N.P.K v K.A.K (15202/2020; 023432/2024) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1332 (24 November 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPJHC 1332 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## N.P.K v K.A.K (15202/2020; 023432/2024) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1332 (24 November 2025) N.P.K v K.A.K (15202/2020; 023432/2024) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1332 (24 November 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_1332.html sino date 24 November 2025 SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG (1) REPORTABLE: NO (2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3) REVISED: NO In the matter between: CASE NO:  15202/2020 and CASE NO : 023432/2024 In the matter between : N[…] P[…] K[…] Applicant And K[…] A[…] K[…] Respondent JUDGMENT VON LUDWIG AJ : Introduction [1]  On 18 March 2025 I heard 5 applications. 3 launched by Mrs K[…] and 1 by Mr K[…] were directed by the Deputy Judge President (“DJP”) to be heard on the same day. Mrs K[…]’s further application arose from this same-day rostering. [2]  Mrs K[…]’s first application she called “Application for Reconsideration of Date” (15202/2020). She contended that it was procedurally incorrect, and prejudicial to her, for the DJP to have allocated all 4 applications to be heard on the same day. [3]  I gave an ex tempore judgment, dismissing her application as having no basis in fact or in procedure. I made no costs order. [4]  Next came her applications to Set Aside Judgments of Bezuidenhout AJ in a R43(6) application (15202/2020) and Hardy AJ in an application to “set aside” the Bezuidenhout R43(6) Order (023432/2024) [5]  I gave one judgment under both case numbers on 01 September 2025 in which I dismissed both applications and awarded costs against the Applicant on the party and party scale C, finding that the Applicant had no “applicable legal premise on which to base the relief she seeks”. [6]  The third application was for a Contribution to Legal Costs in terms of Rule 43 (15202/2020). She sought to “stay” the Respondent’s “Compelled Disclosure Application” and applied for costs for “defending and complying with” that disclosure application, “the legal costs arising from the pending divorce case” and “the legal costs associated with the pending applications seeking to set aside the contested urgent stay and Rule 43(6) judgments”. The latter referred to her Applications in respect of the Bezuidenhout and Hardy Judgments. [7]  I dismissed the R43 application ex tempore with party and party costs on scale B, part of my reasoning being that the costs of the “Compelled Disclosure Application” and the Bezuidenhout and Hardy applications would flow from whatever occurred in the hearing of those applications on that very day, as they in fact did. The transcript of this Judgment is dated 11 July 2025. [8]  On behalf of Mr K[…] application was made to compel compliance with his Notices in terms of R35 of the Superior Courts Act and s7 of the Matrimonial Property Act (the “Compelled Disclosure Application”) (15202/2020).  I granted this relief ex tempore and awarded party and party costs on scale B. A written judgment was given but had the other case number. The corrected judgment was dated 02 October 2025. Leave to Appeal [9]  The Applicant seeks Leave to Appeal all of these decisions. The Respondent opposes all. [10]  The Applicant has brought her 5 applications for leave to appeal in 3 parts. The first one dated 19 April 2025 is “Application for Leave to Appeal (Reconsideration of the Hearing Schedule; Compelled Disclosure; and Contribution to Legal Costs)”. She seeks condonation for the late filing of this Application (15202/2020). [11]  Dated 17 September 2025 is the Application for Leave to Appeal (Setting Aside – Hardy AJ Judgment) (023432/2024). [12]  Dated 18 September 2025 is her Application for Leave to Appeal (Setting Aside – Bezuidenhout AJ Judgment) (15202/2020). Condonation [13]  Applicant’s first Application for Leave to Appeal (Reconsideration of the Hearing Schedule, Compelled Disclosure and Contribution to Legal Costs) is dated 19 April. The orders were given on 18 March. Her application is thus out of time. Her application for condonation encompasses all three applications. [14]  I would ordinarily, where the outcome is as clearcut as it is in these applications, restrict further time expended and keep my judgment concise. However the Applicant has shown a propensity to question every decision and to refer all for “re-consideration”; she will probably not accept this judgment either. As such I attempt to make my judgment thorough and to address her submissions in more detail than I might ordinarily do, hoping to put an end to further processes of appeal and further wasted time and costs. [15]  To secure condonation an Applicant must address the length of delay, the reason for delay, prejudice, prospects of success in the matter if condonation is granted, and interests of justice