Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 84South Africa
Dr Fekeni and Others v Lombard Insurance Company Limited and Another (43891/19) [2024] ZAGPJHC 84 (2 February 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
2 February 2024
Judgment
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## Dr Fekeni and Others v Lombard Insurance Company Limited and Another (43891/19) [2024] ZAGPJHC 84 (2 February 2024)
Dr Fekeni and Others v Lombard Insurance Company Limited and Another (43891/19) [2024] ZAGPJHC 84 (2 February 2024)
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sino date 2 February 2024
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
No:43891/19
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/ NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
In
the matter between:
DR SOMADODA PATRICK
MAYIBONGWE FIKENI N.O.
DR GCWALISILE
CYNTHIA KABANYANE N.O.
MOROKA ISAAC
BUTCHER MATUTLE N.O.
ZANDILE QUEENETTE
LAVINIA MDHLADHLANA N.O.
MZAMO MICHAEL
MLENGANA N.O.
MATSHIPSANA MERIAM
MOLALA N.O.
TLHOTSE ENOCH
MOTSWALEDI N.O.
NANDISELE FLAVOUR
THOKO MPUMLWANA N.O.
PHELISA NKOMO N.O.
RASHID AMOD SADECK
PATEL N.O.
ZAKHELE ALEX TUNNY
ZITHA N.O.
1
st
Applicant
2
nd
Applicant
3
rd
Applicant
4
th
Applicant
5
th
Applicant
6
th
Applicant
7
th
Applicant
8
th
Applicant
9
th
Applicant
10
th
Applicant
11
th
Applicant
And
LOMBARD INSURANCE
COMPANY LIMITED
.
1
st
Respondent
GROUP FIVE
CONSTRUCTION (PTY) LTD
(
In
Business Rescue
)
2
nd
Respondent
## JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
NOKO
J
Introduction
[1]
The first respondent
issued a variable construction guarantee
[1]
(
construction
guarantee
)
on 23 October 2013 in favour of Independent Development Trust (IDT)
for the due fulfilment of the construction work undertaken
by the
second respondent. The applicants sued out papers for an order
directing the first respondent to pay the guaranteed
sum of
R16 132 194.77
[2]
(including vat) as result of the second respondent having committed
acts which triggered the calling up of the construction guarantee.
[2]
The applicants contend
that the construction guarantee is being called up since the second
respondent was placed under business
rescue alternatively on the
basis that IDT incurred expenses as a result of the appointment of
another contractor to rectify some
defects and complete the
construction work (
outstanding
work
)
which the second respondent failed to complete.
[3]
The first respondent having refused to effect payment of the
guaranteed amount IDT then launched these proceedings on 12 December
2019.
[3]
At the initial stage the suit was between the applicant
and the first
respondent, and the second respondent brought an application for
joinder which was granted by Carrim AJ on 6 October
2022.
Parties
[4]
The applicants are the trustees for the time being for
IDT (also
referred to an employer), which is a schedule 2 Major Public Entity
in terms of the Public Finance Management Act, with
its principal
place of business situated at Glenwood Office Park, cnr Oberon and
Sprite Streets, Faerie Glen, Pretoria.
[5]
The first respondent is Lombard Insurance Company Limited,
a public
company duly registered in terms of the laws of the Republic of South
Africa (registration number 1990/001253/06) with
its principal place
of business situated at Ground Floor, Building C, Sunnyside Office
Park, 2 Carse, O’Gowrie Road, Parktown,
Johannesburg.
[6]
The second respondent is Group Five Construction (Pty)
Ltd (also
referred as the contractor) a private company duly incorporated in
terms of the laws of the Republic of South Africa
(registration
number 1974/003166/07) with its principal place of business situated
at 2 Eglin Road, Sunninghill, Johannesburg.
[7]
The second respondent is
placed under business rescue and its participation in this
lis
is sanctioned by the
business rescue practitioners, Petrus Francois Van Den Steen and Dave
Lake in terms of
section 133
of the
Companies Act 17 of 2008
.
