Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 1160South Africa
N.P.K v K.A.K (023432/2024) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1160 (12 November 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
12 November 2024
Judgment
begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2024
>>
[2024] ZAGPJHC 1160
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## N.P.K v K.A.K (023432/2024) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1160 (12 November 2024)
N.P.K v K.A.K (023432/2024) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1160 (12 November 2024)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2024_1160.html
sino date 12 November 2024
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
# IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
# GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO
: 023432/2024
DATE
:
2024-03-08
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES : NO
- REVISED: YESDate : 12/11/2024
REVISED: YES
Date : 12/11/2024
In
the matter between
N[…] P[…]
K[…]
Applicant
and
K[…]
A[…] K[..]
Respondent
JUDGMENT
HARDY,
AJ
: Here follows a quick
ex-tempore
-judgment in the
matter. The Applicant, Ms K[..] is seeking a stay of execution of the
Rule 43 order granted by F. Bezuidenhout
AJ on 16 January 2024,
pending the determination of an application in terms of Rule 43(6),
that is for a variation of the order,
to be instituted by her.
She brings this application as a
matter of urgency, having launched it on 01 March 2024, the very same
day that the order referred
to introduces unsupervised contact by the
Respondent to their minor child, and then as of today, alleges
ongoing urgency after
that.
In this matter the Applicant has known
since at least 16 January 2024 that there was going to be a need to
do something on or before
01 March 2024 - the unsupervised contact
was coming. Even though throughout that time she has been hunting for
new legal representation,
it could not have escaped her that
something needed to be done if she wished to prevent unsupervised
contact becoming a reality.
What has happened with the contact?
Neither party has told me that there had been any problems with
unsupervised contact at all
in the last week. The only information I
have in that regard, is that it has gone well, and that the minor
child is happy, according
to the answering affidavit.
So, to rely on ongoing urgency as the
Applicant wishes to do, she would need to show on the papers that
there has been a problem;
that there will be ongoing problems with
unsupervised contact in the future; and she alleges a fear of
victimisation of the child.
Nothing concrete in that regard is set
out in the founding affidavit.
So, it does not appear to me,
nor am I entirely convinced that the matter is urgent, but we are
dealing with a minor child - and
a fairly young one - so I am erring
on the side of caution.
If I am to deal with the matter on an
urgent basis, I then need to consider the merits and have regard to
the fact that this is
an application in terms of Uniform Rule of
Court 45A, to suspend the operation of the court order for some
period of time, or suspend
the execution for whatever period the
Court deems fit.
In all of the commentary on Rule 45A,
it is very clear that the suspension may never be for speculative
reasons.
Furthermore, the decision in
Gois
trading as Shakespeare’s Pub v van Zyl
2011 (1) SA 148
(LC) sets out a number of requirements for suspending
the operation of a court order. The most pertinent here is that a
suspension
may only happen to facilitate real and substantial justice
requirements, or to prevent an injustice.
Regard must be had to the requirements
for an interim interdict and in particular, the concept of
irreparable harm. The case authority
goes so far as to suggest that
irreparable harm will be a given where the underlying
causa
may be removed.
So, my understanding simply is that
when the appeal or variation - depending on the type of matter - is
ultimately heard, if the
fundamental point of the judgment that is
sought to be stayed is going to go away, then there will be
irreparable harm and the
application should be granted.
Which then runs us clearly into the
merits here, because I am told that a Rule 43(6) will be brought on
two changed circumstances
which would render the judgment of F.
Bezuidenhout AJ a nullity.
I take it not much further than that
the entire order would be set aside and no variation would be
required, but I do not think
strong evidence of that has been set
out.
The more fundamental concern is the
allegation that the changed circumstances will be that the Respondent
will be criminally prosecuted
for the sexual assault on the parties’
daughter.
This poses a challenge, because as
things stand at the moment, it is quite clear that the NDPP are
refusing to prosecute the Respondent
and have set this out in a
letter addressed to the parties.
The second allegation is that this
decision not to prosecute will be overturned because of an incomplete
docket.
The real difficulty with both of these
allegations - a fake record of decision and/or an incomplete docket -
as a changed circumstance,
is that, as of today, they represent no
more than a hope.
As regards a fake document, Advocate
de Kock’s (of the NDPP) own letter, so his own later writing,
sets out that the document
is not a fake - the document recording the
decision not to prosecute is not fake. Some of the correspondence is
under his hand
and some of the correspondence has been done under the
hand of an authorised staff member acting on his instruction.
