Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 1490South Africa
H.M obo H.V v Road Accident Fund (2020/3398) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1490 (8 August 2023)
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Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## H.M obo H.V v Road Accident Fund (2020/3398) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1490 (8 August 2023)
H.M obo H.V v Road Accident Fund (2020/3398) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1490 (8 August 2023)
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sino date 8 August 2023
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
No.
2020/3398
1.
Reportable:
2.
Of interest to other judges:
3. Revised: Yes
In
the matter between:
H[...] N[...] M[...] obo
H[...]
V[...] Plaintiff
and
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
Defendant
This judgment was
handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’
representatives via e-mail, by being uploaded
to CaseLines and by
release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand- down is deemed to be
10h00 on 00 …………
2023.
Summary:
Held:
Order: Following para 61
of this judgment.
JUDGMENT
WHITINGTON, AJ:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
At issue in this matter are the future
prospects of V[...] A[...] H[...] who, at the time of the hearing of
this matter, was 14
years of age.
[2]
On the 20
th
September 2018 V[...], who was 9 years old at the time, was injured
in a motor vehicle collision.
[3]
Subsequently V[...]’s mother, N[...]
M[...] H[...], instituted a claim on her behalf against the Road
Accident Fund (“Fund”).
[4]
The issues of the merits of the matter were
settled by the parties at the pre-trial conference of 13
th
June 2022 with the Fund conceding the merits in favour of the
plaintiff.
[5]
It further appears that the dispute
relating to the liability of the Fund for the payment of general
damages was settled between
the parties by agreement on the 18
th
October 2022. The plaintiff accepted an offer by the Fund for payment
in the amount of R 600,000.00 in respect of general damages.
[6]
There being no claim for past medical
expenses, the remaining issues for determination relate to the
estimated future loss of earnings
and future medical expenses.
[7]
I note that, at the hearing of the matter,
the representatives for the parties confirmed that, in the event that
an order was made
in the plaintiff’s favour, the subject of the
future medical expenses would be accounted for by means of an
undertaking by
the Fund in terms of section 17 (4) (a) of the Act.
THE PLAINTIFF’S
INJURIES
[8]
The hospital records indicate that on the
day of the accident V[...] was initially taken to Chamela Clinic
before she was transferred
and admitted to the Chris Hani Baragwanath
Hospital (“Baragwanath”) with a dislocated hip, fractures
to the right arm
and left hip, a laceration to her liver and a
laceration to her head.
[9]
Her score on the Glascow Coma Scale (“GCS”)
at the scene was reported as 15/15 however, this dropped to 10/15
when tested
at Chamela Clinic. Shortly after her arrival at the
clinic, she experienced a seizure and required resuscitation.
[10]
V[...] was stabilised and transferred to
Baragwanath later on the same day. On arrival at Baragwanath her GCS
score had dropped
to 6/15 and on further investigation she was found
to have sustained a right frontal brain haemorrhage.
[11]
Thereafter, and later during the day of the
collision her GSC score improved to 12/15.
[12]
V[...] received treatment for her multiple
injuries and was discharged from hospital on 5 October 2018.
[13]
Following this, on 10 June 2021, V[...]’s
injuries were assessed by a specialist neurosurgeon, Dr Mazwi, in
accordance with
the provisions of regulation 3 read with the
provisions of section 17 (1A) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of
1996 (“Act”).
[14]
I am aware that the regulations referred to
above relate to claims for non-pecuniary loss. Nonetheless, the
diagnosis which is recorded
on the “RAF4” form has not
been challenged by the Fund.
[15]
When the Fund’s representative was
asked directly whether there could be any challenge to proposition
that V[...] had suffered
a right frontal brain haemorrhage as a
result of the accident or that her subsequent seizure was as a result
of this injury it
was conceded that there could be no challenge.
[16]
Accordingly, it can be accepted that V[...]
sustained the injuries set out in paragraph 8 above, that she
suffered a seizure as
a result of her injuries and that the injury to
her head was severe.
THE EXPERT REPORTS
[17]
At the outset of the proceedings before me
the Fund had indicated that the objection to the evidence of the
experts related to the
reports of the neuro surgeon, Dr Mazwi, and
the neuropsychological and educational psychologist, Ms Margaret Anne
Gibson.
[18]
After the objections to the reliance on
expert affidavits had been withdrawn, the Fund’s representative
indicated that he
would limit his submissions to the evidence of Dr
Mazwi and Ms Gibson.
