Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 1187South Africa
KS v AM and Another (2021/28121) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1187; 2025 (4) SA 626 (GJ) (12 November 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
12 November 2024
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## KS v AM and Another (2021/28121) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1187; 2025 (4) SA 626 (GJ) (12 November 2024)
KS v AM and Another (2021/28121) [2024] ZAGPJHC 1187; 2025 (4) SA 626 (GJ) (12 November 2024)
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sino date 12 November 2024
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
2021/28121
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES
(2)
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
12 November 2024
In
the matter between:
KS
Plaintiff
And
AM
First
Defendant
SHM
Second
Defendant
JUDGMENT
MIA J:
[1]
The plaintiff seeks general
and special damages against the first and second defendants. The
matter comes before me as an application
for default judgment. The
first and second defendant's defences were struck out by an order of
this court on 23 July 2023.
I
was satisfied to proceed, notwithstanding the defendants' defence
being struck out, as the application for default judgment was
served
on the attorney of record, and an attempt was made to serve the
application on the first defendant personally, who refused
to accept
the service.
[1]
The notice of
set down was left with the defendant.
[2]
The
plaintiff’s claims arise from the creation of an imposter
social media profile of the plaintiff, the recording of intimate
images of the plaintiff, the non-consensual publication and
distribution of intimate depictions of the plaintiff on a fake
Facebook
account of the plaintiff created by the defendants; as well
as communications by the second defendant with various colleagues of
the plaintiff and a senior colleague at the company where the
plaintiff was employed. It is appropriate to provide background and
context to the claim.
[3]
The plaintiff
and the first defendant were in a romantic relationship from
approximately August 2014 to January 2015. The first
defendant led
the plaintiff to believe he was unmarried and proposed to her, and
she accepted the proposal in December 2014. In
January 2015, the
second defendant approached her and informed her that she was the
first defendant’s wife. The plaintiff
immediately ended the
relationship. The first defendant refused to stop seeing the
plaintiff and arrived at her place of employment
in the mornings. She
sent an attorney’s letter requesting that he stop communicating
with her.
[4]
The first
defendant continued sending WhatsApp messages to the plaintiff after
receipt of the letter requesting that he desist communicating
with
her. He then threatened to send videos he described as “porno
videos” to the plaintiff’s attorney. He threatened
that
he would take three steps for each step she took. This was followed
with a threat to send a video he recorded of her engaged
in sex with
him, to her family and friends. He directed her to a Facebook profile
that had been created and said he would invite
everyone they knew and
post the video he had recorded. He sent a clip of a video to her
WhatsApp to ensure she saw what the content
was. She was not aware
that the first defendant had been recording intimate images and
recordings of them whilst they were together.
[5]
The fake
Facebook profile was created on 13 August 2015. The plaintiff’s
friends, family, and professional colleagues were
invited to join
this profile. The images and videos were posted on this fake Facebook
profile. On 15 August 2015, the first defendant
threatened that he
had published the explicit videos and would send them to everyone if
the plaintiff did not sleep with him.
[6]
The plaintiff
was contacted by friends and family who had seen the content. It also
came to the attention of persons unknown to
the plaintiff during the
period the content was available on the active fake Facebook account
until the account was deactivated.
The plaintiff deactivated the
account when the posts came to her attention.
[7]
The plaintiff
averred that the harm occurred within the jurisdiction of this court
in Ekhurhuleni, Germiston, as she resides there,
and the infringement
came to her attention in this jurisdiction. The defendants' conduct
infringed on her personality, privacy,
and reputation personally and
professionally primarily in this court’s jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that the infringement
occurred online the plaintiff’s
colleagues and seniors were based within this court’s
jurisdiction and received the
communication whilst in this court’s
jurisdiction.
[8]
The first
claim, A, is for the creation and activation of the false Facebook
profile with the plaintiff's details and picture, which
the
defendants operated until the administrators deactivated it. The
plaintiff avers that this constituted an infringement of her
dignity
and privacy by the defendants, who operated this account, which came
to the attention of her friends and family. This claim
is for
R250 000.00.
