Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 725South Africa
Mavudzi v Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng Division, Johannesburg (31864/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 725 (26 June 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
26 June 2023
Headnotes
of the evidence upon which Mr. Majola actually relied when he formed the suspicion necessary to sustain the warrant application.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Mavudzi v Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng Division, Johannesburg (31864/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 725 (26 June 2023)
Mavudzi v Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng Division, Johannesburg (31864/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 725 (26 June 2023)
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sino date 26 June 2023
IN THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG)
Case
No.
31864/2022
NOT
REPORTABLE
NOT
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
REVISED
26.06.23
In the matter between:
MAXWELL
MAVUDZI
Applicant
and
DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS,
GAUTENG
DIVISION: JOHANNESBURG
Respondent
##### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
WILSON
J:
1
The applicant, Mr. Mavudzi, applies to
rescind the dismissal of a point
in
limine
he first raised in a bail
application three years ago. The substance of the point was that his
arrest, on multiple charges of money
laundering, fraud and
racketeering, was unlawful because there was no information under
oath before the Magistrate who issued the
arrest warrant that could
have given rise to a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Mavudzi had
committed an offence. The contention was
that the warrant was applied
for on 17 March 2015 on the strength of allegations made in
complainant statements that were only
made on 10 April 2015. It was
argued that the applicant for the warrant, a Mr. Majola, could not
reasonably have suspected that
Mr. Mavudzi was guilty of an offence
at the time he applied for the warrant.
2
Du Plessis AJ, who heard the bail
application, rejected that submission. He did so the basis that, at
the time Mr. Majola applied
for the warrant, he had in his possession
complainant statements that predated the warrant, and which were
sufficient to justify
the arrest. Those statements were commissioned
in 2014. This was confirmed in an affidavit from the investigating
officer in Mr.
Mavudzi’s case, which was handed up to Du
Plessis AJ, and referred to as “Exhibit B” in his ruling
dismissing
the point
in limine
.
3
Having dismissed the point
in limine
Du
Plessis AJ went on to refuse bail. Mr. Mavudzi’s attempts to
appeal that decision were unsuccessful.
Undeterred, Mr.
Mavudzi issued a fresh application to have his arrest declared null
and void on more or less the same basis as he
had argued in his point
in limine
before Du Plessis AJ. That
application came before Gilbert AJ who, unsurprisingly, dismissed it
because the issue of the lawfulness
of Mr. Mavudzi’s arrest is
res judicata
.
4
In his judgment, Gilbert AJ remarked that
Mr. Mavudzi had made serious allegations of fraud against Mr. Majola.
The substance of
those allegations is that Mr. Majola had falsely
assured Du Plessis AJ that the warrant of arrest was applied for on
the basis
of the affidavit from the investigating officer, Exhibit B.
However, that affidavit turns out to have been deposed to after the
warrant was applied for. It follows, Mr. Mavudzi argues, that the
investigating officer’s affidavit could not have formed
part of
the material upon which the warrant was applied for, or the basis on
which Mr. Majola formed the reasonable suspicion he
was required to
have entertained before the application could properly have been
lodged. Mr. Majola’s apparent assertion
that Exhibit B formed
part of the material upon which he applied for the warrant was the
respect in which Mr. Majola is said to
have misled Du Plessis AJ.
5
Mr. Majola did not depose to an affidavit before Gilbert AJ.
This does not surprise me, as the mainstay of the DPP’s
opposition
to that application was that the issues raised were
res
judicata
. There would have been little point in feeding the
erroneous assertion that there were new facts to adjudicate by
attempting to
join issue with more of Mr. Mavudzi’s allegations
than was strictly necessary. However, Gilbert AJ was less than
impressed
with Mr. Majola’s failure to explain the discrepancy
Mr. Mavudzi identified. Gilbert AJ found “for the purposes”
of the proceedings before him that Mr. Mavudzi had “established
the misrepresentations upon which he relies” (
Mavudzi v
Director Public Prosecutions Gauteng Local Division
[2021]
ZAGPJHC 418 (23 September 2021) (“the Gilbert AJ judgment”),
paragraph 53).
6
Gilbert AJ went on to suggest that, although Mr. Mavudzi’s
allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation could not be entertained
in the proceedings before him, they might found an application to
rescind and set aside Du Plessis AJ’s judgment on the basis
that it was obtained by fraud (see the Gilbert AJ judgment, paragraph
62). Critically, however, Gilbert AJ did not make a finding
that Mr.
