Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 807South Africa
PT Paint and Palel (Pty) Ltd and Another v Verios and Others (2024/084378) [2024] ZAGPJHC 807 (16 August 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
16 August 2024
Headnotes
Summary:
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## PT Paint and Palel (Pty) Ltd and Another v Verios and Others (2024/084378) [2024] ZAGPJHC 807 (16 August 2024)
PT Paint and Palel (Pty) Ltd and Another v Verios and Others (2024/084378) [2024] ZAGPJHC 807 (16 August 2024)
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sino date 16 August 2024
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number: 2024-084378
1.
REPORTABLE: NO
2.
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
3.
REVISED: NO
16
August 2024
In
the matter between:
PT
PAINT AND PALEL (PTY) LTD
First Applicant
SOLOMON PHUTI
MASHITISHO
Second Applicant
and
ANDREW
VERIOS
First Respondent
TROY VERIOS
Second Respondent
XANTIUM TRADING
410 (PTY) LTD
Third Respondent
COMPANIES
AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
COMMISSION
Fourth Respondent
RBI CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANTS’ INC
Fifth Respondent
NEDBANK LIMITED
Sixth Respondent
JUDGMENT
Summary:
Civil
procedure
–
urgent application –
whether the applicants meet the requirements in respect of urgency as
set out in rule 6(12).
Security
law
–
whether the perfecting of
the second applicant’s shares in the first applicant by the
third respondents was legally effected.
Modiba J
[1]
This is an opposed urgent application in
which the applicants seek the following relief:
“
1. That this application be
heard on an urgent basis in accordance with the provisions of Rule
6(12) and that the requirements pertaining
to service and time
periods be dispensed with;
2. …
PART - A
3. An order declaring that the
appointment of the First and Second Respondents as directors of the
First Applicant by the Fourth
Respondent be declared as invalid and
unlawful in terms of section 163(2)(a) read with sections 76(2),
77(3) and 77(10) of the
Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 (“the
Act”) and the Memorandum of Incorporation of the First
Applicant;
4. An interim order interdicting and
prohibiting the First and Second Respondents from:
4.1 acting in the name of the
First Applicant, signing anything on behalf of the First Applicant,
or purporting to bind the
First Applicant or authorising the taking
of any action by or on behalf of the First Applicant;
4.2 acquiescing
in
the carrying on of the
First Applicant’s
business;
and/or
4.3
any
act or
omission
in the name of the
First
Applicant
despite knowing that the act or omission
was calculated to defraud a creditor, employee or shareholder of the
First Applicant
, or had another fraudulent
purpose,
pending the hearing and determination of Part B of
this application;
5 That the status of the Second
Applicant as the sole director of the First Applicant be restored;
6 That any act taken by the
Sixth Respondent to appoint the First and Second Respondent as
signatories to the First Applicant’s
banking account be
declared invalid and unlawful and that the Sixth Respondent be
directed to restore the Second Applicant as the
sole signatory in
respect of the First Applicant’s bank account;
7 Directing the First, Second
and Fourth Respondents to pay the costs of this application on an
attorney own client scale;
8 Interest on the aforesaid
costs at a rate of 11,75% per annum until date of payment; and
9 Further and/or alternative
relief this Honourable Court may deem fit.
PART - B
1. Declaring, in terms of
section 163(2)
of the
Companies Act No. 71 of 2008
read together with
section 162 of the Act that the First, Second and Fourth Respondents:
1.1. An order restraining the
conduct complained of by the First and Second Applicants (section
163(2)(a));
1.2. An order declaring any
person delinquent or under probation, as contemplated in section 162
of the Act (section 163(2)(f)(ii));
1.3. An order directing the
First Applicant or any other person to restore to a shareholder any
part of the consideration
that the shareholder paid for shares, or
pay the equivalent value, with or without conditions (section
163(2)(g));
1.4. An order varying or setting
aside a transaction or an agreement to which the First Applicant is a
party and compensating
the First Applicant or any other party to the
transaction or agreement (section 163(2)(h));
1.5. An order to pay
compensation to an aggrieved person, subject to any other law
entitling that person to compensation (section
163(2)(j));
1.6. An order directing
rectification of the registers or other records of the First
Applicant (section 163(2)(k)), where
so required;
2. Directing the First, or any
other Respondents to pay the costs of this application on an attorney
own client scale;
3. Interest on the aforesaid
costs at a rate of 11,75% per annum until date of payment; and
4. Further and/or alternative
relief this Honourable Court may deem fit.” (sic)
[2]
The first, second and fifth respondents
oppose the application. I conveniently refer to them jointly as the
respondents. Although
the respondents took issue with the urgency of
the application, during oral argument, their counsel conceded that
the alleged urgency
of the application is linked to the merits. It is
for that reason that a have considered the applicants’ case on
urgency
and the merits to determine whether they make out a case for
the relief sought in respect of Part A.
