Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 54South Africa
White Wall Trading (CC) and Another v Biyela and Others (090403/2023) [2024] ZAGPJHC 54 (26 January 2024)
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## White Wall Trading (CC) and Another v Biyela and Others (090403/2023) [2024] ZAGPJHC 54 (26 January 2024)
White Wall Trading (CC) and Another v Biyela and Others (090403/2023) [2024] ZAGPJHC 54 (26 January 2024)
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sino date 26 January 2024
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number:
090403/2023
1.
Reportable: No
2.
Of interest to other judges: No
26
January 2024
In
the matter between:
WHITE WALL TRADING
(CC)
(REGISTRATION
NUMBER: 2009/203783/23
)
First Applicant
OPAL WALL TRADING CC
(REGISTRATION
NUMBER: 2009/203807/23)
Second Applicant
and
NONDUMISO BRONHILDA
BIYELA &
THOSE LISTED IN
ANNEXURE “A”
TO
THE NOTICE OF MOTION
First to Thirty-Third Respondents
THE FURTHER UNLAWFUL
OCCUPIERS
OF ERVEN
142,143,144,145,146
AND 198 DOORNFONTEIN
TOWNSHIP,
REGISTRATION
DIVISION I.R
Thirty-Fourth Respondent
THE
CITY OF JOHANNESBURG
Thirty-Fifth Respondent
BRINK
N.O FLOYD
Thirty-Sixth Respondent (in his capacity as the
municipal manager of The City of Johannesburg)
THE GAUTENG DEPARTMENT
OF
HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS
Thirty-Seventh Respondent
MAILE NO LEBOGANG
ISAAC
(in his capacity as the
Member of the
Executive Council:
Gauteng Department
of Human Settlements)
Thirty-Eighth Respondent
THE NATIONAL
DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS
Thirty-Ninth Respondent
THE
CITY OF JOHANNESBURG
Fortieth Respondent
JUDGMENT
MIA, J
[1]
This is an application for the eviction of the first to 33rd
respondents (the occupiers) in terms
of the provisions of the
Prevention of Illegal Occupation and the Unlawful Occupation of Land
Act 19 of 1998 (PIE)
on an urgent basis.
The applicant also seeks relief against the 35
th
and 36
th
respondents (the City), namely that the City
relocate the occupiers to alternative accommodation as it is obliged
to in terms of
PIE. The application is opposed by the occupiers
as well as the City. The occupiers lodged a counterapplication in
which
they requested that the City provide them with accommodation in
terms of the National Housing Code and specify the parameters of
the
accommodation.
[2]
The applicants are the owners of the registered properties'. It is
not in dispute that the occupiers
occupied the properties without the
applicants' consent. What is in dispute, however, is the basis of the
urgent relief. The occupiers
and the City dispute the applicants’
claims that there is “real or imminent danger of injury to a
person or danger
of harm and or loss of properties if the occupiers
are not forthwith evicted from the property.” They also deny
that the
likely hardship to the applicants is more significant than
to the occupiers and any other person if an order for eviction is not
granted.
[3]
The context in which the urgent application was lodged was on the
heels of two fires that occurred
in the Johannesburg CBD on 31 August
2023 and 15 September 2023. The applicants rely on these fires in the
CBD, their lack of access
to their own properties and the lack of
maintenance of the buildings to make out a case that the conditions
at the buildings are
dangerous and pose a risk to the lives of
occupiers with devastating consequences. They allege that another
fire will be a devastating
loss for the owners of the commercial
buildings if an order for eviction is not granted.
[4]
The applicants previously applied to evict the occupiers from the
premises in 2011. The applications
were lodged under
case
numbers 2011/27627 and 2011/2768
[1]
(the 2011 eviction applications). These 2011 eviction applications
are
pending in this court. The applicants did not join the City in the
2011 eviction applications at the outset. During the prosecution
of
the eviction, they launched an urgent application in terms of section
5 of PIE when a fire broke out in another building, relying
on
imminent danger. The urgent application for an interim order for
eviction was dismissed on that occasion. The 2011 eviction
application was referred for case management. The application was
case-managed, and the City’s report was awaited. There
appeared
to be dissatisfaction with the report regarding the provision of
temporary emergency accommodation (TEA). This delayed
the prosecution
of the 2011 eviction applications, which came to a halt after the
case management procedure was terminated.
[5]
The occupiers maintain they have been in occupation of the properties
since 2001. If an eviction
is granted, they seek in their
counterclaim TEA from the City in units that comply with the
standards set out in the National
Housing Code. While the occupiers
have not paid rent, they state they do what they can to maintain the
properties. It is common
cause the applicants have not had access to
the properties and consequently have been unable to maintain the
property. The property,
intended for commercial purposes, has been
used for residential purposes by many occupiers. The lack of proper
maintenance is reflected
in the report attached to the affidavit
filed by the occupiers. They deny they are paying rent to a slumlord
and assert the properties
are the only option they have. Alternately,
they seek TEA from the City. They do not, however, wish to be
moved into tents
and anticipate this by requesting in the
counterclaim seeking TEA in units with running water and flushing
lavatories.
