Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 459South Africa
T.M obo D.M v MEC for Health, Gauteng Province (36681/2017) [2023] ZAGPJHC 459 (11 May 2023)
Judgment
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## T.M obo D.M v MEC for Health, Gauteng Province (36681/2017) [2023] ZAGPJHC 459 (11 May 2023)
T.M obo D.M v MEC for Health, Gauteng Province (36681/2017) [2023] ZAGPJHC 459 (11 May 2023)
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sino date 11 May 2023
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
###
CASE
NO:
36681/2017
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
NOT REVISED
In the matter between:
TM
obo DM
Plaintiff
And
THE
MEC FOR HEALTH, GAUTENG PROVINCE
Defendant
Neutral Citation: TM
obo DM v THE MEC FOR HEALTH, GAUTENG PROVINCE (Case No: 3681/2017)
[2023] ZAG 459 (11 May 2023)
J U D G M E N T
MAIER-FRAWLEY
J
:
Introductory
background
1.
The
plaintiff, acting in her personal and representative capacity on
behalf of her minor child (DM) (hereinafter referred to as
‘baby
D’ or ‘the baby’), instituted a claim for delictual
damages against the defendant as the employer
of the nursing staff at
the Hillbrow Community Health Centre (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Hillbrow clinic’). The
plaintiff’s claim against
the defendant was brought on the basis that the MEC was vicariously
liable for the negligent conduct
or omission of the employees of the
defendant who attended to the plaintiff (and her then unborn child)
at the Hillbrow clinic
after her admission and/or who attended to
baby D during the Plaintiff’s labour process and the delivery
of baby D on 9 July
2009. She claims that this negligence caused and
culminated in baby D developing cerebral palsy as a consequence of a
hypoxic-ischaemic
event that resulted in irreversible brain damage
being sustained by baby D.
2.
The
element of wrongfulness in the assessment of delictual liability was
not in issue in the action. The other elements of delictual
liability, namely, negligence and causation remained in dispute.
3.
In her particulars of claim, the plaintiff pleaded
that the defendant owed her and her and her unborn child a legal duty
of care,
amongst others, to monitor the plaintiff’s labour with
such skill, care and diligence as could reasonably be expected of
medical practitioners and/or nursing staff with appropriate obstetric
knowledge in similar circumstances, which duty was breached
by
employees of the defendant who were alleged to have been negligent in
several respects, but which for purposes of the judgment,
in the
main, included, amongst others, that they:
3.1.
Failed to properly monitor the progress of the
plaintiff’s labour and the foetal well-being with sufficient
regularity during
the active phase of labour (i.e when the
plaintiff’s cervix had dilated 4cm or more);
3.2.
Failed to either appropriately, timeously and/or
with sufficient frequency, monitor the plaintiff’s labour;
3.3.
Failed to perform a caesarean section (c-section)
timeously or at all
in
circumstances where it was necessary and/or indicated to do so;
3.4.
Failed to monitor the foetal heart rate
appropriately, timeously or with sufficient frequency and/or at all
and/or failed to detect
that baby D was in foetal distress;
3.5.
Failed to appreciate and/or properly and/or
adequately react to foetal distress;
3.6.
Failed to timeously or adequately institute
appropriate or effective measures to prevent further distress in the
foetus;
3.7.
Failed to maintain a proper and accurate
partogram;
3.8.
Failed to summon, timeously
or at all, for purposes assessment, advice and/or appropriate action,
the assistance of a medical practitioner
in circumstances where it
was necessary and/or indicated to do so;
.
4.
The defendant opposed the action and filed a plea,
inter alia:
4.1.
denying that the employees of the defendant were
negligent in any of the respects alleged or at all; and
4.2.
denying that there was any causal connection
between the negligence (if any) of the staff at Hillbrow clinic and
the cerebral palsy
sustained by baby D.
5.
No contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff was averred in the plea.
6.
The plaintiff called the following witnesses to
testify at the trial:
6.1.
Mz ‘TM’ (plaintiff);
6.2.
Dr Alheit (Radiologist)
6.3.
Professor Anthony (Obstetrician &
Gynaecologist);
6.4.
Dr Kara (Paediatrician) and
6.5.
Dr Pierce (Paediatric Neurologist)
7.
The defendant called the following witnesses to
testify at the trial:
7.1.
Dr Mogashoa (Paediatric Neurologist)
7.2.
Professor Bolton (Paediatrician)
7.3.
Sr Moqhae (Midwife who delivered baby D);
7.4.
Sr Mabanga (Midwife who assisted with
resuscitation of baby D)
7.5.
Dr Manthata-Cruywagen (Obstetrician and
Gynaecologist);and
7.6.
Dr Weinstein (Radiologist)
8.
The expert reports filed of record by both parties
were admitted into evidence at the trial as well as the available
hospital and
medical records on which all experts relied to formulate
their respective opinions. The expertise and experience of all
experts
and midwives who testified at the trial was not in dispute.
Background Matrix
9.
The background factual matrix is the following:
The plaintiff received ongoing antenatal care and management of her
pregnancy at
the Jeppe Street Clinic. Baby D was the plaintiff’s
first pregnancy and is her firstborn child. The pregnancy was
uneventful
and progressed normally. The plaintiff experienced no
illnesses and remained healthy throughout her pregnancy. She attended
antenatal
check-ups every month and was informed of the anticipated
due date of baby D’s birth. About 20 days before her due date,
she was advised to attend at a hospital if she felt any pain. She
initially attended at the Hillbrow clinic on 8 July 2012 after
she
noticed a discharge and blood being expelled whilst experiencing
abdominal pain. She was assessed not to be in labour and told
she
should return home. Later that evening she returned to Hillbrow
clinic as she perceived that liquid had been expelled from
her vagina
whilst continuing to experience abdominal pain, including back pain.
She was assessed and admitted to what was ostensibly
the labour ward
at the clinic.
10.
According to the medical records, between midnight
and 4 am on 9 July 2012, the plaintiff’s condition was
monitored in the
labour ward every hour at which times the foetal
heart rate (FHR) was plotted on a partogram and recorded to be
between 120 and
135 beats per minute (bpm), i.e., at 00h00; 01h00;
02h00; 03h00 and at 4h00. After 4h00, there were no further entries
on the partogram.
11.
At 0h00, the plaibntiff’s cervix was 4cm
dilated and she had thus entered the first stage of the active phase
of labour. A
FHR of 120 bpm was recorded at this time. At 04h00, the
plaintiff’s cervix was 8cm dilated, at which time the medical
records
reflect that her membranes had ruptured and that she was
draining clear liquor. A FHR of 133 bpm was recorded. At 06h00 the
plaintiff’s
cervix was 9cm dilated and a FHR of 120 bpm was
recorded. At 7h00 the plaintiff’scervix was fully dilated at 10
cm and the
plaintiff had thus entered the second stage of active
labour, however, by then, she was draining very thick (grade 111)
meconium
stained liquor and an abnormal foetal heart rate of 109 bpm
was recorded. The plaintiff was thereupon taken to a section that was
used as a delivery room where she gave birth to baby D by way of an
unassisted vaginal delivery at 08h00 on 9 July 2012. Delivery
of the
placenta occurred at 8h15 on that day. After the delivery, the
plaintiff was given 10 units of Syntocinon in a 100mls of
Ringers
Lactate intravenous infusion.
12.
When baby D was delivered, he did not move or cry.
He was put onto the plaintiff’s chest and meconium was wiped
manually from
his mouth by the midwife. After the umbilical cord was
cut, he was taken for resuscitation and suctioning and given oxygen.
Baby
D’s apgar scores at birth were 6/10 at 1 minute; 6/10 at 5
minutes and 6/10 at 10 minutes. Baby D was diagnosed as having
_______ and then transferred to Charlotte Maxeke hospital for further
care where he was admitted to the paediatric ICU.
Issues in contention
at trial
13.
The main controversy at the trial was in relation
to the cause of the brain injury sustained by baby D. Whilst the
experts (neuro-paediatricians
and gynaecologist/Obstetricianss) were
agreed that the insult that led to the eventual brain injury occurred
intrapartem (before
delivery) and not after the birth of baby D, the
dispute between the parties was whether it happened suddenly (without
warning)
and was so severe as to result in a total shut down of
oxygen very quickly, i.e., in the space of between 5 to 15 minutes,
so that
no amount of monitoring of the foetal condition could have
prevented it, or stated differently, so that inadequate monitoring of
the foetal condition in fact made no difference,
or
whether it happened as a result of intermittent
episodes of hypoxia that went undetected because of a lack of proper
foetal monitoring.
The further dispute centred around whether the
negligence on the part of the attending staff caused baby D to suffer
the consequences
of such event.
14.
Linked
to the main controversy, was the question of whether the BGT
[1]
brain injury which baby D sustained can be caused by anything other
than
an
acute profound total or near-total hypoxic ischaemic insult
or
whether
it can be caused by intermittent or prolonged episodes of
subacute/subthreshold hypoxic insults (interruption of the supply
of
blood to the brain).
15.
A further controversy which featured during the
trial was whether or not the plaintiff had chewed a leafy substance
called
khat
(also
referred to as
Mira
)
during her pregnancy, such that it had an adverse effect on her
placenta and if so, whether this is what caused baby D to suffer
the
brain injury in question.
Agreements
per experts’ joint minutes
16.
The agreements
reached in the joint minutes of the various experts are extensive and
are a matter of record. I therefore intend
to only highlight the most
salient of these for purposes of judgment.
17.
The paediatricians
agreed in their
addendum
joint minute that
foetal bradycardia and late onset of grade 3 meconium liquor was
detected an hour before birth. Baby D was transferred
from Hillbrow
clinic to Charlotte Maxeke hospital with an initial diagnosis of
meconium aspiration. Baby D’s birth weight,
length and head
size were in keeping with a baby born at term and there was no growth
restriction or asymmetry. Baby D required
resuscitation after birth.
18.
The
Gynaecologists/Obstetricians agreed in their joint minute of 22
November 2020, amongst others
,
that:
(i)
The abnormal fetal
heart rate observed and the development of thick meconium stained
liquor (at 07h00, an hour before birth) failed
to elicit any response
directed at more accurate assessment of fetal wellbeing from the
nursing staff, which amounted to substandard
care;
(ii)
The commencement of
the second stage of [active] labour lasted another hour beyond the
07h00 assessment and this may have added
additional risk of injury to
the
fetus
that was hypoxic
before the onset of the second stage of labour
;
(emphasis added)
(iii)
The partogram was
blank after 04h00 and during the remaining four hours of labour only
two assessments were made and only two assessments
of the fetal
condition were recorded, which was substandard care. Partograms are
required in the management of all parturients
and failure to use a
partogram correctly increases the likelihood of perinatal death and
injury due to asphyxia;
(iv)
Baby D showed no
signs of growth restriction at delivery and was described as having
suffered from acute profound hypoxia in the
perinatal period. The
development of acute profound hypoxia may be attributable to a
sentinel event in the perinatal period such
as placental separation,
cord prolapse or uterine rupture
but
it may also develop during the course of what may otherwise be deemed
to be normal labour
;
(emphasis added)
(v)
The risks of fetal
monitoring are well recognized and fetal monitoring in labour is
universally recommended in order to detect the
onset of fetal
compromise even in a completely normal pregnancy. Protocols of fetal
monitoring are universally endorsed and typically
dictate that the
fetal condition needs assessment every two hours in latent labour,
every half hour in active labour and after
every second contraction
in the second stage of [active] labour. The changes in fetal heart
rate precede injury and are markers
of insult (which if unchecked)
lead to injury. The purpose of fetal monitoring is the detection of
patterns associated with hypoxia
and acidosis which mark the
occurrence of a compensated insult manifesting
before
injury is sustained;
(emphasis
added);
(vi)
The second stage of
labour is the most dangerous time for the development of hypoxia and
for that reason the monitoring of the fetal
condition is by
prescription at its most intense;
(vii)
The susceptibility of
the foetus to injury during the second stage of labour varies
depending on the extent to which compensatory
mechanisms have already
been deployed in the earlier part of labour and a baby that enters
the second stage of labour with compensated
acidosis may be more
susceptible to injury in the second stage of labour than a child who
has sustained normal metabolic activity
on the basis of adequate
oxygenation up to the start of the second stage of labour;
(viii)
A normal baby can
sustain 10 to 15 minutes of complete hypoxia before damage ensues;
however the susceptibility to injury and the
time taken to cause
injury will depend on the baseline oxygenation of the foetus. Where a
gradual decline in oxygenation has occurred
during labour and
compensatory mechanisms have already been deployed, the capacity to
withstand further hypoxic insult also declines
creating the situation
where seemingly unremarkable additional stresses may be the
proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s
back Thus, a baby who
has suffered a progressive decline in oxygenation throughout the
first stage of labour may not be able to
sustain the same difficult
second stage of labour without developing neurological injury;
(ix)
Avoidable injury is
to be recognized where typical evidence exists of abnormal fetal
heart rate patterns in the first or second
stage of labour which
provide evidence of the activation of reflex mechanisms
characteristic of evolving fetal hypoxia and acidosis.
Failure to
recognize these patterns and failure to intervene early enough (while
compensatory mechanisms can still sustain adequate
perfusion of the
brain) will have increased the susceptibility of the foetus to
neurological injury the longer the labour progresses.
The addition of
further
insult
(such
as the use of oxytocic drugs, the onset of a long second stage of
labour
with
the mother bearing down
and
the use of fundal pressure during the second stage of labour) may
provide the straw that breaks the camel’s back and may
lead to
limited or profound injury of the foetal brain;
(x)
Injury is avoidable
by early detection of evolving hypoxia;
(xi)
The object of foetal
monitoring is to diagnose evolving foetal hypoxia
before
insult
leads to injury;
(xii)
Where protocols of
foetal heart rate monitoring have been breached and injury ensues
there must be consideration of liability with
the only exception to
liability being the rare occurrence of a devastating and
unpredictable sentinel event such as sudden antepartum
haemorrhage
due to placental separation before or during labour or the unprovoked
development of a ruptured uterus – acute
severe hypoxic
ischaemic injury to the fetal brain may be avoidable and where
abnormal fetal heart rate monitoring precedes the
injury in the
absence of a sentinel event, such assumptions are reasonable and
sustainable;
(xiii)
Foetal monitoring in
this case was inadequately performed during labour in conflict with
the published national maternity guidelines;
(xiv)
Inadequate foetal
monitoring precluded the identification of any abnormal fetal heart
rate pattern;
(xv)
There is evidence
that certain markers of potential foetal hypoxia emerged during the
course of labour: (i) the development of thick
meconium stained
liquor; (ii) a slow foetal heart rate observed one hour before
delivery and (iii) further foetal heart rate assessment
did not take
place before delivery;
(xvi)
In this case the
markers of fetal hypoxia did not elicit an appropriate response in
terms of immediate electronic fetal monitoring,
intrauterine
resuscitation or any attempt to expedite delivery;
(xvii)
Management [in
labour] took place in breach of published guidelines and what
evidence there is [in the clinical records]: (i) indicates
the
possibility of fetal hypoxia which either went unrecognized or may
have been ignored by the attending staff and (ii) supports
the
probability of an intrapartum cause for early onset neonatal
encephalopathy;
(xviii)
Consequently,
neurological injury held to be associated with intrapartum hypoxia
developed because the care provided was inadequate.
19.
An amended joint
minute by the Gynaecologists/Obstetricians was subsequently filed due
to the fact that Dr Manthata-Cruywagen changed
her opinion after
receiving additional medical notes which queried the use of Mira/Khat
by the plaintiff. Amendments to the initial
joint minute were
effected on 22 January 2022. In terms of the amended joint minute, Dr
Manthata-Cruywagen raised the use of Khat/Mira
by the plaintiff
during her pregnancy as a causal factor that led to a total shutdown
of oxygenated blood supply to the fetus 30
minutes before delivery.
In her view, the use of Khat exposed the plaintiff’s placenta
to an ‘amphetamine like substance’
which has been
postulated to have a deleterious effect on the placental function
causing vasoconstriction and reducing fetal oxygenation.