[9]
The second
claim, claim B, is for the operation of the false Facebook account
where the defendants posted two videos depicting the
plaintiff in a
state of undress and engaging in sexual conduct. The first defendant
created the videos without her consent. The
defendants intended this
to come to the plaintiff's attention and to humiliate her, and she
was severely traumatised as a result.
She has experienced pain and
suffering and has undergone medical treatment and will require
treatment in the future due to the
emotional trauma she has
experienced. This claim is for R2 500 000.00 for general
damages. The treatment is estimated to be
in the amount of R 250 000.
The total claim for medical costs, is thus R300 000, is made up
of R50 000.00 for past
and R250 000.00 for future medical
expenses.
[10]
The third
claim, claim C, is for specific words published on the fake Facebook
platform for the attention of the plaintiff’s
family, friends,
and social acquaintances who had access to it. The words are
alleged to be defamatory of the plaintiff and
calculated to impute an
immoral picture of the plaintiff to bring shame to her family and her
professional life. The content describes
the plaintiff as the person
in the video who engaged in sexual conduct and describes how the
plaintiff and the defendant met. Namely,
the first defendant
requested the plaintiff’s number when they met at a filling
station, and despite there being a baby on
board sign the plaintiff
commenced a relationship. The second defendant comments, “
it's
sad that educated… from good homes can stoop to that level and
not respect other women’s marriages
or
homes.
Homewrecker?? You be the judge. all we have at the end of the day are
our morals n our character not our money or our professions
or title”
[sic]… to all who believe she is an honest n moral human being
…here is a wakeup call” [sic].
The
plaintiff alleges the words are
per
se
defamatory and calculated to defame her and depict her as a
dishonest, immoral, promiscuous and adulterous person who is a
disgrace
to her family and profession. As a result, the plaintiff
seeks damages of R500 000.00.
[11]
The fourth
claim, D, is for communication by the second defendant to a colleague
of the plaintiff of words that infringed the plaintiff’s
privacy and were intended to harm her dignity and professional
reputation. The second defendant communicated, “
ur
friend started an affair with a married man in.. with 2kids while his
wife is expecting their second child…… where
are her
morals and brains to ruin a home…no use being educated with a
degree when your morals and values are so low. How
does she face
herself.
This
was intended to attribute a defamatory meaning that the plaintiff is
cruel, dishonest, immoral, promiscuous, adulterous and
a disgrace to
her profession. The plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of
R250,000.00 for this instance.
[12]
The fifth
claim, claim E, is for the second defendant’s communication
with the receptionist at the plaintiff’s previous
employment.
The second defendant stated to the receptionist words to the effect
that that the plaintiff was having an affair with
the second
defendant’s husband, she should tell the plaintiff to stop
having an affair with the first defendant and the company
should not
employ women like the plaintiff. This communication the plaintiff
avers was understood to impute a defamatory meaning,
specifically
that the plaintiff was immoral, adulterous and a disgrace to her
employer. The second defendant intended the statements
to come to the
attention of the plaintiff and her superior, which occurred on the
same day as the receptionist communicated this,
and it did come to
the attention of the plaintiff’s senior, and she was
embarrassed and humiliated. The plaintiff claims
R 250 000.00 as
a result of this infringement. Claim F was for an email sent to
the plaintiff’s superiors, which
is summarised and referred to
the plaintiff as a homewrecker and intimating that she was not an
asset to the company if she slept
with married men. This claim was
for R250 000.00.
[13]
The evidence
before this court comprised the plaintiff's testimony regarding the
humiliation she experienced as a result of the
first and second
defendants' conduct, as well as its impact on her. She was unable to
continue working at the same company. She
was embarrassed and
humiliated when her family and friends discovered the videos. She was
so emotionally distressed she considered
suicide. She suffered from
and has been treated for alopecia caused by the stress and anxiety
she experiences. She does not go
out and fears for her family when
they go out. She obtained a protection order against the first
defendant. As a result of the
trauma and distress she experienced,
she sought the professional assistance of a psychologist. She will
continue seeing this health
professional for some time. It is
envisaged that this will be for at least the next three years. Her
evidence indicated that she
had received medical treatment for the
emotional trauma at a total cost of R 50,000.00. The plaintiff
indicated that she would
continue seeing this psychologist for some
time. The expert report also addresses how this supports ongoing
treatment.