[3]
The background facts are largely common
cause. Until 28 July 2021, the third respondent held shares in the
first applicant. It sold
the shares to the second applicant in terms
of a sale of shares agreement (agreement) concluded on the aforesaid
date. The first
respondent represented the third respondent in this
transaction in his capacity as its sole director.
[4]
Prior to this acquisition, the second
applicant was employed by the first applicant. He was appointed as
its director on 30 August
2018. From that date, he became its
co-director together with the first respondent. Subsequent to
concluding the agreement, these
parties also concluded a service
agreement and a suretyship. I deal with the latter agreements later
in this judgment.
[5]
In the agreement, reference to the
purchaser is to the second applicant. Reference to the seller is to
the third respondent. The
material terms of the agreement are as
follows:
“
2.2 The Seller
owns 100% of the Shares in the Company and wishes to sell their
Shares to the Purchaser as part of an agreed B-BBEE
process and as
allowable by the South African company laws and B-BBEE regulations.
2.3 The Purchaser
wishes to purchase the Seller’s Shares on the terms and
conditions contained herein.”
3 The Purchaser hereby
with effect from the Effective Date, purchases the Shares from the
Seller, subject to the terms and conditions
recorded in this
Agreement. ”
4.1 Purchase price
The Purchase price shall
be made up as follows:
4.1.1 an amount of
R100.00 (One Hundred Rand) for the Shares;
4.1.2 the loan accounts
as outlined in the Trial balance, inclusive of the loan between the
Seller and the Company in the amount
of R2 796 917,70 (Two million
seven hundred and ninety-six thousand nine hundred and seventeen Rand
and seventy cents) attached
hereto as “Annexure E”. For
the avoidance of doubt, the aforesaid loan is set to equalise the
Nedbank term loan between
the Seller and Nedbank, which loan is
repayable by the Company monthly to Nedbank on the same terms and
conditions as set out therein;
4.1.3 the motor vehicles,
which values are as agreed upon between the Parties and as set out
more fully in the schedule attached
hereto as “Annexure G”
and which schedule shall be further subject to verification by the
auditors for the time being
with the Trial Balance within ten (10)
days of the signature of this Agreement. In respect of the motor
vehicles:
4.1.3.1 Same are to be
transferred to the Company within 30 days of the conclusion of this
agreement but not later than 30 June
2021;
4.1.3.2 The loan in
respect of the motor vehicles shall be repaid after the Loan Accounts
set out in clause 4.1.2 are settled and
shall bear interest at the
official interest rate:
4.1.3.3 The loan in
respect of the motor vehicle shall be repayable within 36 months, on
a monthly basis after the Loan Accounts
set out in clause 4.1.2 are
settled, and
4.1.3.4 The motor
vehicles shall remain as security on the loan for the Seller until
fully repaid by the Company.
4.1.4 The Nedbank
Overdraft in the books of the Company as of 28 February 2021. In
relation hereto:
4.1.4.1 The Nedbank
Overdraft shall be covered by the Seller’s guarantee as
contained in the Liberty Policy which is being
paid off in the amount
of R65 000.00 (Sixty-five thousand rand) per month directly to
Nedbank by the Company in order to reduce
the Company’s monthly
overdraft to a level of R2 million.
4.1.4.2 Upon signature of
this Agreement and no later than 30 June 2021, the Seller shall
transfer Liberty Policy in favour of the
Nedbank Overdraft to the
Company, to the value of R2 Million.
4.1.4.3 The Company will,
on receipt of the Liberty Policy, record the transfer to it as income
to the Company and the Seller will
expanse (sic) the Liberty Policy
in its books of account in favour of the Company.