Put
differently, the compromised placenta exacerbated the reduction in
oxygen blood supply. Dr Manthata-Cruywagen recorded in the
amended
joint minute that ‘
A
substance-exposed placenta will not be able to supply oxygenated
blood to the fetus during labour adequately because during labour,
contractions further exacerbate reduction of oxygenated blood supply.
Ms [M…] acknowledged during the interview with the
neuro
development doctor Dr Blumberg in 2013 to using Mira/Khat during
pregnancy
.’
She therefore concluded that in the second stage of labour ‘
where
a sub-optimally functioning placenta that has been exposed to an
amphetamine like substance, further exacerbated the reduction
in
oxygen blood supply. This was the straw that broke the camel’s
back and led to a total shutdown of oxygenated blood supply
to the
fetus just a few minutes before delivery.
’
Her earlier agreement
recorded in sub-paragraphs 17 (ix); (x) and (xii) above, was
retracted with Dr Manthata-Cruywagen recording
that ‘
Acute
severe hypoxic ischemic injury to the fetal brain, implies either
rapid total shutdown oxygenated blood
(sic)
(in which
compensatory mechanisms have no time to become deployed)…’.
20.
Save for the issue of
Khat and its postulated deleterious effect upon the mother’s
placenta, coupled with the suggested unavoidability
or
non-preventability of the postulated inevitable consequences of an
abnormally functioning placenta, the agreements recorded
in the
initial joint minute of the Gynaecologists/Obstetricians remained
unchanged.
21.
In their joint minute
dated 10 May 2019, the radiologists initially agreed that the MRI
pattern observed was in keeping with
acute
profound hypoxic ischaemic
brain
injury. The findings of the MRI study suggested that genetic
disorders as a cause of baby D’s brain damage were unlikely.
There was no evidence of intracranial infection on the reviewed MRI.
They further agreed that a review of the clinical and obstetrical
records by pediatric, neurology and obstetrics experts was essential
in determining the cause and probable timing of the hypoxic
ischemic
injury.
22.
In
a subsequent addendum joint minute dated 19 January 2022, Dr Alheit
recorded that the term ‘acute profound’ hypoxic
ischaemic
injury of the brain ‘
is
inappropriate as there is no history of an intrapartum sentinel event
in this case. This statement is based on the article by
Smith et al,
which was published at the end of 2020 and the 2019 revision of the
ACOG guidelines as well as the recently published
article:
Neuroimaging in the term newborn with neonatal encephalopathy…the
terminology used for identifying the injury in
this case should only
describe the structural changes *PGBT/Central
[2]
hypoxic
ischaemic injury of the brain
.’
Dr Weinstein remained resolute that the pattern observed was ‘in
keeping with a hypoxic ischemic event/s of an acute
profound
distribution (type).’
23.
The
Paediatric
Neurologists agreed
in their joint minute that baby D’s condition was most likely
the result of intrapartum hypoxia. As regards
his condition, they
agreed that he suffers from a mixed cerebral palsy (predominantly
dystonic/dyskinetic). He is capable only
of limited independent
mobility and his co-morbidities include profound intellectual
disability, microcephaly, strabismus, contractures,
dislocated left
hip and severe developmental delay.
24.
Although they did not
testify at the trial, the Paediatric/Genetic joint minute compiled by
Dr Gerike and Dr Bhengu records their
agreed observations of baby D’s
condition: he has no self-initiated movement; he has to be fed; wears
nappies; he can see
and hear and understand the most basic forms of
communication but there is no expressive speech. Clinically, his lack
of autonomous
mobility makes for a diagnosis of GMFCS level v
cerebral palsy, which indicates the most severe level of motor muscle
disability.
Pre-trial
admissions
25.
Pursuant
to a formal request for admissions and trial enquiries,
[3]
the parties agreed that:
(i)
The plaintiff did not
suffer from complications during her pregnancy and her pregnancy
progressed normally;
(ii)
The Hillbrow
Community Health Centre is fully equipped with foetal monitoring
equipment and has a staff compliment that is fully
trained in
obstetric care and obstetric emergency management;
(iii)
A hypoxic ischaemic
event in a term child can result from final circulatory collapse in a
neonate exposed to subthreshold hypoxia
over a period of time,
however, the defendant stated that the facts of this case differ in
that the hypoxic ischaemic event was
caused by an acute profound
injury;
(iv)
The late first and
the second stages of labour require careful and continuous
monitoring;
(v)
A prolonged labour
may result in a lack of oxygen which can cause hypoxia;
(vi)
The purpose of foetal
monitoring in labour is to detect hypoxia and to prevent asphyxia;
(vii)
Intrapartum hypoxia
(foetal distress) can precipitate hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy
(HIE) in the neonate thereby leading to neonatal
encephalopathy and
cerebral palsy;
(viii)
Birth asphyxia may cause permanent
neurological damage, expressed as cerebral palsy or mental deficiency
or both; and
(ix)
Besides death, the most severe expression
of birth asphyxia is the syndrome of Hypoxic Ischemic Encephalopathy
(HIE).
Pre-trial
enquiry
26.
In terms of the
plaintiff’s list of pre-trial enquiries, amongst others
,
the
following question was asked and answered:
“
Does
the defendant intend relying on any intrapartum (during labour and
birth) cause for [baby D’s] cerebral palsy? If so,
the-plaintiff requires the defendant, to indicate what intrapartum
cause will be relied upon which caused [baby D's] cerebral palsy?
Answer: Yes. The hypoxic
ischemic event was caused by an acute profound injury.”
27.
At the outset of the
trial, the plaintiff placed on record that the defendant did not
dispute that sub-standard care was rendered
to the plaintiff (and by
implication, also the unborn foetus) at the Hillbrow clinic during
the labour process.
Evidence
at trial
Plaintiff’s
witnesses
Plaintiff (Mother)
28.
The
plaintiff testified through the aid of an
interpreter.
She testified
about
her pregnancy having progressed normally, without complications,
including the events leading up to her admission at Hillbrow
clinic
on 8 July 2012.
[4]
She confirmed
being 31 years old when she fell pregnant and that baby D was her
first child. She hails from Ethiopia and is unable
to speak or
understand any African languages. She understands a little English.
29.
According
to the plaintiff, the nurse who checked on her at midnight and at 4am
checked her blood pressure but did not use any instrument
to check on
baby D. When she screamed out for help because of the pain she was
experiencing, the nurses did not heed her cries.
She was aware of a
changeover of staff after 6 am. One of the new nurses from the day
shift, took her to a room that had a curtain
where the nurse
performed a vaginal examination. Then the nurse came with medical
tools such as a needle, scissors and other instruments.
The nurse
told her to push for the baby to come out. She only started pushing
once the nurse told her to push. The plaintiff said
she was
experiencing constant pain. At some point the nurse gave her an
injection in her right thigh after which she felt intense
pain and
she screamed. The nurse swore at her and told her to keep quiet and
to keep pushing until the baby came out. She could
not remember for
how long she was pushing before the baby came out. When all this was
happening, no-one else came into the room
to help the nurse who had
delivered baby D.
30.
After
his delivery, the nurse put baby D on the plaintiff’s chest.
According to the plaintiff, baby D had a ‘yellowish’
blue
colour. He did not cry or move and the nurse told her that the baby
was dying. She could not recall how long the baby lay
on her chest
before he was taken away. She recalled falling asleep thereafter
until she was woken up by another nurse and told
to count her
fingers. As the plaintiff was counting, she fell asleep again. This
prompted the nurse to call for help. Other nurses
then came into the
room. One of the nurses put a drip into each of her hands and after a
while they put an extra drip into her
one hand. She recalled bleeding
a lot after the birth of baby D and that she was feeling weak. She
was transferred to Charlotte
Maxeke hospital, where she was admitted,
however, in the evening she was told that she could go home.
31.
The following day she saw baby D at the hospital.
He was lying inside an incubator and he was shaking orshivering and
had medical
tools attached to his body and head. The following day
she was told to feed baby D but he was unable to suckle from her
breast.
The nurses told her to extract milk from her breasts and to
bring it to the hospital inside a cup which they provided Baby
D remained in hospital for 7 days. On the 7
th
day of admission, a doctor explained to her and
her husband that baby D had suffered a shortage of oxygen and damage
and that he
would have a problem in the future in that he would not
be able to speak or walk.
32.
About 18 to 20 days after baby D’s discharge
from hospital, he was crying so much that the plaintiff took him to
the clinic
for a check-up. The baby was examined and the plaintiff
was told to take him to the hospital. She attended at the emergency
department
at Charlotte Maxeke where a doctor examined baby D and
sent him for X-rays. She was later informed by a specialist doctor
that
the baby had an infection and a blood clot in his shoulder. He
underwent an operation to remove the blood clot and remained
hospitalised
for about two months.
33.
When baby D was about 6 months old, he developed a
fever. She took him to hospital and it was then, when the examining
doctor tried
to sit him down, that she saw something was wrong with
baby D, as he could not balance his head, which was ‘wobbly’.
She was referred to a ‘brain doctor’ who examined baby D
and advised that the baby had suffered a lack of oxygen before
birth.
34.
The plaintiff was asked whether she used a
substance known as khat (which is also referred to as ‘Mira’).
She admitted
chewing it, however, not on a regular basis. In the
Ethiopian culture, people chew khat at social gatherings as a
cultural pleasure.
She stated that she had last chewed it about one
or two months before she fell pregnant and did not use Khat or any
similar substance
at all during her pregnancy.
35.
During cross-examination she stated that she had
not mentioned to any health worker that she had used khat during her
pregnancy,
nor had she informed any healthcare professional at the
‘Johannesburg’ hospital of her usage of khat. Prior to
her
pregnancy, she only chewed it once in a while, not regularly.
When asked why she did not use it during her pregnancy, the plaintiff
stated that it was because she did not feel like it.
36.
During cross-examination the plaintiff confirmed
that she was taken to the room where baby D was delivered by the new
nurse, where
she was told to lie down. Either the nurse or she
(plaintiff) opened her legs. She was lying on her back and the nurse
told her
to push the baby out. The nurse was standing in front of her
legs and she was pushing on the nurse’s instruction.
37.
During re-examination the plaintiff stated that
from the time the nurse did the vaginal instruction until the birth
of the baby,
the nurse did not listen to baby D’s heartbeat.
Dr Alheit
(Radiologist)
38.
Dr
Alheit explained that the MRI scan performed on baby D’s brain
when he was 5 years and 6 months old reflected damage to
the central
part of the brain involving the basal ganglia thalamus structures of
the brain and periolandic area, i.e., impacting
the deep grey nuclei.
This
pattern of injury is ordinarily associated with an acute profound
insult following the occurrence of an obstetric sentinel
event.
[5]
39.
In his initial joint minute prepared with Dr
Weinstein on 10 May 2019, he described the pattern of injury seen on
baby D’s
MRI by its conventional nomenclature as ‘
Acute
Profound Hypoxic Ischemic injury’.
‘
Hypoxic’
denotes too little oxygen whilst ‘Ischemic’ denotes too
little blood pressure. Nomenclature such as ‘Acute/Profound’
gives a context of timing and severity, ‘acute’ denoting
quick or sudden or abrupt cessation of blood supply or oxygen
to the
baby and ‘profound’ denoting how severe the insult is,
i.e., a short severe process.
40.
Thereafter,
in November 2021, he came across an article published by Smith et
al
[6]
wherein the authors
concluded that
in
the absence of a perinatal sentinel event, subacute or subthreshold
prolonged or intermittent intrapartum hypoxic ischaemia may
cause a
BGT pattern brain injury but that warning signs in the form of
non-reassuring foetal status, would be detectable by means
of
cardiotocograph (CTG) or auscultation monitoring up to a few hours
before delivery. They thus concluded that the BGT pattern
injury and
radiologically termed ‘acute profound’ HI brain injury
are not necessarily synonymous and that radiologists
ought preferably
to describe the pattern in relation to the areas of the brain that
are damaged rather than to describe a causative
mechanism of
injury.
[7]
In other words, it is
inappropriate to describe the BGT pattern of injury as ‘acute
profound’ in the absence of a sentinel
event.
41.
He
testified that the 2019 revision of the ACOG guidelines distinguishes
the description of an injury to the deep nuclear grey matter
of the
brain where a sentinel event has occurred from the description of an
injury to the deep nuclear grey matter in the absence
of evidence of
a sentinel event. They describe an acute profound hypoxic ischaemic
injury involving the deep nuclear grey matter
in the context of an
acute total hypoxic ischaemic insult, whereas they describe the
BGT-HII injury, also involving the deep nuclear
grey matter, in the
context of severe partial insult of prolonged duration or a combined
partial with profound terminal insult.
[8]
In other words, ACOG 2019 recognises that the BGT pattern can occur
in the absence of a sentinel event.
42.
Thus there are two mechanisms that can result in
the same injury pattern:
42.1.
An
injury resulting from a sentinel event;
[9]
or
42.2.
Where no sentinel event occurred, an injury
resulting from an insult that occurred over a prolonged period of
either less than an
hour or more than an hour.
By looking at an MRI
image, radiologists cannot say which one of the said injuries
occurred and one would need the clinical information
to be in a
position to say when and how the injury occurred. That is why he and
Dr Weinstein agreed in their addendum joint minute
that they (as
radiologists) are unable to determine the cause/s or the time that
the injury to the brain occurred and that a review
of the clinical
and obstetrical records by paediatric, neurology and Obstetrics
experts is essential in determining the cause and
probable timing of
baby D’s hypoxic ischemic injury.
43.
Dr
Alheit testified about a letter he addressed to the SA journal of
radiology on the appropriate use of nomenclature when describing
patterns of injuries.
[10]
Dr
Misser responded to this letter in his letter to the Editor of the SA
Journal of Radiology and published therein, wherein he
stated that in
his co-authored article titled
‘
A
pictorial review of the pathophysiology and classification of the
magnetic resonance imaging patters of perinatal term hypoxic
ischemic
brain injury – What the radiologists need to know’,
[11]
the
cases therein described as ‘acute profound HIBI’ were in
respect of children who had suffered sentinel events. Dr
Misser
pointed out that up until October 2020 (when the said article was
published) radiological reporting of the central pattern
of injury
(the basal-ganglia, thalamus and periolandic injury), which they
called acute profound injury, has previously been ascribed
to an
acute pathophysiology, but that cognizance was taken of the recent
Smith et al article showing that a BGT pattern may also
occur in the
absence of sentinel events and is therefore not synonymous with acute
profound HIBI. His group was therefore not opposed
to the use of the
anatomical description proposed, to call this injury a BGT pattern
where there is no correlative sentinel event
documented.
44.
In the
definitive article titled ‘
Neuroimaging
in the term newborn with neonatal encephalopathy’
authored
by highly esteemed professionals from a variety of fields,
[12]
published in October 2021, they describe the pattern of injury to the
basal-ganglia thalamus
and
periolandic cortex (PBGT) of the brain as ‘Central/BGT’
whether caused by sentinel events or whether caused by severe
partial
asphyxia with prolonged duration or a combination of partial and
near-total asphyxia. In other words, the latest literature
does not
use the term ‘acute profound’ to describe a central brain
injury involving the PBGT structures of the brain.
45.
Dr Alheit was asked whether an infection such as
that sustained by baby D some twenty days after birth and which
resulted in arthritis
in his shoulder, would be visible on an MRI. He
replied that a remote infection – if it is septicaemia- could
get to the
brain if it eventually forms a brain abscess. There was
however no evidence of a brain abscess on his MRI.
46.
During cross-examination Dr testified that you
cannot get the BGT injury without hypoxia. It is not impossible to
say how long it
took for the injury to occur, as no-one knows. The
only way is to postulate through foetal monitoring - if foetal
distress is detected
through monitoring, then one can postulate that
the hypoxic insult probably started at that time. The central brain
injury is due
to a combination of hypoxia and ischaemia. Where there
is no sentinel event, no-one can say when it started and when it
concluded.