to persuade the court that there is good cause for it to exercise its discretion condoning the lateness. Delay and reasons for delay – all 3 applications [16]  Applicant had 15 days to bring these Applications for Leave to Appeal. She took 30 days. She says that she was “under the genuine but mistaken belief that a 30-day period applied”. [17]  Given that on the very date of the hearing she stated her intention to appeal the Reconsideration of Date Application she could have been expected to immediately look up the time requirement. She has represented herself for some time and shown her ability to research. Looking up time periods is a simple thing, especially compared to some of the relatively complex case law research she has done. Given her scant regard to other rules of process (such as the desire to file further affidavits which are not permitted) I am disinclined to accept the bona fides of this submission, especially in light of its baldness. She does not say why she had this belief, or that she looked anything up but incorrectly, or confused it with another process. She simply says she “believed she had 30 days” and wants this court to firstly accept that she so believed and secondly accept that this is a reasonable basis for condonation. I am inclined not to accept this in the totality of circumstances and absence of any attempt to explain such belief. [18]  She goes on to contend that she was “overburdened by consolidated proceedings” which did not leave her enough time to prepare. This is blatantly inconsistent with thinking she had 30 days and in fact filing on the 30 th day. [19]  Her allegation of a “refusal of extension for outstanding submissions” at the hearing has no relevance to the lateness and is also inconsistent with her submission that she thought she had 30 days. She seems to be saying “if I had got what I wanted at the hearing then I would not have had to apply for leave to appeal.”  The fact is that the “outstanding submissions” were a Reply in the R43 and a supplementary affidavit in the “compelled disclosure” neither of which is permitted without specific leave of the Court. No postponement was justified, although this is anyway of no relevance to her application for condonation. It is also inconsistent with thinking she had 30 days and filing accordingly. [20]  Delays in uploading of orders is not relevant. The orders were given ex tempore on 18 March and that she relied on this date to count days is self-evident from the date of her application being 19 April. [21]  The submission that a refusal of condonation “would penalise the Applicant for circumstances largely beyond her control and risk extinguishing her rights to a fair hearing and appellate review” is not consistent with thinking she had 30 days. That was not “beyond her control”. Her application is replete with sweeping but non-fact-specific contentions which do not match up to the relevant principles of law and process or to the facts of the case. She has had her fair hearing and has a right to “appellate review” (sic) only if she can show a proper basis for leave to appeal. [22]  The only factor in er favour is the relatively short period of the delay. However she does not expressly emphasise this and, within the context of her thinking she had 30 days, her attempts to blame “consolidation of four hearings”,  “multiple same-day judgments” and delayed uploading of orders are illogical at best and disingenuous at worst. [23]  It seems that all her lamentations about being overwhelmed, having to deal with “multiple same-day judgments” and four “consolidated hearings” are geared to shift blame, create atmosphere and invoke sympathy, none of which has any possible role in the adjudication of this application. The same approach permeates her grounds of appeal where she broadly invokes constitutional rights, interests of justice and principles of fairness without matching them to the facts. Prejudice – all 3 applications [24]  It is incorrect that the Respondent will suffer minimal prejudice if condonation is granted and she does not say why this would be so. The delays in this litigation, and the further delays in the process of appeal, are significant. “Justice delayed is justice denied”, especially in a divorce in which a child is involved. Continued uncertainty and increased costs will also prejudice the Respondent. Delays and continued acrimonious litigation prejudice the child. Prospects of Success – Reconsideration of Date Application [25]  This is the most significant aspect of this application, because it is relevant to condonation and to the actual basis for granting leave to appeal. [26]  Applicant, in all three applications, contends to have “compelling grounds” of prospects of success on “procedural fairness, bias and misapplication of the law”. These are not the correct criteria, and on the real criteria she has shown no prospects of success in any of the applications. She has not substantiated her bald allegations that there was not “procedural fairness” and that there was “bias” and “misapplication of law” [27]  All the applications are interlocutory applications. Interlocutory decisions are not capable of appeal. This is conceded by the Applicant who specifically says “generally, interlocutory orders are not readily appealable”. [28]  However she contends that all these applications meet the criteria in terms of which interlocutory applications may be appealable, namely that they were “final in effect”, “definitive of the rights of the parties” and “disposed of a substantial part of the relief claimed in the main proceedings”. She further contends that where this may not be the case, the “interests of justice” justify her appeals. [29]  Applicant ought to deal with each of these criteria specifically with reference to each decision. She does not. [30]  In her “Reconsideration of Date” application for leave, she re-addresses the submissions made at the hearing and tries to paint a general picture of the DJP, in response to “extra-judicial correspondence” ignoring the Practice Directives, and too soon and without adherence to “procedure” rostering 4 applications to be heard on the same day when 2 were originally to be heard the next week and the others had not yet been allocated dates. She says this was in breach of process and prejudicial to her. She contends I did not address the relevant Practice Directives and failed to give a “reasoned finding”. My non-disclosure of my membership of Gauteng Family Law Forum led to a possible undisclosed conflict and possible bias because Bezuidenhout AJ and the Respondent’s attorney both belong also to GFLF. [31]  She says on 18 March she sought “separate hearings on different dates” and in the alternative she sought “a postponement of some issues, so that she would have adequate time to prepare and file all necessary papers”. In addition she sought to “have the DJP’s administrative decision reviewed or set aside” and for the Court to “vacate or adjourn the consolidated hearing and reinstate a proper scheduling process”. Much, if not all, of this relief was ultra vires the Court. [32]  Having sought relief that the Court could not grant, the Applicant can certainly not contend that she has any prospects of success on appeal or that the order in any way satisfies the requirements to be appealable despite being in an interlocutory application. The interests of justice alone dictate that this application must not be permitted to take up any more time or waste any further costs. [33]  The relief Applicant seeks from the appeal court is also ultra vires any “re-hearing” court.  She requires that “the rehearing judge should not be a member of the GFLF or subject to the same potential conflict”, that the Court must “direct” the Registrar and DJP” to “adhere strictly to the applicable Practice Directives” and to “guarantee that each substantive application …is heard on its own day with adequate preparation time”. [34]  Applicant has not cleared the first hurdle of this being an Interlocutory application and thus inherently not capable of appeal. [35]  Examining prospects of success serves a second purpose. If condonation were granted and the Application for Leave to Appeal was considered, the enquiry “would another court come to a different decision” is also answered. The Applicant has clearly not shown any prospects of success and the Application for leave to Appeal would fail even if late filing were condoned. Interests of Justice [36]  Applicant turns often to “the interests of justice” to support the relief she seeks. [37]  Magardie AJ in Ewels v Francis and Other (6497/2022 ZAWCHC 113 was faced with a similar application for leave to appeal a decision in an interlocutory application and provided a most useful and thorough analysis of relevant caselaw. The extract from TWK Agriculture Holding (Pty) Ltd v Hoogveld Boerderybeleggings (Pty) Ltd 2023 (S) SA 163 is of particular relevance in reminding a Court to consider legal certainty and finality in litigation when dealing with condonation and the interests of justice. [38]  Applicant cannot use the “interests of justice” as a “get out of jail free” card when there are no other bases to grant condonation. Indeed adding the factors of certainty and finality in litigation into this application confirm that her applications must fail. Finding – Reconsideration of Date Application [39]  The late filing of this application is not condoned and the application is thus dismissed. [40]  There is no basis to deviate from the usual conclusion that costs in an application follow the result. I am of the view that the Applicant’s application contains a number of disingenuous and blatantly unfounded submissions and is poorly founded in law and fact. It is fortunate for the Applicant that no punitive costs were sought against her and for that reason I simply award party and party costs on Scale B. Prospects of success – Compelled Disclosure Application [41]  The second order against which the applicant