Police and the South African Defence
Force.’
[56].
In my view, the evidence before me does not support a conclusion, as
contended for by the applicants, that the military
style attire worn
by members of Operation Dudula at their gatherings ‘resemble
any of the uniforms worn by members of the
security forces’.
Importantly, the clothing worn by Operation Dudula members do not
bear the distinctive mark or crest which
distinguishes a SANDF
uninform, for example, from those worn at gatherings by the said
members. Therefore, at a factual level,
I am of the view that the
applicants have not demonstrated that the provisions of s 8(8) have
been contravened by the Operation
Dudula respondents.
[57].
I therefore do not accept the contention on behalf of the applicants
that the members of Operation Dudula contravenes
s 8(8) of the
Gatherings Act in that they wear ‘any form of apparel' that
‘resembles’ the uniform
inter alia
worn by members
of the SANDF. It is not, in my view, sufficient that the attire
‘resembles’ the SANDF uniform as per
the Oxford English
Dictionary, namely ‘to be like, to have a likeness or
similarity to, to have some feature or property
in common with’
with it. The important point for me is that the clothes worn by the
Operation Dudula members do not bear
the distinguishing mark or crest
of the SANDF uniform. To hold otherwise would be stretching the
definition in the context of this
matter and, in particular, having
regard to the related legislation referenced
supra
, that being
s 104(5)
of the
Defence Act.
[58
].
For these reasons, the applicants are not entitled to the relief
sought by them in relation to wearing uniforms by the
members of
Operation Dudula. That relates to both the declaratory and the
interdictory relief sought against Operation Dudula and
the SAPS.
The
Alleged Failure by the Government to Fully Implement the National
Action Plan
[59].
The government's stated policy position, in line with its
constitutional and international law obligations, is to take
all
reasonable measures to combat xenophobia, racism and related forms of
unfair discrimination. That commitment is reflected in
the NAP,
referenced
supra
and which was adopted and approved by Cabinet
on 28 February 2019 and formally launched on 25 March 2019. This Plan
expressly seeks
to give effect to South Africa's commitments under
the 2002 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action. The government
has also
adopted a National Action Plan Implementation Plan,
representing the steps to be taken to implement the National Action
Plan over
a five-year period from 2019/2020 to 2023/2024.
[60].
The UN Guidelines on the Development of National Action Plans Against
Racial Discrimination (UN Guidelines), which are
referenced
throughout the NAP, describe the purpose of such plans as being to
‘help States give effect to their international
human rights
obligations related to the elimination of racial discrimination’.
These Guidelines emphasise that ‘State
bodies, including the
national institution for racial equality, ministries or departments
of justice, foreign affairs, defence,
education, health and so on,
are responsible for implementing the plan’.
[61].
It is the case on behalf of the applicants that more than five years
after its adoption, critical aspects of the NAP
and its
Implementation Plan have not been implemented. They therefore contend
that the government has failed in three critical
respects: (a) It has
not operationalised an early warning system and rapid response
mechanism in respect of racist and xenophobic
violence and hate
crimes; (b) It has not established or operationalised a system to
collect disaggregated data on racist and xenophobic
offences and hate
crimes; and (c) It has not taken proper steps to roll out social
mobilisation campaigns to combat racism,
xenophobia and related forms
of intolerance.
[62].
The Plan specifically emphasised the need for proper monitoring, data
collection and an effective response to acts of
xenophobic violence,
in the following terms:
‘
It is imperative
to monitor and report on attacks and to reach out to communities
affected by violence to reduce fear, assist victims,
and improve
reporting of incidents, It is equally important to promote a spirit
of integration through engaging communities where
xenophobia is most
rampant. Government should send out clear messages that violence
against foreign nationals and xenophobic attacks
will not be
tolerated and that those involved in such activities will be
prosecuted.’
[63].
The Implementation Plan of the NAP further set dates and targets for
the rollout of these mechanisms, recording that:
(a)
The Department of Justice (or other government entity) was to conduct
a baseline study
on the levels of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related tolerance by 31 March 2020, and to analyse the
disaggregated
data to determine patterns, trends and challenges by 30
September 2020;
(b)
The DOJ (or other government entity) was to establish an ‘effective
governance
structure’ in the form of a National Focal Point to
implement the National Action Plan, by 1 April 2020;
(c)
The DOJ was to secure funding for the implementation of the National
Action Plan by
31 March 2020;
(d)
The DOJ and Statistics South Africa were to collect disaggregated
data on racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
tolerance in the form of a virtual data repository for ongoing use,
to be operationalised
by 31 March 2021;
[64].
The NAP further recorded government's commitments that police would
‘prioritise’ the investigation of xenophobic
hate crimes,
that the prosecuting authority would deal with such cases
‘efficiently and speedily' and that such cases would
be
monitored.
[65].
The applicants submit that the government has failed to do any of the
aforegoing and to fully implement its own NAP.
Such failure, so the
case on behalf of the applicants goes, constitutes a breach of its
section 7(2)
constitutional obligations to respect, protect and
promote rights, which requires the state to take ‘reasonable
and effective’
steps. That, in turn, requires more than the
mere adoption of a plan, but it also requires action to implement
those plans.
[66].
For these reasons, the applicants apply for the relief sought in
paragraph 7 of the amended notice of motion, referred
to above.
[67].
The government and, in particular, the DHA offer very little by way
of resistance to this relief sought by the applicants.
[68].
The high watermark of the DHA’s grounds of opposition to this
relief is to the effect that the government bears
no responsibility
for the implementation of that Plan. As contended by the applicants,
this is an astounding approach to adopt.
Moreover, it demonstrates a
misunderstand of the contents and purpose of the NAP, which
explicitly places the burden of implementation
on the shoulders of
government. The Plan specifically acknowledges, at paragraph 159,
that ‘[g]overnment is responsible for
creating a legal and
policy framework for the prevention of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance as
well as for the effective
implementation of the prevention measures and practices’.