But what is now known is that in the absence of a sentinel
event, the injury does not happen suddenly – it can take place
over a period of time.
Professor Anthony
(Gynaecologist/Obstetrician)
47.
Prof Anthony testified that
the process of labour is a dangerous journey, particularly during the
active phase of labour when contractions
increase in frequency.
During a contraction there is a reduction in blood supply and a
decrease in oxygen content in the foetal
blood. Generally, if there
is sufficient time between contractions, the baby will be able to
recover from a lack of oxygen experienced
during contractions. If the
contractions become too frequent or prolonged, the baby may not be
able to maintain a baseline oxygenation
as the mother’s labour
progresses.
48.
Foetal monitoring is
employed to detect the evolution of foetal hypoxia where the baby
does not have enough oxygen due to contractions.
Where the baby does
not receive enough oxygen there will be a change in the acid content
of the blood. This is detected in foetal
circulation and these are
translated into changes in foetal heart rate. The start of hypoxia is
an indication of a potential insult
which if sustained and severe may
lead to injury. Therefore one looks at any change in the foetal heart
rate pattern to detect
any insult.
49.
In order to determine from
the foetal heart rate whether the baby is coping with the demands of
labour, one would have to listen
to the baby’s heartbeat
before, during and after uterine contractions. An attempt to measure
the foetal heart rate without
reference to contractions means that
the nurse will not be able to ascertain or deduce the wellbeing of
the foetus with certainty.
50.
From a perusal of the maternity records, there is
no evidence that the nurse/s monitored the foetal heart rate at the
required intervals
(every half hour in the active stage of labour,
precisely because a hypoxic insult may occur) or in the correct
manner (auscultation
before, during and after contractions) as
prescribed in the 2007 Maternity Guidelines. As the labour
progresses, so the frequency
of monitoring increases because it is
important to know the state of the foetus so that timeous
intervention can occur in the event
that foetal distress is suspected
or diagnosed.
51.
In the case of baby D, prior to 7am on 9 July
2012, his recorded heart rate which was recorded, fell within the
normal baseline
range between 120 and 133 bpm. However, at each
assessment, only a single heartbeat was recorded. The recorded
heartbeat may or
may not represent a foetal heart rate before or
after contractions. So for example, at 04h00 the labour record
reflects the foetal
condition as ‘satisfactory at 133bpm’.
However, such a record denotes no more than that the baby was alive
because
one cannot determine foetal wellbeing without auscultating
the foetal heart rate.
52.
At 7
am, the records reflect the presence of thick meconium and an
abnormal heart rate of 109bpm.
[13]
At this point there ought to have been a real suspicion of foetal
distress and that the baby was becoming or had become hypoxic.
The
maternity guidelines prescribe CTG tracing to evaluate the foetal
condition more accurately in a case of suspected foetal distress
but
if that is not available, the foetal condition could be assessed by
means of auscultation every five minutes or after every
second
contraction with a stethoscope. Intervention is required to manage
foetal distress and it is vitally important to take appropriate
steps
to alleviate the lack of oxygen the baby would be experiencing. The
correct protocol is to administer oxygen to the mother
in order to
increase oxygen in the circulation, and to have the mother lay on her
left lateral side. Further steps include attenuating
the contractions
as best one can, so as to try and let the baby catch up on oxygen
intake between contractions, e.g., by the use
of tocolytic drugs to
reduce the frequency and duration of the contractions in order to
restore oxygenation to the baby, and performing
intrauterine
resuscitation ‘until you can get the baby out.’ However,
if delivery is imminent in that the cervix is
fully dilated and the
baby’s head has descended onto the perineum of the pelvic
floor, then expedited delivery by means of
vacuum extraction or the
use of forceps to pull the baby out of the birth canal ought to be
performed. The maternity guidelines
allow for one hour from the time
a decision is made that delivery is necessary, to the time that the
delivery occurs. In the case
of baby D, there was no way that the
staff at Hillbrow clinic could have foreseen that delivery would take
place naturally within
one hour.
53.
If the mother is encouraged to start pushing at a
time when thick meconium is sighted (the presence of
thick
meconium being compatible with a diagnosis of foetal hypoxia)
,
by pushing, she will thereby increase her intrauterine pressure,
which decreases the placenta profusion and oxygen supply to the
baby.
The mother is usually lying on her back when she is pushing. In the
context of probable foetal distress when meconium was
sighted,
immediate intervention was required to manage the foetal distress by
restoring oxygen to the baby until such time as delivery
could be
expedited.
54.
Foetal monitoring at 5 minute intervals or after
every second contraction is necessary during the second stage of
active labour
because contractions tend to cause a reduction of
oxygen to the foetal blood and the baby’s vulnerability to
foetal distress
is at its greatest during this stage of labour. When
the mother is lying on her back she pumps less blood through the
peripheral
circulation at a time when it is most needed.
55.
It is common practice for a nurse to administer
oxytocin drugs whilst the baby is in the process of being born in
order to get the
mother’s uterus to contract after delivery.
However, if oxytocin was given to the plaintiff before the baby D was
being delivered,
it would have stimulated foetal contractions,
thereby worsening any underlying hypoxia.
56.
In the case of baby D, what was done by the nurse
in the second stage of active labour was inappropriate. The baby was
showing signs
of distress due to not having enough oxygen available,
as evidenced by the baby’s abnormal heart rate and the presence
of
thick meconium at 7am. The presence of thick meconium at 7 am
means it probably developed prior to 7 am. What the nurse ought to
have done is to
first
address
the foetal distress by alleviating the lack of oxygen to the baby and
then to expedite delivery. No foetal resuscitation
was carried out on
baby D and oxygen was also not given to the mother. No attempt was
either made to expedite delivery. Instead,
labour was allowed to
continue normally after 7 am instead of attempts being made to
restore oxygen supply to the baby and to deliver
by means of assisted
delivery.
57.
During the period between 4 to 6 am and between 6
and 7 am there is no record evidencing any monitoring whatsoever of
the foetal
condition. This was in breach of the maternity guidelines.
It is thus possible that baby D could have become hypoxic and that
signs
of foetal distress existed prior to 07h00 on 9 July 2012
without this being detected and diagnosed.
58.
In the case of baby D, there was a lapse in
monitoring and a failure to assess the foetal condition through
auscultation at the
required intervals in accordance with the
standard of care required in terms of the maternity guidelines. In
addition, the nurse’s
response to the evidence of foetal
distress at and after 7am was inappropriate. The partogram used in
the case of baby D was not
completed properly either. No observations
of the foetal condition or contractions were plotted on the partogram
after 4 am. The
nursing staff at Hillbrow clinic staff would have
been blind as to the condition of the foetus between 4 and 7 am. The
partogram
is used to document the process of labour – it is a
pictorial graph that shows what happens during labour over time. When
used and completed correctly, a nurse would be able to detect
abnormalities in labour so that care and intervention can be provided
before there is an adverse outcome to the baby. This all cumulatively
amounted to substandard care which culminated in an adverse
outcome
in this case.
59.
Baby D’s apgar scores of 6/10 at 1, 5 and 10
minutes indicated that the baby was not a normal/well baby. Baby D
required resuscitation
after delivery. The neonatal records indicate
that baby D developed convulsions (seizures) and was diagnosed with
HI encephalopathy
shortly after birth. Baby D was also hospitalised
after birth. A baby who is well would not require hospital care
60.
Foetal monitoring is designed to detect a hypoxic
insult so that intervention can take place before an injury occurs to
the baby.
Obstetricians do not know for how long the baby can endure
foetal insult or when precisely an injury occurs. All we know is that
where there is evidence of hypoxia we intervene immediately by
restoring oxygenation to the baby and if foetal hypoxia remains,
by
expediting delivery before injury occurs.
61.
Prof Anthony was asked to comment on the
defendant’s version, namely that the kind of central brain
injury Baby D sustained
occurred suddenly or unpredictably and was so
severe (the conventionally described ‘acute profound’ HI
injury) that
nothing could have been done to prevent it. According to
Prof Anthony, Neuro-Radiologists have conflated the process giving
rise
to the injury, with the injury itself. A sentinel event
means an alerting or overt event that one cannot help but observe
and
which would have to be noted in the obstetric records. It is always
overt and seen. A sentinel event is an acute profound event
that
gives rise to the ultimate brain injury. There is no evidence that a
BGT injury can
only
take
place in the presence of a sentinel event. There is substantive
expert opinion that indicates that a rapid shutdown of oxygenated
blood is not the only mechanism by which this BGT injury can occur.
So the presumption that with a BGT injury, the mechanism is
an acute
profound obstetric insult (characterised by rapid total shutdown of
oxygenated blood in which compensatory mechanisms
have no time to
become deployed) is no longer correct.
62.
Where there is evidence of foetal distress/hypoxia
and even if the only feasible action is to deliver the baby, then
protocol still
requires that whilst taking steps to expedite
delivery, actions that may exacerbate the lack of oxygen to the baby
are to be avoided
and interventions such as administering oxygen to
the mother; avoiding having the mother start pushing so as to allow
the baby
to recover from a lack of oxygen during contractions and
carrying out foetal resuscitation is called for. In other words,
there
is therefore still a process to be followed and active steps to
be taken to mitigate the injury.
63.
In this case, there is no evidence that a sentinel
event occurred. Had it presented, it would no doubt have been noted
in the obstetric
records.
64.
Any problem with the mother’s placenta,
i.e., some form of placental disease, would usually lead to growth
restriction. Based
on his birth weight of 3.999kg, baby D was not
growth restricted.
65.
Dr Mantha-Crywagen’s opinion in the amended
joint minute, namely that there was no evidence of foetal distress in
the first
stage of active labour prior to full cervical dilation is
true only to the extent that what was recorded as the foetal heart
rate
and that it was ‘satisfactory’ did not demonstrate
the presence of foetal hypoxia, however, FHR monitoring was
inadequate
and not performed in accordance with the maternity
guidelines and hence any foetal distress would not have been
detected.
66.
Management of foetal distress is provided for in
the maternity guidelines. It is not just managed by expedited
delivery. Expedited
delivery is a proponent, but it is not the first
thing that has to be done. The first thing is to give the baby the
oxygen he/she
needs so that the baby survives. Intervention would
include lying the mother in the left lateral position; give oxygen to
the mother
by face mask at 6L per minute; start an intravenous
infusion of ringers lactate to run at 240ml per hour (this is a
non-colloidal
infusion which assists in mopping up acid in the
mother’s bloodstream); perform a vaginal examination to exclude
cord prolapse;
if delivery is imminent, then deliver immediately by
vacuum extraction or forceps. If delivery is not imminent, give a
tocolytic
drug to stop contractions and prepare for a caesarean
delivery and urgent transfer to a hospital. If at the time that a
problem
comes to light, i.e., foetal distress is noted, the baby’s
head is already deep into the mother’s pelvis, then it would
be
permissible to deliver by vacuum extraction.
67.
In this case, an abnormal heart rate and presence
of thick meconium liquor was sighted at 7 am. A finding of meconium
reasonably
implies that it was present for an unknown period of time
before being sighted because of inadequate monitoring. Baby D was
born
one hour later at 8am. This was not a rapid extraction or
expedited delivery. By 7am it was not foreseeable that the baby would
be delivered naturally at 8 am. The guidelines allow for 2 hours
after full cervical dilation (10cm) for the descent of the baby’s
head and delivery. Whilst the guidelines prescribe that delivery must
occur within one hour of noting some sort of abnormality,
in this
case the nurse allowed a natural birth to proceed for an entire hour
in circumstances where there was no way to predict
how long the
second stage of labour would take or that an unassisted vaginal
delivery would take place within that hour. The guidelines
state if
delivery is imminent, deliver
immediately
.
This implies a high degree of urgency once foetal distress is
suspected or diagnosed - it is not a licence to wait for up to one
hour before delivering. Once foetal distress is noted one cannot just
let labour continue naturally. This would be prejudicial
to an
already hypoxic baby. The midwife is required to deliver immediately
if delivery is imminent and that means intervening to
deliver quicker
than the one hour allowed for delivery. The process of management of
foetal distress has to do with rescuing the
baby by restoring oxygen
supply to the baby and by foetal resuscitation. This was not done in
the case of baby D.
Dr Kara
(Paediatrician))
68.
Dr Kara’s evidence is on record and only a
few salient aspects of his testimony need be referred to for purposes
of judgment.
69.
Dr Kara stated that the medical records confirmed
that there was evidence of Hypoxic Ischemic Encephalopathy at birth –
the
baby had an abnormal tone, did not cry, experienced respiratory
distress at birth requiring resuscitation, was lethargic, could
not
suckle and also experienced convulsions after birth.
70.
From what is contained in the medical records,
after4 am there are only two records of monitoring, namely, at 6am
and at 7am, at
which time thick meconium was observed and an abnormal
heart rate was detected. Between 4am and 7am something happened,
because
at 7am, thick meconium was
already
present when it was detected. The presence of
thick meconium is a sign of foetal compromise. In his opinion, an
insult (evidenced
by the recorded deceleration in baby D’s
heart rate and presence of thick meconium) most likely occurred
between 4am and
7pm, which insult led to the brain injury that
occurred thereafter but before baby D was delivered.
71.
Baby D’s apgar scores remained at 6/10 at 1
minute and 5 minutes and 10 minutes. That means that 9 minutes later,
the baby
was unresponsive to resuscitation. A score under 7/10 is a
sub-standard score, meaning that baby D was not in a good condition
but was compromised. Usually a baby’s apgar scores will
improve after some stimulation and resuscitation. A score of
6/10 at
10 minutes shows that resuscitation either did not improve the baby’s
condition or it was improperly performed. The
need to transfer baby D
to a neonatal ICU at Charlotte Maxeke hospital after birth supports
the conclusion that he had neurological
depression or compromise at
birth. Two to three weeks after birth, baby D was hospitalised and
diagnosed with septic arthritis.
Arthritis could be caused by an
infection but such infection was only present long after the
diagnosis of ‘Hypoxic ischaemic
encephalopathy grade II’
some two days after birth.
72.
Dr Kara supported Prof Anthony’s opinion
that in the face of poor monitoring of the foetal heart rate between
4am and 7am,
the presence of thick meconium foetal bradycardia (slow
heart rate) at 7 am and constituted enough evidence of foetal
distress.
73.
Nobody is able to tell from MRI imaging exactly
when an injury occurred. One can only deduce that there has been a
sudden unanticipated
injury that occurred if proper foetal monitoring
took place and which evidenced normal signs until suddenly something
happened
from whence abnormal signs were noted.
74.
Some
experts have suggested that the ‘acute profound’ pattern
of injury on a MRI scan means that the brain injury would
have
occurred in the last 30 to 60 minutes of labour (otherwise the baby
would be dead). Dr Kara stated hat this may not be correct,
for as
stated by Professor Volpe in his textbook ‘Neurology of the
Newborn’
[14]
:”80-90%
of cases of infants with hypoxic ischaemic disease in which [an]
overt sentinel event is not present, the uncertainty
in timing is
often measured in hours, often many hours or more and not minutes.”
75.
Dr Kara confirmed what was stated in his report,
namely that:
“
Volpe
quotes 4 studies involving foetal lambs that suggest that "the
severe terminal insult that results in injury to deep
nuclear
structures especially, may be likely to occur after brief repeated
hypoxic ischaemic insults first cause a cumulative deleterious
effect
on cardiovascular function that presumably then can result in a
severe late insult." This means that it is probable
that
effective foetal monitoring would be able to identify the "at
risk" foetus as the heart rate would alter (and be
detected),
followed by cardiac compromise and then reduced blood supply to the
brain. This may allow for intervention before brain
injury can
manifest, noting that it is stated that repeated brief hypoxic
insults occur before cardiac compromise occurs.
In this case, we have no
means to identify exactly when in the labour the injury occurred but
it probably occurred over hours and
not minutes, (with a sudden
decompensation that led to basal ganglia and thalamic injury). If it
did occur over a process of hours,
there would have been opportunity
to detect warning signs of potential catastrophic brain injury had
there been good foetal monitoring.