[4]
Background
Prologue
[8]
On 1 November 2013 IDT and the second respondent entered
into a
Principal Building Agreement (
PBA
) for the construction of the
Nelspruit High Court building in Mbombela, Mpumalanga Province. The
construction contract was for
the sum of R537 739 825.76
(vat exclusive).
[9]
IDT contended during the proceedings that the anticipated
date of
opening of the court was on 8 November 2019.
[10]
Focus Project Management
(Pty) Ltd (
principal
agent
)
was appointed by IDT as its principal agent to manage and supervise
the implementation of the construction work on behalf of IDT.
The
agent would,
inter
alia
,
issue monthly interim payment certificates
[5]
which will reflect the amount due to the second respondent and also
issue recovery monthly statement
[6]
to the employer or contractor for any sum recoverable from the other
party. In addition, the principal agent would issue practical
completion certificate, works completion certificate and final
completion certificate.
[11]
The second respondent and
its sub-contractors were, towards the anticipated date of opening of
the court as set out above, locked
into dispute resolution over
payments of invoices due to sub-contractors, including CIS (Pty) Ltd
(
CIS
).
[7]
As a result of this dispute CIS refused to complete portion of the
work assigned to it by the second respondent. In view of the
looming
date of the opening IDT entered into a direct contract with CIS to
complete the outstanding the work. IDT paid CIS the
amount which was
due to it by the second respondent (which was the subject of the
dispute with second respondent referred to above)
and also paid
invoices rendered by CIS for the outstanding work executed pursuant
to the direct contract with the IDT. The total
amount paid was
R2 831 372.91
[8]
.
[12]
Meanwhile the principal
agent issued a certificate of practical completion on 3 May 2019
which was followed by the works completion
certificate/letter on 12
May 2019. The certificate of works completion was accompanied by a
list of defects which would have to
be rectified before achieving
final completion. The said defects included, ‘
cracks
between copings and waterproofing to roofs’
[9]
,
(
sic
).
[13]
IDT subsequently sent a
letter of demand dated 30 October 2019 calling up the guarantee on
the basis of the submission that the
PBA provided that the
construction guarantee would be called up once the court issued an
order placing the second respondent under
inter
alia
,
liquidation or having a similar effect.
[10]
The letter of demand in addition, sought to call up the guarantee on
the basis of the payments effected by IDT to CIS.
[14]
The first respondent declined the demand for payment as the letter of
demand
does not comply with the provisions of the construction
guarantee and PBA as the recovery statement setting out the loss or
expenses
claimed as envisaged by clause 3 of the construction
guarantee was not attached. In return IDT submitted a statement of
recovery
dated 28 November 2019. IDT subsequently proceeded to launch
these proceedings on 12 December 2019.
[15]
On 31 August 2021 the principal agent issued a final completion
certificate
which stated that ‘
[T]herefore, the requested FC
(Final Completion) certificate is hereby issued in terms of clause
26.2.1 and the latent defects liability
period shall continue from
the FC date in terms of clause 27.0. The contractor will be required
to complete the latent defects
during construction and defects
liability period as well as the defects identified during the latent
defects period after FC. The
following defects are the latent defects
identified at FC: 1. Waterproofing; and 2. Potential structural
cracks observed in walls.”
The certificate was accompanied
by a final account which reflect the amounts due by IDT, which
includes amount of R1 728 534.00,
payable to the second
respondent. The principal agent having deducted the amount which IDT
paid to CIS.
[16]
The construction
guarantee provides that once the certificate of final completion has
been issued all payments (if any) effected
in favour of IDT would
have to be accounted for and further that IDT would then return the
original guarantee to the first respondent.
[11]
Now that the certificate of final completion has been issued
indicating that IDT is indebted to the second respondent, the first
respondent contends that the purpose of IDT’s suit is moot.
[17]
The second respondent launched a counter application against IDT
seeking an
order that the amount of R1 728 534.00 stated in
the certificate of final completion be paid by IDT. IDT resisted the
counter application on the basis that it is irregular and further
that on the proper reading of the final certificate of completion
the
second respondent would have to rectify the defects before the said
sum is paid.