[69].
Whilst the NAP calls for the engagement and assistance of civil
society and private actors, this does not detract from
the
government's primary legal responsibility for the protection,
promotion and fulfilment of rights. The buck stops with the
government for any failures to implement the Plan, as it is the
primary bearer of constitutional obligations under section 7(2)
of
the Constitution.
[70].
In these circumstances, I find myself in agreement with the
applicants contention that the government's unexplained
failures to
give proper effect to critical components of the NAP are an
unconstitutional violation of its duties. The just and
equitable
remedy that must follow is a mandamus, requiring the government to
take reasonable steps to implement its own plan, as
is sought in
prayer 7 of the notice of motion. Such an order is consistent with
this Court's just and equitable remedial powers
under section
172(1)(b) of the Constitution.
The
Alleged Failures by the SAPS to Combat, Prevent and Investigate
Criminal Conduct
[71].
In addition to its general section 7(2) constitutional obligations,
the SAPS has a specific duty under section 205(3)
of the Constitution
‘to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public
order, to protect and secure the inhabitants
of the Republic and
their property, and to uphold and enforce the law’.
[72].
The SAPS's constitutional duties are reinforced by section 13 of the
South African Police Services Act 68 of 1995 (SAPS
Act). Section 13
(1) to (3)(a) provides that:
‘
(1)
Subject to the Constitution and with due regard to the fundamental
rights of every person, a member may exercise
such powers and shall
perform such duties and functions as are by law conferred on or
assigned to a police official.
(2)
Where a member becomes aware that a prescribed offence has been
committed, he or she shall inform his
or her commanding officer
thereof as soon as possible.
(3)
(a) A member who is obliged to perform an
official duty, shall, with due regard
to his or her powers, duties
and functions, perform such duty in a manner that is reasonable in
the circumstances.’
[73].
The SAPS is therefore one of the primary state agencies responsible
for the protection of the public in general, including
foreign
nationals, against the invasion of their fundamental rights by
perpetrators of criminal conduct.
[74].
The case on behalf of the applicants is that there are numerous
instances, as detailed in their founding papers, where
the SAPS
failed in its duties to adequately protect the public from Operation
Dudula's unlawful conduct. These failures, so the
case for the
applicants goes, fall into the following three broad categories: (a)
The failure to act when crimes were committed
in the presence of the
police; (b) The refusal to assist or accept complaints when foreign
nationals went to police stations to
lay charges; and (c) The
failure to take reasonable and effective steps to investigate crimes
reported to the police.
[75].
The allegation is made that there are multiple instances on the
papers where the police stood passively by while Operation
Dudula
members engaged in unlawful conduct. So, for example, it is alleged
that on 6 February 2022, at the Tsietsi Mashinini Centre,
in Jabavu,
Soweto, members of the SAPS accompanied Operation Dudula members in a
raid of the Centre, in which Operation Dudula
members went
door-to-door, harassing residents and demanding that they produce
documentation. The applicants submit that no explanation
is provided
for why SAPS officers were present, nor is there any explanation as
to why the SAPS officers failed to intervene to
prevent Operation
Dudula's unlawful conduct, which included the harassment and
intimidation of residents and the destruction of
their property.
[76].
SAPS officers are also alleged to have been present in Diepsloot on 6
April 2022, when the then leader of Operation
Dudula addressed a
crowd and incited violence against foreign nationals, calling for
people to deal with foreign nationals in their
community. Mr Elvis
Nyathi was murdered by a mob in Diepsloot later that evening after
the mob went door to door demanding passports
from people. In the
gathering earlier in the day, Operation Dudula’s leader
acknowledged the presence of the police when
he said:
‘
We will wait for
the police to leave and then disperse to the streets and our approach
will depend on the people we are fighting,
if those people have guns
and weapons, we also have guns and weapons.’
[77].
The response of the National Commissioner of the SAPS, who deposed to
the answering affidavit, is to deny knowledge
of these events, which,
according to the applicants, does not suffice to establish a genuine
dispute of fact. The applicants give
further examples of instances
where members of the SAPS allegedly stood by and watched whilst
Operation Dudula made itself guilty
of unlawful attacks on other
individuals.
[78].
In their founding papers, the applicants also detail evidence of the
police refusing to assist foreign nationals in
laying charges against
Operation Dudula members. So, for example, it is alleged that on 13
June 2022, at the Norwood police station,
SAPS members initially
refused to open cases against Operation Dudula members who had
threatened informal traders in Orange Grove.
At the time, a Sergeant
Mtshali allegedly made xenophobic remarks that ‘foreign
nationals are tiring’.
[79].
What is more, so the contention on behalf of the applicants goes, the
relevant evidence of these failures is not genuinely
in dispute by
the SAPS.
[80].
The applicants make the point quite poignantly that the SAPS's
unreasonable inaction and its lack of transparency is
illustrated by
its response to the murder of Mr Nyathi in Diepsloot in April 2022
following an Operation Dudula gathering –
a crime which caused
national and international outrage. In the aftermath of Mr Nyathi's
murder, so it is alleged by the applicants,
the SAPS proceeded to
conduct a ‘joint operation’, instead of investigating the
murder and the vigilante violence,
and in the process targeted
foreign nationals. The SAPS further admits that while arrests were
subsequently made, the murderers
remain at large and there have been
no successful prosecutions. No details are provided about the status
of the investigations
and what steps, if any, the SAPS is taking to
continue these investigations.
[81].
This indicates, so the applicants contend, that the manner in which
the SAPS investigated the murder of Mr Nyathi falls
far below the
standard set by the Constitutional Court.
[82].