[14]
The report of
a psychologist, which was independent of the treatment psychologist,
offered insight into the plaintiff’s trauma.
The psychologist's
report is detailed and indicates the assessment comprised the
application of standardised tests and an interview
with the plaintiff
before the report was compiled. For this matter, I have
considered the full report and noted the portions
that support the
plaintiff’s evidence and are relevant to the matter.
[15]
The
psychologist indicates the plaintiff resigned from her employment due
to the humiliation the defendants’ conduct occasioned.
This
resulted in substantial financial losses for the plaintiff. On a
social level, the plaintiff withdrew due to embarrassment
and
psychological dysfunction. She began to live in fear for her family
and her own safety due to information disclosed to her
by the first
defendant about what he had done to other persons.
[16]
The plaintiff
had a stable upbringing and is educationally advanced, having
progressed in doctoral-level LLD/PhD studies and successfully
completing her board examinations. Before her resignation, she worked
on major coal-fired power-producing plant projects. Her financial
history was also stable. After she terminated their relationship, he
threatened to expose the recorded videos if she did not remain
in the
relationship. The plaintiff started seeing a psychologist to deal
with the emotional state occasioned by the fallout and
threats and
was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder(PTSD). Medication
was prescribed for PTSD; the medication affected
her as it worsened a
pre-existing heart condition she had and also impacted her kidneys.
The stress has also resulted in significant
hair loss.
[17]
The
psychologist indicates that her distrust is significant and makes it
difficult to enter and establish meaningful relationships.
This
indicates that the infringement has impacted her physical, emotional
and mental health so that she has suffered physically,
she is unable
to continue working, and she does not trust easily. Her inability to
trust impacts her relationships, which is a
core aspect of being
human, and her ability to function normally and ably in social and
work settings. It impacts her ability to
thrive.
[18]
The
determination to be made is the award of damages in the matter. There
are six different claims for general and or special damages
for the
recordings of the plaintiff, the creation of the false Facebook
profile, the posting of the recordings and comments to
friends and
colleagues of the plaintiff on the Facebook profile intended to harm
her and cast her in her negative light. The communication
about the
plaintiff was created via the false Facebook account on different
occasions and the email communication with her seniors.
[19]
The
claims are novel in that the defamation and posting of images and
recordings of a person online is a relatively new occurrence.
Legislation has been enacted to protect persons against such
occurrences and prevent harm. Counsel for the plaintiff pointed out
in his heads of argument that there is an acceptance that the damage
may not be calculated with mathematical precision. By their
very
nature, the claims involve determining a just and reasonable amount.
I thank counsel for the heads of argument that were helpful
and also
the case referred to
FGX
v Gaunt
[2]
which it was submitted was similar to the present.
[20]
Justice
Thornton DBE in
FGX
v Gaunt
[3]
refers to the term revenge porn as the term commonly used to describe
the first defendant’s conduct. This is the publication
of
non-consensual intimate images, recording or depictions. It is
recognised as a violation against persons. The United Nations
Special
Rapporteur has recognised that posting intimate images without
consent violates the rights to privacy and dignity and to
live a life
free of violence.
[4]
In the
matter before Justice Thornton, the court considered a claim for
damages arising from the publication of naked images on
a website.
The court took into account the emotional impact on the plaintiff,
that she suffered from PTSD which led to an enduring
personality
change. It was also relevant that and that the defendant was paid for
the images. The court awarded general damages
of 60 000
pounds and special damages of 37 041.67 pounds which included
costs for removing the images from the internet,
past medical costs,
estimated future medical costs, the cost of prescribed medication for
the remainder of her life and the cost
of a wasted holiday and her
unplanned departure from the defendant’s home including
furniture she left behind.
[21]
The
publication of non-consensual intimate images is a recognised form of
violence as provided in the Criminal Law Amendment Act
32 of
20027.
