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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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[2024] ZAGPJHC 808
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## Shackleton Credit Management (Pty) Ltd v Baloyi (2023/043172)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 808 (19 August 2024)
Shackleton Credit Management (Pty) Ltd v Baloyi (2023/043172)
[2024] ZAGPJHC 808 (19 August 2024)
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sino date 19 August 2024
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
JOHANNESBURG
1.
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
2.
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
3.
REVISED.
CASE
NO: 2023/043172
In the matter between:
SHACKLETON
CREDIT MANAGEMENT (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
KEDISALETSE
PATRICIA BALOYI
Respondent
JUDGMENT
GRAVES
AJ
:
[1]
This is an
application for sequestration of the Respondent. In its founding
affidavit the Applicant sets out the background to the
application,
relying predominantly upon a judgment granted on 31 July 2028 in the
High Court, Limpopo Division, Polokwane, under
case number 1852/2018
against the Respondent and Lebone Customer Management Consulting CC,
jointly and severally. The judgment
was for payment of the sum of
R484 651,98, interest on the sum of R242 725,99 at the
compounded rate of 2,162% per
annum
from 5 October 2017 to date of payment, and costs on the
attorney-and-client scale.
[2]
The Applicant
alleges in founding papers that a warrant of execution was issued
against the Respondent’s movable property,
following which
three payments of R500,00 each were made during January, April and
October 2019. No further payments have since
been made. During August
2022, the Applicant took further steps in execution of the judgment
against the Respondent and recovered
a sum of R108 642,24, being
the proceeds from the attachment of funds held to the credit of the
Respondent with First National
Bank. Applying this further credit the
outstanding balance in terms of the judgment at that time was
R401 346,18, excluding
costs and further interest accruing.
[3]
A further
warrant of execution against movable property was issued against the
Respondent during October 2022, was served on her
personally on
23 February 2023 and resulted in the Sheriff rendering a
nulla
bona
return. During the execution process the Respondent informed the
Sheriff that she had no money or attachable assets to satisfy
the
balance owing. The Applicant relies upon Section 8(b) of the
Insolvency Act, 24 of 1936 (insufficient disposable property
found by
the Sheriff to satisfy the judgment) read with Section 10(b)
(
prima
facie
evidence of an act of insolvency committed or that the person is
insolvent). The Respondent delivered an answering affidavit which
I
deal with below.
[4]
At
the commencement of the hearing, the Respondent - who appeared in
person - applied for a postponement of the application. This
was
opposed by counsel for the Applicant and I accordingly heard
argument. The essential ground for the postponement being sought
was
that the Respondent’s attorneys had withdrawn by notice dated
20 May 2024. It became apparent that the attorneys
previously
representing the Respondent had merely acted as a correspondent and
that Adv. Sibya, an advocate registered under
the Legal Practice
Act,
[1]
had been
responsible for all legal advice and services rendered to the
Respondent. Adv. Sibya had himself withdrawn as early
as 25 July
2024.
[2]
[5]
Counsel for
the Applicant referred me to a notice of set down delivered by the
Applicant’s attorneys to Adv. Sibya at
his email address
on 24 May 2024. The Respondent confirmed that she had herself
received an email notification that the matter
was enrolled for
hearing on 31 May 2024 and that she had communicated this to
counsel and instructed him to be in attendance
to represent her. She
said that she had last spoken to Adv. Sibya some three weeks
previously. During a more recent discussion
with Adv. Sibya
after the notice of set-down had been served, counsel informed her
that he was engaged in another matter during
the week in question and
was unable to attend to represent her.
[6]
Counsel for
the Applicant pointed out that the sequestration application had been
launched during 2023 and that the matter had been
beset by delays,
largely it was submitted, due to non-compliance by the Respondent’s
legal representatives. An order to compel
heads of argument had been
granted and this had not elicited heads being filed. Counsel pointed
out that the Respondent was fully
aware that the matter would be
heard during the week commencing 29 July 2024, that the
prospects of success were strongly
in favour of the Applicant and
that further delay would be to the prejudice of creditors.