Issues
[18]
Issues for determination in a truncated format are, first, whether
the guarantee
is an on-demand or conditional guarantee. Secondly,
whether IDT made out a case to call up the guarantee. Thirdly,
whether the
relief sought by IDT is moot in view of the certificate
of final completion is issued. Fourthly, whether the counter
application
launched by the second respondent is sustainable. These
issues will not be dealt with in any specified order.
Relevant
clauses.
[19]
As a prelude to the parties’ submissions, it is imperative to
set out
clauses germane to this
lis
as specified in both the
construction guarantee and PBA.
Construction
guarantee
.
[20]
Clause 3 provides that
the first respondent shall pay the guaranteed amount to IDT “…
during
the period when a claim is received by the guarantor, on receipt of a
written demand from the employer to do so, and which
demand the
employer may make if the employer has a right of recovery against the
contractor in terms of 33.0 of the contract.’
[12]
[21]
Clause 2(d) provides that ‘
On the
date of payment
of the amount in the final payment certificate
, the
employer shall refund the remaining of the guarantee to the
contractor.’
(Underlining added).
[22]
Clause 7 provides that the guarantee would lapse on the date of
payment of
the amount in the final payment certificate and further
that the guarantor’s liability is limited to the guaranteed
amount.
PBA
[23]
Clause 17.4
[13]
provides that IDT would be entitled to enter into an agreement with a
third party to complete the work which the second respondent
failed
to complete. Clause 30.0 provides for circumstances under which IDT
would be entitled to demand payment for loss and expenses
incurred.
Clause 33.1 provides that the principal agent shall issue a monthly
recovery statement to the contractor simultaneously
with the interim
payment certificate. Clause 33.2.2 provides that expenses and loss
incurred for having employed another contractor
(in terms of clause
17.4) may be claimed from the first respondent. Clause 33.6 provides
that IDT would be entitled to call up
the guaranteed sum if the
second respondent is placed under,
inter
alia
,
liquidation
[14]
through an
order of court.
Parties’
submissions and contentions.
Applicant’s Main
Claim.
[24]
IDT contends that it is
entitled to the reduced
[15]
guaranteed sum on the basis that the second respondent failed to
complete its work pursuant to which IDT had to appoint CIS to
complete same. The claim is based on clause 17.4 read with clause
33.2.2 of the PBA as referred to above.
[25]
The first respondent
contends that the claim is for the recovery of expenses and loss
claimed in accordance with clause 17.4. of
the PBA and was preceded
by a letter of demand, dated (30 October 2019) which was not
compliant with the provisions of clause 3
of the construction
guarantee. The said letter of demand should have been based on the
recovery statement
[16]
issued
by the principal agent reflecting the amount due by the contractor
for the demand to comply with clause 3 of the construction
guarantee.
[26]
Further that the attempt by IDT to regularise the defect in the
letter of demand
by submitting a recovery statement only on 28
November 2019 cannot cure the defect on the demand, which was issued,
almost a month
earlier on 30 October 2019. In the end this claim
should be dismissed.
IDT’s
alternative claim
[27]
IDT’s alternative claim is premised on the contention that the
second
respondent was placed under business rescue and IDT is
therefore entitled to call up the guarantee in terms of clause 33.6
of the
PBA. IDT contends that an error was made by stating that the
second respondent was placed under business rescue through an order
of court instead of the director’s special resolution. Further
that the argument by the first respondent that such a mistake
is
material and not condonable is unsustainable.
[28]
In addition, so the argument continued, clause 33.6 made specific
reference
to the court order for,
inter alia
, liquidation or
an order of similar effect
. To this end IDT contends that being
placed under business rescue has similar effect with,
inter alia
,
liquidation since the status of the entity is changed and further
that there is a moratorium on the legal proceedings once such
an
entity is placed under business rescue.
[29]
The first respondent contends that the alternative claim is bound to
fail since
the second respondent was placed under business rescue
through a special resolution and not as per court order as alleged by
IDT.
In addition, being placed under business rescue is not included
in clause 33.6 as a circumstance which will trigger IDT’s
right
to call up the guarantee. The first respondent stated, so argument
continued, that clause 33.6 is triggered by an order of
court and
since there was no court order the demand by IDT predicated on this
clause should be construed as
pro non scripto
.