For all of these reasons, the applicants apply, on the basis that the
SAPS has failed in its constitutional duties and
on the basis that
rights in the Bill of Rights have been infringed by the SAPS, for
‘appropriate’ and ‘just and
equitable’ relief
under sections 38 and 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. That relief, so
the contention is concluded, should
take the form of an order that
SAPS should be required to fulfil its constitutional obligations to
prevent, combat and investigate
crimes committed by Operation Dudula
and/or its members.
[83].
The SAPS denies that it breached its constitutional or legislative
obligations and therefore contends that the applicants
are not
entitled to the relief sought by them against the SAPS. It denies
that it has failed to protect victims of attacks by Operation
Dudula
or that they have failed to take steps to prevent Operation Dudula
from committing crimes.
[84].
As regards, for example, the 6 February 2022 incident referred to by
the applicants, the SAPS expressly denies that
its members
accompanied Operation Dudula, who, according to the SAPS, were in
fact accompanied by church leaders. Moreover, the
conduct complained
about was not in the presence of the SAPS.
[85].
As for the incident in Diepsloot on 6 April 2022, during which Mr
Nyathi was killed, the applicants allege that police
officers were
present when the leader of Operation Dudula addressed a crowd and
incited violence. And the third incident relates
to the SAPS’s
failure to intervene when Operation Dudula attacked waiters in the
Maboneng precinct.
[86].
In respect of these incidents, the case on behalf of the SAPS is that
they did respond to the precinct when they were
called. They
continued to monitor the situation and remained at the scene in order
to maintain law and order and to protect the
patrons and the
employees. A number of the employees, so the SAPS avers, laid
complaints, as a result of which dockets were opened
for further
investigation and/or arrests.
[87].
As for the applicants’ claims that the SAPS refused to assist
complainants or to receive complaints arising from
xenophobic
attacks, two particular incidents are referenced by the applicants.
[88].
The Applicants allege that on 13 June 2022, the Norwood Police
Station SAPS members refused to open cases against Operation
Dudula
members who had threatened informal traders. In response to these
assertions by the applicants, the SAPS provided references
to dockets
opened on 13 June 2022 for intimidation and malicious damage to
property under case number 251/03/2022. In addition,
the SAPS
indicates that the complainants were provided with the contact
details of the investigating officer for progress updates.
[89].
The SAPS accordingly submits that the aforegoing demonstrates that
they not only received complaints but they also investigated
the
claims made by foreign nationals. I agree with this submission.
Whilst it is so that the applicants maintain that there is
a pattern
of reluctance or refusal by the SAPS to act against Operation Dudula,
the SAPS has, in my view, demonstrated that they
have indeed acted
where they were called upon to do so.
[90].
The same applies to the claims by the applicants that the SAPS failed
to properly investigation complaints expeditiously.
In its answering
affidavit, the SAPS provides clear accounts where complaints were
laid and dockets were opened. By way of example,
the SAPS points out
that in the murder case of Mr Nyathi, suspects were arrested.
However, subsequently the case was struck from
the roll due to
witnesses failing to co-operate. The SAPS handed over its suspects,
the witness and the docket to the National
Prosecting authority to
secure the convictions of the suspects.
[91].
The point about the SAPS’s case on this aspect of the matter is
that they have always acted reasonably and that
it cannot be said
with conviction that they have thus far failed in their statutory and
legislative duties. To further demonstrate
the aforegoing, the SAPS
provided the applicants with the full fire inquiry documents,
including statements from shop owners, vendors
and foreigners, in
relation to the inquiry into the Yeoville marketplace fire, which
includes statements of a witness indicating
that the fire started in
shop 20, where a stove was left on, which seemingly caused the fire
to start. The SAPS, during its aforesaid
investigations,
indiscriminately interviewed and obtained statements from all the
shop owners and vendor whether foreign or not.
[92].
In
AK
v Minister of Police
[11]
,
the Constitutional Court at para 17 held as follows: -
‘
[71]
It follows from the above that the enquiry must be centred on whether
the SAPS acted reasonably in
the circumstances, considering the
resources which were available to them at the time. Whether the SAPS
acted reasonably is based
on, amongst others, the positive obligation
imposed on organs of state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil
the rights in the
Bill of Rights. I therefore agree with the
applicant that the SAPS must establish that they took reasonable and
appropriate measures
available to them in the circumstances.
Furthermore, in my view, the enquiry must centre on whether the SAPS
took reasonable measures
to protect and fulfil the rights of women,
such as the applicant, to dignity, equality and freedom and security
of the person,
including the right to be free from violence from both
public and private sources.’
[93].
Also at para 86, the Constitutional Court held as follows: -
‘
[86]
For these reasons, the police investigation was negligent. The police
failed to take reasonable measures
which were available to them in
the circumstances. They furthermore failed to act promptly and
expeditiously so as to follow up
on any available leads. The
investigation was not deficient because it failed to result in a
successful prosecution of the applicant's
perpetrators, but because
the methodology was flawed; the police failed to act diligently and
with the skill required of them by
the Constitution.’
[94].
On the basis of this authority and having regard to the evidence
before me, I conclude that the SAPS has within its
framework acted
reasonably in its investigations of reported matters relating to
foreigners. The applicants have therefore, in
my view, failed to
demonstrate why the court should exercise its discretion in favour of
the applicants for the declaratory relief
sought against the SAPS.
SAPS
and the DHA alleged Communications and Collusion with Operation
Dudula
[95].
The applicants contend that the answering affidavits of the SAPS and
the DHA disclose that there has been ongoing engagement
and
communication between state officials and Operation Dudula, the
details of which have not been provided to the court, despite
express
invitation and demand. The SAPS admits that it has previously
‘escorted' Operation Dudula members on some of their
’missions’. In that regard, the National Commissioner of
the SAPS states in its answering affidavit that ‘where
the SAPS
is requested to escort a march or protest, it has an obligation to do
so to ensure it remains peaceful’. And the
DHA admits that it
has had communications and meetings with Operation Dudula, but,
according to the applicants, also elects not
to disclose any details,
disturbingly suggesting that it has no records of these engagements.
