Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 672South Africa
Rand Leases Property (Pty) Ltd v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (2022/23303) [2024] ZAGPJHC 672 (24 July 2024)
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Rand Leases Property (Pty) Ltd v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (2022/23303) [2024] ZAGPJHC 672 (24 July 2024)
Rand Leases Property (Pty) Ltd v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (2022/23303) [2024] ZAGPJHC 672 (24 July 2024)
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sino date 24 July 2024
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
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SAFLII
Policy
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number: 2022/23303
1.
REPORTABLE: NO
2.OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
3.
REVISED: YES
24
July 2024
In
the matter between:
RAND
LEASES PROPERTY (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
CITY
OF JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
Respondent
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by e-mail and released to
SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10h00 on 24
July 2024
JUDGMENT
Mudau, J
Introduction
[1]
The applicant, Rand Leases Property (Pty) Ltd
(“Rand Leases”) launched the main application against the
respondent,
the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (“the
City”) and seeks in the amended Notice of Motion declaratory
relief in the following terms:
1.1
An order directing the respondent to credit the
applicant's account with the capital amount of R37 123 495.00.
1.2
An order directing the respondent credit the
applicant's account with the sum of R8 123 873.85 plus any
further interest
debited against the applicant's account by the
respondent between the period of 1 March 2023 and the date
on which the
aforesaid credits are passed in favour of the applicant
by the respondent as well as costs.
The Main Application and
the Interlocutory Application have been enrolled simultaneously after
a direction by the Deputy Judge President.
Background facts
[2]
Rand Leases is an owner of various pieces of
immovable property situated on the West and East Rand.
Rand
Leases has a dispute with the City concerning its industrial
electricity account on the West Rand, which exists in the records
of
the City as account number 221323017.
The
dispute has been on-going since 2012.
Many
of the properties owned by the applicant were previously utilised for
mining purposes.
Mining on the relevant
properties has ceased.
[3]
The Rand Leases rents out numerous of the
properties, or portions thereof, to various industrial, commercial
entities and in some
cases, residential tenants. The tenants
occupying property owned by Rand Leases are dependent upon the supply
of electricity from
Rand Leases and, Rand Leases is, in turn,
dependent upon the supply of electricity from the City. Rand Leases
is undeniably a large
industrial consumer of electricity.
[4]
In or about 2006, at the instance of the City, the
electricity supply to Rand Leases properties relevant to this matter,
was converted
from a supply of bulk electricity for mining purposes,
to a supply for commercial purposes.
Immediately
after the conversion of the electricity supply from mining to
commercial, Rand Leases was unable to obtain electricity
accounts
from the City. Consequently, the City instituted action against Rand
Leases in this Court under case no. 38750/2012, claiming
an amount
that it contended was owing by Rand Leases of R37 123 495.00
(“the 2012 summons”);
an order
declaring Erf 3[…] V[…] to be executable; plus,
interest at 15.5%.
The amount claimed in
the 2012 summons was allegedly for the period from February 2006 to
September 2012.
[5]
Rand Leases filed a notice in terms of Rule 23,
which disputed the legal basis of the claim on the basis that it was
based on the
Local Government: Municipal Rates Act No 6 of 2004,
which it alleged is inapplicable because electricity is not a “rate”
as defined in the Act. The City, however, did not react to the Rule
23 notice. From November 2012 to March 2023, according to Rand
Leases, the City debited interest against its electricity account in
the sum of R8 123 873.85. Meantime,
the
parties agreed that the filing of further pleadings would be
suspended whilst Rand Leases conducted investigations into its
account with the City.
[6]
In due course, some ten years later, on 21
November 2022, the City withdrew the 2012 summons. In the period 2012
to 2016, the original
City meter was found to be faulty after Rand
Leases enlisted the services of an independent electricity consultant
to investigate
and advise upon the account of Rand Leases with the
City. It was established to be over-reading by approximately 61% on 4
June
2013 but by 25% on the City’s version. However, there were
deviations of a negative, under reading error of 14% in the
measurement
of Kwh.
The original meter was,
according to Rand Leases, as per agreement supposed to be removed
jointly and taken to a laboratory for
further analysis and testing.