[7]
I
dismissed the request for a postponement on the basis that the
Respondent had not shown that in the circumstances she was entitled
to a postponement of the matter. I took into account the various
delays caused by procedural non-compliance by the Respondent’s
legal representatives, that the Respondent bore responsibility to
ensure that her legal representative (or a replacement, if required)
was available to present argument on her behalf, that the request for
postponement was only made at the commencement of the hearing
and
that the interests of creditors require that the matter be finalised
without further delay.
[3]
[8]
Counsel for
the Applicant pointed to further features relevant to the application
and order sought. The founding affidavit discloses
that the
Respondent is the sole director of a company Blue Falcon 33 Trading
(Pty) Limited, owning at least four immovable properties,
one of
which was purchased for R2 500 000,00 on 3 February
2020. During argument, the Respondent confirmed that
she was in fact
also the sole shareholder of Blue Falcon. It was suggested in the
founding affidavit that if the Respondent owned
shares in Blue Falcon
(which she confirmed to me), then there would be value in these
shares by virtue of the underlying assets
of the company. Counsel
referred to an email addressed by the Respondent to Adv. Sibya on 17
April 2023 and forwarded to the Applicant’s
attorney, in which
she said that she did not have money and suggested that she be given
three years to settle the indebtedness,
without any specific monthly
payments. This was not acceptable to the Applicant. Counsel submitted
that a particular benefit of
sequestration to creditors was that a
provisional trustee could investigate and take control of such assets
forming part of the
estate of the Respondent for the benefit of
creditors.
[9]
In
her answering affidavit the Respondent raised the matters which I
list below, together with the Applicant’s response in
its
replying affidavit:
[4]
[9.1]
The
Applicant failed to comply with Rule 41A.
[5]
The Applicant admits failing to comply with the Rule, asked for
condonation and requested condonation in allowing the notice to
be
served simultaneously with its reply.
•
As
I understand the authorities referred to in
Erasmus
:
Superior Court Practice
dealing this
rule various High Courts have found that the failure to engage in
mediation does not impact upon the validity or correctness
of a
judgment granted and that the party complaining of non-compliance
must demonstrate that this non-compliance has caused prejudice.
The
question of whether mediation would be beneficial is also a factor to
be considered. In the light of the terse grounds on which
the
Respondent disputes the allegations in the founding affidavit, I see
no benefit that would have flowed from mediation, which
would
probably have served only further to delay the proceedings. I find
that the Applicant’s failure to invoke the mediation
process
does not preclude the relief sought.
[9.2]
The attachment
and freezing of the Respondent’s FNB account pursuant to the
warrant of execution precluded her being able
to receive amounts due
to her in the sum of approximately R1 200 000,00. The
Applicant in reply says that the account
was only non-operational
until the judicial process of attachment had been completed and that
the account has been “
released”
.
It further points to the Respondent’s email to her advocate
referred to above in which she indicated that she did not have
funds
at that time and did not want to commit because she did not know when
she would have money. This email was not disputed or
dealt with in
the answering affidavit.
·
The
Applicant’s answer provides no details of the source of the
expected funds or whether these funds were due to her in her
personal
capacity or emanating from any of the corporate entities in which she
has an interest. Also missing from this narrative
is why an
alternative method of payment of part of these expected funds could
not be deployed to permit settlement of the judgment
debt.
[9.3]
In her
answering affidavit the Respondent contends that she could settle the
amount outstanding within a period of 24 months if
the warrant of
execution could be lifted from her account. The Applicant in reply
pointed out that if it was true that the Respondent
was owed the
amount of some R1,2 million, then it was unclear why she was unable
to settle the outstanding indebtedness owed.
·
The
Applicant’s contention was not refuted by the Respondent, whose
reason for failing to settle the judgment debt appears
from what
follows immediately below.