[96].
The Director-General of the DHA, who deposed to its answering
affidavit, states that ‘the DHA does admit communicating
from
time to time, and when necessary, with civic organisations, including
Operation Dudula’. He furthermore confirms that
the DHA admits
‘having communicated with Operation Dudula in the past, however
there is no record of any correspondence AND/OR
letters between the
DHA and Operation Dudula’.
[97].
The applicants furthermore note that the SAPS and DHA admit
conducting joint operations in areas that had been specifically
targeted by Operation Dudula. For example, the National Commissioner
of the SAPS specifically admits a ‘joint operation between
the
SAPS and immigration officials’ in Diepsloot, immediately
following the murder of Mr Nyathi, with the purpose of ‘verify[ing]
the status in the particular area’. The applicants make the
point, in that regard, that no details are provided as to how
this
operation was planned, who gave the orders to conduct these
operations, for what reasons, and whether there were communications
with Operation Dudula in the process. Disturbingly, so the submission
on behalf of the applicants goes, in the aftermath of a murder
allegedly instigated by Operation Dudula, the response of the SAPS
was to conduct an operation in the area to ‘verify the
status’
of non-national residents.
[98].
The aforegoing, so the case on behalf of the applicants is concluded
on this aspect of the matter, coupled with the
deliberate refusal to
disclose relevant engagement with Operation Dudula by both the SAPS
and the DHA, ground sufficiently a basis
for an order in terms of
prayers 9 and 10 of the notice of motion prohibiting collusion with
Operation Dudula including the conduct
of raids at its instigation.
Such an order, according to the applicants, would prohibit support
for or collusion with Operation
Dudula, interdict the SAPS and the
DHA from ‘conducting raids targeting whole communities at the
instigation of [Operation
Dudula] or any of its office-bearers or
members in the absence of a warrant or a reasonable suspicion that
identified individuals
have committed a criminal offence’.
[99].
The DHA has in its answering papers denied allegations concerning any
collusion with Operation Dudula. What is denied,
in particular, by
the DHA is that it or its officers collude and join forces with
Operation Dudula when conducting searches against
illegal foreigners.
The DHA submits that the applicants have not, in their founding
papers, produced any evidence which prove any
of the allegations of
collusion and therefore contends that the sought relief should be
refused on the basis that it is without
any factual grounds.
[100].
The DHA explains that when raids and searches are done, it is
governed by
sections 33(5)
and (6) of the
Immigration Act. It
denies
being involved in any of the alleged raids and searches alleged in
the founding papers. Moreover, so the DHA contends, the
applicants
have failed to prove and establish, as they are required to do in
order to establish a clear right if they were to obtain
interdictory
relief, that the DHA has factually colluded with Dudula. This is a
factual enquiry. There are no clear facts in the
founding papers to
sustain the allegations of support and collusion other than
speculations and suspicions. The SAPS adopts a similar
approach to
that of the DHA, namely that a factual basis has not been established
to support the relief sought in relation to collusion.
[101].
I agree with these contentions on behalf of DHA and the SAPS. And the
interdictory relief sought in that regard by
the applicants should
not be granted.
Section
41
of the
Immigration Act
[102
].
Section 41
of the
Immigration Act is
frequently used by the SAPS and
the DHA to conduct dragnet, warrantless raids and operations in
public streets, as well as in private
homes and businesses. The
applicants, with a view to ensuring the effective protection of
rights, seek declaratory and interdictory
relief, confirming that the
s 41
powers may not be exercised by private individuals, other than
police officers and immigration officials. I have already indicated
supra
that the applicants are entitled to such a declaratory
order for the reasons alluded to above.
[103].
Secondly, the applicants have mounted a constitutional challenge to
s 41
, alternatively, ask for declaratory orders on the proper
interpretation of these powers, to ensure that these powers are
exercised
by state officials in a manner that is consistent with
human rights. This addresses the question of how these powers may be
lawfully
exercised.
[104].
Section 41
of the
Immigration Act gives
immigration officials and
police officers the power to request any person to identify
themselves and their immigration status,
in the following terms: -
‘
41
Identification
(1)
When so requested by an immigration officer or a police officer, any
person
shall identify himself or herself as a citizen, permanent
resident or foreigner, and if on reasonable grounds such immigration
officer or police officer is not satisfied that such person is
entitled to be in the Republic, such person may be interviewed by
an
immigration officer or a police officer about his or her identity or
status, and such immigration officer or police officer
may take such
person into custody without a warrant, and shall take reasonable
steps, as may be prescribed, to assist the person
in verifying his or
her identity or status, and thereafter, if necessary detain him or
her in terms of
section 34.
’
[105].
As submitted on behalf of the applicants, the powers envisaged by
s
41
has five components: (a) Stop and identification: An immigration
officer or police officer may request that any person identify
themselves as a citizen, permanent resident or foreigner, without any
restrictions or guidance on the time, place, or reasons for
this
demand; (b) Interview: After this request for identification, if ‘on
reasonable grounds’ an immigration or police
officer is not
satisfied that the person is entitled to be in the Republic, they may
interview the person about their identity
or status; (c) Arrest and
detention without a warrant: The person may then be arrested and
taken into custody without a warrant,
for purposes of further steps
to verify their identity or status; (d) Verification: While in
custody, the immigration officer or
police officer will then take
steps to assist the person in verifying their identity, following the
procedure prescribed in regulation
37 of the Immigration Regulations;
and (e) Section 34 detention: The person may, ‘if necessary',
be further detained in terms
of
s 34
of the
Immigration Act, which
is
the provision regulating detention of illegal foreigners pending
deportation.