seeks leave to appeal is that compelling her to comply with the Respondent’s notices in terms of R35 of the Rules and section 7 of the Matrimonial Property Act. [42]  This is another application in respect of which condonation for late filing is sought and I have dealt with most of the elements above. I deal with prospects of success separately herein because the facts differ from the other 2 applications and because, as with the others, this is relevant not only to the condonation application but to the prospects of success on appeal as well. [43]  An application to compel compliance with provisions requiring disclosure of documents and details to be used at trial is the most basic interlocutory application. Even in the application for specific further and better discovery which was the substance of Ewels the Court found such an application to be Interlocutory and not appealable.  That application did not raise any “significant questions of law or issues of public importance” to take it outside the non-appealable rule. Even less are there any significant questions of law or issues of public importance in instant application. [44]  In her Application for Leave to Appeal Applicant repeats the same incorrect legal submissions which she made in the application itself, namely that completion of a Financial Disclosure Form absolves her of compliance with R35 and s7. This is blatantly wrong in law and she makes no submissions to the contrary. [45]  She further repeats her submissions about alleged non-service, on which finding was made, but makes submissions why that finding is appealable. [46]  There can be no possible prospect of success of this application on appeal and there is no possible basis to distinguish it from the hundreds if not thousands of non-appealable interlocutory applications to compel which are granted monthly. Finding – Compelled Disclosure Application [47]  There is accordingly no basis to grant condonation for the late filing of the application. As above, insofar as her grounds of appeal have already been examined to determine prospects of success for condonation, I see no basis whatever that any court would come to a different conclusion and the application for leave to appeal would fail even if condonation had been granted. [48]  I thus decline condonation and dismiss the application. [49]  There is again no basis for costs not to follow the result, particularly when an application is as devoid of merit as this one. Applicant is to pay the costs of this application on the party and party scale B. Prospects of success – Rule 43 Contribution to Costs application [50]  The third order against which leave to appeal is sought is the Rule 43 Order in the Application for a Contribution to Costs. [51]  A Rule 43 Order is expressly legislated to be incapable of appeal. It has been held that only in “exceptional circumstances”, which are case-specific, might such an order be appealable. The Applicant does not deal with this application any differently from the way in which she deals with the other “plain interlocutory” applications and makes no attempt to show exceptional circumstances. [52]  The ground that Applicant was “never permitted to file a replying affidavit or to update her financial disclosure” is based on an incorrect premise of process. No Replying Affidavit is permitted in a R43 application and there is no provision in the Directive for any “updating” of a Financial Disclosure Form. [53]  The ground that “the court treated the request as contingent on (her) compliance with disclosure obligations” is not understood and is not congruent with the relief actually sought by the Applicant in that application. Grounds for appeal need to be clear and understandable and this one is not. [54]  In this application she sought a contribution to costs to enable her to deal with the 2 other applications which were that day before the Court. Those proceeded as self-standing applications and each had its own costs order. A separate application for a contribution to costs to deal with them made no sense, especially given that applicant self-represented which was relevant to the balance of her application. Even if this did not fall under the no-appeal R43 category, no appeal could succeed on these facts [55]  No “punitive” costs order was made, simply a party and party order following the result as is acceptable and a norm in “money” R43 applications. Finding – Rule 43 Contribution to Costs [56]  This application therefore, even more than the others, is not capable of appeal and the Applicant has made no attempt to aver any exceptional circumstances. As such there can be no basis to grant condonation for its late filing and it must be dismissed. Like the others, even had condonation been granted, there is no hope that another court would come to a different conclusion and the application for leave to appeal would have failed. [57]  An application for leave to appeal an admittedly unappealable decision has to attract an adverse costs order