The available records do
not confirm foetal well being in labour (from 04.00 onward in
particular as there was poor foetal monitoring),
It then cannot be
stated that there was a sudden deterioration in the foetal condition
late in labour. It is likely that the injury
could have been
anticipated and possibly prevented if the foetal monitoring was done
according to [maternity] guidelines.”
76.
The importance of foetal monitoring is to arrest
the abnormal situation from worsening. There could be a hypoxic
insult that progresses
or increases over time, i.e., a gradual
deterioration of oxygen and blood supply to the baby and if the
insult is detected, injury
could be prevented if the baby were to be
delivered before any injury occurs. In other words, if the labour is
monitored appropriately,
there is a good probability that you will
detect signs of foetal compromise and act/intervene before the
catastrophic injury occurs
77.
By the time baby D developed septic arthritis a
few weeks after birth, according to the obstetric records, neonatal
encephalopathy
had already been diagnosed weeks and it had already
been determined that baby D’s cerebral palsy was caused by a
hypoxic
ischaemic injury. Thus Baby D’s brain was already
damaged by the time the septic arthritis arose. There is nothing in
the
records to support a conclusion that either the use of Khat or
the development of septic arthritis some weeks after birth was a
cause of the cerebral palsy. In particular, there is no record that
postnatally, baby D went into postnatal septic shock, which
if it
occurs, can lead to HI injury.
Dr Pierce (Paediatric
Neurologist)
78.
Dr Pierce testified
that it was common cause between herself and Dr Mogashoa the timing
of the insult and injury is that it occurred
in the intrapartum phase
given that there was no record or evidence of an identified sentinel
event in this case.
Defendant’s
witnesses
Dr
Mogashoa (Paediatric Neurologist)
79.
Dr Mogoshoa confirmed
that baby D’s birth weight of 3.999 kg was normal and evidenced
that no growth restriction was present.
Likewise, his length was
normal and not suggestive of any abnormality.
80.
Dr Mogoashoa
confirmed the contents of her expert report and her conclusions
therein. She testified that the injury to baby D’s
brain was
caused by hypoxia during the intrapartum period. This is borne out by
the labour records in that after birth, baby D
was unwell and had to
be transferred to a hospital for management and care. Apgar scores of
6/10 at 5 and 10 minutes after birth
indicate that baby D was
depressed at birth.
81.
As highlighted in her
report, the definition of neonatal encephalopathy, according to ACOG,
is that it is a clinically defined syndrome
of disturbed neurologic
function in the earliest days of life in an infant born at or beyond
35 weeks of gestation, manifested
by a subnormal level of
consciousness or seizures, and often accompanied by difficulty with
initiating or maintaining respiration.
82.
Placental
insufficiency is a lack of adequate supply of nutrition or blood or
oxygenation to the foetus
.
83.
At 7am on the morning
of 9 July 2012 the foetal heart beat was compromised and meconium
stained liquor was visible. Dr Mogashoa
agreed with Prof Anthony that
there may have been signs of foetal distress before 7am, which went
undetected, because the 6.30
am assessment was not performed.
84.
Under
cross-examination, Dr Mogashoa stated that the clinical picture found
in respect of baby D is that he suffers from dystonic
or diskinetic
cerebral palsy, being a signal of a particular brain injury referred
to either as acute profound or BGT injury. She
is aware of the debate
as to whether radiologists should refer to the pattern of injury as
acute profound HI injury in the absence
of a sentinel event. In her
view, acute profound suggests a particular mechanism and timing of
the injury i.e., how and when it
occurred, and radiologists cannot
determine this from looking at an image on a MRI scan, therefore it
makes logical sense to describe
only the anatomical areas of damage
to the brain.
85.
With the use of the
term ‘acute profound’ the conventional/traditional
thinking has been that there is a sudden severe
insult which is not
compensated for and which will result in damage to the most
metaphysically active areas of the brain such as
the PBGT. In other
words, if it is not sudden, the baby will try and compensate for a
lack of oxygen/blood supply in order to spare
the central brain from
being injured. If oxygen/blood supply is suddenly totally cut off
then the GBT is not spared and is affected.
But having heard
Prof Anthony’s evidence, Dr Mogashoa stated that she accepts
that if there is another way that the same
BGT injury can be caused,
namely by evolving sub-threshold hypoxia. In other words, if there is
no evidence of a sentinel event
that results in a sudden, total cut
off of oxygen and blood supply, then one cannot attribute the
mechanism of the injury to a
sudden total cut off of oxygen and blood
supply to the baby, as denoted by the words ‘acute profound’.
Professor Bolton
(Paediatrician)
86.
Prof Bolton confirmed
his amended report which he prepared after receipt of further records
in the matter.
87.
In his evidence in
chief, he confirmed that it is essential to suction meconium from the
baby’s mouth and before the baby
takes his first breath so that
the baby does not inhale it into his lungs and develop respiratory
distress. Baby D had respiratory
distress at birth, requiring
admission to hospital.
88.
“
Asphyxia
”
means a state of the
baby at birth –a sub-optimal neurological condition due to
hypoxia. In other words, because of hypoxia,
the baby does not
breathe adequately after birth and has low apgar scores. “
Hypoxia
”
is inadequate oxygen
circulation in the baby’s blood and the brain is the organ in
the body that needs it most.
89.
All babies become
hypoxic during labour with each contraction but are usually able to
recover from it. It becomes problematic when
the baby is unable to
continue to manage the deprivation of oxygen during contractions. The
foetal heart rate during a contraction
is always slow. One therefore
looks for a sustained heart rate dip after the contraction. A baby
can become hypoxic systematically
and be unable to cope, which
constitutes foetal distress. We call it foetal distress when there is
a delay in recovery from a lack
of oxygen during a contraction, which
is marked by a persistent low foetal heart rate after the
contraction.
90.
In the case of baby
D, at 7am on 9 July 2012, the simultaneous passage of meconium and
drop in foetal heart rated would suggest
that there was foetal
distress detected at that point.
91.
According
to the 2014 Acog consensus statement, before ascribing an outcome of
HI encephalopathy and cerebral palsy, one must consider
all the
possible causes, because multiple causes can lead to brain injury in
term infants, not just oxygen deprivation around the
time of
birth.
[15]
Possible causes are
from intrapartum events, a positive HIV status, severe neonatal
infection within the perinatal period or inadequate
placental
function. Here, meconium aspiration at birth, the mother’s use
of khat (which when taken during pregnancy has been
shown to have a
deleterious effect on foetal outcome) and the baby’s infection
18 days after birth were factors Prof Bolton
stated that he
considered in this case as possible causes of Baby D’s adverse
outcome.
92.
When reviewing the
neurodevelopmental records from Charlotte Maxeke hospital, Prof
Bolton testified that he came across an inscription
made by the
attending doctor under the heading ‘Birth history’, which
queried the possible use of Khat/Mira by baby
D’s mother. The
note read: “
?
chewed tobacco – occasionally (called Mira)”
He interpreted the
note as a query concerning what the mother had chewed – ie.,
tobacco or mira. He further testified that
according to some
literature, the effects of khat are said to be intrauterine growth
restriction, congenital abnormalities and
it has also been associated
with foetal distress and low Apgar scores at birth and post-partem
haemorrhage
.
In this case, no growth retardation was evident and no congenital
abnormalities were found. Nor was there evidence of inadequate
placental function and thus he could not say in this case that there
was inadequate placental function.
93.
An acute profound
injury to the PBGT structures is due to an acute (sudden) profound
(severe) drop in oxygen and blood supply to
the brain. The timing of
the injury cannot be determined from a MRI scan performed years
later.
94.
There are many causes
besides hypoxic ischaemia for neonatal encephalopathy, one of which
is meconium aspiration. According to the
Hillbrow clinic delivery
records, baby D was transferred to the hospital for meconium
aspiration. However it is possible that a
severe systematic infection
at day 18 after birth could have caused the damage as babies born
with asphyxia are predisposed to
later infection. In this case, baby
D was diagnosed with sepsis 20 days after birth.
95.
The common cause for
bradycardia is due to hypoxia to the foetus. If it is sustained after
a contraction it suggests a failure to
compensate for the deprivation
of oxygen and is reflective of persistent hypoxia.
96.
During
cross-examination Prof Bolton made significant concessions. These
included that:
96.1.
There is a high
degree of probability that the insult occurred in the intrapartum
phase although Prof Bolton was not willing exclude
other causes;
96.2.
He agreed that the
objective medical records reflect that a medical doctor (Dr J
Groenewald at Charlotte Maxeke hospital) had diagnosed
baby D with
grade 2 HI encephalopathy two days after his birth;
96.3.
The medical record
from the neurodevelopmental clinic at Charlotte Maxeke hospital does
not refer to the plaintiff as having chewed
Khat during her
pregnancy;
96.4.
In so far as his
amended report recorded that the plaintiff had
admitted
to having chewed Khat
during her pregnancy, this was incorrect and could not either be
assumed;
96.5.
Since he has been
unable to locate certain additional source documents that he relied
on for his opinions in his amended report,
and without such source
documents having been discovered at the trial, his opinions in his
amended report were unsustainable;
96.6.
His opinion regarding
other causes of neonatal encephalopathy (use of khat during pregnancy
and the infection some weeks after birth)
and the timing and
mechanism of the injury sustained by baby D could likewise not be
supported or sustained.
Sister
Moqhae (midwife who delivered baby D)
97.
The witness testified
that she obtained a diploma in advanced midwifery in 2011. On 9 July
2012 she was on duty at Hillbrow clinic.
She was part of the day
shift that took over from the night shift with her duties commencing
at 7am. She confirmed that she was
familiar with the 2007 guidelines
for maternity care during July 2012.
98.
When she assessed
baby D’s mother at 7am, she was 10 cm dilated and therefore the
plaintiff was moved to the delivery room
that is located inside the
labour ward. The mother was restless and screaming and had told Sr
Moqhae that she had an urge to pass
a bowel movement, hence Sr Moqhae
recorded in the obstetric records that the plaintiff had an urge to
push. When a mother is fully
dilated she would usually experience 4
to 5 contractions in the space of ten minutes. Nurses use a
foetoscope at Hillbrow clinic
to check the foetal heart rate, and do
not make use of CTG tracings as they do not have a CTG machine at
Hillbrow clinic. There
is however a stethoscope available for use at
Hillbrow clinic. At the 7am assessment, she recorded the FHR as 109
bpm. This was
the heart rate that was measured after the plaintiff’s
contraction. She was unable to recall what the FHR was before the
contraction, but stated that she checked the FHR both before and
after contractions. The plaintiff’s liquor was stained with
meconium and was very thick and she thus graded it as grade 3. That
meant that the foetus was in distress at the time. At 7am she
also
performed a vaginal examination at which time the baby’s head
was not visible on the perineum of the pelvis but ‘was
still
high up.’ When performing a vaginal examination she is able to
tell how far the baby’s head is from the perineum.
99.
Since
the plaintiff was fully dilated with an urge to push, she encouraged
her to push ‘as pushing encourages the baby’s
head to
descend.’
[16]
As the
plaintiff could not understand much English, she demonstrated to the
plaintiff with gestures how to push. The plaintiff
only started
pushing at 7h30am. At this time the baby’s head was still not
visible although she believed that it was ‘near’.
She
checked the plaintiff every 15 minutes whilst she was bearing down,
however she stated that she was unable to record her findings
anywhere. She screamed for Sister Mabanga to assist her as she did
not want to leave the plaintiff alone.
100.
Baby D was delivered at 8am, a half an hour after
the plaintiff started to push. Before the baby’s full body came
out, she
‘tried to wipe meconium from the baby’s mouth’.
After the baby came out she put the baby onto the mother’s
chest and cut the umbilical cord. She then suctioned his mouth
because the baby was not crying. According to the witness, when
the
baby came out he had meconium aspiration which blocked his airways.
Thereafter she and sister Mabanga started resuscitation
and used a
bag and mask to administer oxygen to the baby as he was struggling to
breathe and also put up a drip to administer fluid
to the baby
intravenously. Baby D’s heart rate was 140 bpm after delivery
and his respiratory effort was graded as 1/10.
Sister Mabanga was
present when the baby was delivered and Sister Pasha also came to
assist because it was an emergency. They notified
the hospital that
they had a baby who had aspirated meconium and who was in distress
and that they needed to transfer him for further
management.
101.
Sister Pasha took over management of the
plaintiff. She was bleeding profusely and therefore fluids (ringers
lactate and oxytocin)
were administered to her intravenously by means
of a drip in an attempt to control the post partem haemorrhaging.
102.
Sr
Moqhae
was asked how she managed the foetal distress she had observed at
7am. She initially stated that she had reassured the plaintiff
and
had encouraged her to bear down so that the baby could be delivered.
After being referred to the maternity guidelines
on how to
manage foetal distress,
[17]
she stated that whenever she asked the plaintiff to bear down, the
plaintiff would lie on her left lateral side, however, she would
also
change sides and therefore did not always lie in a supine position.
Later during cross-examination she stated that the plaintiff
would
turn whenever she did not have contractions. Because she believed
that delivery was imminent (as the plaintiff was fully
dilated) she
‘tried to deliver the baby immediately’. They did not
have vacuum extraction equipment at the Hillbrow
clinic
.
103.
During cross-examination the witness confirmed
that the partogram that was used by the night staff between the hours
of 0h00 and
04h00 was inadequately completed. It only showed the
foetal heart rate but did not reflect if there were decelerations
after contractions.
The plaintiff’s contractions were not
plotted, and the rate of descent of the foetal head was also not
recorded. She agreed
with the proposition put to her, namely, that if
the partogram only reflects the foetal heart rate without reflecting
if there
were decelerations, the nurse would not know if the child
was coping with contractions and thus there is a strong possibility
that
abnormalities in FHR would be missed. Sr Moqhae also stated that
itt is important to plot the rate of deceleration of the FHR as
it
enables the nursing professional to intervene if problems manifest.
104.
At
0h00 on 9 July 2012 the plaintiff’s cervix was 4cm dilated
which meant that she had entered the first stage of the active
phase
of labour at which stage, according to the witness, the FHR ought to
have been checked every 2 hours.
[18]
In this case, the witness stated that it was not checked at the
required intervals. For example, no assessment took place at 2am.
After 4 am until delivery, nothing at all was plotted on the
partogram.
Sister Mabanga
(Midwife)
105.
Sr Mabanga confirmed that she is trained as an
advanced midwife. She was in charge of managing the maternity
department at Hillbrow
clinic in July 2012 in the position of
operational manager and team leader. On 9 July 2012 there were five
midwives on duty (including
herself) during the day shift, which
started at 7am.
106.
She was asked what management she would give if
she were to find a patient where signs of foetal distress were
observed, such as
draining of thick meconium stained liquor and where
the foetal hear beat was 109 bpm. She replied that she would question
where
the baby’s head was in relation to the pelvic rim
(perineum). She would also assess the rate of contractions as
contractions
usually intensify and tend to be expulsive when the
baby’s head has descended. If the head has descended and is
already on
the perineum and the mother is fully dilated at 10 cm,
this would determine if delivery is imminent or not. In that event,
she
would take steps to deliver the baby immediately.
107.
She testified that she was called to assist with
possible resuscitation when delivery of baby D was ‘happening’.
108.
At Hillbrow clinic the midwives use a foetoscope
to determine the FHR. The clinic did not have a hand held Doppler in
July 2012.
She started ordering hand held Dopplers subsequent
thereto. She indicated that she was more comfortable in using a
foetoscope as
opposed to a Doppler or stethoscope, as midwives are
not trained to use stethoscopes to auscultate FHB. They are only
trained to
listen to the chest of the mother with a stethoscope.
109.
Midwives are trained to determine the FHR before,
during and after contractions. The FHR measured before and after
contractions
must be recorded. One tends not to get an accurate
reading of the FHR when using a foetoscope as a tool or instrument.