[19]
Neither party made any submissions
regarding the evidence of the remaining experts Dr Kumbirai
(orthopaedic surgeon), Dr Strydom
(industrial psychologist) and Mr
Willem Boshoff (actuary).
[20]
Dr Mazwi’s report notes that the
hospital records indicate that V[...] presented with a GSC score of
12/15.
[21]
This, according to the Fund, is indicative
of the fact that the head injury sustained by V[...] was moderate
rather than severe
on the reasoning that a score of under 9 is
indicative of a severe injury. This was the main thrust of the attack
on the report
of Dr Mazwi.
[22]
This reasoning cannot be sustained on the
information recorded in the hospital records, as set out above –
if anything the
total picture suggests that the injury sustained by
V[...] was rather more pronounced than a finding that she presented
with a
GCS score of 12/15 might suggest.
[23]
In any event, I note that the conclusions
reached by Dr Mazwi were based on a number of factors including a
general examination
of V[...] and a detailed neurological examination
in order to establish the full picture of any impairment resulting
from the injuries
sustained - the GCS score is but one factor to
consider and cannot be regarded in isolation.
[24]
It was further pointed out by the Fund that
the conclusion of Dr Mazwi’s report states both that V[...]
sustained a severe
head injury and mild head injury and that these
conclusions are incompatible.
[25]
The representative for the plaintiff
however made the submission that the one line stating that V[...] had
sustained a mild head
injury in the conclusion of a report spanning
nineteen pages and which is incompatible with everything else in the
report was probably
an error. I am inclined to agree.
[26]
I note that it is not disputed that V[...]
had reached maximal medical improvement by the time she was examined
by Dr Mazwi.
[27]
It was contended on behalf of the Fund
that, as the report of Dr Mazwi was unsustainable, on the reasoning
set out paragraphs 19,
20 and 23 above, the report of Ms Gibson could
not be sustained as the latter relied on the findings in the former.
[28]
I have already noted that the reasoning of
the Fund, which is based on the submission that a GCS score of 12/15
indicates that the
injury sustained by V[...] was moderate at best,
is flawed and cannot be sustained. It follows that this line of the
attack on
Ms Gibson’s report must also fail.
[29]
Ms Gibson’s report notes that, at the
time of the injury, V[...] was in grade 4 and had done well
scholastically.
[30]
The Fund makes much of the fact that, on
the evidence of her most recent report card, V[...] achieved very
well in certain of her
subjects.
[31]
This, so the argument goes, is indicative
of the fact that any difficulties which V[...] has experienced
following her injury must
be negligible.
[32]
This argument fails to consider that her
average has dropped from 67% at the end of grade 8 to under 60% in
grade 9 and that these
results are well below those attained in grade
4 in which year her average was 76%.
[33]
It is further apparent that, in certain
subjects, V[...] has begun to face challenges. By way of example her
mathematics results,
which were previously good, dropped
significantly on her most recent reports.
[34]
There was no challenge to the findings in
Ms Gibson’s report that the adverse effects of injuries of the
kind sustained by
V[...] are likely to become more manifest over the
course of her development to adulthood as the divergence between
injured and
non-injured people would tend to be more obvious over
time.
[35]
Additionally, there was no challenge to the
findings that, following a battery of tests, V[...] was found to have
various educational
deficiencies in literacy, numeracy fund of
knowledge, difficulty in comprehension of English and ability to
extract meaning from
print. All of these would eventually have
implications in the real world and scholastically. Importantly Ms
Gibson notes that educational
difficulties are likely to become more
evident as V[...] progresses through secondary school where the
quantity and nature of the
tasks she is expected to perform increases
and become more abstract and complex.
[36]
Ms Gibson in her report states that the
postmorbid educational outcome for V[...] is likely to be between
National Qualifying Level
(“NQF”) 4 to 6 which she notes
is a substantial deterioration from what could have been expected if
not for the injuries
sustained. For the sake of clarity, Ms Gibson
estimates that prior to her injury V[...] might have expected an
educational outcome
between NQF 7 and 8.
[37]
I note that the report records that both
V[...]’s parents only achieved a grade 11 qualification and
that neither are employed.
She further has two sisters, one older and
one younger, neither of whom have any difficulties however no further
information regarding
the scholastic achievements of V[...]’s
siblings is recorded.