Section 34
permits the arrest and detention of a person,
without a warrant, for a period of up to 48 hours, which may later be
extended by
a court for an initial period of up to 30 days and a
further period of up to 90 days.
[106].
Regulation 37
, titled ‘Identification’, provides that:
‘
An immigration
officer or police officer shall take the following steps in order to
verify the identity or status of the person
contemplated in section
41(1) of the Act:
(a)
access relevant documents that may be readily available in this
regard;
(b)
contact relatives or other persons who could prove such identity and
status;
(c)
access Departmental records in this regard;
or
(d)
provide the necessary means for the person to obtain the documents
that may
confirm his or her identity and status.’
[107].
In
Lawyers
for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs and Others
[12]
,
the Constitutional Court declared s 34 to be constitutionally
invalid, it suspended that order for 24 months and granted an interim
reading-in order to ensure protections pending the enactment of
amendments. When Parliament failed to pass amending legislation
in
time, the Constitutional Court granted further supplementary relief,
expanding the interim protections pending the enactment
of remedial
legislation
[13]
.
[108].
A failure or refusal to comply with a s 41 request for identification
carries harsh criminal sanctions under
section 49(6)
of the
Immigration Act, punishable
by up to five years' imprisonment.
[109].
As I have already indicated, the applicants have mounted a
constitutional challenge to
s 41.
They, in particular, take issue
with the manner in which the powers conferred on immigration
officials and police officers ought
to be lawfully exercised in a
manner that is consistent with the constitution and the individual
rights enshrined in the Bill of
Rights.
[110].
The applicants impugn
s 41
on the ground that it is not consistent
with the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and they have
identified three constitutional
defects in the said section and its
application, namely: (a) These powers are not confined to public
places, but have been used
to conduct warrantless searches in private
places that include the home and places of study, work or business;
(b) The section
does not impose any guidance, internal safeguards or
constraints for when or how these
s 41
powers may be used. For
instance, it does not require that an immigration officer or police
officer act reasonably or hold a reasonable
suspicion that a person
is unlawfully in South Africa, in order to request them to identify
themselves as a citizen, permanent
resident or foreigner; and (c)
Section 41
authorises the arrest and detention of children, without
adequate safeguards that are consistent with the children's
constitutional
rights.
[111].
The applicants contend that
s 41
should either be declared invalid
due to these unconstitutional defects, alternatively it should be
read down to preserve its constitutional
validity, with appropriate
declaratory relief to give proper guidance on its application.
[112].
This constitutional challenge, so the applicants’ case goes,
has its genesis in the fact that
s 41
has been repeatedly used by the
DHA and the SAPS to conduct so-called ‘joint operations’,
in which communities that
had previously been targeted by Operation
Dudula are subjected to raids. The Minister of Home Affairs have
confirmed that these
raids had involved warrantless searches and
invoked
s 41
as the legal basis for this conduct. In correspondence
between the Minister and the legal representatives of the applicants,
the
Minister stated that ‘
section 41
permits an immigration
officer or a police officer to exercise the powers bestowed upon him
or her without a warrant’. The
DHA has also officially adopted
the approach that ‘[t]he immigration officers and members of
the SAPS do not require any
warrant to request someone to identify
himself or herself.
Section 41
even permits detention of a person so
identified without a warrant’.
[113].
The applicants contend that the indiscriminate nature of these
s 41
powers means that any person may be arrested and detained if they are
unable to provide documentation, including citizens and children.
That is confirmed by the further evidence presented by the SAHRC of
the arrest of a 16-year-old girl, who is a South African citizen,
when she was unable to provide identification to police officers.
[114].
The first challenge
relates to the exercise of the
s 41
powers in private spaces during
warrantless raids. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly confirmed
that warrantless searches
and raids are a severe violation of
constitutional rights, including the rights to privacy and
dignity
[14]
. Section 14 of the
Constitution grants everyone the right to privacy, which specifically
includes the right not to have one's person,
home or property
searched
[15]
. This right is
intimately connected with the right to dignity, guaranteeing a ‘right
to a sphere of intimacy and autonomy
that should be protected from
invasion’
[16]
.
[115].
In
Residents
of Industry House
[17]
,
in a constitutional challenge to a provision of the
South African
Police Service Act 68 of 1995
that permitted warrantless raids of
buildings targeting foreign nationals, Mhlantla J (for a unanimous
Constitutional Court on
these issues) held:
‘
The rights to
privacy and dignity in the Constitution attach to "everyone"
and not just citizens. Human dignity has no
nationality. It appears
to me that the respondents were under the impression that because the
applicants were largely suspected
to be non-citizens or undocumented
they could repeatedly over many months at any hour of the day or
night violate their rights
without consequence. This cannot be so.’
[116].
On the basis of these authorities, the applicants contend that, to
the extent that s 41 authorises warrantless raids
on homes and
businesses, as contended for by the Minister, it constitutes a severe
limitation of these rights, for which no justification
is provided.
This therefore stands to be declared invalid.
[117].
In response to the applicants’ claim for the aforegoing relief,
the DHA and the SAPS adopt an interpretation
of s 41 that directly
contradicts their conduct and position before the litigation. The DHA
in its answering affidavit states that
‘[i]t is not correct
that section 41 permits warrantless raids of people's homes and other
places. There is no provision
for such in the section, and there are
no words in the section approximating such an effect’. The
Director-General further
states that ‘[i]mplicit to the
provisions of s 41 are the guidelines and guiding principles set out
in s 33 of the Act for
searches and arrest’. The deponent for
the SAPS, the National Commissioner, states that "[o]n [a]
reasonable reading
and interpretation of the section it does not
permit warrantless raids of any kind’.
[118].