[6]
They note the accommodation they currently reside in, namely the
five-story and three-storey commercial
properties, has been divided
with partitioning. They dispute it is unsafe as iterated by the
applicants. They maintain they have
lived in the property since 2001.
The applicants have been aware of their existence and occupation
since they became the owners
of the properties. They refer to the
previous urgent application to evict them that did not succeed. They
rely on an architectural
engineer's report to rebut the applicant’s
case. According to the report, there are informal and unsafe
electrical connections
[2]
. The
water connection is present but is not sufficient for communal use.
The sewer inspection indicates an absence of maintenance
of pipes and
leaks.
[3]
[7]
The recommendations for improvements made in the report are removing
fire hazards, namely, piles
of debris that collect and removing
flammable material that forms part of the partitioning. It is also
recommended that fire suppression
equipment be installed and a second
escape route be established. The cleaning of the waste and debris
requires an account of the
hazardous waste that may have accumulated.
It is also recommended that informal electrical connections are
formalised to prevent
electrocution.
[8]
The issues for determination are urgency and whether the applicants
are entitled to relief in
terms of section 5 of PIE. If an order for
eviction is granted, whether the relief in the counter application
should be granted
as sought by the occupiers.
URGENCY
[9]
The application is brought in terms of section 5 of PIE. Both the
occupiers and the City disputed
the issue of urgency. Counsel argued
that Rule 6(12) is not simply there to be taken, and a party must
make a case for urgent relief.
Counsel referred to the notice
informing practitioners that due to the increasing number of urgent
matters enrolled in this Division,
a more disciplined approach to
dealing with urgent matters has been directed by the Deputy Judge
President of this Division
[4]
to
ensure that parties do not lodge urgent matters ‘to see what
the judge thinks’.
[10]
Counsel for the occupiers and the City submitted that the matter did
not meet the criteria for urgency. Both
counsel for the occupiers and
the City argued that on the applicant’s version, the properties
have been occupied since 2010,
and on the occupier’s version,
the properties have been occupied since 2001. On this basis, Counsel
submitted that the applicants
have not proved there is a risk of
imminent danger or harm to the occupiers. To support this view, they
referred to the previous
urgent application launched by the
applicants in this court in 2017, where the applicant similarly
relied on urgency and imminent
danger in terms of section 5 of PIE.
The application was dismissed by Makume J.
[11]
Counsel for the applicants argued that the 2011 and the current
applications differed and that the court
had erred in 2017. It is
noteworthy that the 2011 applications are still pending. The current
application is brought under a new
case number. Still, the occupiers
maintain they are the same respondents as cited in the 2011
application and the urgent application
that was dismissed in 2017.
[12]
The consideration in terms of section 5 of PIE, that an
eviction may be granted if there is a)
real
and imminent danger or substantial injury or damage to any person or
property if the unlawful
occupier is not
forthwith evicted from the land;
b) the likely hardship to
the owner or any other affected person if an order for eviction is
not granted, exceeds the likely hardship
to the unlawful occupier
against whom the order is sought, if an order for eviction is
granted, and c) there is no other effective
remedy available.
[13]
Counsel submitted that the applicants had only gained access to the
premises shortly before they launched
the application through the
efforts of SERI. They rely on the historical information provided
after the City’s raid on the
premises in 2017 after the
application to move the occupiers was dismissed by Makume J. Then the
City found the property unsuitable
for occupation. The applicants
also rely on the report filed by the occupiers, which records several
items that require attention
to ensure the property is safe for the
occupation. Among the issues raised are the debris and piles of
accumulated dirt, which
pose a problem. Informal electrical
connections which can potentially be hazardous for the occupiers. The
shortage of water taps,
ablution facilities and toilets intended for
commercial use and now being utilised by the occupiers for
residential
purposes places a strain on the system resulting
blockages.
[14]
The applicants rely on imminent danger and reference the fires
occurring in the city. That a fire occurred
elsewhere is insufficient
to satisfy the test of imminent danger or harm. A fire could occur
anywhere in the city. In these buildings,
however the report shows no
evidence other than the normal disintegration and crumbling of a
building neglected over time and subjected
to inappropriate use. This
is no indication of imminent danger. The report recommends that
informal connections be formalised.
This does not suggest an
imminent fire risk. The occupiers indicate there are 80 women, 102
children and 149 unemployed in
324 households. The properties have
been their shelter against the elements, and they have come together
to maintain it as best
they can.
[15] In
the seven years they have resided in the properties since the last
application was dismissed in 2017,
there has been no incident at the
properties. They note that they have been awaiting accommodation from
the City. They point out
that in other matters unlawful occupiers
have only been accommodated by the City when they have been compelled
to do so in terms
of a court order. Hence their counter-application
against the City. They referred to the decision in
City of
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and Others v Hlophe and others
noting this decision and
Changing Tides Investments v
Occupiers of Chung Hua Mansions
where the court ordered the City
to provide occupiers with TEA. In the Hlophe decision, the City
appealed the decision, it went
to the Constitutional Court where the
matter was summarily refused by the Constitutional Court in May 2015.
