Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 504South Africa
Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v Ramabe (37524/2020) [2023] ZAGPJHC 504 (18 May 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
18 May 2023
Headnotes
JUDGMENT)
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v Ramabe (37524/2020) [2023] ZAGPJHC 504 (18 May 2023)
Changing Tides 17 (Pty) Ltd NO v Ramabe (37524/2020) [2023] ZAGPJHC 504 (18 May 2023)
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sino date 18 May 2023
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG)
Case no: 37524/2020
NOT REPORTABLE’
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
REVISED
18.05.23
In
the matter between:
CHANGING
TIDES 17 PROPRIETARY LIMITED N.O.
Plaintiff
And
RAMABE
,
MASHAKENG FRANS
Defendant
NEUTRAL
CITATION:
Changing Tides (Pty) Ltd
N.O. v Ramabe
(Case No: 37524/2020)
[2023] ZAGP JHC
504
(18 May 2023)
JUDGMENT (SUMMARY
JUDGMENT)
DELIVERED
:
This judgment was handed down
electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by e mail and publication
on CaseLines.
The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 14h00 on 18 May 2023
.
MOULTRIE AJ
[1]
The plaintiff seeks summary judgment in respect of a liquidated
amount in money due and owing pursuant to the defendant’s
breach of a loan agreement concluded by the parties, and an order
declaring the immovable property it holds as security for the
defendant’s indebtedness to be specially executable. The
plaintiff delivered an affidavit as contemplated in paragraph 10.17
of the practice manual setting out information in support of the
latter relief.
[2]
In his plea and in his affidavit opposing summary judgment, the
defendant does not dispute the alleged breach, the amount of
the
indebtedness or the security, but alleges that:
(a) the government
measures put in place to combat the COVID-19 pandemic “
had a
retrogressive impact on the normal servicing of the loan
”;
(b) the plaintiff failed
to comply with the requirements of
section 129
of the
National Credit
Act, 34 of 2005
in that the defendant has no knowledge of various
additional addresses (other than the agreed
domicilium
address) to which the plaintiff claims to have delivered the relevant
notice; and
(c) the mortgaged
property is his primary residence at which he resides with his family
including three minor children, and that
the plaintiff should be
required to first execute against his movable property in
satisfaction of the debt.
[3]
The defendant’s allegation of his inability to service the loan
as a result of the COVID-19 measures does not constitute
a valid
substantive defence to the plaintiff’s claim.
[4]
I am
furthermore satisfied that the plaintiff did indeed duly serve the
section 129
letter on the defendant. The loan agreement relied upon
by the plaintiff identifies the defendant’s chosen
domicilium
citandi et executandi
as being 17 Marble Street, Lenasia Ext 13, Gauteng, 1827.
[1]
While it appears that the plaintiff also purported to serve the
section 129
letter at various other addresses, the sheriff’s
return submitted by the plaintiff indicates that the
section 129
letter dated 23 September 2020 and addressed to the defendant at the
domicilium
address
[2]
was personally served
on the defendant by the Deputy Sheriff at the domicilium address at
15h02 on 28 September 2020.
[3]
[5]
While a
sheriff’s return only stands as
prima
facie
evidence of its contents,
[4]
it
calls for an answer, and places an evidential burden on the party
seeking to impeach it. That party must do so on the basis
of “
the
clearest and most satisfactory evidence
”.
[5]
The burden of the defendant’s contentions in this regard is
that he has never stayed at the additional addresses, and his
bald
denial of personal service does not in my view meet the standard
required to successfully impugn the sheriff’s return
of
service.
[6]
In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the plea does not raise any
substantive defence to the plaintiff’s claim and
that the
plaintiff is entitled to the monetary judgment that it seeks.
[7]
However,
since the loan agreement stipulates that the loan bears interest at a
variable rate, it is inappropriate to fix the interest
rate as at the
date of the certificate relied upon by the plaintiff, as sought in
its draft order.
[6]
The order
for interest should instead reflect the wording of the loan
agreement, with the result that the rate will continue to
vary
pursuant to changes in the relevant rate until such time as the debt
is finally discharged.
[8]
The interest rate provided for in the loan agreement as pleaded in
the (undisputed) particulars of claim is as follows:
“…
. the
mid-market rate for deposits in South African Rand for a period
ofthree months, which appears on the Reuters Screen, SAFEY
page under
the caption
"yield"
as of
approximately 11
:00
AM, Johannesburg
time on the date of registration of the … bond … and
would be reset thereafter on the same basis
on the 21 February, 21
May, 21 August and 21 November (or, if that day is not a business
day, the immediately succeeding business
day) ("the JIBAR rate")
converted to and expressed as a nominal annual rate, compounded
monthly, rounded up to the nearest
first decimal point ("the
BASE rate"), plus 3.80% …”
[9]
The order that I make reflects the contractually agreed formulation
with reference to the definition of the “base rate”
in
the loan agreement.
[10]
With regard to the order for special executability, I have taken into
account the following information gleaned from the papers
and from
the plaintiff’s paragraph 10.17 affidavit (which was not
disputed by the defendant at the hearing):
(a) The defendant’s
total indebtedness as of 21 October 2020 was approximately R650,000.
(b) It appears from the
instalment and account statements attached to the plaintiff’s
affidavit as “MJ5 and “MJ6”
that while the
defendant has been making payments on a fairly regular basis, these
have gradually reduced over time to R2,500 per
month and the total
indebtedness stood at approximately R695,000 as at December 2022.