This, in my view, amounts to a concession on the part of the DHA and
the SAPS that s 41 does not permit of warrantless
stops, raids and
searches. The said section must accordingly either be declared
invalid to the extent that it permits warrantless
searches,
alternatively, it must be read down to preserve its constitutional
validity.
[119].
Section 41 is, in my judgment, indeed capable of a constitutionally
compatible reading, that does not permit warrantless
searches. I
agree with the applicants that it is in the interests of justice to
grant the declaratory relief sought by the applicants
in prayer 14A.1
of the amended notice of motion, which would confirm that the powers
conferred on DHA officials and SAPS officers
by s 41 ‘do not
authorise warrantless searches in private places that include the
home and places of study, work or business’.
[120].
Such a declaratory order
would be a just and equitable remedy in the circumstances,
particularly given the apparent confusion and
disagreement within the
DHA and SAPS over the scope of their s 41 powers. Declaratory relief
in such circumstances plays an important
role, in providing guidance
on the future use of s 41 powers. As the Constitutional Court
observed in
Rail
Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail
[18]
‘
[a] declaratory
order is a flexible remedy which can assist in clarifying legal and
constitutional obligations in a manner which
promotes the protection
and enforcement of our Constitution and its values’.
[121].
I am of the view that the same argument applies to the second ground
on which the constitutional challenge is directed
at s 41, namely the
said section confers an unguided discretion on immigration officials
and police officers to stop and question
any person, which is not
qualified by any requirement of reasonable suspicion or any other
restrictions on how these powers should
be exercised.
[122].
The applicants contend that it appears from the pre-litigation
conduct and the positions of the SAPS and the DHA that
they both
consider s 41 to confer an unconstrained power to request any person,
anywhere and at any time, to produce their documents,
without the
need for a warrant even if the request is made in a private place.
This appears from correspondence from the Minister
of Home Affairs,
confirming the use of s 41 in joint SAPS / DHA operations throughout
Johannesburg targeting whole parts of the
City through warrantless
raids of homes and businesses, as well as from their conduct.
[123].
On this interpretation adopted by the SAPS and the DHA, any
immigration official or SAPS officer may stop any person
and request
that they identify themselves, at any time and any place, in any
manner, and for any reason (or without any particular
reason).
[124].
As submitted on behalf of the applicants, this is a coercive power
that is coupled with a duty to cooperate on pain
of criminal
sanction. Any person who fails or refuses to cooperate or respond to
this request to identify themselves is guilty
of a criminal offence,
punishable by up to five years' imprisonment. If they do answer, and
their answer is disbelieved for any
reason, they face the risk of
being arrested and detained without a warrant while officials conduct
further inquiries under s 41
and face the risk of further detention
under s 34 if the officials are not satisfied with the outcome of
those investigations.
[125].
These risks are not confined to non-citizens. Any citizen who is
undocumented or has lost or misplaced their identity
documents would
face the same risks, as confirmed by the experience of the minor
child, Ms SN, a South African national whose complaint
was
investigated by the SAHRC.
[126].
This directly limits the rights to privacy and dignity, which
together confer a general ‘right to be left alone
by the
state’, unless specific conditions are satisfied. It also
implicates the section 12(1) right not to be ‘deprived
of
freedom' arbitrarily or without just cause, a right which is
expressly not confined to circumstances of arrest and detention.
These freedom rights are implicated whenever a person is accosted by
a police officer or immigration official, using their s 41
powers,
and is prevented from walking away or remaining silent, on pain of
criminal sanctions for non-cooperation. However, these
s 41 powers
are not qualified by any requirement that police officers or
immigration officers must have reasonable cause for stopping
and
questioning a person or any other guidance on when or how these
powers may be lawfully exercised.
[127].
The Constitutional Court has repeatedly held that it is
unconstitutional to afford broad discretionary powers that
threaten
constitutional rights without appropriate guidance on their use.
[128].
In
Dawood
and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and
Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and
Another v
Minister of Home Affairs and Others
[19]
,
the Constitutional Court struck down a statutory provision that
conferred unguided discretionary powers on immigration officers
to
grant or refuse foreign spouses temporary residence permits. There
the Court held that:
‘
[54]
We must not lose sight of the fact that rights enshrined in the Bill
of Rights must be protected and
may not be unjustifiably infringed.
It is for the Legislature to ensure that, when necessary, guidance is
provided as to when limitation
of rights will be justifiable. It is
therefore not ordinarily sufficient for the Legislature merely to say
that discretionary powers
that may be exercised in a manner that
could limit rights should be read in a manner consistent with the
Constitution in the light
of the constitutional obligations placed on
such officials to respect the Constitution. Such an approach would
often not promote
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights. Guidance will often be required to ensure that the
Constitution takes root
in the daily practice of governance. Where
necessary, such guidance must be given. Guidance could be provided
either in the legislation
itself on where appropriate, by a
legislative requirement that delegated legislation be properly
enacted by a competent authority.
[55]
Such guidance is demonstrably absent in this case. It is important
that discretion be conferred
upon immigration officials to make
decisions concerning temporary permits. Discretion of this kind,
though subject to review, is
an important part of the statutory
framework under consideration. However, no attempt has been made by
the Legislature to give
guidance to decision-makers in relation to
their power to refuse to extend or grant temporary permits in a
manner that would protect
the constitutional rights of spouses and
family members.’
[129].
I conclude that s 41 is capable of a constitutionally compatible
interpretation. It can and should be interpreted as
requiring a
police officer or immigration official to hold a reasonable suspicion
that a person is unlawfully in South Africa before
they may request a
person to identify themselves as a citizen, permanent resident or
foreigner. That is reflected in the declaratory
relief sought in
prayer 14A.2 of the amended notice of motion.
Children's
Rights
[130].