4.1.5 The Purchaser will,
however, have the right to settle the Purchase Price and subsequent
loans as detailed in this clause 4
for an amount of R15 million which
amount shall include the value of the Services Agreement entered into
between the Seller and
the Company.”
4.2
With effect from the Effective Date, the Parties shall:
4.2.1 transfer the Shares
to the Purchaser;
4.2.2 deliver, to the
Purchaser, duly executed share certificate which comply with the
provisions of section 51 of
Companies Act;
4.2.3 procure that the
Purchaser be registered as a holder of the Shares in the Security
Register;
4.2.4 Procure the passing
of such resolutions as are necessary to effect all the actions
contemplated in this clause 4.2; and
4.2.5 The Seller shall
provide a signed fixed asset register confirming that the Company is
the owner of the assets as indicated
therein which is attached hereto
as "Annexure H” and which fixed asset register shall be
further subject to verification
by the auditors for the time being
with the Trial Balance within 10(Ten) days of the signature of this
agreement."
4.3 (Ownership, Risk and
Benefit)
With effect from the
Effective Date [1 March 2021]:
4.3.1 All ownership
rights; entitlements, and benefits in and to the Shares shall vest in
the Purchaser; and
4.3.2 All risks,
obligations, and duties in and to the Shares shall transfer to the
Purchaser.”
6. Conditions and Options
6.1 This Agreement is
conditional upon the implementation of the actions required to give
effect to the payment of the Purchase
Price, including but not
limited to, the transfer of the movable assets, work in progress,
funding agreements and sureties as well
as a Service Agreement in
respect of the services to be provided by the Seller to the Company.
6.2 The Purchaser shall
conclude at the same time, a Suretyship Agreement to be attached to
this Agreement.
6.3 The Purchaser shall
have the option to, at any time, make payment of a once-off amount to
be agreed upon by the Parties to fulfil
the abovementioned
conditions. The Parties have calculated the value to be concluded if
the Purchaser can reconstruct the finance
as R15 Million. This will
be allocated as follows:
6.3.1 Settlement of the
Nedbank Overdraft to a maximum R4.3 million or as at the date of the
transaction, the value thereof less
R2 million as held in surety by
the Nedbank and as delivered by the Seller to Nedbank;
6.3.2 Settlement of the
Nedbank Loan Account with the Seller in the amount of R2.2 million or
the value thereof as at the date of
the transaction;
6.3.3 Settlement of the
Service Agreement with the Seller, and
6.3.4 The remaining of
the funds, to a maximum of R10.5 million less monthly payments made
by the Company at the date of the transaction.”
[5]On
15 October 2021, the first respondent resigned as director from the
first applicant. From that date, the second applicant
became the sole
director in the first applicant. He is also responsible for the first
applicant’s day to day business operations.
The parties have
since become embroiled in a dispute regarding the sale of shares
referred to above in respect of which legal proceedings
are pending
in this court under case number 2023-053751.
[6]On
25 July 2024, the first and second respondent were appointed as
directors of the first applicant. This change was effected
without
consulting with second applicant and without his knowledge and
consent. The second applicant contends that since he is
the sole
shareholder in the first applicant, this change of directorship is
unlawful because he did not approve it.
[7]The
fifth respondent was the first applicant auditors until October 2022,
when the second applicant removed them and appointed
NMA Consulting
(NMA). He alleges that he effected the change in auditors to avoid a
potential and/ or existing conflict of interest
between the first
applicant and the third respondent. The fifth respondent is alleged
to have continued to represent the first
and third respondents’
interests in the first applicant notwithstanding the sale of shares.
[8]The
first and second respondent have reappointed the fifth respondent as
the first applicant’s auditors. The second applicant
takes
issue with this appointment as he did not give instructions or
approval for it.
[9]On
26 July 2024, attorneys for the first and second respondent addressed
correspondence to the second applicant:
(a)
Seeking certain information from him,
including the suretyship agreement.
(b)
Alleging that the first respondent shall
exercise his right as the sole shareholder in the first applicant to
safeguard and protect
his security.
(c)
Threatening to suspend his employment from
the first applicant, propose a resolution to have him removed as a
director and have
the first applicant wound up.
[10] These
events prompted the applicants to seek the relief set out above. They
contend that they seek to restrain and put
the first and second
respondents in probation because their conduct is calculated to trade
in the first applicant’s business
fraudulently, recklessly and
negligently.
