Mwaba v Standard Bank Insurance Brokers (Pty) Limited and Another (2025/234612) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1330 (10 December 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPJHC 1330 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Mwaba v Standard Bank Insurance Brokers (Pty) Limited and Another (2025/234612) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1330 (10 December 2025) Mwaba v Standard Bank Insurance Brokers (Pty) Limited and Another (2025/234612) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1330 (10 December 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_1330.html sino date 10 December 2025 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG CASE NO: 2025-234612 (1) REPORTABLE: NO (2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3) REVISED: NO 10/12/2025 In the matter between: EMMANUEL CHOLA MWABA APPLICANT and STANDARD BANK INSURANCE BROKERS FIRST RESPONDENT (PTY) LIMITED LIBERTY GROUP LIMITED SECOND RESPONDENT Neutral Citation : Delivered: By transmission to the parties via email and uploading onto Case Lines the Judgment is deemed to be delivered. JUDGMENT SENYATSI J Introduction [1] This is an opposed urgent application in which the Applicant seeks, inter alia, an interim payment of R500,000.00 pending a contemplated action for damages and declaratory relief relating to a joint consent order granted by Dippenaar J on 5 August 2025. This is the third urgent application the Applicant has launched against the Respondents in six months. The Respondents oppose the application on the grounds that it lacks urgency, that the Applicant has no substantive claim due to a prior settlement, and that the application constitutes an abuse of court process. The applicant, Mr Mwaba, appears in person. Background [2] The litigation history is material. The Applicant’s first urgent application (case no. 2025/111813) was struck from the roll by Malungana AJ on 22 July 2025 for lack of urgency. His second urgent application (case no. 2025/125779) culminated in a joint consent order (“the Consent Order”) granted by Dippenaar J on 5 August 2025. [3] The Consent Order required the Respondents to pay the Applicant R69,615.66 “in full and final settlement of the matter as well as any claims arising from or related to the policy” by 12h00 on 7 August 2025. The order further stipulated the cancellation of the policy and the Applicant’s waiver of any right to bring further claims. In return, the Applicant was to withdraw the first application. [4] It is common cause that the R69,615.66 was credited to the Applicant’s bank account on the morning of 8 August 2025, not by 12h00 on 7 August 2025 as stipulated. The Applicant accepted the payment but immediately reserved his rights, contending that the late payment constituted a material breach and repudiation of the settlement, nullifying the “full and final” waiver clauses. [5] The present application is triggered by a “Final Termination” letter from Reddford House school dated 27 November 2025. The letter states that if 80% of the Applicant’s outstanding fees (approximately R320,522.00) are not paid by 5 December 2025, his two sons will not be allowed to attend the school in 2026. The Applicant contends that this imminent exclusion of his children from school creates the requisite urgency and that the Respondents’ breach of the Consent Order revives his underlying claims for mis-selling and unjust enrichment. The Issue of Urgency [6] Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court permits a departure from the ordinary timeframes if the applicant can satisfy the court that he will not obtain substantial redress at a hearing in due course. The test is well-established: an applicant must set forth explicitly the circumstances which he avers render the matter urgent and the reasons why he claims he cannot be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course. [1] [7] The Applicant’s case for urgency rests squarely on the school’s Final Termination letter of 27 November 2025 and the alleged causal link to the Respondents’ conduct. [8] Having considered the papers, I find that the Applicant has failed to establish genuine urgency for the  reasons set out below. Self-created and Longstanding Financial Difficulty [9] The Applicant’s indebtedness to the school has been accruing consistently since the beginning of 2025. The school’s own statement of account (Annexure “O”) indicates that no payments were made by the Applicant for the entire 2025 academic year. The school communicated with him about this debt on 14 February 2025, 21 July 2025, and 1 July 2025. The 27 November 2025 letter is not a new or unforeseen crisis but a final step in a protracted process of which the Applicant was fully aware. The urgency, to the extent it exists, is of his own making due to his failure to meet his financial obligations over a prolonged period. [2] Misrepresentation to the Court [10] A most significant factor is the Applicant’s conduct in the second urgent application. In those proceedings, he passionately argued that the R69,615.66 was urgently required to pay the school and avert the exclusion of his son. The court (Dippenaar J) was persuaded to make the Consent Order in that context. It is now an uncontested fact, apparent from the school’s statement, that the Applicant never paid the R69,615.66 to the school after receiving it. This conduct severely undermines his credibility and demonstrates that the alleged crisis concerning school fees is being used instrumentally to create urgency for litigation, rather than representing a genuine and immediate need that the litigation aims to