[38]
I am mindful of the fact that the family
history as recorded in Ms Gibson’s report would probably need
to be taken into account
as a factor which may operate to lower
V[...]’s expected educational outcomes however this must be
weighed against her scholastic
achievements to date which, even now,
suggest that she may be capable of more than what her parents were
able to achieve.
[39]
The report of Dr Strydom, an industrial
psychologist, builds on that of Ms Gibson. She estimates that prior
to her injuries, and
assuming an educational outcome between NQF 7
and 8, V[...] would have entered the job market at a B4 or 5 level on
the Paterson
Scale and progressed to D2 or 3 level.
[40]
Importantly, Dr Strydom notes that
pre-morbid contingencies should be applied to accommodate
uncertainties regarding specific future
educational qualifications.
[41]
Regarding V[...]’s post morbid
potential, Dr Strydom bases her estimations on the projection that an
NQF 5 certificate would
be obtained which would translate potentially
to an entry into the job market at a B2 or 3 level (again on the
Paterson Scale)
with a progression to level C1 or 2.
[42]
Again, regarding V[...]’s post morbid
potential Dr Strydom acknowledges the fact that the outcomes
predicted in her report
would be subject to contingencies.
[43]
The most recent actuarial calculation
provided by the plaintiff applies a 20% contingency to the uninjured
future earnings and 30%
to the injured future earnings and notes that
a contingency differential of less than 20% would be normal in the
circumstances.
[44]
Based on these reports it would appear that
V[...] would have, but for her injuries, been capable of attaining a
degree qualification
at an NQF 7 or 8 level.
[45]
It would further appear that, after her
injuries, she might be expected to attain a certificate qualification
at an NQF 4 to 6 level.
CONTINGENCIES
[46]
It has been
noted by the court in the matter of Masemola v Road Accident Fund
[1]
that
the
determination of allowances for
contingencies
involves,
by its very nature, a process of subjective impression or estimation
rather than an objective calculation.
[47]
Further,
in the Quantum Yearbook
[2]
the
learned author points out that there are no fixed rules as regards
general contingencies. However, he suggests the following
guidelines:
"
Sliding scale:
0,5% per year to retirement age, i.e. 25% for a child, 20% for a
youth and 10% in the middle age . . .
Normal
contingencies: The RAF usually agrees to deductions of 5% for past
loss and 15% for future loss, the so-called normal contingencies.
"
[48]
In the matter of Masemola referred to above
the court noted that the
resultant
consequence of allowing a higher contingency deduction for pre-morbid
future loss of earnings is that a plaintiff will
get a lower award
for damages for loss of earnings.
[49]
The plaintiff in its heads of argument
submits that the court ought to accept a 20% contingency in respect
of “uninjured income”
and 30% in respect of “injured
income”.
[50]
Given
inter
alia
that V[...] was 9 years old at the
time of her injury and her family background I am of the view that
the application of a 25% contingency
in respect of “injured”
income would be justified.
[51]
I note that V[...]’s demonstrated
work ethic has enabled her to mitigate, to a degree, the challenges
she faces scholastically
to this point however she is still only 14
years of age and the full impact of her injuries on her future
prospects is difficult
to predict. I am accordingly satisfied that
the application of a 30% contingency in respect of “uninjured”
earnings
may be justified.
[52]
I am inclined in the circumstances to make
the projected “injured” income subject to a contingency
of 25%.
[53]
I am further inclined to make the projected
“uninjured” income subject to a contingency of 30%.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
[54]
I note that the plaintiff entered into a
contingency fee agreement with her attorneys on 7 August 2023. The
matter was heard before
me on 16 August 2023.
[55]
Having
considered the application of the principles enunciated in the matter
of Tjatji v Road Accident Fund and Two Similar Cases
[3]
I
am of the view that the contingency fee agreement is invalid.
[56]
Having revisited the actuarial calculation
in the light of the contingencies which I intend to apply as set out
above I have made
the following adjustments: The “Uninjured
Earnings” are reduced at R 10,982,850.00 and the “Injured
Earnings”
remain at R 6,694,350.00.
[57]
As a result, the quantum of the future loss
of earnings is reduced from an amount of R 5,466,980.00 to R
4,288,500.00.
[58]
I
note that provision has been made for the establishment of a trust
for the benefit of V[...] and that Standard Trust Limited have
consented to act as trustees. I note further that the proposed tariff
of fees appears to be in line with the customary charges
noted in the
matter of
Master
of the High Court (Pretoria Society of Advocates and others as Amici
Curiae) and related matters
[4]
.