The SAHRC presented uncontested evidence that, as a consequence of
section 41, a 15-year-old child, Ms SN, was detained
after she could
not provide documentation to prove her citizenship or immigration
status. Ms SN was subjected to this treatment
even though she is a
citizen. In its answering affidavit to the SAHRC, the SAPS's
deponent, Brigadier Nevhuhulwi, does not deny
that SN was
interrogated and then arrested under section 41. The SAPS also does
not deny that section 41 has been and will continue
to be applied to
children in this way.
[131].
While the SAPS acknowledges that it applies section 41 to children,
it suggests that if a member of SAPS ‘ascertains
that the
individual being arrested is a minor child, that child will be
immediately released’. However, no formal guidance
to that
effect is to be found in section 41 itself, the
Children's Act 38 of
2005
, the
Child Justice Act 75 of 2008
or in the National Instruction
referenced in the SAPS' answering affidavit.
[132].
Thie means, as contended on behalf of the applicants, that
s 41
has
the potential to be interpreted with unconstitutional and
rights-limiting consequences for all whom it impacts, including
adults and children. However, the impact on children is a matter for
particular concern, as courts are required by section 28(2)
of the
Constitution and the
Children's Act to
ensure that the best interests
of children are considered paramount in all matters concerning the
child.
[133].
It is not in the best interests of children to subject them to such
questioning under
s 41
, which carries criminal sanctions for any
failure or refusal to cooperate. It is also unconstitutional to
subject children
to warrantless arrest and detention under
s 41
,
except as a matter of last resort and subject to safeguards.
[134].
I am therefore of the view that
s 41
should be read down to avoid
these unconstitutional consequences, with an appropriate declaratory
order, as reflected in prayer
14A.3.
Conclusion
and Costs
[135].
In this application, the applicants seek to prohibit conduct by
Operation Dudula that is unlawful. They also apply
for orders
requiring the SAPS and the DHA to discharge their obligations in
their dealing with Operation Dudula and victims of
its conduct.
Moreover, the applicants seek an order requiring the government to
implement its own policy — the 2019 National
Action Plan —
to combat racism and xenophobia. And lastly the applicants apply to
have
s 41
of the
Immigration Act subjected
to appropriate
constitutional scrutiny. As I have already indicated
supra
,
the applicants are entitled to some of the relief sought by them in
their amended notice of motion and they are not entitled to
other
relief.
[136].
As for costs, the applicants have been substantially successful
against Operation Dudula and those government respondents,
who
opposed the application. This means that, applying the general rule
that a successful party should be awarded the costs of
his suit, the
applicants should be awarded the costs of the opposed application as
against the foregoing respondents.
Order
[137].
In the result, I make the following order:
(1)
It be and is hereby declared that only an
immigration officer or a police officer has the power in terms of
section 41
of the
Immigration Act 13 of 2002
to demand that another
private person produce her / his passport or other identity documents
to demonstrate her / his right to
be in the Republic of South Africa
and that no private person has the power to do so unless expressly so
authorised by law.
(2)
The first respondent, the eleventh and twelfth
respondents be and are hereby interdicted and restrained from
demanding that any
private person produce her / his passport or other
identity documents to demonstrate her / his right to be in the
Republic.
(3)
The first respondent, the eleventh and the twelfth
respondents be and are hereby interdicted and restrained from: -
(a)
Intimidating, harassing and/or assaulting any
individuals that they identify as being foreign nationals;
(b)
Making public statements that constitute hate
speech on the grounds of nationality, social origin or ethnicity at
public gatherings,
on social media platforms or in any other way;
(c)
Interfering with the access of foreign nationals
to health care services and/or their right to such access;
(d)
Interfering with access to, or the operations of,
schools and intimidating or harassing learners, teachers or parents
at schools;
(e)
Unlawfully evicting foreign nationals from their
homes;
(f)
Unlawfully removing foreign nationals from their
trading stalls or interfering with the employment of foreign
nationals in shops
and businesses;
(g)
Instigating, encouraging or inciting any other
person to perform any of the acts prohibited by this order, on social
media, at gatherings
in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205
of 1993, or in any other way;
(4)
The first respondent be and is hereby ordered and
directed to communicate this order to any and/or all of its
office-bearers and
members.
(5)
The second respondent be and is hereby directed
and ordered to take reasonable steps to implement the National Action
Plan to Combat
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance, including by: -
(a)
taking steps to establish an early warning and
rapid response mechanism regarding threats of xenophobic hate speech
and hate crimes;
(b)
collating and publishing disaggregated data in
respect of xenophobic hate speech and hate crimes, including the
prosecution and
conviction of persons who commit such offences.
(6)
It be and is hereby declared that on a proper
interpretation of section 41 of
Immigration Act 13 of 2002
, the
powers conferred on an immigration officer or police officer:
(a)
are confined to public places and do not authorise
warrantless searches in private places that include the home and
places of study,
work or business;
(b)
require that an immigration officer or police
officer hold a reasonable suspicion that a person is unlawfully in
South Africa in
order to request them to identify themselves as a
citizen, permanent resident or foreigner; and
(c)
do not permit the interrogation, arrest and
detention of children under the age of 18, except as a measure of
last resort and in
a manner that is consistent with section 28(1)(g)
of the Constitution.
(7)
The first, second, third, fourth, sixth, eleventh
and twelfth respondents, jointly and severally, the one paying the
other to be
absolved, shall pay the applicants costs of their opposed
Special Motion, such cost to include the costs of three Counsel,
where
so employed, and in regard to Counsel’s costs incurred
after 12 April 2024, same shall be on scale ‘C’ of the
tariff applicable in terms of Uniform Rule of Court 67A.