This is in circumstances where the monthly
instalment is R6,913.95
and interest is accruing on the arrear balance in the amount of
approximately R5,770 per month.
(c) The municipal
valuation of the property is R728,000.
(d) An automated
‘Lightstone’ valuation dated 2 December 2022 identifies
the “
expected value
” of the property as being
R940,000.00.
(e) The plaintiff’s
valuation dated 12 January 2023 indicates the “
market value
”
to be R770,000 and the “
forced sale
” value to be
R600,000.
(f) The outstanding
municipal charges on the property as at November 2022 were
R101,332.91.
(g)
The
application of the ‘usual formula’ (i.e. the average of
the market valuation and the municipal valuation, less outstanding
municipal charges, less 30%)
[7]
would produce a result of approximately R453,366.96.
[11]
It appears from the above that the amount of the defendant’s
arrears has been steadily increasing and that there is little
prospect that his total or arrears indebtedness will be reduced, let
alone extinguished, in the foreseeable future. There also
appears to
be little equity remaining in the property over and above the amount
owed to the plaintiff. Furthermore, there is no
evidence before me of
the value of the defendant’s movable property – let alone
whether it would be sufficient to discharge
his indebtedness to the
plaintiff. Against that is the fact that the defendant specifically
agreed to mortgage the property as
security for the debt.
[12]
In those circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate that
the property should be sold in execution.
[13]
Having considered the various valuations and the outstanding
municipal charges, I am of the view that a reserve price of
R500,000.00
would be appropriate. I have calculated this on the basis
of the average of the Lightstone valuation, the market valuation and
the municipal valuation (which gives a result of R812,666.66), less
the outstanding municipal charges (R101,332.91), less 30%, and
rounding to the nearest R10,000.
[14]
I should add that it is common cause that the loan agreement provides
for the payment of enforcement costs by the defendant
on the attorney
and own client scale.
[15]
Judgment is granted in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant
for:
1.
Payment of the sum of R650,223.77.
2.
Interest on the above amount at the “base
rate” as defined in clause 1.1.5 of Annexure B to the
plaintiff’s particulars
of claim from time to time plus 3.80%
per annum compounded monthly in arrears from 21 October 2020 to date
of payment.
3.
The following property is declared
executable:
ERF [...] LENASIA
EXTENSION 13 TOWNSHIP, REGISTRATION DIVISION I.Q., PROVINCE OF
GAUTENG measuring 350 (three hundred and fifty)
square metres held by
Deed of Transfer No. T47550/2007 subject to the conditions therein
contained (“
the property
”).
4.
The Registrar is authorised to issue a Writ
of Execution for the attachment of the property.
5.
A reserve price in the amount of
R500,000.00 is set for the sale of the property in execution (“
the
reserve price
”).
6.
In the event that the reserve price is not
achieved at the first sale in execution, the plaintiff may:
a.
proceed to a second sale in execution with
the same reserve price; and/or
b.
approach this court on the same papers,
duly supplemented (including the sheriff’s report in terms of
Rule 46A9(c))
for the reconsideration of the reserve price; or
c.
approach this court on the same papers,
duly supplemented (including the sheriff’s report in terms of
Rule 46A9(c))
for the ratification and confirmation of a sale to the
highest bidder at the first or second sale in execution.
7.
The defendant may in terms of the
provisions of section 129(3)(a) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2004
at any time before the plaintiff
has cancelled the agreement
re-instate the agreement by paying the amounts referred to in
paragraph 8 below but the defendant may
not re-instate the agreement
in terms of section 129(4) after the sale of the property.
8.
The defendant may prevent the sale of the
property if he pays to the plaintiff all of the arrear amounts owing
to the plaintiff,
together with the plaintiff’s permitted
default charges and reasonable costs of enforcing the agreement up to
the time of
re-instatement, prior to the property being sold in
execution.
9.
The arrear amounts, enforcement costs and
default charges referred to in paragraph 8 above may be obtained from
the plaintiff.
10.
The defendant is advised that the arrear
amount is not the full amount of the Judgment debt, but the amount
owing by the defendant
to the plaintiff without reference to the
accelerated amount.
11.
A copy of this order is to be served
personally on the defendant as soon as is practical after the order
is granted, but prior to
any sale in execution.
12.
Costs of suit on the attorney and client
scale.
RJ Moultrie AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
DATE HEARD: 16 January
2023
JUDGMENT: 18 May 2023
APPEARANCES
For
the Plaintiff:
M Amojee
Instructed
by
Strauss Daly Inc.
For
the Defendant:
In
Person
[1]
Caselines 013-34, 38, 40, 43 and 33.
[2]
Caselines 013-81.
[3]
Caselines 013-89.
[4]
Section 43(2)
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
.
[5]
Deputy-Sheriff,
Witwatersrand District v Goldberg
1905 TS 680
at 684;
Sasfin
Bank Limited v Vareltzis
2018
JDR 1347 (GP) paras 206 - 217
[6]
I note that section 1(1) of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act, 55
of 1975 (in terms of which the rate of interest is fixed
“
as
at the time when … interest begins to run
”
– see
Davehill
(Pty) Ltd and Others v Community Development Board
1988 (1) SA 290
(A) at 300I – 301C), does not apply.
[7]
Cf.
National
Urban Reconstruction & Housing Agency NPC v Morula Resources CC
2020 JDR 2473 (GJ) footnote 21.
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