Rand Leases alleges that the City unilaterally removed the original
meter. This resulted in Rand Leases’
attorneys addressing
a letter dated 12 September 2013 to the respondent recording out that
the City had unilaterally replaced the
meter that was proven to be
faulty.
[7]
Surreptitiously, contrary to an arrangement
according to Rand Leases, on or about 2 September 2013, the City
installed a new meter
(“the second meter”). The second
meter was also found to be faulty. It was over-reading by some 35%.
This resulted
in further correspondence being addressed.
[8]
In 2013, the City threatened to terminate the
electricity supply, despite the dispute and despite the process of
engagement. An
interim interdict was obtained by Rand Leases against
the City on 4
September 2013 under case
number 32447/2013 in this Court (per Foulkes-Jones AJ).
In
response to the interim interdict the City, bizarrely, filed an
application for leave to appeal, but took no effort to have the
application for leave to appeal prosecuted.
[9]
Following the granting of the interim interdict,
over a period until approximately April 2016, efforts were made to
reach a resolution
with the City. These efforts were, however,
unsuccessful. The facts as they unfolded were recorded in various
correspondences that
were addressed to the City's attorneys by
Rand Leases’ attorneys. I refer to Annexures “X1”
to “X6”
thereto per paragraph 62 of the founding
affidavit.
[10]
Ultimately, after a long process of interaction
between the parties, and after the settings on the second meter were
corrected by
the City, consensus was reached in or about April 2016
that the second meter was producing the correct readings.
Until that point, and whilst the dispute
prevailed, Rand Leases was, on its version, making provisional
monthly payments of 60%
of the monthly charges which were levied by
the City regarding the disputed account from the faulty meters.
[11]
Rand Leases, of its own volition, calculated an
amount,
of R5 784 898.38 against
the production by the City of a zero-balance account, which it
contended could possibly relate
to arrears that may, at that point in
time, have been due to the City. This it tendered to pay to the City
in correspondence dated
7 April 2016 for which it claims no privilege
to settle any possible outstanding historical arrears. In the same
letter (“X6”),
Rand Leases did not accept any liability
for historical debt preceding March 2013. However, the City refused
to accept the tender
in a letter dated 5 September 2016 and countered
it with an amount of R24 406 858.84 instead after pointing
out the flaws
in the calculations by Rand Leases as a basis for
the tender.
[12]
According to Rand Leases, it thereafter paid the
full charge that had been levied by the City in respect of
electricity consumption
relating to the Rand Leases account as
generated by the corrected meter, on a monthly basis up to the
present time subject only
to the reservation that interest has not
been paid because the interest amounts relate to the bigger alleged
indebtedness, which
remains disputed.
[13]
Rand Leases alleges that any amounts that may be
alleged by the City to be owing from the time of issue of the 2012
summons to the
point in 2016 when the monthly accounts were paid in
full, after the settings on the second meter had been corrected, have
also
prescribed.
The City continued to
render accounts, which according to Rand Leases were inexplicable
very high amounts, i.e. in the sum of R
43 157 164.23 at
the launch of this application. Efforts to engage with senior
officials of the City with a view to reaching
an overall settlement
did not yield the desired results. The deponent to the founding
affidavit referred to a spreadsheet, “annexure
AA” that
was prepared setting out the particularity and total of all amounts
paid to the City since April 2016. However,
AA is inscrutable and so
is “annexure BB”, a spread sheet, which purports to be
proof that since December 2012, Rand
Leases have paid the City the
sum of R79 352 965.21 up to the end of May 2022. The City
denied this and put Rand Leases
to the proof thereof.
[14]
In opposing this application and
in
limine
, the respondent contends that
the meters which form the basis of this application belong to and are
maintained and owned by City
Power Johannesburg (SOC) Ltd, a legal
person, which can be sued and sue in its own name and not the City of
Johannesburg Metropolitan
Municipality. Alternatively, it is alleged
Rand Leases has failed and/or neglected to join City Power
Johannesburg (SOC) Ltd to
these proceedings. The City contends that
City Power Johannesburg (SOC) Ltd has a direct and substantial
interests in the subject
matter of this application as the subject
matter of these proceedings involves the supply, distribution and
billing of electricity,
which falls within the exclusive purview of
City Power Johannesburg (SOC) Ltd.