The midwife
would have to have a good timing of the end of a
contraction to note the FHR. It’s a tricky situation to time
when the contraction
has subsided. If a woman has a contraction the
uterus is hard and intense pain is experienced by the mother, which
makes it very
difficult to put the foetoscope on the contracted
abdomen because the mother tends to be very restless and is moving
around, i.e.,
is not lying in a supine position all the time.
Therefore it happens that by the time the midwife starts feeling for
the FHR, the
contraction has stopped a long time ago. Midwives use
the mother’s contraction and the FHR to determine whether any
deceleration
is late or early. It is not a common practice to record
the FHR before, during and after contractions.
110.
A normal FHR is between 110 and 160 bpm. If it
drops below 110 bpm you would want to know the duration of such
deceleration.
111.
According to the labour records, at 4am the
plaintiff’s membranes had ruptured and she was draining clear
liquor. At 6am,
the mother was 9cm dilated. There was no record of
any liquor draining at 6am. The descent of the baby’s head was
also not
recorded.
112.
The known principle in nursing is that what is not
recorded, was not done.
113.
At 7am the plaintiff was draining thick meconium
stained liquor. The records reflect only one recording of the FHR at
109bpm. One
reading cannot give you confirmation of bradycardia but
because of the presence of meconium stained liquor (grade 3), there
was
foetal bradycardia or foetal distress. The correct protocol would
have been to insert a drip of ringers lactate and to administer
oxygen to the mother.
114.
If a midwife decides to transfer a patient to a
hospital, the process is as follows; (i) phone the labour ward and
locate the obstetrician
on call. Phone the doctor on call and discuss
the patient’s history, how far she is dilated, state of
contractions, foetal
distress. If the doctor accepts the patient,
then (ii) call the emergency medical services control to request an
ambulance. It
depends if an ambulance is available as to how soon the
ambulance will arrive. At the hospital the patient is taken to
maternity
admission and admitted to the labour ward. In most cases
the patient will be escorted by the midwife in the ambulance in case
she
delivers in transit. The doctor would examine the patient and
decide if an emergency caesarean has to be performed or whether to
deliver by vacuum extraction or by way of normal vaginal delivery. If
a caesarean has to be performed in hospital, the patient’s
consent has to be obtained and other preparations would have to be
done before the patient is taken to theatre. Between 7 to 8
am all
this was unlikely to be achieved.
115.
Under cross-examination the witness stated that
although the delivery record reflects that she assisted in the
delivery of baby
D, her only independent recall is that she took part
in the resuscitation after delivery.
116.
She further confirmed that information plotted on
a partogram is to provide a pictorial view of the progress of labour
from admission
until delivery. It is used to alert any medical
practitioner of any pathological development during the course of
labour. In this
case, the partogram was not completed properly from
0h00 to 4h00 on 12 July 2012 in that the FHR before, during and after
contractions
was not plotted. The rate of descent of the baby’s
head was also not recorded at all.
117.
In a situation where the mother is draining
meconium stained liquor and the foetal heart rate has dropped below
110bpm, the witness
stated that she would not have doubted that the
foetus was in distress. In such a situation she agreed with the
proposition put
to her, namely, that the first obligation would be to
relieve the baby’s distress. As there was no record of the
descent
of the head at 7am at all, one could not determine that
delivery was imminent, more particularly, as there was no record of
the
descent of the head in relation to the pelvic brim. Delivery is
imminent if the patient is fully dilated
and
the head has descended onto the
perineum of the cervix. In the event that delivery was indeed
imminent, the guidelines require immediate
delivery, by vacuum
extraction, if necessary. The witness agreed with the proposition put
to her that the priority in the face
of foetal distress is to get the
baby in a good enough condition to deliver without injury or further
injury to the baby. She also
agreed that if the only route is to
deliver because the baby’s condition is deteriorating rapidly,
then one should expedite
the delivery eg by using forceps, although
the witness qualified this by stating that midwives ‘can’t
do vacuum extraction’
and given that she herself last did
vacuum extraction in 2008, her competency level could not be
guaranteed.
118.
Based on incomplete records, the witness conceded
that it could not have been known at 7 am that delivery was imminent
because the
rate of descent of the head was not recorded and the
position of the head in relation to the pelvic brim was not recorded.
The
witness agreed that the guidelines require that contractions be
slowed down or stopped and tocolytic dugs administered to the mother
in order to buy time for the foetus to recover between contractions
and for the mother to be transferred to a higher level of care.
On
the records as they stand, the mother was not given ringers lactate
intravenously, the foetal heart rate was not assessed at
all after 7
am and administration of a tocolytic drug to inhibit contractions was
not considered.
119.
The witness also agreed that it cannot be
determined with certainty how long it would take for the child to be
delivered once the
mother’s cervix has fully dilated – it
could be anytime from 30 minutes to two hours before delivery would
take place
and therefore, in the face of foetal distress, the midwife
might have have had time to make arrangements to transfer the
plaintiff
to a hospital for higher care. She further agreed that on
the available records, there was a lapse in how labour and delivery
was
managed in relation to the condition of the mother and foetus,
and sub-standard care was given during the labour process. In this
case, baby D’s adverse outcome was most probably due to
sub-standard care administered by the midwives.
Dr Manthata-Cruywagen
(gynaecologist/obstetrician)
120.
Dr Manthata-Cruywagen confirmed that she prepared
an addendum report in which she changed her opinion as to the likely
cause of
baby D’s brain injury that resulted from hypoxia.
Initially she agreed on all aspects reflected in the first joint
minute
signed by herself and Prof Anthony. The amended joint minute
sets out her amended opinion that the neurological outcome suffered
by baby D was likely caused by placental compromise (where the
placenta does not function as it is supposed to function) due to
the
mother’s use of Khat during the pregnancy. The use of Khat
during the pregnancy caused some form of placental pathology
which
only manifested in the second stage of the active phase of labour.
121.
Proper monitoring is used to detect foetal
distress so that timeous intervention can take place to prevent an
injury from occurring.
The failure to monitor adequately does not
cause the injury. Something else causes the hypoxia that culminates
in injury. In this
case it was most likely caused by compromised
placental function due to the mother’s use of khat during
pregnancy. With a
compromised placenta, in utero blood flow to the
foetus is compromised. In the second stage of active labour
contractions intensify
in regularity. The baby cannot perfuse because
the placenta is not functioning properly and will therefore not be
able to compensate
for the lack of oxygen experienced during
increased contractions.
122.
After receiving records pertaining to Charlotte
Maxeke hospital’s neurodevelopmental clinic, the witness noted
what the attending
doctor had recorded under the heading ‘Birth
History’, namely: “
? Chewed
tobacco-occasionally (called Mira)
”
which
meant that the mother had admitted to using khat when she was
pregnant. Because anything pertaining to ‘birth history’
relates to the mother’s pregnancy and the plaintiff would have
told the attending doctor who completed the record that he
had chewed
khat during her pregnancy. It is recorded that the mother used Khat
(mira) on occasions, which means that she could
have used it on the
occasion of labour.
123.
According to the witness, foetal monitoring is
used to detect hypoxia but it does not prevent or cause the hypoxia.
A lack of oxygen
supply is caused by something else, be it a sentinel
event or placental abnormality or something else such as the mother’s
heart that would inhibit oxygen/blood supply to the foetus. A foetal
heart rate below 110 bpm signifies that the foetus is hypoxic
i.e.,
there is reduced oxygen supply to the baby.
124.
In her view, one cannot administer tocolytic drugs
to a fully dilated mother. According to the witness, ‘why stop
contractions
in a woman who is going to deliver?’ According to
the witness, delivery is imminent when the mother has an urge to
push.
As the baby’s head descends, it presses on the pelvic
floor and it causes a reflex so that the mother has the urge to push.
The urge is there because the head is there. Delivery is not
imminent where the mother is not fully dilated and does not
have the
urge to push. If the head is not engaged in the pelvis then one can
stop contractions but if there is an urge to push,
delivery is
imminent. If the head was higher than the pelvic brim then the mother
would not have an urge to push.
125.
In the second stage of active labour the
guidelines prescribe that the FHR should be monitored after every
second contraction, which
could equate to every 5 or 6 minutes.
126.
In her opinion, delivery could have been expedited
by means of assisted delivery with an episiotomy in order to get the
baby out
as quickly as possible. However, the guidelines state that
delivery must take place within one hour of a diagnosis of foetal
distress.
In this case, delivery in fact occurred within one hour of
the diagnosis of foetal distress.
127.
In her opinion, the injury to baby D’s brain
occurred within the last 30 minutes of labour when the uterine
expulsive contractions
were pushing the baby out and that the injury
resulted from a total sudden shut down of oxygen supply to the baby.
128.
She disagreed with Prof Anthony that the cause of
the injury was due to evolving hypoxia because ‘acute profound’
implies
a rapid total shut down of oxygen supply to the foetus and
therefore it cannot be evolving. Had it evolved and occurred over a
long period of time, the pattern on the MRI would not have been that
of ‘acute profound’ but of ‘partial prolonged’.
129.
In her view, evolving hypoxia means that the
hypoxia (deprivation of oxygen supply) was ‘going on and foetal
distress was
continuing’ while the mother was pushing. In this
case there was evidence (in the form of Khat usage by the plaintiff)
of
an abnormally functioning placenta, which the literature suggests
could have predisposed the foetus to foetal distress. Monitoring
is
required to identify foetal distress and the guidelines specify how
to manage the foetal distress. The management of foetal
distress is
to expedite delivery. The guidelines allow for one hour in which to
deliver after diagnosing foetal distress. In this
case the delivery
occurred within an hour of foetal distress having been diagnosed.
With an acute profound injury, it means that
the injury occurred
within the last 30 minutes of delivery.
130.
She agreed with Prof Anthony that injury is
avoidable by early detection of evolving hypoxia, however, in her
view, the records
reflect that there was no foetal distress during
the period from 0h00 until 6h00. Had the FHR not been satisfactory
(i.e., between
110 and 160 bpm) the midwife would have recorded this.
Since baby D’s FHR was not assessed at 6h30 am, she was unable
to
say that all was well with baby D at 6h30 am. Midwives normally
record the FHB taken after a contraction. In labour, when there
is a
reduction in oxygenation, the baby tries to conserve energy and
his/her heart slows down. That is when a deceleration happens.
A late
deceleration which comes after the contraction is a sign that the
baby is not getting enough oxygen, in which event the
heart rate goes
down.
131.
During cross-examination the witness agreed that
Charlotte Maxeke hospital is situated approximately 2 km from the
Hillbrow clinic.
In her estimation, it was 8 to 10 minutes away from
the Hillbrow clinic.
132.
She agreed with Prof Anthony that maternity
monitoring in this case was not at the required standard, and that
the FHR had to be
monitored up until delivery, which was not done in
this case, which amounted to sub-standard care. Furthermore there is
no record
of the descent of the foetal head, which also amounts to
sub-standard care.
133.
She also agreed that even if the mother is fully
dilated but the baby’s head has not sufficiently descended,
delivery would
not be imminent. As the position of the baby’s
head was not known at 7 am, the midwife could not have determined
that delivery
was imminent. It is when the baby’s head reaches
the pelvic floor that the ‘ferguson’ reflex kicks in so
that
the mother starts pushing involuntarily. This causes more
contractions but the head has to descend further until it reaches the
perineum of the cervix. So at 7 am the head was in the pelvis but it
still had to descend gradually.
134.
She conceded during cross-examination that given
the signs of foetal distress at 7 am and given her evidence that
delivery ought
to have been expedited by means of assisted delivery,
it was not an option for the midwife to just stand by and let labour
continue
naturally – there needed to be an intervention. Later
during cross-examination she reverted to the view that foetal
distress
was managed well, as delivery was imminent and baby D was
delivered within one hour of the diagnosis of foetal distress.
135.
Dr
Manthata-Cruywagen referred to an article authored by Janet Rennie
and Lewis Roosenbloom titled ‘
Review
How long have we got to get the baby out? A review of the effects of
acute and profound intrapartum hypoxia and ischaemia’
[19]
in
which the authors conclude that damage to a human baby begins to
accrue after 10 minutes of an acute profound hypoxic ischaemic
insult.
If
it is accepted that damage can occcur within 10 minutes of an insult,
when you discover foetal distress you cant wait for an
hour to
deliver. You must do something to alleviate the foetal distress if
delivery is not imminent or if it is imminent, you must
deliver
immediately to avoid the insult from developing into an injury. You
must intervene immediately and you can’t simply
wait for an
hour whilst waiting for delivery to happen naturally
136.
During re-examination Dr Manthata-Cruywagen
testified about the known causes of foetal distress, namely, uterine
contractions (especially
in the second stage of labour); placental
dysfunction or compromise (which could be caused by infection, high
blood pressure or
exposure to ‘amphetamine-like substances’
such as Khat during pregnancy); cord prolapse; and sentinel events.
With
placental compromise, the blood vessels in the placenta become
constricted. They are not open enough to take in oxygen from the
mother to supply to the baby.
Dr Weinstein
(Radiologist)
137.
Dr Weinstein confirmed that he studied an MRI scan
taken of Baby D’s brain when he was 5 years and ten months
old. He
confirmed the anatomical areas that were damaged,
namely the PGBT, are the metabolically active areas of the foetal
brain. The
damage is consistent with an acute profound pattern of
injury. These areas get damaged from a short episode (insult)
whatever the
episode may be. What damages the metabolically active
areas of the foetal brain is, inter alia, a cut-off of blood supply
to these
areas. If blood supply is mildly cut off for a long time
then the other areas of the brain will suffer damage. An acute
profound
injury is caused by a short, sudden, severe event, although
the radiologist cannot tell from the MRI image when it happened. The
obstetricians have to determine how and when it occurred
138.
In this case although the clinical records mention
that baby D suffered septic arthritis some weeks after birth, there
is no evidence
that sepsis got to the brain.
139.
In regard to the addendum joint minute he complied
with Dr Alheit and wherein Dr Alheit expressed the view that it is
inappropriate
to use the conventional terminology ‘acute
profound’ in the absence of a sentinel event, Dr Weinsten
stated that such
terminology has been used for the past 20 to 30
years and it has not been refuted that the metabolically active areas
of the brain
get damaged by a short, severe event (ranging between 15
to 35 minutes). However, if the baby was in a poor condition before
the
event, then it will take a shorter time for damage to occur.
140.
The Smith et al article that suggests that the
intrapartum BGT pattern injury and radiologically termed ‘acute
profound HI
brain injury’ are not necessarily synonymous goes
against the convention of 20 to 30 years of understanding. In his
view,
the pattern is the same – one could call it a BGT pattern
or an ‘acute profound’ pattern as long as it is
understood
that the injury arises from a sudden and severe insult
that causes the auto-regulatory response ‘to go off’ and
not
protect the metabolically active areas of the brain, so that they
are damaged.
141.
An
acute profound pattern of injury means that the injury occurred
suddenly and was severe, in which regard, Dr Weinstein relied
on an
article that was published in the SA Journal of Radiology in October
2020, which was co-authored by esteemed radiologists,
Misser SK,
Barkovich AJ, Lotz JW and Archery M, titled “
A
pictorial review of the pathophysiology and classification of the
magnetic resonance imaging patterns of perinatal term hypoxic
ischemic brain injury – What the radiologist needs to
know...”
[20]
Dr Weinstein went on to say that he agrees with the Misser article
- the nature of the injury is such that it happens suddenly.
Misser
et al explain the pathophysiology of the acute profound ischemic
injury and do not merely explain the pattern of injury
seen on MRI
images in relation to the anatomical features of the brain, which is
what Dr Alheit contends for.
142.
If the severe injury happens for longer than 10
minutes there will be damage to the central areas of the brain. If it
takes longer
than 15 to 25 minutes then the whole brain will be
impacted and the pattern will be acute profound partial prolonged,
which is
called a mixed pattern. In the case of baby D, there was
damage to the basal ganglia thalamic areas and the periolandic strip,
as well as the vermis, so one could also call it a PBGT pattern (or
by a shortened name, being a BGT pattern).
143.