solve. In any event, when challenged by this Court during the argument to point out in the Consent Order a paragraph that dealt with urgency, he could not. This is understandable because as correctly submitted by Mr. Ossin for the respondent, Diepenaar J did not consider urgency as she was more concerned with the Consent Order agreed to by the parties. No Causal Link to Respondents for Current Crisis [11] The Applicant’s current financial predicament with the school is a result of his personal financial management over many months. The alleged late payment of the R69,615.66 by one day did not cause the R320,000 debt. Even if the payment had been made on time, on the Applicant’s own logic, it would only have reduced the debt by R69,615.66, leaving a substantial balance. The core of the current crisis is his inability to settle the remaining, significantly larger balance, for which the respondents bear no responsibility. Availability of Substantial Redress in Due Course [12] The primary relief sought is an interim payment of R500,000.00 towards a claim for what the applicant calls constitutional damages. Claims for money are quintessentially matters where substantial redress can be obtained in the ordinary course. The fact that the Applicant may face personal financial consequences, including his children changing schools, does not alter this legal principle. The constitutional rights of children, while paramount, do not provide a blanket justification for urgency in a commercial dispute where the link between the respondent’s conduct and the alleged imminent harm is, as here, tenuous and self-created. [13] For these reasons, I find that the Applicant has failed to meet the threshold for urgency. The application should, therefore, not be heard as an urgent matter. The Consent Order and Alleged Breach [14] Even if I were wrong on urgency, the Applicant faces an insurmountable hurdle in the Consent Order. His case depends on establishing that the Respondents’ late payment was a material breach that entitled him to cancel the settlement and revive all claims. [14] The Consent Order stated that the Respondents would “pay out” the amount by 12h00. The Respondents provided proof that a payment instruction was issued before the deadline, albeit the funds only cleared the next day due to inter-bank processing times. The Applicant demanded, but the Respondents did not provide, a bank-generated timestamped proof of the exact debit time from their account. [15] I am not persuaded that a delay in clearance of one day, where a payment instruction was issued, constitutes a repudiation or material breach of a settlement agreement that was expressly in “full and final settlement” of all claims. The obligation was to “pay out”. In modern banking, initiating a payment instruction to the beneficiary’s nominated account is the act of payment; the time of reflection is subject to systemic processes beyond the payer’s absolute control. The Respondents took reasonable steps to comply. [16] Crucially, the failure of the Applicant to use the funds for its stated purpose  to pay the school  eviscerates his argument that the timing was “of the essence” or that he suffered any prejudice from the one-day delay. His own conduct demonstrates that the timing was not, in fact, critical to the resolution of the school crisis as he had represented to Dippenaar J. [17] The Consent Order, therefore, remains binding. It constitutes a full and final settlement of all claims arising from the policy. The Applicant’s attempt to resile from it and resurrect claims for mis-selling and unjust enrichment is barred. Abuse of Process [18] The pattern of litigation is concerning. This is the third urgent application on substantially the same cause of action within six months. The first was struck for lack of urgency. The second was settled on terms highly favourable to the Applicant, including payment of a sum he had previously demanded. Having secured that payment, he now seeks to set aside the settlement using a technical argument on timing, while having failed to apply the funds as he told the court he would. [19] The courts must protect their processes from abuse. The Applicant’s conduct  using his children’s schooling as a recurring pretext for urgency while not applying settled funds to that purpose amounts to an abuse. It unfairly burdens both the Respondents and the court. Costs [17] The Respondents seek costs on an attorney and client scale. Given the finding of a lack of urgency and the elements of abuse, Mr Ossin for the Respondents contended that a punitive cost order is justified. However, I am mindful that the Applicant is self-represented. In the exercise of my discretion, I find that a costs order that should be made should not at this stage be punitive. Order [18] In the result, I make the following order: (a) The application is struck from the roll for lack of urgency. (b) The Applicant is to pay the Respondents’ costs of the application, including the costs of counsel, on the party and party scale B. ML SENYATSI JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG DATE APPLICATION HEARD :               09 December 2025 DATE JUDGMENT HANDED DOWN : 10 December 2025 APPEARANCES For the Applicant: In person Counsel for the Second Respondent: Advocate T. Ossin Instructed by: Moodie and Robertson Attorneys [1] See Luna Meubel Vervaardigers v Makin and Another 1977 (4) SA 135 (W) page 137E-F ## [2]East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd[ 2011] ZAGPJHC 196 paras 14-15 [2] East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd [ 2011] ZAGPJHC 196 paras 14-15 sino noindex make_database footer start