[11] The
respondents deny these allegations. They allege that after the
agreement was concluded; it was anticipated that the
second applicant
would raise funds to settle the R15 million purchase price. This did
not materialise. As a result, the second
applicant has not been able
to pay the purchase price. To address this, the services agreement
was concluded. It makes provision
for the second applicant to pay the
purchase price in R200,000 monthly instalments over the 60-month
service agreement period.
The service agreement also makes provision
for a suspensive condition in respect of the sale of shares agreement
and gives the
second applicant an option to pay the purchase price or
any balance thereof immediately.
[12] Together
with his wife, the first respondent has provided surety for the first
applicant’s loan facilities with
the sixth respondent
(Nedbank). The second applicant had to secure their release from
these securities or settle these debts. Approximately
18
months after concluding the sale of shares agreement, the respondents
further allege that the second applicant, having assumed
control of
the business of the first applicant and enjoying its profits, caused
the first applicant to fail to honour the services
agreement but
continued using the Nedbank finance facility under circumstances
where the first respondent and his wife remained
sureties thereof.
[13] The
respondents also allege that in terms of the suretyship agreement,
the second applicant pledged his shares in the
first applicant to the
third respondent. Owing to the second applicant’s breach of the
sale of shares agreement as set out
in the first respondent’s
attorney’s letter to him dated 26 July 2024, the third
respondent exercised its rights in
terms of the suretyship agreement
and perfected the shares held by the second applicant in the first
applicant. It is as a result
of the perfection of the pledge that the
third respondent’s status as sole shareholder in the first
applicant was restored.
[14] To
establish urgency, the applicants rely on the alleged unlawful
perfection of the pledge. The applicants contends that
the perfection
is unlawful because the second applicant did not consent to it and it
was not effected in terms of a court order.
As I find below, they
fail on both scores, thus failing to establish their alleged case on
urgency.
[15] As
contended by the respondents, the second applicant’s sole
reliance on the sale of shares agreements seeks to
obscure the first
and third respondents’ rights in terms of both the service and
suretyship agreements, thus creating the
false impression that the
third respondent has no right to perfect their security. The terms
and effect of the three contracts
concluded between the first
applicant and the first and second respondents (the contracts) are
that:
a.
The third respondent sold the shares
including certain assets and liabilities in the first applicant to
the second for a combined
purchase price of R15 million.
b.
When he failed to pay the purchase price,
the second applicant undertook to pay it in instalments in the amount
of R200 000
per month. He retained the option to at any time pay
the full purchase price or balance owing from time to time,
immediately. This
arrangement enabled the second applicant to pay the
purchase price from the profits generated by the business of the
first applicant.
c.
In addition to his obligation to make
payment of the purchase price, the second applicant undertook to
release the first respondent
and his wife from their
surety-obligations for the debts of the first applicant.
[18]
The second applicant does not dispute that
the failed to make payment of the instalments as and when they fell
due. He is therefore
in breach of his obligation to make payment in
the amount of R200 000 per month. It is as a result of this breach
that the third
respondent exercised its rights, set out below in
terms of the suretyship agreement.
“
5.1.
As security for the discharge of its obligations in terms hereof, the
[second applicant] … pledges [his]
right title and interest to
the shares held in the [first applicant], constituting 100% (one
hundred percent) of the issues share
capital in the [first
applicant], to the [third respondent].
5.2 The [second
applicant] irrevocably and
in rem suam
authorises and appoints
the [third respondent] with full power to sign and execute all and
any documents on behalf of the [second
applicant] which may be
necessary to give effect to or to enforce the rights afforded to the
[third respondent] in terms of this
cession.”
[19]
A plain reading of these clauses is that
the third respondent is entitled to perfect the pledge of the shares
without the intervention
of a court. The second applicant consented
to the perfection in terms of the express terms of the suretyship. To
perfect the pledge
of the shares, the third respondent does not
require a court order. The first and third respondents’
reliance on the authorities
and principles set out below is proper.
