Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 152South Africa
Muyela v Minister Of Police and Another (32440/18) [2024] ZAGPJHC 152 (19 February 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
19 February 2024
Headnotes
by several courts[1] (and therefore trite) that the provisions section 17 of the Superior Court Act have introduced a higher threshold to be met in application for leave to appeal and the usage of the word ‘would’ require the applicant to demonstrate that another court would certainly come to a different conclusion.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Muyela v Minister Of Police and Another (32440/18) [2024] ZAGPJHC 152 (19 February 2024)
Muyela v Minister Of Police and Another (32440/18) [2024] ZAGPJHC 152 (19 February 2024)
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sino date 19 February 2024
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
No:32440/18
REPORTABLE:
YES
/ NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
REVISED:
NO
19
February 2024
In
the matter between:
KHUMBELO
MULEYA
Applicant
And
MINISTER
OF POLICE
NATIONAL
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
1
st
Respondent
2
nd
Respondent
## JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
NOKO
J
Introduction
[1]
The applicant launched an application for leave to appeal the whole
judgment and order I granted on 18 December 2023 in
terms of which
the civil claim against the respondents for damages predicated on
unlawful arrest, unlawful detention and malicious
prosecution was
dismissed with costs. .
Background
[2]
The factual background has been set out
in extenso
in my
judgment and same will not be repeated in this judgment. I have
decided that the facts/evidence presented by the respondents
justified the invocation of the provisions of section 40(1)(b) of the
Criminal Procedure Act (
the CPA
). The investigating officer
had a suspicion that the complainant suffered a dangerous wound which
suspicions formed the basis for
proceedings with the arrest without a
warrant. The suspicion was based on the observation of the
fresh stitches on the complainant’s
hand and the fact that he
was hospitalised for two days.
[3]
I have also decided that the applicant failed to demonstrate that
there was malice in the institution of the prosecution
by the second
respondent who enrolled the case pursuant to the prosecution’s
realisation that the complainant was injured,
and the applicant made
a statement that indeed he assaulted the complainant. The contention
by the applicant that the withdrawal
of charges is indicative of
malice and the case against the applicant was at all times weak lacks
proper legal foundation and unsustainable.
[4]
As set out above the applicant is aggrieved by my judgment and order
and seek leave to appeal same.
Legal
principles
[5]
In the application for leave to appeal the applicant relies on
section 17 of the Superior Court Act which provides that
leave to
appeal would be granted where the court is,
inter alia
, of the
opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success
and further that the adjudication of the application
to stay would be
precedent setting.
[6]
It has been
held by several courts
[1]
(and
therefore trite) that the provisions section 17 of the Superior Court
Act have introduced a higher threshold to be met in
application for
leave to appeal and the usage of the word ‘
would
’
require the applicant to demonstrate that another court would
certainly come to a different conclusion.
[7]
The mere
possibility of success, an arguable case or one that is not hopeless
is not enough.
[2]
There must be
a sound, rational basis to conclude that there is a reasonable
prospect of success on appeal
[3]
.
Parties
submissions analysis
[8]
The fulcrum
of the applicant’s application for leave to appeal is still
(just like in the action proceedings) predicated on
the contention
that the investigating officer did not make proper investigation of
the wounds to conclude that it was dangerous
to justify the arrest
without warrant. This contention could not subvert the judgment in
Mananga
[4]
as quoted by the respondent’s counsel when she submitted that
‘
it
is not necessary to establish as a fact that the inflicted wound was
dangerous. Suspicion implies an absence of certainty or
adequate
proof. Thus, a suspicion might be reasonable even if there is
insufficient evidence for a prima facie case against the
arrestee’
.
[5]
[9]
There was no persuasive arguments advanced to persuade me that the
decision to enrol the matter by the second respondent
is assailable.
There is also no legal justification for the applicant to content
that the second respondent did not hold ‘…
an honest
belief in the guilt of the plaintiff, but its belief and conduct must
have been objectively reasonable, as would have
been exercised by a
person using ordinary care and prudence.
’ The record in the
docket presented before the prosecution included an indication that
the complainant was assaulted by a
mob, the applicant was at the
scene, and he acknowledged that he is the first person to hit the
complainant with an open hand.
This was good enough to have a
prima
facie
conclusion that there was triable offence was committed by
the applicant. Nothing has been presented to gainsay this conclusion
at trial and during argument for leave to appeal.
Conclusion
[10]
The applicant has failed to meet the threshold and I am not persuaded
that the appeal has reasonable prospects of success
and further that
another court would come to a different conclusion. To this end the
application for leave to appeal is bound to
fail.
Costs
[11]
There are no reasons presented to unsettle or upset the general
principle that the costs should follow the results.
Order
[12]
In the premises I grant the following order:
That
the application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
Mokate
Victor Noko
Judge
of the High Court
This
judgement was prepared and authored by Noko J is handed down
electronically by circulation to the Parties / their legal
representatives
by email and by uploading it to the electronic file
of this matter on CaseLines. The date of the judgment is deemed to be
19 February
2024.
Date
of hearing: 15 February 2024
Date
of judgment: 19 February 2024
For
the Applicant: Attorney
N Gumede
Attorneys
for the Applicant: Ndou
Attorneys Inc
For
the Respondent: Advocate
NM Mtshweni
Attorneys
for the Respondent
Office of the State Attorneys.
[1]
Mont
Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen & 18 Others
2014
JDR 2325.
MEC
for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha
2016 ZASCA (25 November 2016),
Acting
National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Democratic
Alliance: In Re Democratic Alliance v Acting Director
of Public
Prosecutions and Others
2016
ZAGPPHC 489.
[2]
MEC
for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha
2016
ZASCA (25 November 2016) at para 17
[3]
S
v Smith
2012
(1) SACR 527.
[4]
Mananga and Others v Minister of Police (324/20200[2021] ZASCA
71 at para 8
.
[5]
See
para 22 of Respondents’ Heads of Argument on page 8
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