Mootness
of IDT’s relief.
[30]
The first respondent contends that relief sought by IDT is moot as
IDT’s
principal agent has issued a final completion certificate
which indicates that IDT is indebted to the second respondent. In the
premises any amount which the first respondent may be ordered by this
court to pay, IDT would have to be pay it back to the first
respondent since IDT is required to account for all monies which may
have not been expended during construction.
[31]
Though clause 27 of the PBA provides that the defects liability
continues for
5 years after date of final completion, clause 2(d) of
the construction guarantee states that it lapses on the date of
payment
of the amount in the final payment certificate.
[32]
The liability of the second respondent, so the argument continued, in
relation
to IDT now relates to latent defects and construction
guarantee does not cover same.
[33]
First respondent referred
to
National
Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs
2000 (2) SA 1
CC where
the court held that the courts should avoid giving advisory opinions
on abstract propositions of law. Further that the
court adjudicate
over matters which are moot where the interest of justice so
demands
[17]
and IDT’s
case fails to make the cut.
[34]
In retort IDT contends that the final completion certificate listed
the defects
which requires rectification and to this end there are
still obligations on the second respondent for the defects
outstanding during
the construction and defect liability period which
cannot be construed as the latent defect incurred after the final
completion
certificate.
Second
Respondent’s Counter application
[35]
IDT raised two issues contending that the second respondent embarked
on a deliberately
curated process for it to be joined in these
proceedings which is irregular. First, ordinarily a counter
application is launched
when responding to a claim and it was
irregular for the second respondent to launch a counter application
which creates an impression
that there was a claim against the second
respondent. Secondly IDT contends the second respondent did not
follow the correct procedure
which is prescribed in terms of Rule 13
of the Uniform Rules of Court in its claim. In retort the second
respondent contends that
Rule 13 of the Uniform rules finds no
application in this
lis
and furthermore issues relating to the
alleged defects in the application for the intervention/joinder
should have been raised
before the order was granted.
[36]
With regard to the final completion certificate the IDT contends that
the principal
agent has erroneously issued the certificate of final
completion since the said certificate listed the defects which were
identified
before the certificate was issued and which should have
been rectified first.
[37]
The second respondent on
the other hand contends that IDT’s principal agent has issued a
final payment certificate which indicates
that the work is completed.
The certificate indicates that the amount due and payable to the
second respondent is R1 728 534.00.
In addition, the second
respondent further contends that the listed defects have been
attended to
[18]
and principal
agent having ‘
determined
that the final completion had occurred on 11 August 2021’
.
[19]
Furthermore, the report by its own engineer stated that the defects
complained of are as a result of lapses in maintenance for
which the
second respondent is not responsible.
[20]
[38]
In any event, so argument
continued, the value of the said defects have not been quantified
(
illiquid
claim
)
to justify the basis for IDT to contend that it is entitled to retain
the whole sum. To this end the second respondent contends
that IDT’s
attempt to argue set off is unsustainable as ‘…
the
IDT has failed to quantify or provide an expert who is able to
demonstrate what the nature of the defect is’.
[21]
[39]
IDT resists this claim on the basis that there is still work not
completed
by the second respondent and as such IDT is entitled to
retain the amount aforesaid until the outstanding work is completed
or
defects being rectified.
Other
issues
[40]
There is a dispute
between the parties as to whether the construction guarantee is a
conditional guarantee or a demand bond. Ordinarily,
so argues IDT, as
the definition of a guarantee policy set out in the definition in
terms of
section 1(1)
of the
Short-Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998
means ‘
a
contract in terms of which a person, other than a bank, in return for
a premium, undertakes to provide policy benefits
if
any event relating to the failure of a person to discharge an
obligation, occurs
’
[22]
.
(underling
added). IDT has also referred to the definitions of the construction
guarantee in the PBA as a guarantee on call and
it submits it exist
independent of the PBA.
[41]
IDT contends that the contention by the first respondent that the
construction
guarantee is a conditional guarantee is unsustainable.
This was in response to the first respondent having stated that the
amount
claimed should have been captured in a recovery statement and
must be first claimed from the second respondent.