The founding affidavit takes it no
further than the allegation of a fake document that should be
investigated. But that is where
it leaves it. Bearing in mind that
the document - recording that there would be no prosecution - has
existed since October 2023
and that the Applicant’s father has
already been challenging it, that certainly is not a new issue that
has arisen on the
handing down of the judgment by F. Bezuidenhout AJ.
The further challenge that the docket
is incomplete also poses some difficulty. The documents attached to
the founding affidavit
already show that Captain Nel disputes this
since he states the docket was complete. To the extent that any
reliance is placed
on the say-so of Advocates Jabelo or Chikane or of
what was said in a meeting about the decision not to prosecute the
Respondent,
that forms hearsay and is not a proof that the docket was
or would be incomplete.
The Applicant has also in argument
placed much reliance on an advocate at the prosecuting authority she
spoke to last year, who
said she would never have considered a docket
without the child statements being in the docket. One would therefor
infer that all
of her colleagues would do exactly the same.
As things stand today, it is at best
speculation that the docket was incomplete. There is nothing to tell
me that it was incomplete.
The highest point that has been reached is
to say that the docket at the time of decision and the docket that
exists now should
be identical, but there is nobody who has said that
they are not identical or that the child’s statements were
missing at
the time of deciding not to prosecute the Respondent.
Thus the changed circumstance on which
the Applicant would primarily rely, do not yet exist and is at best a
hope that they may
exist in the future.
The circumstances why contact changed
from supervised to unsupervised was the decision not to prosecute. At
this stage, the Applicant
engaging with the police and pursuing a
reopening of the investigation has not yet got to the point of a
change of the decision
not to prosecute. That may happen - it may
not. We are speculating.
In light of the time that the first
investigation took, one cannot expect that this decision is going to
happen any time soon. As
set out before, the Applicant has been aware
since at least August 2023 and very definitely October 2023 of her
allegations regarding
the police and the NPA - it was thus not
necessary for her to wait until the judgment on 16 January 2024 to
start pursuing her
complaints that she had against those entities.
Having set out that the changed
circumstances at this stage is only a
spes
or a hope on the part of the Applicant, that may not even
materialise, I also have regard to statements by the minor child that
were only uploaded to Caselines yesterday. Although there is some
dispute as to whether these formed part of the original docket,
neither of these two statements in any way, shape or form accused the
Respondent of perpetrating sexual abuse on her.
In the result there is no change of
circumstances yet. We simply do not - I simply do not - know if there
ever will be. There is
thus no underlying
causa
that will be changed or removed in the intervening period or before
the hearing of the Rule 43(6) and thus, I am not able, on the
facts
to find that there is irreparable harm as required by the
Shakespeare’s Pub
matter.
In the circumstances, I cannot suspend
the execution of the Rule 43 order granted by F. Bezuidenhout AJ.
I am however mindful that if at any
point these changed circumstances ceases to be a
spes
,
but becomes a reality, it is quite possible to go from launching a
Rule 43(6) application to it being heard in this division within
six
weeks in term time - that is a fairly short time frame, much shorter
than a regular opposed motion.
I am aware then, in light of the
finding I have just mentioned, that I cannot suspend the order, that
the Applicant has been unsuccessful,
and cost usually follow the
result.
Although this is a matter involving a
minor child, when the Court usually orders each party to pay their
own costs in circumstances
where the parties have been behaving in a
reasonable fashion, I cannot reach this conclusion.
Where it has become quite apparent to
me in the papers and through the argument that this Applicant will
not rest at all until the
Respondent and minor child can only enjoy
supervised contact and/or until the Respondent has been criminally
charged with some
offence, she will continue to litigate.
In the circumstances I am going to
make an order that the costs follow the result, but on a party and
party scale.
In the result, my order is:
ORDER
[1] The application before me today to
stay or suspend the execution of F. Bezuidenhout AJ’s order
granted on 16 January 2024
until such time as a Rule 43(6) can be
heard is dismissed.
[2] The Applicant is to pay the costs
of this application on a scale as between party and party.
HARDY,
AJ
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
DATE
:
………………..
sino noindex
make_database footer start
Similar Cases
N.P.K v K.A.K (15202/2020; 023432/2024) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1332 (24 November 2025)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 1332High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)100% similar
N.M.M v J.G.M (5052/2019) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1174 (30 October 2024)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 1174High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)100% similar
N.N.P v C.B.S and Others (2021/59500) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1357 (21 November 2023)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1357High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)100% similar
N.C.M v Road Accident Fund (A2023/123915) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1033 (14 October 2024)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 1033High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)100% similar
K.N v N.Z and Another (2019/33708) [2024] ZAGPJHC 440 (10 May 2024)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 440High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)100% similar