[15]
Regarding the merits, the City contends that Rand
Leases has failed or neglected to attach to its founding affidavit
results of
a test conducted by the head of the City council's
electricity undertaking or an official duly authorised by the council
of the
meter alleged to be over reading by 60%, which is denied.
According to the City, Rand leases has been making sporadic payments
of its account since 2012, which have the effect of interrupting the
running of prescription contrary to submissions by the applicant.
[16]
As for the alleged overreading, the City contends
that it was, as indicated, 25% in relation to the second meter for
the period
June 2013 to April 2015, and for this period Rand Leases
was billed R14 143 481.96 (excl VAT) for electricity usage.
In overall summary, the City contends that that Rand Leases’
payments are allocated to the oldest debt and that each payment
comprises an acknowledgement of the overall indebtedness to the City.
[17]
As Rand Leases points out in reply in response to
the preliminary points, the accounts that it has attached to the
founding affidavit,
which appear from Annexure "A" to
Annexure "B16", it is apparent that there is no suggestion
or reference whatsoever
to the existence of City Power Johannesburg
(SOC) Limited as the contracting party. Significantly, the action
instituted against
Rand Leases in 2012, was in the name of the
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and not City Power.
All correspondence
relied upon exchanged with the attorneys for the
City referred to the City of Johannesburg as their client, and not
City Power.
It follows that the point
in
limine
is without any valid foundation
and falls to be dismissed. The point
in
limine
is dismissed for lack of merit.
[18]
As for the obligations of the City in respect of
services rendered to its customers within the context of a disputed
water bill,
the full court of this division (per Van Oosten
J) in
Euphorbia (Pty) Ltd t/a Gallagher
Estates v City of Johannesburg
stated:
“
In
the absence of special circumstances, considerations of policy,
practice and fairness require that the City is saddled with the
onus
of proving the correctness of its meters, the measurements of water
consumption and statements of account rendered pursuant
thereto. It
cannot reasonably be expected from the consumer, having raised a bona
fide dispute concerning the services delivered
by the City, to pierce
the municipal veil in order to prove aspects that peculiarly fall
within the knowledge of and are controlled
by the City. In the
present matter it was impossible for Euphorbia to perform its own
test on the contentious meter as, firstly,
only Termets was legally
permitted to perform the tests and, as it happened, the meter was
untimely disposed of by the City. The
statements and other data
concerning the water usage were in the possession and under control
of the City. Euphorbia relied on
justified inferences arising from a
sudden spike in water consumption arising from its own comprehensive
investigation, in order
to verify the correctness thereof. It
accordingly raised a bona fide dispute as to the City’s billing
in regard to the services,
and the City bore the onus to prove the
correctness thereof”.
[1]
[19]
Rand Leases introduced a supplementary affidavit
that deals with the 2012 summons withdrawn on 21 November 2022 by the
City. It
set out in the supplementary affidavit what it contends to
be the effect of the withdrawal of the 2012 summons on the relief
sought
by the applicant. It contends that as an immediate consequence
of the withdrawal of the 2012 summons, it immediately
became
entitled to a credit on its account of the capital amount claimed in
the 2012 summons, being the sum of R37 123 495.00
indicated
above, plus interest thereon the amount claimed is not owing by Rand
Leases to the City. Rand Leases requires that
all interest
charged from the 2012 summons to the current time must be credited
because, working backwards in time, any interest
on the monthly
accounts from April 2016 to date, all the monthly accounts have been
paid.