[42]
IDT further contended that the guarantee was an on-demand and not
conditional
guarantee. As such the guaranteed sum was payable once a
demand has been made and not dependent on the contract entered into
with
the second respondent.
[43]
The first respondent on
the other hand, contends that in interpreting the guarantee IDT
incorrectly made reference to the definitions
in the PBA and not the
terms as set out in the guarantee itself. The respondent further drew
a distinction between on demand and
conditional guarantee and
submitted that ‘…
where
the guarantee, or a bond, is unconditional the liability of the
guarantor is established by the demand alone – hence,
an
“on-demand bond”; assuming, of course, that demand is
compliant with the requirements of the guarantee. However,
where the
guarantee, or bond, is conditional then the liability of the
guarantor is not established by the demand alone, but also
by
compliance with the condition set out in the guarantee’
.
[23]
[44]
In this case, the first respondent argued, the guarantee was
conditional to
what is set out in clause 3 of the guarantee in terms
of which IDT was required to demand in writing the amount which is
recoverable
from the second respondent in terms of clause 33.0 of the
PBA. Further that the letter of demand dated 30 October 2019
did
not reflect recoverable amount due by the second respondent. The
attempt to regularise the demand through a recovery statement
prepared a month later cannot cure the defect lest applicant would be
entitled to make a demand for the amount due in future as
the demand
was made in October and liability only arose in November, through the
recovery statement.
Legal
principles and analysis
Applicants
main claim
[45]
It is self-evident that the letter of demand is silent with regard to
the recovery
statement from the principal agent. The argument
by IDT seems to be that the requirement for a recovery statement was
not
necessary since the claim is for the guaranteed sum and not
necessarily the expenses incurred. This argument is unsustainable as
the claim for the loss and expenses in terms of clause 17.4 read with
33.2.2 would require that the expenses to be listed.
[46]
In any event, it appears that in the final calculation by the
principal agent,
account has been taken of the sum already paid to
CIS before determining the total sum due the second respondent. To
the extent
that the amount claimed by IDT is for the amount which IDT
paid to CIS as set out in the recovery statement the IDT’s
claim
would be unsuccessful as there is no longer amount due to IDT.
I make this assessment subject to the outcome of this
lis
as
is set out below.
Applicant’s
Alternative claim
[47]
The first respondent correctly stated that calling up the guaranteed
would
have been triggered by an order of court having been issued
for,
inter alia
, liquidation or order having a similar effect.
In this instance there is no court order to that effect. Secondly, I
am not persuaded
that the consequences between liquidation and
business rescue are similar, and IDT has failed to present an
authoritative argument
in support of the submission that they are the
similar. The fact that the agreement between IDT and second
respondent is still
valid and enforceable makes an important
difference between liquidation and business rescue process.
[48]
The situation would be
different if the business rescue practitioner has decided to cancel
the contract
[24]
in which case
IDT would be entitled to call up the guarantee for cancellation as
contemplated in terms of clause 33.2.3. of PBA.
[25]
In addition, the suspension of the legal proceedings is not
absolutely barred since legal proceedings may be launched with,
inter
alia
,
consent of the business rescue practitioner alternatively through an
order of the court.
[26]
The
IDT’s alternative claim is, subject to what is set out below,
also unsustainable.
Second
respondent’s claim and mootness of the relief sought
[49]
First respondent contends
that since the final completion certificate has been issued which
reflect that the IDT is indebted to
the second respondent there is no
longer a valid basis to claim any monies from the first respondent.
Final completion is defined
as ‘the stage of completion where
in the opinion of the principal agent, the works
are
free of all defects
.
[27]
In addition, clause 26.2 of the PBA provides that where the
agent is satisfied that the works has reached final completion
stage
he shall forthwith issue a certificate of final completion but where
same has not been reached the agent shall forthwith
issue a defect
lists which must be rectified to achieve final completion.
[50]
The principal agent went
and proceeded to identify latent defects as at issuance of the final
completion certificate which are ‘
waterproofing’
and ‘potential structural cracks observed in walls
’
.
(
Sic
).