[5]
I was referred to the
decision of this court in
KS
v AM,
which
is an appeal relating to a protection order arising from the same set
of facts as the present matter. Briefly, the court
a
quo
confirmed the interim protection order that had been granted. The
appeal before this court was against the court
a
quo’s
refusal to grant additional orders which sought to protect the
appellant namely by directing the first defendant to hand over the
device with the recordings and depictions of the plaintiff to enable
her to remove them. The court on appeal ordered that any device
with
a photograph, depiction, video or audio related to the applicant
[plaintiff] be handed over. The court also noted the preamble
of the
Act
[6]
that the purpose seeks
“to afford a victim of domestic violence maximum protection
from domestic abuse that the law can provide”.
[22]
The
preamble
[7]
recognises that
domestic violence takes many forms and that it can be committed in a
wide range of domestic relationships. In committing
to its obligation
to end violence against women and children, specifically, the
preamble references the Constitution and its international
obligations, which include the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the
Rights of the Child.
[8]
[23]
It
is in this context that this claim is considered. Counsel for the
plaintiff also drew to this court’s attention that the
extent
of the breach of privacy is evident when regard is had to section 11
of the Cybercrimes Act
[9]
which
criminalises the disclosure of data messages of intimate images where
the intimate image violates or offends the sexual integrity
or
dignity of the person or amounts to sexual exploitation. It was
submitted that the first defendant and second defendant violated
the
plaintiff’s dignity when they published the images and
recording on the fake Facebook profile. This is an aggravated
offence. Section 16 of the Cybercrimes Act also provides:
16.
Disclosure of data message of intimate image.
—
(1)
Any person (“
A”
)
who unlawfully and intentionally discloses, by means of an electronic
communications service, a data message of an intimate image
of a
person (“
B”
),
without the consent of B, is guilty of an offence.
(2)
For purposes of subsection
(1)—
(
a
)“
B”
means—
(i)
the person who can be identified as
being displayed in the data message;
(ii)
any person who is described as being
displayed in the data message, irrespective of the fact that the
person cannot be identified
as being displayed in the data message;
or
(iii)
any person who can be identified from other information as being
displayed in the data message; and
(
b
)“
intimate
image”
means a depiction of a person—
(i)
real or simulated, and made by any means in which—
(
aa
)
B is nude, or the genital organs or anal region of B is displayed, or
if B is a female person, transgender person
or intersex person, their
breasts, are displayed; or
(
bb
)
the covered genital or anal region of B, or if B is a female person,
transgender person or intersex person,
their covered breasts, are
displayed; and
(iii)
in respect of which B so displayed
retains a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time that the data
message was made in a manner
that—
(
aa
)
violates or offends the sexual integrity or dignity of B; or
(
bb
)
amounts to sexual exploitation.
[24]
Counsel also referred to
section 24E of Films and Publications Amendment Act 11 of 2019, which
provides penalties for knowingly
distributing private sexual
photographs and films in any medium, including the Internet and
social media, without the prior consent
of the individual.
[25]
I
note that Facebook has its own terms of service and user policy
requiring that a user not access an account belonging to another
person. Moreover, a user will not intimidate, bully or harass
another. The creation of the fake Facebook profile appears to be
a
breach of such policy. The terms of service also indicate that when
intellectual property is deleted
,
it does so in a manner similar to emptying the recycle bin on a
computer. Whilst the content is removed, backup copies may remain
for
a period. Where the content was published using a public setting, the
content would have been available to everyone, including
people off
Facebook, to access and use the information and to associate it with
the name and profile picture.
[10]
The infringement is apparent, the extent of the harm depends on
whether it was possible to download the images and video during
the
period it was online or if it was possible to screen-record the video
depending on the device on which a viewer accessed the
content.
[26]
I have had regard to
the various legislation referred to by counsel and note that the
legislation refers to offences are criminal
in nature. The current
matter is a civil matter requiring a different standard of proof. I
have considered that the legislation
criminalising the conduct is
reflective of the seriousness of the infringement. This reflects the
extent to which the State has
acted to ensure the protection of the
right to privacy and dignity of persons and is in keeping with their
international obligations
to do so.