In
Bock and Others v Duburoro Investments (Pty) Ltd
2004 (2) SA 242 (SCA) para [7] – [10]:
“
[7]
The principles concerning
parate
executie
(immediate execution) are
trite. A clause in a mortgage bond permitting the bondholder to
execute without recourse to
the mortgagor or the court by taking
possession of the property and selling it is void. Nevertheless,
after default the mortgagor
may grant the bondholder the necessary
authority to realise the bonded property. It does not
matter whether the goods
are immovable or movable: in the latter
instance, to perfect the security, the court's imprimatur is
required. It is different
with movables held in pledge: a term
in an agreement of pledge, which provides for the private sale of the
pledged article and
in the possession of the creditor, is valid but a
debtor may
'seek the protection of
the Court if, upon any just ground, he can show that, in carrying out
the agreement and effecting a sale,
the creditor has acted in a
manner which has prejudiced him in his rights'.
Smalberger JA put the
proviso in slightly different terms when he said that for validity
the private execution clause should not
prejudice, or be ikely to
prejudice, rights of the debtor unduly, meaning that the clause
should not contain execution provisions
that would be
contra
bonos mores
.
[8] The principles
about a
pactum commissorium
have recently been
reaffirmed by this Court:
'A
pactum
commissorium
in the context of a pledge is an agreement
that, if the pledgor defaults, the pledgee may keep the security as
his own property.'
Such
an agreement is void.
[9]
An agreement whereby a creditor may keep a pledge upon the debtor's
default - at a fair price then determined - is similar
to a
conditional sale. Such an agreement is valid and, in relation to the
pledging of shares, known since at least 1892. It does
not differ
much in kind from a
lex
commissoria
or
forfeiture clause which, typically, permits a creditor to keep what
was received from a debtor in the event of the cancellation
of an
agreement. The effect of a forfeiture clause may be alleviated under
the Conventional Penalties Act.”
[10]
The
quoted clause in the Nedcor pledge does provide for
parate
executie
of
the pledged shares, which, for purposes of these rules, are
considered to be movables held by the creditor
in
securitatem debiti
.
But Nedcor did not 'execute' in terms of this right. It had,
additionally, the right to exercise the 'option' to purchase the
pledged shares at a fair price and it is this right the bank sought
to exercise.” (footnotes omitted)
[20]
In
Vantage Goldfields SA (Pty) Ltd and another v Arqomanzi (Pty)
Ltd and others
2023 JDR 2275 (SCA) para [32], re-affirming the
principles in Block, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that:
“
It is accepted
that a provision for immediate execution (a
parate
executie
clause) in an agreement is valid and
enforceable when it relates to movables that are held in pledge. The
cession of a personal
right
in securitatem
debiti
is regarded as a pledge of that right.
A debtor may, when the creditor seeks to invoke the
parate
executie
clause in an agreement, ‘seek
the protection of the Court if, upon any just ground, he can show
that, in carrying out the
agreement and effecting a sale, the
creditor has acted in a manner which has prejudiced him in his
rights’. The onus, in
this regard, would be on the
debtor.”(footnotes omitted)
[21]
The shares have not been transferred to the second applicant. The
first and third respondents have established that the
third
respondent was entitled to exercise their right to perfect the pledge
of the shares. Only when the third respondent deals
with the shares
in a manner that is prejudicial to the second applicant will the
second applicant have the right to approach the
court. No allegation
that the third respondent has so acted has been made. Therefore, the
second applicant has not made out a case
for the relief sought.
[22]
For these reasons, no case is made out in
respect of both urgency and the merits in respect of part A. The
appropriate order is
to dismiss Part A of the application. No reason
has been advanced as to why costs should not follow the cause. The
first and third
respondents contend for costs on scale B. The
contention raises no controversy.
[23]
In the premises, the following order is
made:
Order
1. Part A of the application is
dismissed.
2. The second applicant shall pay the
first and third respondents’ costs and scale B.
MODIBA J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT,
JOHANNESBURG
Appearances
For
the Applicant:
A
T Raselebana
Instructed
by:
Molai
Attorneys
For
the Respondent:
H
A Van Der Merwe
Instructed
by:
Senekal
Simmonds Attorneys
Date
of hearing:
08
August 2024
Date
of judgment:
16
August 2024
MODE
OF DELIVERY
:
This
judgment is handed down electronically by emailing it to the parties’
legal representative, uploading on CaseLines and
release to SAFLLI.
The date and time for delivery is deemed to be 10 am
.
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