These defects, as correctly argued by IDT, were already identified in
the works completion certificate as they appear on the
list reflected
on the agent’s certificate of 12 May 2019. In support of the
understanding that the defects were identified
prior the issuing of
the said final completion certificate, the second respondent contends
firstly that attempt was made to refer
the dispute regarding the said
defects for arbitration but was unsuccessful. Further that the issue
of the dispute has been noted
and mentioned by the second respondent
who stated that ‘
[T]he
source of the defects has consistently been a matter of
contention’.
[28]
Secondly, the second
respondent’s position has always been that the defects are due
to lack of maintenance and the second
respondent is therefore not
liable for their rectification.
[51]
The final completion certificate speaks to two aspects, first, latent
defects
which were identified during the construction and defects
liability period which must be completed or rectified by the second
respondent.
These defects were existing as at date of issuing of the
final certificate. Secondly, the certificate further refers to the
latent
defects which may be identified during the latent defects
period after the
FC (
referring to Final Certificate).
[52]
In view of the fact that the principal agent identified those defects
before
the date of the final certificate and the said finding by the
principal agent has not been challenged by the second respondent the
latter is liable to rectify them. In addition, the fact that they
were identified before the final certificate also implies that
the
construction guarantee remain extant though limited to the
rectification of the defects alternatively until the second
respondent
has successfully challenged the principal agent’s
findings that the defects are for the second respondent’s
account.
To this end, IDT is entitled to withhold payment until the
defects which were listed before the completion certificate and still
existing at the issuance of the final completion certificate have
been rectified. It is noted that since the work has not been
quantified it is possible that the quantum may even exceed the amount
now claimed by the second respondent.
[53]
In the premises it also follows that the argument advanced by the
first respondent
that the issuance of the final certificate brings to
finality and the lapsing of the guarantee is unsustainable as the
certificate
clearly identified defects which must be completed by the
second respondent. Noting also that clause 27.1 of the PBA states
that
‘
Defects that appear up to the date of final completion
shall be addressed in terms of 24.0 and 26.0’
and the
process set herein has to be embarked upon. To this end the
contention that the relief sought by IDT is moot is unsustainable
and
cannot be upheld.
Other
issues
[54]
The contentions raised by IDT that the joinder application was
defective cannot
be argued before me as that argument should have
been raised before the application for joinder was granted. The
proceedings serving
before me are not for a review or appeal of the
order granted by Carrim AJ.
[55]
There are merits in IDT’s contention that it is ingenious that
a party
against whom no claim is made can bring a counter
application. Be that as it may IDT did not raise an irregular
proceedings and
instead opted to engage with the issues raised in the
counter application as if there was a claim against the second
respondent.
Such conduct is construed as condoning the alleged
irregularity in the process followed by the second respondent. It is
indeed
correct that
Rule 13
finds no application in these proceedings
and the fact IDT has failed to launch irregular proceedings thwarts
the wherewithal to
take issue with the process undertaken.
[56]
IDT further raised the contention by the first respondent that the
claim for
expenses and loss should first be submitted to the second
respondent and be referred to the first respondent only when second
respondent
is unable to pay in baseless. This is informed by the fact
that the PBA states that the principal agent should on monthly basis
submit the recovery statement to the parties. It follows that if at
the time when the claim was lodged with the first respondent
and the
second respondent having not paid for whatever reason there would not
be any excuse for the first respondent to refuse
to pay the
guaranteed sum. The payment is not conditional on the second
respondent’s ability to pay, though if the second
respondent
pays the recovery amount no further amount would be due to IDT to
warrant calling up the guarantee.
[57]
Regarding the argument whether the construction guarantee in this
instance
is an on-demand guarantee or not, it appears that the
construction guarantee read with PBA has both demand and conditional
guarantee
characteristics. It appears that claims set out in clauses
33.1 till 33.5 need to be read in conjunction with the work or
performance
by the second respondent and therefore construction
guarantee cannot be enforced independent of the PBA clauses. On the
other hand,
the claim to call up the guarantee as contemplated in
clause 33.6 is not dependent on the performance of the second
respondent
and the guaranteed sum would be paid once the second
respondent is, as an example, liquidated. The circumstances under
clause 33.6
are characteristics of an on-demand guarantee. That
notwithstanding the terms and /or conditions set out in the
construction guarantee
will always prevail.