During cross-examination, Dr Weinstein maintained
the stance that he was trained in conventional radiology to report
things in a
conventional way as ‘acute profound’ and that
the BGT pattern of injury is synonymous with acute profound pattern
of
injury as both refer to the same areas in the brain that are
damaged.
144.
During cross-examination Dr Weinstein made the
following important concessions:
144.1.
When using terminology to describe a brain
injury pattern observed on MRI imaging it is important that the
appropriate clinical
context accompany the use of such terminology;
144.2.
The BGT injury is described in the 2019 ACOG
consensus statement as a ‘
cerebral
– deep nuclear neuronal injury
’
impacting
the deep nuclear gray matter in the brain and is associated with
severe partial insult of prolonged
duration or a combined partial with profound terminal insult
;
however Dr Weinstein questioned ‘how long is ‘prolonged’
in the BGT injury?’ He reiterated that if the
insult persists
for longer than 40 to 50 minutes, then a mixed pattern would result.
If the insult is longer than 10 minutes (allowing
for up to 20 to 40
minutes), a BGT pattern would result.
144.3.
Dr Weinstein agreed that ACOG 2019 distinguishes
the BGT injury from cases where there is a complete shut-down of
blood supply,
which ACOG describes as a ‘
deep
nuclear gray – brain stem
’
which
is associated with
acute total hypoxic
ischemic insult
. In this case, baby D’s
brainstem was not damaged.
145.
Dr
Weinstein was referred to an article titled ‘
Neuroimaging
in the term newborn with neonatal encephalopathy
’
that
appeared in the publication ‘Seminars in Fetal and Neonatal
Medicine’ and which was published online on 29 October
2021,
[21]
in which article the
authors identify three pathophysiology’s that may cause the BGT
pattern of injury to the BGT and periolandic
cortex, namely, (i)
sentinel events; or (ii) severe partial asphyxia with prolonged
duration; or (iii) combination of partial and
near-total asphyxia.
For ease of reference, I will refer to this article as ‘Barkovich
et al’. It was thus put to Dr
Weinstein that the description
‘acute profound’ is no longer used in relation to the BGT
injury and that the BGT injury
is also not only caused by a short
severe event (such as a sentinel event) as Dr Weinstein testified
in-chief, but can also be
caused by a severe partial insult of
prolonged duration. Dr Weinstein responded that he uses the
terminology ‘acute profound’
in its classic sense to
indicate where the damage in the brain occurred (PGBT) and one can
call it BGT or ‘acute profound’
because the
pathophysiology is the same.
146.
Dr
Weinstein was referred to an article authored by Volpe titled
‘
Hypoxic
Ischemic Injury in the Term Infant’: Pathophysiology
’
where
Volpe discusses a deep nuclear brainstem injury caused by total
asphyxia.
[22]
According to
Volpe, total asphyxia will take approximately between 10 to 15
minutes to result in brain injury in a human foetus.
In other words,
a human foetus that is subjected to total asphyxia, for example, with
cord prolapse or uterine rupture [i.e., (a
sentinel event] will
suffer brain damage within approximately 10 to 15 minutes. Volpe also
points out that in one carefully documented
human study, this
neuropathology was identified by neuroimaging
after
such sentinel events occurring
generally
from 10 to 46 minutes before delivery. Dr Weinstein did not disagree
with what is documented by Volpe. On the same
page, Volpe
records that ‘
in
the 80% or 90% of cases with hypoxic ischemic disease in which an
overt fetal sentinel event is not present, the uncertainty
in timing
is often measured in hours and not minutes.
’
Dr
Weinstein was asked to comment thereon. He replied stating that as
Volpe was dealing with obstetrics, he could not comment thereon.
Discussion
147.
Upon a consideration of the full conspectus of
evidence, the following indisputable and irrefutable facts were
established in evidence:
147.1.
Foetal heart rate monitoring during the
plaintiff’s first phase of the active stage of labour was not
carried out with the
required frequency (every half hour) or in the
required manner by auscultation before, during and after
contractions, as stipulated
in the maternity guidelines. The
defendant conceded that this amounted to sub-standard care;
147.2.
During the second stage of active labour until
baby D’s delivery, the FHR was not monitored at all;
147.3.
As from 7 am at which time when the plaintiff’s
cervix was fully dilated and the second stage of active labour
commenced,
the FHR was required to be monitored even more frequently,
that is, after every second contraction, as this is the period during
which an upsurge in foetal hypoxia would be expected during
contractions, which increase in frequency and strength;
147.4.
The partogram that was utilised only from 0h00 to
0h04 during the first stage of active labour was not completed
correctly or record
the required information in that the nurses
failed, amongst others, to plot the rate of descent of baby D’s
head and failed
to plot
plaintiff’s
contractions properly, more specifically, the variability of
accelerations and decelerations in relation to the
contractions
;
147.5.
The nurses nurses who monitored the plaintiff’s
labour did not keep proper records and by the time the staff took
over the
care of the plaintiff at 7am, they would have been in the
dark as to the true condition of baby D or the extent or duration of
the foetal distress diagnosed at 07h00, given that no partogram had
been utilised after 04h00 and that which had been used was
incomplete, and given that there was no record of auscultation of the
FHR before, during and after contractions;
147.6.
The care that the plaintiff (and her unborn child)
received from the midwives at Hillbrow clinic during the plaintiff’s
active
stage of labour until delivery of baby D amounted to
sub-standard care in so far as the conduct of the midwives failed to
comply
with the maternity guidelines in the various respects as
highlighted in the testimony of Prof Anthony and other experts;
147.7.
At 7am, the attending midwife had not factual
basis to conclude that delivery was imminent given that the descent
of the baby’s
head was unknown.
148.
The obstetricians including the midwives who
testified all agreed that the purpose of monitoring of the FHR is to
detect foetal
distress so that immediate intervention can take place
to prevent injury or further injury to the foetus. Stated
differently, if
the FHR is not monitored properly and with the
required frequency, any abnormalities in FHR would not be detected
and if abnormalities
go undetected, the nurses would not be able to
respond adequately or immediately to foetal distress.
149.
It
was common cause between the obstetricians and the paediatric
neurologists and radiologists who testified that the insult that
led
to Baby D’s irreversible brain damage occurred intrapartum,
i.e., before birth, the cause of which was hypoxia (where
the baby is
deprived of sufficient oxygen). Prof Bolton was a lone voice in
postulating that the brain damage may have been caused
by sepsis that
developed 20 days after baby D’s birth, however, such
postulation was conceded by him to be unsupportable
by proven facts
and in any event, is irreconcilable with the diagnosis of h
hypoxic
ischaemic encephalopathy grade II
some
two days after birth, based on established facts such as baby D’s
abnormal
tone, the fact that he did not cry, that he experienced respiratory
distress at birth requiring resuscitation, which respiratory
distress
was sustained despite continued resuscitation, the fact that baby D
was lethargic, could not suckle and also experienced
seizures after
birth.
[23]
150.
In
AN
v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape,
[24]
the
court explained that a sudden, total, persistent interruption to the
blood supply [and hence oxygen supply] in the prepartum
period is
usually caused by a perinatal sentinel event such as placental
abruption, uterine rupture, umbilical cord prolapse, shoulder
dystocia, maternal collapse or compression of the cord (which totally
interrupts blood supply for a period long enough to cause
damage) (a
total, persistent interruption). Each of these (with the exception of
a cord compression) can be verified afterwards
because they leave a
footprint.
[25]
151.
In the present case,
the evidence did not establish that any such markers were present at
birth to denote that any sentinel event
had occurred. There was also
no evidence that cord compression had likely occurred. Likewise,
there was no evidence of congenital,
metabolic, infectious or genetic
causes for baby D’s brain injury.
152.
It should be noted at
the outset that the defendant denied that the sub-standard care
provided to the plaintiff in the management
of her labour until
delivery of baby D (evidenced,
inter
alia,
by a
lack of proper monitoring of the FHR throughout the active phase of
labour until delivery; the inability to timeously detect
the onset of
foetal distress through the failure to monitor the FHR correctly or
at all at the required intervals; the midwife’s
inappropriate
response to diagnosed foetal distress when detected; her
inappropriate response to the meconium stained liquor observed
at 7
am; her failure to monitor the FHR at all between the period 7am to
delivery; her failure to intervene appropriately once
foetal distress
was detected; her failure to suction meconium from Baby D’s
mouth before his trunk was delivered) amounted
to negligence on the
part of the relevant midwives in all the attendant circumstances.
153.
The defendant
disputed causation – the contention being that there was no
causal connection between the negligence alleged
and the cerebral
palsy suffered by Baby D. This was premised on the addendum reports
of Dr Manthata-Cruywagen and Professor Bolton
and the report of Dr
Weinstein. These experts raised the following two issues to deny
causation:
(i)
That the plaintiff
used the substance called Khat (also called Mira) during her
pregnancy which had an adverse effect on her placenta
and caused
placental insufficiency, thereby causing the foetus to suffer a
hypoxic ischaemic injury in the last 30 minutes of labour
prior to
delivery; and
(ii)
The injury pattern
identified on the MRI scan was of an acute profound hypoxic ischaemic
injury which suggests that the insult which
caused the child to
sustain brain damage occurred suddenly (acutely) and was of a severe
nature (profound) as is denoted by the
term ‘acute profound’.
154.
In
A
M and Another
,
[26]
the Supreme Court of Appeal had occasion to reiterate the role of
experts and how their evidence is to be approached. Wallis JA
put it
thus:
[17]
…
The functions of an
expert witness are threefold. First, where they have themselves
observed relevant facts that evidence will be
evidence of fact and
admissible as such. Second, they provide the court with abstract or
general knowledge concerning their discipline
that is necessary to
enable the court to understand the issues arising in the litigation.
This includes evidence of the current
state of knowledge and
generally accepted practice in the field in question. Although such
evidence can only be given by an expert
qualified in the relevant
field, it remains, at the end of the day, essentially evidence of
fact on which the court will have to
make factual findings. It is
necessary to enable the court to assess the validity of opinions that
they express. Third, they give
evidence concerning their own
inferences and opinions on the issues in the case and the grounds for
drawing those inferences and
expressing those conclusions.
[20]
The
need for clarity as to the facts on which an expert’s opinion
is based has been stressed in a number of cases. In
PriceWaterhouseCoopers
v National Potato Co-operative Ltd
the
following passage from a Canadian judgment was cited with approval:
‘
[326]
“
Before
any weight can be given to an expert’s opinion, the facts upon
which the opinion is based must be found to exist
”
[327]
“
As long as there is some admissible evidence on which the
expert’s testimony is based it cannot be ignored; but it
follows
that
the more an expert relies on facts not in
evidence, the weight given to his opinion will diminish
”.
[328]
An opinion based on facts not in evidence has no value for the
Court.’
[21]
The
opinions of expert witnesses involve the drawing of inferences from
facts
.
The
inferences must be reasonably capable of being drawn from those
facts. If they are tenuous, or far-fetched, they cannot form
the
foundation for the court to make any finding of fact
.
Furthermore,
in any process of reasoning the drawing of inferences from the facts
must be based on admitted or proven facts and
not matters of
speculation
.
As Lord Wright said in his speech in
Caswell
v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd
:
‘
Inference
must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or speculation. There
can be no inference unless there are objective facts
from which to
infer the other facts which it is sought to establish …
But
if there are no positive proved facts from which the inference can be
made, the method of inference fails and what is left is
mere
speculation or conjecture
.’”
(emphasis added)
(footnotes
omitted)
155.
In
regard to the factual evidence presented at trial, being that of the
plaintiff and the two midwives, I bear in mind the principles
that I
am to apply in the face of conflicting evidence as set out in
Stellenbosch
Farmers' Winery Group Ltd v Martell et Cie
,
[
2003
(1) SA 11 (SCA )
at
paras14–15
156.
In written argument
presented on behalf of the defendant, it was submitted that the
plaintiff was not a truthful or credible witness
due to certain
external contradictions between her testimony concerning what the
nurses did or did not do when monitoring the plaintiff
and her unborn
baby at 0h00, 04h00; and 06h00, and that which was in fact done as
reflected in the labour records, as well
as an internal contradiction
concerning the language barrier that impeded communication between
the plaintiff and the midwives.
As I understand the argument, on the
one hand, the plaintiff’s testimony was that she was not
conversant in the English language
and that she used a person to help
her when she was asking for help, whilst on the other hand, she
testified that she told the
nurse that she was feeling pain and that
the nurse told her that she must try to push so that the baby can
come out. The
defendant’s submission was that ‘
based
on the contradictions highlighted above, the plaintiff was not a
truthful and credible witness as she had serious language
barriers
and could therefore not have comprehended what the nurses were
telling her. This appears from the evidence of Sister Moqhae
that the
plaintiff did not follow instructions. The plaintiff’s evidence
regarding the events of the 08
th
to 9
th
July 2012 is
therefore not probable, The only reliable evidence regarding the
events of the said dates is that of the midwives,
Moqhae and Mbanga.’
157.
I cannot, with
respect, agree with the defendant’s submission that the
plaintiff was not a truthful or credible witness or
that sister
Moqhae was a reliable witness regarding the events. The plaintiff’s
evidence was that she was in abject pain
from the time of her
admission to Hillbrow labour ward on 8 July 2012. There were
times when she cried out for help when
the pain was really bad, but
the nurses did not heed her calls. As a first time mother who had
never before endured labour pains,
one would expect that the
plaintiff may have needed comfort and reassurance when the pain
became unbearable. In my view, it cannot
be said that the plaintiff
was not honestly mistaken as to how she and baby D were assessed
prior to 7 am on 9 July 2012. Stated
differently, I cannot find that
the plaintiff was deliberately lying about the conduct of the
midwives, whether before or after
7 am. In other words, being
honestly mistaken does not necessarily translate to willfully lying
or being deliberately dishonest.
My impression of the plaintiff was
that she did not seek to embellish her evidence, nor did she seek to
exaggerate how the midwives
treated her prior to the delivery of Baby
D. On her usage of Khat prior to falling pregnant, her evidence
was consistent
– she did not partake in it regularly, but only
occasionally. She had last used it two or three months before falling
pregnant.
The plaintiff remained steadfast, despite vigorous
questioning, about the fact that she did not use Khat at all during
her pregnancy,
which, as was not refuted in evidence, had progressed
normally and without complications.
158.
Sister Moqhae denied
having sworn or shouted at the plaintiff after she took over the
management of the plaintiff’s labour
when commencing her duties
at 7 am on 9 July 2012. As she had only commenced duties at 7 am on
that date, she was understandably
not able to comment on how the
night shift midwife may have treated the plaintiff. In
contradistinction to the plaintiff’s
evidence, Sr Moqhae’s
evidence was in my view tailored to exculpate herself from the
consequences of failing to adhere to
the maternity guidelines, not
only as regards her failure to properly intervene in the face of
foetal distress or to manage or
react to the presence of meconium
stained liquor, but also as regards the failure by the night shift
midwife to monitor the FHR
at the correct frequency and in the
correct manner and her own failure to monitor the FHR at all after
examining the plaintiff
at 7am.
159.
It is worth repeating
what the maternity guidelines require when foetal distress and the
presence of meconium is detected. The following
intervention for
foetal
distress
is
mandated:
Explain
the problem to the mother;
Lie
the mother in a left lateral position;
Give
oxygen by face mask at 6 L/minute; (this was not done)
Start
an intravenous infusion of Ringer-Lactate to run at 240 mL/hour;
Do
a vaginal examination for cervical dilation and to exclude cord
prolapse.
If
vaginal delivery is imminent
(cervix fully
dilated),
deliver
immediately
,
by vacuum extraction if necessary.
If
vaginal delivery is not imminent
,
give hexoprenaline 10 micrograms IV and prepare for immediate
caesarean section.
Arrange
urgent transfer from a community health centre to hospital.
Where
thick meconium
is present the following steps must be taken:
Transfer
the patient
from
a community health centre to hospital unless delivery is imminent;
Monitor
the foetus with a cardiotocograph (CTG) if available;
When
the head extends at delivery,
thoroughly suction the infant’s
mouth and then nose before delivering the trunk.