[59]
The plaintiff’s attorneys have, in
its proposed draft order, included several provisions regulating
payment of their fees
by the plaintiff. Such matters ought properly
to be regulated by way of a fee mandate signed and agreed to between
the attorney
and the client.
[60]
The court is not entitled to make an
agreement between the plaintiff’s attorneys and the plaintiff
nor would it be proper,
in the absence of a dispute between the
plaintiff and her attorneys which I have been called upon to
adjudicate, for me to make
such an order.
[61]
I accordingly decline to act as a
collection agent for the plaintiff’s attorneys. In the event
that any issues regarding payment
of fees arises the plaintiff’s
attorneys are at liberty to approach the court for appropriate
relief.
Accordingly I make the
following order:
1.
The defendant is to make payment into the
trust account of the attorneys for the plaintiff in the amount of R
4,288,500.00 (four
million two hundred and eighty eight thousand five
hundred Rand).
2.
The amount set out above shall be held for
the benefit of V[...] A[...] H[...] pending the establishment of the
trust more fully
described below. On establishment of the trust, all
funds held on her behalf are to be transferred to the bank account of
the trust
together with any interest.
3.
The total amount of R 4,288,500.00 shall be
payable on or before one hundred and eighty days from the date of
this order.
4.
The defendant shall pay interest at the
rate of 10.5% per annum after one hundred and eighty days of this
order to date of full
and final payment.
5.
The plaintiff’s attorneys shall,
cause a trust to be established
in accordance with the
provisions of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 in favour of
V[...] A[...] H[...].
6.
The trust instrument establishing the trust shall make
provision for the following:
6.1.
the sole beneficiary of the trust shall be
V[...]
A[...] H[...]
;
6.2.
Standard Trust Limited shall be nominated
as trustee and the plaintiff’s mother as co-trustee;
6.3.
The co-trustee shall act in an advisory
capacity only and for this reason shall be excused from providing
security to the Master;
6.4.
the trustee shall immediately take all requisite steps to
secure an appropriate bond of security to the satisfaction of the
Master
of the High Court for the due fulfilment of their obligations
and ensure that the bond of security is submitted to the Master of
High Court;
6.5.
the trustee shall be required to disclose any personal
interest in any transaction involving the trust property;
6.6.
the contingent rights of the beneficiary
shall be excluded in the event of attachment or insolvency of the
minor child, prior to
the date of distribution to the beneficiary;
6.7.
the trust deed is to be amended only with
leave of the court;
6.8.
the trustee is to utilise the capital
amount and any income of the trust for the maintenance and benefit of
the beneficiary exclusively;
6.9.
the trustee shall be entitled to
remuneration in accordance with the tariff set out in paragraph 3 of
the consent signed by the
proposed trustee dated 1 August 2023 only;
6.10.
the trust may be terminated by order of
court;
6.11.
the costs and charges relating to the
administration of the trust, the costs and charges incidental to the
formation thereof (including
the costs of furnishing security to the
Master and the annual retention of the security) as well as the costs
of an annual audit
shall be borne by the defendant.
7.
The provisions referred to above shall be
subject to the approval of the Master.
8.
The defendant shall furnish to the plaintiff an undertaking in
terms of
section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996
,
for the costs of the future accommodation of the minor child in a
hospital or nursing home, or treatment of or rendering of service
or
supplying of goods to the beneficiary, arising out of the injuries
sustained in a motor vehicle collision on the 20
th
September 2018, and the
sequelae
thereof, after such costs
have been incurred and upon proof thereof.
9.
The defendant shall pay the plaintiff’s agreed or taxed
party and party High Court costs until to date.
10.
The defendant is to make payment of the plaintiff’s
taxed or agreed costs within one hundred and eighty (180) days of
taxation
or agreement.
11.
This order must be served by the plaintiff’s attorneys
on the Master of the High Court within thirty (30) days from the date
of the Court order.
WHITTINGTON
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Date of Hearing:
16
August 2023
Date of
Judgment: 2023
APPEARANCES
For
the Plaintiff:
Mr Kutama (Attorney with the right of appearance)
Instructed
by:
Kutama Attorneys
For
the Defendant:
Adv. Dokotela
Sondlani
Instructed
by:
Road Accident Fund
[1]
[2016]
JOL 36003
(SCA) at 13
[2]
Robert Koch (2017 Edition) at 126
[3]
2013 (2) SA 632 (GSJ)
[4]
[2022]
JOL 54227
(GP)
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