[27]
In
the prepared heads of argument, counsel referred to cases to assist
in determining an appropriate award of damages. I was referred
to
cases where awards were made but noted that they were a guide as
stated by the court “
an
award for damages cannot be made with mathematical precision. No two
matters are the same.”
[11]
Moreover, as in the present case, “
claims
for unliquidated damages by their very nature involve a determination
by the court of an amount that is just and reasonable
in the light of
a number of imponderable and incommensurable factors.”
[12]
As
is evident in the different legislation referred to above, publishing
intimate videos of a person without that person's consent
constitutes
a recognised form of violence. This intersects with the infringement
of the plaintiff’s privacy and dignity and
the defamation
occasioned by the publication.
[28]
This matter comes before me for general
and special damages. In assessing the damages, I have had regard to
the circumstances of
the relationship between the plaintiff and the
first defendant. The first defendant cultivated a relationship of
trust. He led
the plaintiff to believe he was unmarried and courted
her devotedly before he proposed to her. When the plaintiff was
confronted
with the reality that the first defendant was married, she
terminated the relationship and contact with the first defendant. The
first defendant threatened her, necessitating a protection order.
[29]
As
submitted before me, no two cases are the same. There can be no
mathematical precision when harm is occasioned. The amounts awarded
are a mere solatium and served to reimburse the plaintiff for costs
incurred or that she will incur.
[13]
It is of consequence that the plaintiff had not consented to being
recorded in a state of undress or whilst engaged in sexual activity
by the first defendant or anyone else and had not been aware of this
recording. She terminated the relationship when she learned
that the
first defendant was married. The conduct of the first defendant in
capturing the recording is unconscionable. The plaintiff
should be
safe from such invasive behaviour.
[30]
The further conduct of both
the first and second defendants in creating the fake Facebook account
and posting videos and other content
exacerbates the plaintiff’s
right to be free from violence and to have her dignity intact. The
video content was viewed widely.
There is no way of knowing whether
these videos were downloaded. The first defendant’s recording
of the video is serious
enough to breach the plaintiff’s
integrity. The video uploaded online is an aggravation of the
plaintiff’s privacy
and integrity breach. The plaintiff’s
evidence was that the first defendant refused to hand over the
devices with the recordings,
necessitating an appeal in the
Magistrates Court. Despite the confirmation of the protection order,
there was a refusal to hand
over the devices that contained the
recordings, as the first defendant claimed he was the owner of such
device and content.
[31]
The impact of the abusive
conduct is that the plaintiff has become reclusive, is not able to
leave her home, and suffers from PTSD
because of the breach of her
privacy and integrity. She is depressed and continues to receive
treatment. The impact of the first
and second defendant’s
conduct on the plaintiff's life is far-reaching.
[32]
The first claim regarding activating the
Facebook profile was an invasion of her privacy. She was and is
entitled to the protection
of her privacy and dignity. The first
defendant breached her privacy, and I am satisfied that the plaintiff
is entitled to the
relief of R 250 000.00 for general damages.
[33]
The second claim is for operating the Facebook
account where the two videos were posted. The first defendant
threatened the plaintiff
that he would post the videos and sent them
to her Whatsapp number. He then directed her to the Facebook account.
She testified,
and there was a psychologist report relating to her
mental state. Concerning this claim, the amount of R 2 500 000.00
is for general damages, and R300 00.00 is for special damages related
to medical expenses. The R50 000.00 was for past medical
expenses which is a reasonable amount for the treatment received as
testified by the plaintiff. The amount of R 250 000.00
for
future treatment reasonable is the treatment calculated at a
conservative rate of approximately R 1000- R1500 per session over
three to five years. The third, fourth and fifth claims related to
utterances made on the Facebook profile by the second defendant
and
to the plaintiff’s colleague the second defendant. They were
made to cause harm to the plaintiff, to harm her image among
her
friends, family and her professional image. These were made on
different instances and thus they are different awards. The
plaintiff
is entitled to damages for each of these instances of infringement
calculated to cause her harm. The amounts claimed
for damages under
claims C, D and E are appropriate as sought in the plaintiff’s
particulars of claims. The final claim,
F, was related to an email
communication with the plaintiff’s superiors. In this
communication, the tenor was to cause harm
to the plaintiff’s
professional image as in the previous conduct. The plaintiff is
entitled again to the maximum protection
of the law and I have no
difficulty in granting the amount claimed by the plaintiff.