This did not secure
the occupier's accommodation forthwith, and the
occupiers fear a similar delay.
[16]
The danger or substantial injury or damage to any person or property
if the unlawful
occupier is not evicted
must be weighed against the likely hardship to the owner or any other
affected person if an order for eviction
is not granted. Whether this
exceeds the likely hardship to the unlawful occupier against whom the
order is sought if an order
for eviction is granted. It was argued
that the applicants had no access to the building and had only
recently commenced building
work on the properties. The applicants
did not continue prosecuting the 2011 applications which are still
pending. This must be
contrasted with the occupiers living in the
premises since 2001. They have withstood the degenerating conditions
and state that
they have attempted to maintain the property according
to their means. The crumbling building reflects their limited means
spread
between what they would require for sustenance and other
requirements. It is evident they would be homeless if an eviction
order
is granted. The counter-application for TEA suggests they
anticipate that their stay is overdue on the premises and are
pre-empting
the request for alternative accommodation. Among this
group of 324 households, there are a significant number of women and
children
and unemployed persons.
[17]
The City submitted that they require time to assess whether the
occupiers qualify for TEA or whether occupiers
can afford
accommodation elsewhere in the city. The assessment requires more
than four weeks, and in the interim, the City only
has tents to
provide as TEA. The occupiers’ application was specifically
launched to avoid this type of temporary accommodation.
If the order
for eviction is granted, then the City, in the short space of time
afforded, would only be able to relocate the occupiers
to tented TEA.
In considering the time required to assess the occupiers and to
allocate them to alternate accommodation, this hardship
exceeds the
hardship the owners would endure if an order for eviction were not
granted forthwith.
[18]
I am of the view that there is no imminent danger to the property if
the unlawful occupiers are not forthwith
evicted. The likely hardship
to the owners of the properties does not exceed the hardship to the
occupiers if the court were not
to grant an order for eviction. The
City is not able to offer TEA immediately. The applicants have not
pursued the eviction 2011
applications
against the occupiers since 2017. Thus, the current circumstances at
the properties are not new instances but have
arisen over a period of
time and as a result of the commercial property being overburdened as
well as the applicants’ decision
not to pursue the 2011
applications. The reference to the recent fires, loss of lives and
damage in other premises is merely convenient;
however, without any
indication of the cause of the fire in those buildings, it cannot be
extrapolated to the present properties,
is speculative and cannot be
taken into account in making out a case for imminent danger in the
present application.
[19]
The applicants have not satisfied the stringent test for urgency
required in terms of section 5.
POINTS
IN
LIMINE
[20]
Counsel for the City raised further issues in addition to the
urgency. It was argued
in
limine
that
the application for an eviction order forthwith was defective on
two grounds. The first ground was because the applicants
seek the
same relief namely an eviction of the occupiers in this court
under
case numbers 2011/27627 and 2011/2768
[5]
as referred to above the 2011 eviction applications. Those
applications were in terms of section 4 of PIE. Nonetheless, it was
submitted that if an interim order for eviction was granted, there
would be two cases with the same parties seeking the same relief.
In
the circumstances where the applicants did not withdraw the 2011
applications they remain in abeyance and the City’s
point in
limine is upheld on this aspect.
[21]
As indicated above the applicants did not make out a case for urgency
in terms of section 5(1) of PIE and
on the first point in limine
there is a similar matter pending and the application cannot be dealt
with whilst there is a matter
pending between the same parties. I am
also of the view that section 5(2) is peremptory and there has been
no compliance.
[22]
The applicant sought an interim eviction order pending an order to be
determined in terms of section 4 of
PIE with costs to be reserved.
Counsel for the City sought an order dismissing alternately striking
the application with an order
for costs of three counsel. The
occupiers sought an order striking the application or an alternate
order in the event an eviction
order is granted.
[23]
On the issue of cost the City requested the costs of three counsel. I
am of the view that the matter did
not merit three counsel.
ORDER
[24]
For the reasons above:
1.
The application is dismissed with costs.
2.
The counterclaim is dismissed, no order as to costs.
SC Mia
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
JOHANNESBURG
For
the Applicant:
L
Hollander
Instructed
by
Vermaak
Marshall Wellbeloved Inc
For
the 1
st
to 34
th
Respondents:
O
Motlhasedi
Instructed
by
Seri
Law Clinic
For
the 35
th
and 36
th
Respondents:
A
Milovanovic-Bitter, L Mokwena &
Z
Ngakane
Instructed
by Edward Nathan Sonnenberg Attorneys
Heard:
20 September 2023
Delivered:
26 January 2024
[1]
Answering
Affidavit Caselines
04
– 93 and 04 – 100
[2]
Answering
Affidavit, Caselines 04-41, Electricity
[3]
Ibid,
Water and Sewer
[4]
Notice
to [all legal] practitioners about the Urgent Motion Court,
Johannesburg (4 October 2021) at para 2
[5]
Answering
Affidavit Caselines
04
– 93 and 04 – 100
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