160.
The evidence
irrefutably established, which Sr Moqhae was constrained to concede,
that:
160.1.
She did not explain
the problem of foetal distress to the plaintiff. She sought to excuse
doing so by either blaming the plaintiff
for not listening and/or
because the plaintiff was restless and screaming and/or an inability
to do so because of the language
barrier that impeded communication
and the lack of anyone present to interpret;
160.2.
She did not g
ive
the plaintiff oxygen by face mask at 6 L/minute. Her excuse was that
delivery was imminent;
160.3.
She did not start an
intravenous infusion of Ringer-Lactate to run at 240 mL/hour. Her
excuse was that delivery was imminent;
160.4.
She did not give the
plaintiff a drug (hexoprenaline 10 micrograms IV) to slow down
contractions. Again, her excuse was that delivery
was imminent and in
any event, once the cevix is 10 cm dilated, it is not viable to slow
down contractions;
160.5.
She did not even
consider the need for transfer to a hospital, let alone attempt to
a
rrange an
urgent transfer from the Hillbrow clinic to the hospital, despite the
undisputed and unrefuted evidence that Charlotte
Maxeke was no
further than a 10 minute drive away. Here the excuse was that none of
this could have been achieved in the space
of one hour, being the
time period that elapsed before baby D was delivered;
160.6.
When baby D’s
head extended at delivery, she did not thoroughly suction his mouth
and then nose before delivering the trunk.
Her excuse was that it was
not possible to do so because the plaintiff kept having contractions
when the baby’s head came
out – a proposition I deal with
below;
160.7.
As regards Sr Moqhae
lying the plaintiff in the left lateral position, the probabilities
support a conclusion that Sr Moqhae did
not
do this whether for
purposes of managing the foetal distress or at all, firstly, because
Sr Moqhae considered that delivery was
imminent and that is precisely
why the only thing she did was to encourage the plaintiff to push in
an attempt to get baby D’s
head to descend in order to get the
baby out, and secondly, because her evidence fluctuated between the
plaintiff just lying on
her side prior to bearing down at 7h30 am, to
the plaintiff herself changing sides so that she was not always in a
supine position
and thirdly, because the undisputed evidence of Prof
Anthony was that the mother is usually in a supine position when
bearing down,
coupled with the evidence of the plaintiff that she lay
in the supine position and that Sr Moqhae had remained positioned in
front
of her legs whilst encouraging her to push for purposes of
delivering baby D;
161.
There were several
unsatisfactory aspects to Sister Moghae’s evidence. I need only
mention a few. One was that she considered
that the guidelines only
require full dilation (10cm) for delivery to be considered imminent,
whereas, none of the expert witnesses
supported such interpretation
because it is known that delivery is only imminent when the cervix is
10 cm dilated
and
the baby’s
head extends to the perineum, albeit that Dr Manthata-Cruywagen
testified that delivery is imminent as soon as
the mother has the
urge to push and the urge to push only occurs when the baby’s
head has extended to the pelvic brim. I
agree with Prof Anthony that
Sr Moqhae could not have known at 7am how long it would take for the
head to descend, given that the
guidelines allow for up to two hours
for the head to descend.
162.
Another
unsatisfactory aspect is that she claimed that because delivery was
imminent, she tried to deliver the baby
immediately
,
which was belied by the fact that she had spent an hour doing nothing
other than encouraging the plaintiff to bear down (push)
before baby
D was delivered by way of unassisted natural vaginal birth instead of
intervening immediately to alleviate baby D’s
distress and then
expediting delivery by way of assisted birth (be it by means of
episiotomy or the use of forceps or preparing
the plaintiff for a
c-section and arranging transfer to a hospital or by vacuum suction).
163.
A further
unsatisfactory aspect is that whilst Sr Moqhae agreed that the
purpose of auscultation of the FHR is to determine if there
are late
or sustained decelerations in the foetal heart beat after
contractions in order to detect foetal distress and that
the
only way to do this is by measuring the FHR before, during and after
contractions, she sought to justify the failure of the
night shift
midwife to do so (i) because at Hillbrow clinic, they use a
foetoscope notwithstanding that, according to Sr Moqhae,
one cannot
determine decelerations with a foetoscope as a foetoscope can only
tell one if there is tachycardia or bradycardia and
(ii) the evidence
was that Hillbrow clinic is equipped with a stethoscope which does
permit auscultation of the FHR, which leads
me to the inescapable and
necessary inference that the midwives did not make use of such
instrument by their own choosing. Later
during cross-examination Sr
Moqhae sought to mould her evidence, ostensibly in an attempt to
justify her own failure to auscultate
the FHR at 7 am or thereafter,
by stating that the plaintiff would not allow her to put the
foetoscope on her (plaintiff’s)
abdomen and that during
contractions the plaintiff would change positions. She again
sought to mould her evidence after being
asked during
cross-examination why the staff including Sr Moqhae, having realized
that communication with the plaintiff was problematic,
failed to take
any steps to arrange for the plaintiff’s husband to be present
so that he could assist in interpreting what
was being said. Her
answer was that the situation (leading up to delivery) was chaotic,
and they were trying to save baby D. It
was then put to Sr Moqhae
that the situation was becoming increasingly chaotic because she was
not taking the correct steps. She
then stated that she was
encouraging the plaintiff to push only with contractions and that she
listened to the FHR whenever the
plaintiff allowed her to, ostensibly
to portend that she knew what the condition of baby D was.
164.
Yet a further
unsatisfactory aspect is in relation to the astonishing explanation
Sr Moqhae provided for not following the guidelines
in relation to
the management of meconium, amongst others, to suction the baby’s
mouth and nose
before
the trunk is
delivered. Her explanation was to the effect that the plaintiff was
restless as she was pushing and they could not
understand each other
and that is why she merely wiped baby D’s face because she
could only put a suction into his mouth
if the plaintiff stopped
pushing and Sr Moqhae could not get the plaintiff to stop pushing.
165.
Having
regard to all the issues raised above, I am not persuaded that
the
quality, integrity and independence of Sr Moqhae’s recall
of
the events (more specifically, in regard to how she managed the
maternal and foetal condition between 7 am and 8am) is such that
Sr
Moqhae’s version of events can be considered reliable or
credible in so far as it is in conflict with the plaintiff’s
evidence, namely, that Sr Moqhae injected something into the
plaintiff’s thigh after , she experienced intensified
contraction
pain very shortly after which Baby D was born, or in so
far as it is in conflict with Prof Anthony’s evidence
[27]
discussed below.
166.
Before dealing with
Prof Anthony’s evidence, it convenient to first deal with Dr
Manthata-Cruywagen’s evidence. In relation
to her conclusion in
her addendum report that the brain injury that baby D sustained was
attributable to placental insufficiency
or placental abnormality
caused by the plaintiff’s use of khat during pregnancy, suffice
it to say that her opinion was based
on an assumption of placental
pathology in the absence of factual evidence of placental pathology.
In her testimony she confirmed
having relied on a cryptic note that
went no further than to raise a query as to whether the plaintiff had
chewed khat occasionally.
Dr Manthata-Cruywagen testified that she
interpreted the note to mean that the plaintiff admitted to using
khat during her pregnancy,
an interpretation that was not at all
discernable or sustainable from text of the query itself and which
was entirely devoid of
factual foundation. The plaintiff’s
evidence that she did
not
chew Khat remained
unrefuted . In any event, the doctor who completed the note was not
called to testify on behalf of the defendant
and as such the note
constituted inadmissible hearsay. In short, the inference that Dr
Manthata-Cruywagen sought to draw from the
cryptic note lacked
factual foundation and as such amounts to no more than inadmissible
supposition or conjecture founded upon
illogical or irrational
reasoning that is speculative in the extreme, and as such, her
opinion falls to be rejected in relation
to the use of khat as a
causative basis for the foetal hypoxia sustained by baby D. Dr
Manthata-Cruywagen’s propensity to
couch her opinions as
statements of fact but which are based entirely on speculation, is
perhaps more aptly illustrated by her
most shocking evidence to the
effect that the plaintiff probably chewed khat during labour, which
the nurses probably did not see.
167.
The rejection of Dr
Manthata-Cruywagen’s opinion has the result that Prof Anthony’s
evidence to the effect that the
hypoxia that led to the brain injury
suffered by baby D was, on the available evidence and in the absence
of a obstetric sentinel
event, most likely caused by (i) the failure
of the night midwife to detect the onset of foetal hypoxia due to the
lack of monitoring
of the FHR at the correct intervals and in the
correct manner and which in turn led to an inability to be in a
position to intervene
immediately during the first stage of active
labour and (ii) the concomitant failure of Sr Moqhae to implement the
correct steps
prescribed by the guidelines to arrest foetal distress
in the second stage of labour, remained unrefuted.
168.
The
plaintiff argues that Dr Manthata-Cruywagen was a biased witness in
favour of the defendant, in that she lacked objectivity
and went to
great lengths to create a baseless defence for the defendant which
could not be substantiated. Regrettably, I am inclined
to agree. Her
revised opinion was not defensible on the proven facts. Moreover, she
based her entire opinion that the injury sustained
by baby D occurred
in the last thirty minutes of labour based on the postulation that
the injury resulted from an acute profound
event, i.e., a short
sudden or unpredictable event premised on placental abnormality,
which, irrespective of inadequate monitoring
on the part of the
midwives, resulted in a total shutdown of blood flow and hence oxygen
to the foetus only in the last 30 minutes
before birth so that there
was nothing that the midwives could have done to prevent the adverse
outcome in this case. As was pointed
out in Lord Justice Brooks in
Ratcliffe
:
[28]
“…
the
judge should not be diverted away from the inference of negligence
dictated by the plaintiff’s evidence by mere theoretical
possibilities of how that outcome might have occurred without
negligence: the defendants’ hypothesis must have the ring of
plausibility about it.”
169.
In my view, Dr
Manthata-Cruywagen’s
hypothesis, not being founded on proven facts, lacks plausibility. It
should be noted that the plaintiff’s
placenta was not tested
after birth and therefore there is no medical evidence to confirm any
placental insufficiency. Moreover,
and the objective evidence
established that baby D was not growth restricted as would occur if
there was placental insufficiency.
170.
Prof Anthony’s theory,
on the other hand, was supported by proven facts and was based on
logical reasoning. Firstly, Dr Mogashoa,
Dr Kara and even Sr Moqhae
agreed with Dr Anthony that foetal distress was likely present
before
7 am when it was
first detected, as proper monitoring of the FHR had not taken place
prior thereto so that an abnormal foetal heart
rate may well have
arisen prior to 7am but which went undetected. There was consensus
amongst the experts, including the midwives,
that the presence of
meconium is a sure sign of foetal distress. It seems to me to be
logical that meconium would have developed
or existed
before
it manifested. Since
meconium was
already
present at
7 am, it is probable that it arose before 7am but went undetected
precisely because the 6h30 am assessment of the foetal
condition was
not performed. Even Dr Manthata-Cruywagen was constrained to conclude
that it could not be said that the baby D was
well before 7 am, given
that monitoring was missed at 6h30 am.
171.
Prof
Anthony’s theory regarding evolving hypoxia in the absence of a
sentinel event is, as was pointed out in evidence, not
a novel
notion. It finds support in the 2019 Acog consensus statement, and in
Volpe
[29]
prior to the Smith
et al article as well as the Barkovich et al review, which
unequivocally endorses it. In the Barkovich l quoted
earlier in the
judgement, the authors state concerning the central/BGT injury
pattern: “
Clinically,
the central/BGT pattern is commonly observed following perinatal
sentinel events and moderate to severe relatively prolonged
insult,
while experimental studies in primates suggest that this pattern
results from a combination of anoxia (e.g., near-total
asphyxia) and
hypoxia (e.g., partial asphyxia) which may be incurred during a
single event or across serial events.”
172.
The
theory propounded by Prof Anthony and his co-authors in the
Smith et al article (on which he based his evidence), has
also been
endorsed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
MEC
for Health, Limpopo v L W M obo D M
where
the following was said:
[30]
“
Furthermore,
a lack of general acceptance of his theory cannot, without more,
warrant a rejection of his theory, as it is backed
up by a
case-study. Clearly, t
here
is no basis in law for rejecting Prof Smith’s theory. The 10
cases on their own demonstrate that a series of partial
intermittent,
subacute/subthreshold hypoxic insults can cause an injury to the BGT
deep nuclear structures including the perirolandic
area with a
pattern like that revealed by D M’s MRI scan. Moreover, Prof
Smith’s conclusions were not based exclusively
on animal
experiments. It was also based on his experience and that of his
co-authors over many years, involving human cases. His
views find
material support in Volpe’s textbook, where the following is
stated in relation to the injuries arising from an
insult to the deep
nuclear-brain stem, in which the insult is severe and abrupt:
‘
In
the more prolonged and less severe insults, the diversion of blood to
deep nuclear structures occurs at least to a degree, and
thus the
cerebral regions are more likely to be affected. Studies in the
near-term fetal lamb indicate that the severe terminal
insult that
results in injury to deep nuclear structures especially may be likely
to occur after brief, repeated hypoxic-ischaemic
insults
first
cause
a cumulative deleterious effect on cardiovascular function that
presumably
then
can
result in a severe late insult.’ ”
173.
The
plaintiff argued that ‘the dogmatic and sometimes frighteningly
illogical evidence given by Dr Weinstein, coupled with
his combative
or argumentative, evasive and condescending demeanour is clear proof
of his bias in favour of the defendant.’
I do not agree with
the entire submission. Dr Wenstein certainly behaved in an eccentric
manner in the witness box. He was also
highly argumentative and
emotive, assuming the role of advocate at times.
[31]
The submission is not entirely without substance. My impression was
that he was determined not to concede the cogency of reviews
of
scientific research by a host of international medical professionals
in which they support the finding that in some instances
(e.g., in
the absence of a sentinel event) a BGT pattern injury can result from
hypoxia which develops over time during the labour
process (which is
preventable by early detection of the hypoxic insult before it leads
to injury) as opposed to suddenly (acute)
or severe and total
(profound) which is unexpected and unpredictable, occurring during a
short window period before birth, and
which is thus
unpreventable.
[32]
All being
said, Dr Weinstein’s evidence did nothing to refute Dr Alheit’s
evidence, which was both logical and defensible
on the proven facts,
namely, that in this case there was no evidence that a sentinel event
had occurred. Historicalt nomenclature
such as ‘acute
profound’ (which connotes a sudden, unpredictable, severe and
total event that leads to fetal neurological
injury) is inappropriate
to use in the absence of a sentinel event.
174.
Not much needs to be said about Prof Bolton’s
theories regarding the cause of baby D’s brain injury and
cerebral palsy.
Suffice it to say that the foundation on which his
theories were based, dissipated like mist before a clear sky during
cross-examination.
In so far as Dr Kara’s evidence supported
Prof Anthony’s theory as to the cause of baby D’s injury,
his evidence
was logical, rational and defensible on the proven
facts.
175.
This brings me to the question of whether the
sub-standard care the plaintiff and her unborn child received at the
hands of the
staff at Hillbrow clinic amounted to negligence.
176.
The proper approach for establishing the existence
or otherwise of negligence was formulated by Holmes JA in
Kruger
v Coetzee
1966 (2) SA 428
(A) at 430
E-G where the following was said:
“
For
the purposes of liability culpa arises if—
(a) a diligens
paterfamilias in the position of the defendant—
(i) would foresee the
reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring another in his person
or property and causing him patrimonial
loss; and
(ii) would take
reasonable steps to guard against such occurrence; and
(b) the defendant failed
to take such steps.
…
Whether
a diligens paterfamilias in the position of the person concerned
would take any guarding steps at all and, if so, what steps
would be
reasonable, must always depend upon the particular circumstances of
each case. No hard and fast basis can be laid
down.”
[33]
177.