[10]
I engaged with
the Respondent during the hearing and asked her specifically why she
had not taken steps to raise funds on the security
of the various
properties owned by Blue Lagoon to settle the debt owed to the
Applicant. Her answer to this was that the debt was
owed by Lebone
Customer Management Consulting CC and that the Applicant should have
sought recovery of the outstanding amount from
this close corporation
and not from her personally. When I pointed out and explained to her
the implications of the order of the
Limpopo Division directing that
her liability was joint and several, thereby absolving the Applicant
from any obligation of excussion,
she merely reiterated her stance.
Despite expressing concern about the impact of a sequestration order
against her, given her directorship
/ membership of other corporate
entities, she persisted with the stance that the Applicant was
required to look primarily to Lebone
Customer Management Consulting
CC for recovery of the amount outstanding.
[11]
On
the issue of benefit to creditors, counsel for the Applicant referred
to and relied upon the judgment in
Lynn
& Main Inc. v Naidoo and Another
[6]
in which reference was made to the requirement in
Section 10
of
the
Insolvency Act which
requires the Court in determining whether
provisional sequestration should be ordered, to be of the
prima
facie
view that there is reason to believe that this will be to the
advantage of the creditors. With reference to earlier authority the
learned Judge-President said that this postulated a reasonable
prospect not too remote, but not necessarily a likelihood, that
some
pecuniary benefit would result to creditors. All that is required at
the provisional stage, is
prima
facie
proof of the facts.
[7]
In
Body
Corporate of Empire Gardens v Sithole and Another
[8]
the SCA endorsed this judgment, adding that although advantage to
creditors is not a rigid concept it requires proof of a tangible
benefit to the general body of creditors.
[9]
[12]
I
am satisfied that on the conspectus of the papers before me and
having made enquiries of the Respondent about her stance during
argument, a case has been made out by the Applicant for an order of
provisional sequestration of the estate of the Respondent.
This is
based upon at least
prima
facie
evidence that an act of insolvency has been committed and that there
is reason to believe that there will be an advantage to creditors
if
the Respondent’s estate is sequestrated. The Respondent has
failed to place any evidence before me that displaces this
prima
facie
view.
[13]
The following order will issue:
1.
The estate of the Respondent is placed
under provisional sequestration;
2.
The Respondent and any other party who
wishes to avoid such an order being made final are called upon to
advance the reasons, if
any, why the Court should not grant a final
sequestration Order in respect of the Respondent’s estate on
Monday, 14 October
2024;
3.
The costs of this application will be costs
in the sequestration of the estate of the Respondent.
N.J. GRAVES
Acting Judge of the High
Court of
South Africa
Gauteng Local Division
Johannesburg
APPEARANCES
:
Date
of hearing:
31
July 2024
Date
of judgment:
19
August 2024
Counsel
for Applicant:
Instructed
by:
ADV
R Stevenson
Lynn
& Main Inc
Mr
M Pedie
Counsel
for Respondent:
Appearance
in person
[1]
By
all accounts an advocate rendering legal services on request by
members of the public in accordance with
section 34(2)(a)(ii)
read
with (b) of the
Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014
.
[2]
The
notice reflects that Adv. Sibya practices with a trust account.
[3]
Compare:
Myburgh
Transport v Botha
t/a
SA
Truck Bodies
,
1991 (3) SA 310 (NmS), at 311.
[4]
Condonation
for the late delivery of the Respondent’s answering affidavit
was not opposed.
[5]
This
Rule requires a plaintiff or applicant to serve on the defendant or
respondent, simultaneously with the summons or notice
of motion, a
notice indicating whether that party agrees to or opposes referral
of the dispute to mediation. The respondent is
given an opportunity
to respond and the various sub-rules then set out the procedure to
be followed.
[6]
2006 (1)
SA 59 (N).
[7]
At
paras [35] to [37].
[8]
2017 (4)
SA 161 (SCA).
[9]
See
paras [9], [10].
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