and I thus again order that the costs are paid by the applicant on a party and party scale B Bezuidenhout and Hardy Applications [58]  In her Applications for Leave to Appeal the Bezuidenhout and Hardy Judgments the Applicant states “ The Applicant respectfully requests that the application be adjudicated on the papers, with oral argument if the Court so directs ” (I call this “her paragraph 2 request”). [59]  At the hearing of the applications for leave to appeal she, in her initial address, said nothing about these, but this was consistent with her paragraph 2 request, especially as I had not directed oral argument. Once Respondent’s counsel mentioned these applications, Applicant contended, in reply, that they were to be set down on a different date. I allowed further submissions in this regard and am of the view that, having regard to the paragraph 2 request, and the interests of justice, they were and are before me. There can be no possible prejudice to the Applicant in light of her own paragraph 2 request, and she did not motivate why she then contended that they need a separate date. There can be no basis for any further delay, or administrative waste of time and resources allocating another date for me to address these. [60]  The Bezuidenhout application was a Rule 43(6) application as is conceded by Applicant. She concedes that it is not ordinarily capable of appeal. Hardy then heard an application to stay and then set aside Bezuidenhout. This thinly disguised attempt to appeal a R43(6) order failed. I was then seized with applications to set aside both the Hardy and Bezuidenhout orders. [61]  It is trite that the criterion for appealing a R43 order is “exceptional circumstances”. Applicant contends that there are “special circumstances”. Since she is an In Person litigant and can perhaps not be blamed for interchanging the words ‘special” and “exceptional” I have looked for the required “exceptional” circumstances. I have found none. [62]  Applicant makes lengthy general submissions and repeats much of what was submitted in the applications themselves, but fails to expressly set out any facts to show that the interests of justice require departure from the norm, and gives no exceptional circumstances to justify appeals. There is nothing unique, special or exceptional about these applications and the Applicant has failed to present any case-specific facts to support any divergence from accepted law and process. [63]  Actually, the facts of the case militate against any further delays or uncertainty. The gist of what Applicant seeks is the reconsideration of an order pursuant to which the father of the child has unsupervised contact with the child. He has had this from March 2024. If there had been a material change of circumstance Applicant would have used R43(6). If there has not been a material change of circumstance, re-winding or revoking a 20-month established contact routine (which would be the effect of what Applicant seeks) cannot be in the interests of a child or of certainty and finality, thus indicating scant prospects of success. [64]  This Rule as legislated to be non-appealable for good reasons and it would be contrary to the interests of justice to allow orders made pursuant thereto be to appealed without exceptional circumstances, which are singularly absent in these matters. Finding – Bezuidenhout and Hardy orders [65]  I accordingly dismiss the Applicant’s Applications for Leave to Appeal my decisions in both the Bezuidenhout and Hardy applications. [66]  There is no justification for costs not to follow the result. The Applicant’s course of conduct in her attempts to basically appeal the Bezuidenhout Order, which has brought about this long trail, is inherently defective and is an abuse of the process. Had the Respondent not sought only party and party costs I would have been inclined to make an actual punitive costs order against her. However since Respondent sought only party and party costs on scale B that is what I award. [67]  I thus summarise my order as follows : ORDER [1]  Condonation for the late filing of the Application for Leave to Appeal the Reconsideration of Date Order is refused and the Application is dismissed with costs on the party and party scale B. [2]  Condonation for the late filing of the Application for Leave to Appeal the Compelled Disclosure Order is refused and the Application is dismissed with costs on the party and party scale B. [3]  Condonation for the late filing of the Application for Leave to Appeal the R43 Contribution to Costs Order is refused and the Application is dismissed with costs on the party and party scale B. [4]  The Applications for Leave to Appeal the Bezuidenhout and Hardy Orders are dismissed with costs on the party and party scale B. C VON LUDWIG AJ Date of hearing 07 November 2025 Date of judgment 21 November 2025 For Applicant:        In Person For Respondent:   Adv J Woodward SC Instructed by Attorney Philippa Kruger sino noindex make_database footer start