L R ADAMS
Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg
HEARD ON:
10 and 11 June 2025
JUDGMENT DATE:
4 November 2025
FOR THE APPLICANTS:
J Brickhill, with C
McConnachie and
Z Raqowa
INSTRUCTED BY:
SERI Law Clinic,
Braamfontein, Johannesburg
FOR THE FIRST,
ELEVENTH AND
TWELFTH RESPONDENTS:
No appearance
INSTRUCTED BY:
No appearance
FOR THE SECOND
RESPONDENT:
No appearance
INSTRUCTED BY:
No appearance
FOR THE THIRD AND
FOURTH
RESPONDENTS (THE
SAPS):
W Isaaks
INSTRUCTED BY:
The State Attorney,
Johannesburg
FOR THE FIFTH
RESPONDENT (THE
DHA):
W Mokhare SC, with K
Mnyandu
INSTRUCTED BY:
The State Attorney,
Johannesburg
FOR THE SIXTH,
SEVENTH, EIGHTH
AND NINTH RESPONDENTS:
No appearance –
all of these
respondents delivered
notice of intention
to abide the Court’s
decision
INSTRUCTED BY:
The State Attorney,
Johannesburg
FOR THE TENTH
RESPONDENT (MEC
for EDUCATION,
GAUTENG):
No appearance
INSTRUCTED BY:
The State Attorney,
Johannesburg
FOR THE THIRTEENTH
RESPONDENT
(THE HRC of SA):
I De Vos
INSTRUCTED BY:
The Human Rights
Commission of South
Africa, Johannesburg
FOR THE FIRST
AMICUS
CURIAE
(SECTION27):
N Nyembe
INSTRUCTED BY:
Section27,
Braamfontein
FOR THE SECOND
AMICUS
CURIAE
(THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISION
OF JURISTS or ICJ):
T Pooe
INSTRUCTED BY:
Webber Wentzel, Cape
Town
FOR THE THIRD
AMICUS
CURIAE
(MEDIA MONITORING
AFRICA TRUST
or MMA):
Deborah Mutemwa, with
Akhona Mehlo
INSTRUCTED BY:
Power & Associates
Incorporated,
Rosebank, Johannesburg
FOR THE FOURTH
AMICUS
CURIAE
(UNITED NATIONS
SPECIAL
RAPPORTEUR ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
DEFENDERS):
Jatheen Bhima
INSTRUCTED BY:
Lawyers for Human
Rights,
Braamfontein,
Johannesburg
[1]
Footnote 13.
[2]
National Action Plan to
Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance, 13 March 2019.
[3]
Section 39(1)(b)
provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court ‘must
consider international law’.
[4]
Section 233 of the
Constitution requires that ‘[w]hen interpreting any
legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable
interpretation
of the legislation that is consistent with international law over
any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent
with
international law’. This requires that a court is to prefer an
interpretation that aligns with international law standards,
rather
than that which is inconsistent with such standards.
[5]
S v Makwanyane and
Another
[1995] ZACC 3
;
1995 (3) SA 391
(CC);
1995 (6) BCLR 665
(CC)
(Makwanyane) at para 35.
[6]
See
Special
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance
,
'The Phenomenon of Xenophobia and its Conceptualization, Trends and
Manifestations' (2016) A/HRC/32/50 at paras 6 to 14. All
of these
instruments prohibit discrimination on relevant grounds, including
race, colour, language, religion, and national or
social origin, and
further require that states parties secure the rights of all persons
within their territory.
[7]
United Nations, Durban
Declaration and Plan of Action, adopted at the World Conference
Against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related
Violence, 8 September 2001, endorsed by the UN General Assembly
Resolution 56/266 of 15 May 2002 (Durban
Declaration).
[8]
Commercial
Stevedoring Agricultural and Allied Workers' Union and Others v Oak
Valley Estates (Pty) Ltd and Another
(CCT
301/20)
[2022] ZACC 7
;
[2022] 6 BLLR 487
(CC);
2022 (7) BCLR 787
(CC);
2022 (5) SA 18
(CC) (Oak Valley) at para 19.
[9]
Chief Lesapo v North
West Agricultural Bank and Another
[1999]
ZACC 16
;
2000 (1) SA 409
(CC);
1999 (12) BCLR 1420
(CC) at para 11.
[10]
Minister of Law and
Order v Nordien
1987
(2) SA 894
(A) at 896G-I, restated with approval in
Oak
Valley
id
at para 19.
[11]
AK v Minister of
Police
2023
(2) SA 321 (CC).
[12]
Lawyers for Human
Rights v Minister of Home Affairs and Others
[2017] UCC 22;
2017 (10)
BCLR 1242
(CC);
2017 (5) SA 480
(CC).
[13]
See
Ex
parte Minister of Home Affairs and Others; In re Lawyers for Human
Rights v Minister of Home Affairs and Others
[2023] ZACC 34; 2024 (1)
BCLR 70 (CC); 2024 (2) SA 58 (CC).
[14]
See
Residents
of Industry House, 5 Davies Street, New Doornfontein, Johannesburg
and Others v Minister of Police and Others
[2021]
ZACC 37
;
2023 (3) SA 329
(CC);
2022 (1) BCLR 46
(CC) (Residents of
Industry House) at paras 49 to 57, and the cases cited there.
[15]
Section
14 provides that: -
‘
Everyone
has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have –
(a)
their person or home searched;
(b)
their property searched;
(c)
their possessions seized; or
(d)
the privacy of their communications infringed.’
[16]
Khumalo v Holomisa
[2002] ZACC 12
;
2002 (5)
SA 401
(CC);
2002 (8) BCLR 771
(CC) at para 27.
[17]
Footnote 13.
[18]
Rail Commuters Action
Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail
[2004]
ZACC 20
;
2005 (2) SA 359
(CC);
2005 (4) BCLR 301
(CC) 107.
[19]
Dawood and Another v
Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister
of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and
Another v Minister of Home
Affairs and Others
[2000]
ZACC 8
;
2000 (3) SA 936
(CC);
2000 (8) BCLR 837
(CC) 54 – 55.
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