[20]
Rand Leases also contends that any interest
relating to the amount claimed in the 2012 summons of R37 123 495.00
must
be credited for the same reason that the capital amount must be
credited, because of the withdrawal. Rand Leases contends that,
any
claim the City may have between the period of the 2012 summons to
April 2016, has prescribed. Rand Leases served and filed
a Notice of
Intention to Amend its Notice of Motion due to the City's withdrawal
of its 2012 summons on 7 June 2023, which amendment
was effected on
22 June 2023 without opposition.
The interlocutory
application
[21]
The applicant seeks the following relief in
relation to the interlocutory application: (a) declaring the
respondent to be in contempt
of the Order of this Court granted on 4
October 2023; (b) imposing a suitable punishment on the respondent;
(c)
striking out the respondent's
defence in the action in terms of Rule 35(7) of the Rules of Court by
reason of the Respondent's failure
to comply with the agreed Court
Order as well as costs.
[22]
The background to this is that
on
7 June 2023, Rand Leases served and filed its Heads of Argument, List
of Authorities, Practice Note and Chronology in respect
of the main
application.
The City was obliged to
deliver its Heads of Argument and Practice Note in respect of the
main application on 22 June 2023, which
it failed to do.
[23]
Consequently, Rand Leases, on 8 August 2023,
served on the City’s attorneys, by way of email, an application
to compel the
respondent's Heads of Argument and Practice Note. The
unopposed date for the interlocutory application was 4 October
2023.
On 4 October 2023, Rand Leases agreed to an order, which
Strijdom AJ granted. The order by Strydom AJ granted the respondent
leave
to deliver a supplementary affidavit within 5 days of service
of the Court Order on the City's representatives in respect of which
Rand Leases is entitled to deliver a supplementary replying
affidavit.
The City was also ordered to
deliver its Heads of Argument within 10 days consistent with the
practice in this division before the
matter could be set down for
hearing. Rand Leases’ attorneys served the signed agreed court
order on the City on 10 October
2023.
[24]
The City failed to comply with the Strijdom AJ
order, therefore, on 24 October 2023 Rand Leases’
attorneys served
on the City's attorneys its application to strike
out the City's defence in line with the relief granted on 4 October
2023
as a result of non-compliance. Eventually, the City only served
and filed its answering affidavit to the application to strike out
on
22 November 2023. Consequently, on 23 November 2023, the
matter was removed from the unopposed roll by Fisher J with
the City
ordered to pay the costs. On 29 November 2023, Rand Leases served and
filed its replying affidavit to the application
to strike out.
[25]
It was only on 2 May 2024, which is more than 6
months later and on the eve of the hearing of these applications that
the City served
on its opponent the heads of argument as well as the
chronology. There is no explanation on the papers for non-compliance,
still
less an application for condonation. This is more than 6 months
later after the prescribed deadline. This not only egregious
but
constitutes abuse of court process.
[26]
As
Sutherland DJP had occasion to point out in similar circumstances in
Millu
v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and Another
,
the defiance of the court order is a serious affront to the process
of court and is intolerable.
[2]
This approach is uncontentious. The distinguishing factor with
Millu
to the
facts herein, being that the application there was for a temporary
interdict, and subsidiary relief, pending a final reconciliation
of
an account for services rendered by the City to the applicant's home.
[27]
Counsel for the City, Mr Sithole, submitted that
Rand Leases’ main application pending cannot be heard pending
the hearing
of the applicant's interlocutory application to have the
allegations made in the supplementary affidavit, which the City has
not
opposed. Rather strangely, he further submitted that Rand Leases
cannot seek to strike the Municipality's defence to the main
application in circumstances where the Municipality sought to
supplement its answering affidavit. He added from the bar in his
oral
submissions for another indulgence to do so albeit without an
adequate explanation by the City why a supplementary answering
affidavit could not be served and filed pursuant to the Strydom AJ
order.
[28]
The unmeritorious application was not only opposed
by Rand Leases’ counsel, but dismissed for the simple reason
that the City
had ample time to serve and file the required affidavit
but chose or neglected to do so. In fact, Mr Sithole contended that
the Municipality elected not to deliver its
supplementary affidavit as this would be condoning the applicant's
supplementary affidavit,
which the City considered as the
pro
non scripto.
[29]
However,
it is trite that the striking of a defence is a drastic remedy with a
far reaching impact on the right enshrined in
section 34 of our
Constitution providing that everyone has the right to have a dispute
be resolved by the application of law decided
by a court or tribunal
in a fair public hearing.