[58]
It was held by the SCA in
Compass Insurance Co Ltd v Hospitality
Hotel Developments (Pty) Ltd
that the very purpose of a
performance bond is that the guarantor has an independent, autonomous
contract with the beneficiary
and that the contractual arrangements
with the beneficiary and other parties are of no consequences to the
guarantor.
[59]
In the interpretation of the guarantees by the court IDT referred to
several
judgments which did not speak directly to the issue at hand.
It is noted however that the reference was made to the SCA in
Compass
Insurance Co Ltd v Hospitality Hotel Developments (Pty) Ltd
2012
(2) SA 537
(SCA) where it was stated that ‘…
the
requirements of the particular constructions guarantee was absolutely
clear and that it had to be fulfilled on its terms.’
IDT
further contending that where
[T]he formal requirement for payment
under the guarantee was not complied with at all, and the appellant
was held entitled to refuse
making payment under the guarantee’.
[60]
It was also held in
Standard Bank of India and Another v
Denel SOC Ltd
[2015] 2 All SA 152
at para 7 that a bank issuing
an on-demand guarantee is only obliged to pay where a demand meets
the terms of guarantee. Such a
demand, which complies with the terms
of the guarantee, provides conclusive evidence that payment is due.
Epilogue
to the analysis
[61]
In summing up, the claim by IDT for the payment of the guaranteed
amount relative
to amount paid to CIS is unsustainable since the
demand to call up the guarantee was not accompanied or preceded by
the recovery
statement. In any event the calculation of the final
amount payable to the second respondent the principal agent took into
account
the amount paid by applicant to CIS.
[62]
The claim predicated on clause 33.6 is also unsustainable since there
was no
order by the court as contemplated in that clause. In
addition, being placed under business rescue is not similar to being
placed
under,
inter alia,
liquidation.
[63]
The second respondent’s
counter application is also bound to fail since the principal agent
identified defects in the final
completion certificate which existed
as at final certificate (and not after the final certificate) which
must be rectified by the
second respondent. Since the said defects
were identified before the final certificate
[29]
the construction guarantee remain extant though limited to those
defects. Noting further that clause 7 of the construction guarantee
states that the guarantee would lapse on the date of payment of the
amount in the final payment certificate.
Costs
[64]
There is no reason why the costs should not follow the results.
Order
[65]
I make the following order:
1.
Application against Lombard Insurance Company
Ltd for the payment of
R5 377 398.25 is dismissed with costs.
2.
The second respondent’s application against
IDT for the payment
of R1 728 534.00 is dismissed with costs.
Mokate
Victor Noko
Judge
of the High Court
This
judgement was prepared and authored by Noko J and is handed down
electronically by circulation to the Parties / their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file
of this matter on CaseLines. The date of the judgment is deemed
to be
2 February 2024.
Date
of hearing: 4 September 2023
Date
of judgment:2 February 2024
Appearances
For
the Applicants:
Adv SJ Bekker SC
Attorneys
for the Applicants:
Sikunyana Incorporated.
For
the First Respondent:
Adv CJ Mc Aslin SC
Attorneys
for the First Respondent
Frese Gurovich
Attorneys.
For
the second Respondent
Adv JP Boster
Attorneys
for second Respondent
Cox Yeats Attorneys
[1]
Titled:
“
Variable
Guarantee JBCC Principal Building Agreement”.
[2]
The
construction guarantee was for the sum of R53 773 982.58
which was 10% of the contract value being R537 773 982.58.
The guaranteed amount is reduced in accordance with clause 2(a) and
(b) of the construction guarantee in terms of which
guarantee
would be reduced to amount equal to 3% of the contract value
(excluding vat) within 21 calendar days of the date of
practical
completion of the works and further be reduced to amount equal to 1%
within 21 calendar days of the final completion
of the works.
The
amount was as the time of hearing reduced to 1% being R5 377 398.25.
[3]
The
nature and details hereof are not in dispute between the parties.