[34]
I turn now to the costs
herein. The plaintiff seeks an order for attorney and client costs.
In view of the nature of the relief
sought and the relief I intend
granting the costs order is appropriate.
ORDER
[35]
For the reasons above I grant the following order:
1. The application for
default judgment is granted.
2. The Defendants shall,
jointly and severally, within 60 days of service of this order, pay
the Plaintiff R3,550,000, made up as
follows:
2.1. In relation to Claim
A, R250,000 in general damages;
2.2. In relation to Claim
B:
2.2.1. R2,500,000 in
general damages;
2.2.2. R300,000 in
special damages, plus interest at the prescribed rate from the date
on which each past medical cost was incurred;
2.3. In relation Claim C,
R500,000 in general damages.
3. The Second Defendant
shall, within 60 days of service of this order, pay the Plaintiff
R750,000, made up as follows:
3.1. In relation to Claim
D, R250,000 in general damages;
3.2. In relation to Claim
E, R250,000 in general damages;
3.3. In relation to Claim
F, R250,000 in general damages;
4. The Defendants shall,
jointly and severally, pay the Plaintiff’s costs in this
action, including this application for default
judgment, and
including expert’s fees, on the attorney-client scale.
S C MIA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
DELIVERED
:
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by e mail and publication
on CaseLines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 12
November
2024
Appearances:
On
behalf of the applicant:
Instructed
by:
On
behalf of the defendants:
Adv
B Winks
Power
Singh Attorneys
No
appearance
Date of hearing:
Date
of judgment:
13 June 2024
12
November 2024
[1]
Record,
Confirmatory affidavit Caselines 030-40
[2]
2023
EWHC 419
KB
[3]
2023
EWHC 419
KB
[4]
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women
observed that the “publication or posting online without
the
consent of intimate photographs or photoshopped images that are
sexualised” violates the subject’s rights to
privacy, to
dignity, and to live a life free from violence. See UNHRC, ‘Report
of the Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and
consequences on online violence against women and girls from a human
rights perspective’ (2018).
[5]
See
section 11A
of the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related
Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007
pertaining to the non-consensual
disclosure of content of an explicit or sexual nature provides: 11A.
Harmful disclosure
of pornography
.
—(1)
A person (‘A’) who unlawfully and intentionally
discloses or causes the disclosure of pornography in which
a person
(‘B’) appears or is described and such disclosure—
(
a
)
takes place without the consent of B; and
(
b
)
causes any harm, including mental, psychological, physical, social
or economic harm, to B or any member of the family
of B or any other
person in a close relationship to B,
is
guilty of the offence of harmful disclosure of pornography.
(2)
A person (‘A’) who unlawfully and intentionally
threatens to disclose or threatens to cause the disclosure of
pornography referred to in
subsection
(1)
and
such threat causes, or such disclosure could reasonably be expected
to cause, any harm referred to in
subsection
(1) (
b
)
,
is guilty of the offence of threatening to disclose pornography that
will cause harm.
(3)
A person (‘A’) who unlawfully and intentionally
threatens to disclose or threatens to cause the disclosure of
pornography referred to in
subsection
(1)
,
for the purposes of obtaining any advantage from B or any member of
the family of B or any other person in a close relationship
to B, is
guilty of the offence of harmful disclosure of pornography related
extortion.
[6]
Preamble,
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (since amended)
[7]
Preamble
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (since amended)
[8]
Preamble
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (since amended)
[9]
Act
19 of 2020
[10]
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms/previous
[11]
M.R
v Mokgethi N.O and Another
(393/2015)
[2024] ZANWHC 37
at para 45.
[12]
EFF
and Others v Manuel
(711/2019) [2020] ZASCA 172
[13]
sino noindex
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