[3]
The
power to grant such a remedy is accordingly discretionary and is a
discretion that must be exercised judicially. In this instance,
the
relief was not seriously pursued. Accordingly, the relief sought to
strike the City’s defence is, under the circumstances,
no
longer appropriate given the fact that the long-awaited heads of
argument by the City have since been delivered, albeit late.
I return
to this issue below regarding costs.
[30]
As for
the merits in the main application, it is trite that “motion
proceedings, unless concerned with interim relief, are
all about the
resolution of legal issues based on common cause facts”.
[4]
“Unless the circumstances are special they cannot be used to
resolve factual issues because they are not designed to determine
probabilities”.
[5]
[31]
It is
further trite as a general principle that, if the material facts are
in dispute and there is no request for the hearing of
oral evidence,
a final order will only be granted on the notice of motion if the
facts as stated by the respondent together with
the facts alleged by
the applicant that are admitted by the respondent, justify such an
order.
[6]
In this instance I
have already observed that Annexures AA and BB relied upon by Rand
Leases are illegible. The alleged facts in
that regard are obscure.
[32]
The City in paragraph 159 of its answering
affidavit, in its
ad seriatim
response, admitted to the contents of paragraph 62
of Rand Leases’ founding affidavit, which is an admission of
the correctness
of the content of those letters regarding their
dispute. Rand Leases contend that it is disingenuous for the City to
contend that
the payments made by it amount to an admission of the
historical indebtedness and therefore has the effect of interrupting
prescription.
In terms of
section 14(1)
of the
Prescription Act 68 of
1969
, “the running of prescription shall be interrupted by an
express or tacit acknowledgement of liability by the debtor”.
Rand Leases contend that, if an acknowledgment of liability is made
after the prescription period has elapsed, in any event the
acknowledgment has no effect and cannot interrupt the running of
prescription.
[33]
In
addition, Rand Leases contends that the City could only rely on an
acknowledgment of an existing liability not to a liability
which
existed in the past, which was in any event materially disputed. I am
of the view that reference to the
Miracle
Mile Investment
case
[7]
is unhelpful as the facts are distinguishable. In that case, the
acknowledgment was made to another creditor, First National Bank
in sequestration proceedings brought by such other creditor, which
acknowledgement did not interrupt prescription. I am of the
view
therefore that the main application is incapable of resolution on the
papers. As for the interlocutory application, I have
already
expressed the view that the defiance of the court order is a serious
affront to the process of court and is intolerable.
The order
regarding costs below is intended to express this Court’s
disavowal of such practices. Consequently, the main application
is
referred to trial.
Order
[1]
The notice of motion shall stand as a simple
summons;
[2]
The answering affidavit as a notice of intention
to defend;
[3]
A declaration shall be delivered within twenty
(20) days and;
[4]
The Uniform Rules dealing with further pleadings,
discovery, and the conduct of trials shall thereafter apply;
[5]
The costs of the application abide the result of
the action; and
[6]
The City of Johannesburg is ordered to pay Rand
Leases’ costs in respect of the interlocutory application on an
attorney and
client scale (scale C).
TP MUDAU
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Date
of Hearing:
07 May 2024
Date
of Judgment:
24 July 2024
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the
Applicant: Mr. K
Huyssteen
Instructed
by:
Fluxmans Incorporated
Counsel for the
Respondent: Adv. E Sithole
Instructed
by:
Mojela Hlazo Practice
[1]
[2016]
ZAGPPHC 548 at para 17.
[2]
[2024]
JOL 63711
(GJ) at para 37.
[3]
See
MEC
for The Department of Public Works and Others v Ikamva Architects
and
Others
2022
(6) SA 275 (ECB).
[4]
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma
[2009]
ZASCA 1
;
2009 (2) SA 277
at para 26.
[5]
Cooper
and Another NNO v Curro Heights Properties (Pty) Ltd
[2023]
ZASCA 66
;
2023 (5) SA 402
(SCA) at para 13.
[6]
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A)
at
634H.
[7]
See
Miracle
Mile Investments 67 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Standard Bank of SA Ltd
2016
(2) SA 153
(GJ) at para 34.
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