[4]
See the resolution of the
Business
Rescue Practitioners at 0018-23. The second respondent having been
placed under business rescue through a special resolution
taken on 1
March 2019.
[5]
Clause
31.1. provides that ‘
The
principal agent shall issue an interim payment certificate every
month until the issue of the final payment certificate. The
payment
certificate shall be based on a valuation prepared within seven (7)
calendar days before the stated date in the schedule
which may be
for a nil negative amount.’
[6]
Clause
33.1 provides that ‘
The
principal agent shall issue a recovery statement monthly to the
employer and contractor simultaneously with payment certificates.
Explanatory documentation as may be necessary to support the
calculation of the amounts stated shall accompany the recovery
statement. …’.
[7]
CIS was a sub-contractor to Edison Power Gauteng (Pty) Ltd
(
Edison
)
and the latter was a sub-contractor to the second respondent.
[8]
See
para 75 of the Applicant’s Founding Affidavit at 0001-24. The
amount was constituted by R1 234 572.50 which
was due to
CIS by the second respondent and invoices for outstanding work in
the sums of R1 463 035.84 and R133 572.50.
[9]
See para 124 of the Applicant’s Heads of Argument at 0021-38.
[10]
C
lause
33.6 of the PBA provides that ‘
Where
a provisional sequestration or provisional liquidation order has
been granted or where an order has been granted which commences
sequestration, liquidation, bankruptcy, receivership, winding up or
any similar effect against the contractor or this agreement
is
cancelled in terms of 36.0. the employer may issue a demand to the
guarantor in terms of the construction guarantee held as
security.’
[11]
See
clause 5 of the Construction Guarantee.
[12]
Contract
in this regard refers to PBA.
[13]
In
accordance with clause 17.4 of the PBA which provides that: “
should
the contractor fail to proceed with due diligence with a contract
instruction, the principal agent may notify the contractor
to
proceed within five (5) working days from receipt of the notice.
Without further notice, on default by the contractor, the
employer
may employ other parties to give effect to such contract
instructions in addition to any other rights that the employer
may
have. The employer may recover expenses and loss in terms of clause
33.0 resulting from such employment.
[14]
See note 10 above.
[15]
The applicant averred that the stage as contemplated in clause 2(b)
has been reached and the guarantee amount is reduced to
R5 377 398.25.[15]
[16]
Together
with payment certificate for the payment effected to the third party
in terms of clause 30.1 of PBA.
[17]
See
Minister
of Mineral Resources v Sishen Iron Ore Company (Pty) Ltd
2014
(2) SA 603
(CC) quoted on para 93 of the Respondent’s Heads of
Argument at 0020-25.
[18]
See
para 14 of the Second Respondent’s Notice of Counter
Application at 0018-10 where it is stated that the second respondent
has ‘…
in
fact achieved practical completion on 3 May 2019, thereafter works
completion on 12 May 2021 and then final completion of the
building
works on 11 August 2021 at the Nelspruit High Court’.
[19]
See
para 15 of Second Respondent’s Notice of Counter-application
at 0018-11.
[20]
See
para 23 of the Second Respondent’s Replying Affidavit,
0004-12.
[21]
See
para 66 of the Second Respondent’s Replying Affidavit at
0004-20.
[22]
See para 48 of the Applicant’s Heads of Arguments- at 0021-13.
[23]
See
para 10 of the First Respondent’s Heads of Argument at 0020-5.
[24]
In
terms of
section 136(2)
of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
.
[25]
33.2.
‘
The
employer may recover expense and loss incurred resulting from:
33.2.3.
Cancellation of a nominated subcontract in terms of 20.10.’
[26]
Section
133
of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
.
[27]
See
PBA’s definition and interpretations at 0001-325
[28]
See
para 50 of the second Respondent’s Replying Affidavit at
0004-17. See also para 70 where the Second Respondent contends
that
the ‘…
none
of the reports relied upon are able to identify what the source of
the leaks is. In the absence of the identification of
the source,
there is nothing to be fixed ad there can be no liability on the
part of Group Five for a latent defect.
[29]
Or
as at
FC
as
stated by the principal agent in the certificate.
sino noindex
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