It was common cause in this case that t
he
purpose of foetal monitoring in labour is to detect hypoxia and to
prevent asphyxia. In my view, the failure by the midwives
who
were tasked for caring for baby D ought reasonably to have foreseen
that (i) failure to properly monitor by auscultation of
the FHR in
relation to the plaintiff’s contractions at the correct
intervals during the first and second stages of active
labour would
result in foetal distress being undetected so that it went unmanaged
and (ii) failure to respond to diagnosed foetal
distress by
intervening to first arrest such distress in accordance with the
steps required by the maternity guidelines and then
to expedite
delivery, amounted to negligence in the circumstances of this case.
The injury that befell baby D was both reasonably
foreseeable and
preventable by correct monitoring designed to detect foetal distress
before an insult leads to injury and correct
intervention to
alleviate such distress.
It is not
in dispute that the defendant is vicariously liable for the conduct
or omissions of those responsible for managing the
plaintiff’s
labour and the foetal condition until birth.
178.
The next question is whether the failure to adhere
to the necessary treatment protocols
caused
the HIE and resultant cerebral palsy sustained by
baby D.
179.
Prof Anthony’s evidence that baby D’s
injury was, on the available evidence, likely caused by intermittent
(undetected)
episodes of sub-threshold hypoxia so that baby D entered
the second stage of active labour already hypoxic, which distress was
not alleviated at all by appropriate intervention but was exacerbated
by allowing the labour to progress naturally with the baby
being
exposed to further hypoxia during contractions and by encouraging the
mother to bear down so that further deprivation of
oxygen occurred.
In this context, there was already evidence of declining foetal
oxygenation which, through lack of appropriate
intervention, became
acutely aggravated by intense second-stage uterine contractions so
that the baby lacked compensatory mechanisms
to prevent injury.
180.
There can be no doubt that further exposure to a
deprivation of oxygen at a critical time during which baby D needed
it the most
and which could have been provided in accordance with a
basic treatment protocol designed to alleviate foetal distress, fell
short
of the standard of care that was required to be provided to
baby D by the attending staff who were responsible for monitoring his
condition.
181.
In
AN v Mec for
Health, Eastern Cape,
supra, the test
for causation was stated as follows:
“
The
test for factual causation is whether the act of omission of the
defendant has been proved to have caused or materially contributed
to
the harm suffered. Where the defendant has negligently breached a
legal duty and the plaintiff has suffered harm, it must still
be
proved that the breach is what caused the harm suffered.”
182.
In
Minister
of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden
2002
(6) SA 431
(SCA)
at [25], the court observed as follows:
“
A
plaintiff is not required to establish the causal link with certainty
but only to establish that the wrongful conduct was probably
a cause
of the loss, which calls for a sensible retrospective analysis of
what would probably have occurred, based upon the evidence
and what
can be expected to occur in the ordinary course of human affairs
rather than an exercise in metaphysics.”
183.
In
Minister
of Finance and Others v Gore NO
2007
(1) SA 111
(SCA)
at [33] the SCA
held
that:
“
Application
of the ‘but-for’ test is not based on mathematics,
pure
science or philosophy.
It
is a matter of common sense, based on the practical way in which the
ordinary person’s mind works against the background
of everyday
life experiences.”
184.
In my view, on a conspectus of the expert
testimony, the plaintiff has established that it was the deprivation
of oxygen during
the labour process (which hypoxia, on the
probabilities, went undetected during the first stage of active
labour as a result of
a failure to properly monitor the foetal
condition at the required intervals) and which was acutely aggravated
by intensifying
hypoxia related to intense second-stage uterine
contractions (which the evidence established, was allowed to increase
or intensify
by the failure of the attending midwife intervene
appropriately for purposes of restoring oxygenation to the foetus
until such
time as delivery could be expedited by assisted delivery
or the plaintiff could be transferred to a hospital for higher care)
which
caused baby D to sustain the HIE injury which ultimately
resulted in the cerebral palsy from which he suffers.
185.
I am persuaded that the plaintiff has established
that the defendant is 100% liable for any damages sustained by her as
may be proven
or agreed to as a result of the
negligence
of the defendant’s employees which led directly to the
resultant injury to baby D. It is not in dispute that the
defendant
is vicariously liable for their conduct.
186.
The general rule is that costs follow the result.
I see no reason to depart therefrom.
187.
In the circumstances, the
following order is granted:
ORDER
187.1.
The defendant is liable for any damages that are
proved or agreed to be due to the plaintiff in her capacity as parent
and natural
guardian of DM.
187.2.
The plaintiff’s costs in respect of the
determination of the issue of liability are to be borne by the
defendant.
A. MAIER-FRAWLEY
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION OF
THE HIGH COURT, JOHANNESBURG
This judgement was
prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is
handed down electronically by circulation to
the Parties/their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file
of this matter on CaseLines. The date
for hand-down is deemed to be
10h00 on 11 May 2023.
Dates of virtual hearing:
24 January 2022 to 11 February 2022; &; 18 July 2022 to 22 July
2022 & 4 August 2022.
Judgment delivered: 28
September 2021, 11 May 2023
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for Applicant:
Mr
BD Molojoa
Attorneys
for Applicant:
Jerry
Nkeli & Associates Inc
Counsel
for respondent:
Mr
DJ Joubert SC
Attorney
for Respondent:
State
Attorney (Johannesburg)
[1]
A BGT
(or which is sometimes referred to as a PBGT injury in literature)
is an injury to the
basal-ganglia-thalamus
deep nuclear structures including the periolandic area of the brain,
being the metabolically active parts
of the brain.
[2]
‘
PGBT’
meaning the Periolandic, Basal Ganglia and Thalumus structures.
[3]
The
request for admissions and trial enquiries are contained in a
document at A11 to A14 on Caselines.
[4]
A
summary of the salient event s are recorded in paragraph 9 of the
judgment.
[5]
Sentinal
events being as defined by ACOG – ‘Executive summary;
neonatal encephalopathy and neurologic outcome, 2
nd
ed.
Report of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynaecoogists’
Task Force on Neonatal encephalopathy 2014’
– commonly
referred to as the ACOG guidelines –examples include
uterine
rupture, uterine tear, placenta
praevia,
abruption placenta, umbilical cord prolapses, foeto maternal
haemorrhage.
[6]
‘
Intrapartum
Basal-Ganglia-Thalamic Pattern Injury and Radiologically Termed
“Acute Profound Hypoxic-Ischemic Brain Injury”
are not
synonomous’
,
published online in the American Journal of Perinatology in
November 2020.
The
article is authored by eight medical experts from South Africa in
the fields of obstetrics, paediatric neuroradiology, paediatric
neurology and neonatology.
[7]
In
the article, the authors point out that ‘
medicolegal
lexicon often focus on descriptive radiological terminology which
characterizes BGT pattern injury as an “acute
profound HI
brain injury.” This has been taken to imply that such injury
always occurs suddenly (acutely) and is so profound
(severe and
total) that very little, if anything, can be done to prevent fetal
injury. This assumption is evident in earlier
literature in which
authors use “BGT pattern injury” and “acute
profound HII” as synonymous.’
[8]
This
is not the same as a partial prolonged hypoxic ischaemic event.
[9]
In an
article published in the SA Journal of Radiology by Misser et al
(Misser, Barkovich, Lotz Archary) in October 2020, titled
‘
A
pictorial review of the pathophysiology and classification of the
magnetic resonance imaging patters of perinatal term hypoxic
ischemic brain injury – What the radiologists need to know’,
the
authors describe ‘acute profound’ ischemia as follows;
“
In
the setting of acute cessation of perfusion with rapid progression
(eg in abruptio placentae), there is insufficient time for
the
cerebral autoregulatory mechanisms to adequately redirect blood flow
to the high metabolic areas of the brain… The
failure to
protect these areas will result in a primarily central injury
pattern with selective neuronal necrosis.”
[10]
The
letter was published in the SA Journal of Radiology in May 2021
under the title “
Letter
to the editor: Addressing radiological terminology of basal ganglia
and thalamic injury in hypoxic ischaemic injury”.
A
copy of this letter is to be found at V41 of Caselines. In the
letter, Dr Alheit states,
inter
alia,
as
follows:
“
Why
is it important for us NOT to report the involvement of the deep
nuclei in perinatal hypoxic ischaemic as an ‘acute
profound’
pattern? Smith et al. draw attention to a medicolegal lexicon, which
has evolved in South Africa specifically,
where it is implied that
‘acute profound HIBI is ‘always’ sudden (acute)
and ‘always’ profound
(severe and total. This view has
fostered the belief in courts that very little could have ‘ever’
been done to arrest
the process of neurological injury where that
injury is reported as ‘acute profound’ on MRI… If
there is no
definitive confirmation of a preceding sentinel event, a
radiologist is not in a position to deduce from the structural
damage
identified on MR images under what clinical or obstetrical
conditions this type of injury occurred…the use of the term
‘acute profound’ remains valid, provided it is used in
accordance with the ACOG 2014 definition of an acute profound
injury
and there is definitive obstetrical evidence of a sentinel event
that preceded the insult… Radiologists should
defer to
clinical and obstetrical experts to advise on the clinical context,
the probable causation, timing and severity of the
insult.”
[11]
Cited
in fn 9 above.
[12]
The
article is co-authored by 9 international medical experts (including
the renowned ‘doyan’ of radiology -
A.
James Barkovich)
in
the fields of radiology, paediatric neuroradiology and paediatric
neurology and neonatology, who individually hail from either
the
USA, Canada, United Kingdom or the Netherlands.
[13]
According
to the maternity guidelines, a
normal
heart rate falls between 110 and 160 bpm.
[14]
At p
503
[15]
.
The
ACOG task force states that a comprehensive, multidimensional
assessment should be performed. It is to include the neonatal
status
and all contributing factors including the mother's medical history,
prior obstetric history, factors such as foetal heart
rate
monitoring results, any delivery issues and placental pathology.
[16]
The
maternity guidelines prescribe as follows
:
“
From the time
that full dilatation of the cervix is first noted, up to 2 hours may
pass before the mother starts to bear down.
Time
can only be allowed for the head to descend onto the pelvic floor if
fetal distress and cephalopelvic disproportion have
been ruled out
.
The bladder should be emptied, using a catheter if necessary. The
observations of the first stage of labour should continue.
Efforts
at bearing down are only encouraged when the fetal head starts to
distend the perineum and the mother has an urge to push
.”
(emphasis added)
[17]
According
to the maternity guidelines,
foetal
distress is suspected
when
certain signs are observed. These include, amongst others, a
baseline foetal heartrate of less than 110 bpm and late
decelerations
of the foetal heart rate.
Management
of foetal distress
is as follows:
1.
Explain the problem to the mother.
2.
Lie the mother in a left lateral position.
3.
Give oxygen by face mask at 6 L/minute.
4.
Start an intravenous infusion of Ringer-Lactate to run at 240
mL/hour.
5.
Do a vaginal examination for cervical dilation and to exclude cord
prolapse..
If
vaginal delivery is imminent (cervix fully dilated), deliver
immediately, by vacuum extraction if necessary.
If
vaginal delivery is not imminent, give hexoprenaline 10 micrograms
IV and prepare for immediate caesarean section. Arrange
urgent
transfer from a community health centre to hospital.
[18]
The
maternity guidelines prescribe that when the cervix is 4 cm dilated,
the FHR ought to be checked
half-hourly
before,
during and after contractions
,
using a hand held Doppler instrument.
[19]
The
article is to be found at S42 on caselines. Significantly, the
authors recognize that ‘
[20]
The
article appears at V24 of the papers. Under the heading ‘Acute
profound ischemia’, the authors state the following:
“
In
the setting of acute cessation of perfusion with rapid progression
(e.g.
in
abruptio placentae) there is insufficient time for the cerebral
autoregulatory mechanisms to adequately redirect blood flow
to the
high metabolic areas of the brain…The failure to protect
these areas will result in a primarily central injury
pattern with
selective neuronal necrosis. This pattern of injury…involves
the deep basal nuclei.”
The authors distinguish
‘Partial prolonged ischemia’ which is explained as
follows: “
When there is mild or moderate hypoxia (e.g. in
occult cord prolapse or placental insufficiency), there is
sufficient time available
for the cerebral auto-regulatory
mechanisms to redirect blood flow to the high metabolic areas of the
brain, many of which have
a greater proportion of NMDA receptors.
This results in sparing of these high metabolic areas at the expense
of the watershed
areas of the cerebral hemispheres between the major
arterial territories, especially at the borders between perfused
zones…”
[21]
The
article was co-authored by world renowned radiologists such as
Wisnowki JL and Barkovich AJ and others together with medical
experts in the fields of paediatric neurology,and neonatology.
Barkovich AJ is the same person who co-authoured the Misser article
which is cited in para 141 of the judgment.
[22]
Volpe
___ chapter 19 at p503.
[23]
Acog’s
definition of neonatal encephalopathy is articulated in para 81 in
the judgment. What baby D experienced in the earliest
days of life,
fits in with Acog’s definition.
[24]
AN
v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape
(585/2018)
[2019] ZASCA 102
(15 August 2019), para [16]. It should be noted
that in AN, a sentinel event had occurred intrapartum.
[25]
This
is consistent with Prof Anthony’s testimony.
## [26]A
M and Anotherv
MEC for Health, Western Cape(1258/2018)
[2020] ZASCA 89 (31 July 2020) at paras 17 and 19-21.
[26]
A
M and Another
v
MEC for Health, Western Cape
(1258/2018)
[2020] ZASCA 89 (31 July 2020) at paras 17 and 19-21.
[27]
Conflicts
pertained to, a
mongst
others, whether delivery was imminent or not at 7 am; whether
encouraging the plaintiff to push was inappropriate in circumstances
where overt signs of foetal distress required immediate intervention
as prescribed by the maternity guidelines; that
inadequate
monitoring
of the foetal condition probably led to abnormalities in the FHR
being undetected prior to 7 am; that the approach
whereby the
plaintiff was encouraged to push even though there was no basis to
conclude that delivery was imminent, served to
exacerbate baby D’s
existing hypoxia to the point where he lacked the ability to
compensate for a lack of oxygenation during
the Plaintiff’s
increased contractions in the second stage of labour.
[28]
Ratcliffe
v Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority
(1998)
EWCA Civ 2000.
[29]
Volpe,
in his work titled ‘Neurology of the Newborn’ 5
th
ed,
chapter 19 at page :
[30]
MEC
for Health, Limpopo v L W M obo D M
(502/2021)
[2022] ZASCA 146
(27 October 2022) at para 36.
[31]
In
Schneider
v Aspeling
[2010]
3 ALL SA 332
(WCC) the court cautioned that an expert should
not assume the role of an advocate, nor give evidence which goes
beyond
the logic which is dictated by the scientific knowledge which
the expert possesses. The expert is expected to provide the court
with an objective and unbiased opinion, based on his or her
expertise.
[32]
Put
differently, there is now substantive expert opinion that indicates
that a rapid (sudden) total shut down of oxygenated blood
(i.e., the
mechanism of an acute profound Hypoxic Ischaemic injury) is
not
the
only mechanism by which a BGT pattern injury can occur.
[33]
See
too:
Sea
Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Another v Duncan Dock Cold Storage
(Pty) Ltd and
Another
[1999]
ZASCA 87
;
2000
(1) SA 827
at [19], where the following was said:
“
It
should
not be overlooked that in the ultimate analysis the true criterion
for determining negligence is whether in the particular
circumstances the conduct complained of falls short of the standard
of the reasonable person. Dividing the inquiry into various
stages,
however useful, is no more than an aid or guideline for resolving
this issue… It is probably so that there can
be no
universally applicable formula which will prove to be appropriate in
every case… [I]t has been recognised that while
the precise
or exact manner in which the harm occurs need not be foreseeable,
the general manner of its occurrence must indeed
be reasonably
foreseeable.”
And
Pitzer
v Eskom
[2012]
ZASCA 44
; JOL [2012] 29007 (SCA) at [ 24] where the court
stated:
“
What
is or is not reasonably foreseeable in any particular case is a fact
bound enquiry…Where questions that fall to be
answered are
fact bound there is seldom any assistance to be had from other cases
that do not share all the same facts.”
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