Majola had intentionally misled Du Plessis AJ or that Du Plessis AJ’s
judgment had been fraudulently obtained. Gilbert
AJ’s
observation that “there may be an innocent explanation”
for the discrepancy Mr. Mavudzi relied upon is wholly
inconsistent
with either conclusion (see the Gilbert AJ judgment paragraph 51).
7
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that Gilbert AJ’s
judgment excited a fresh sense of grievance. Mr. Mavudzi applied to
have
Mr. Majola struck from the roll of advocates on the basis that
he had intentionally misled Du Plessis AJ. That application failed
because Mr. Mavudzi relied on nothing more than the Gilbert AJ
judgment to support it. Predictably, Sutherland DJP (with whom
Molahlehi J agreed) found that Gilbert AJ’s conclusions were
not sufficient to support a factual finding that Mr. Majola had
misled Du Plessis AJ (see
Mavudzi v Majola
2022 (6) SA 420
(GJ), paragraph 27).
8
That brings me – finally – to the application
before me, in which it is contended, substantially on the basis of
Gilbert
AJ’s tentative findings, that the ruling of Du Plessis
AJ was obtained by fraud, and that it should be rescinded on that
basis. As should be abundantly clear by now, however, Mr. Mavudzi has
established neither that there was a fraud nor that Du Plessis
AJ
made his ruling as a result of it.
9
In the first place, fraud has not been established. Gilbert AJ
did not find that it was. He accepted that “there may be an
innocent explanation” for the discrepancy Mr. Mavudzi
identified. In the absence of any facts other than the judgment of
Gilbert AJ, which itself allows for the possibility of an “innocent
explanation”, fraud cannot be inferred. In any
event, the
respondent, the DPP, denies that there is anything to explain. The
DPP says that Mr. Majola applied for the warrant
on the basis of the
2014 complainant statements, which were enough in themselves to
justify Mr. Mavudzi’s arrest. The DPP
denies that Mr. Majola
assured Du Plessis AJ that Exhibit B formed part of the material upon
which the warrant was applied for.
The DPP argues that Mr. Majola had
no need to do this, because the 2014 complainant statements were
enough in themselves to underpin
a reasonable suspicion that Mr.
Mavudzi had committed an offence.
10
Indeed, having myself read Du Plessis AJ’s ruing
closely, I think that the most natural interpretation of it is that
Du Plessis
AJ in fact knew that Exhibit B was not part of the
material upon which the warrant was applied for. He seems rather to
refer to
Exhibit B as a useful summary of the evidence upon which Mr.
Majola actually relied when he formed the suspicion necessary to
sustain
the warrant application.
11
Moreover, whether or not Du Plessis AJ thought that Exhibit B
was part of the material upon which Mr. Majola decided to apply for
the warrant, Exhibit B was plainly not the only material upon which
Du Plessis AJ relied to conclude that the arrest warrant was
lawfully
obtained. Du Plessis AJ also refers to and relies upon the 2014
complainant statements, which obviously predate the application
for a
warrant by many months. Indeed, in an application brought for similar
relief on the same facts by one of Mr. Muvudzi’s
co-accused,
Fisher J said that the proposition that Exhibit B was the only
information before the Magistrate was “concocted”
(see
the judgment of Fisher J in
Dube v Director of Public
Prosecutions, Gauteng
(case no. 42296/2020 in this court),
paragraph 38). I agree, but whether or not it was concocted, the
proposition was plainly wrong.
12
Mr. Mavudzi argues that the 2014 complainant statements do not
implicate him, but that proposition must be taken to have been
examined
and rejected by Du Plessis AJ in his judgment dismissing the
bail application. Even if I were inclined to revisit the issue of
whether the 2014 complaint statements were enough to ground the
application for an arrest warrant (I am not so inclined), I would
be
precluded from doing so for the same reason that Gilbert AJ refused
to revisit the lawfulness of Mr. Mavudzi’s arrest:
the issue is
res judicata
.
13
It follows that the application cannot succeed. Mr.
Georgiades, who appeared for the DPP, pressed two points
in
limine
. The first was that I lack jurisdiction to entertain the
recission application, because the proceedings before Du Plessis AJ
are
comprehensively regulated by the bail provisions of the
Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977
, which does not allow for the recission of
bail judgments.
It is, however, trite that the
nature of a legal proceeding is determined by its subject matter, not
its form (
Sita v Olivier
1967 (2) SA 442
(A), 449B-E).
While it is true that the ruling
Mr. Mavudzi seeks to rescind was made in the context of a bail
application, the subject matter
of the point
in limine
Mr.
Mavudzi pursued was the lawfulness of his arrest. The dismissal of
the point
in limine
was a civil ruling that was capable, in
principle, of being rescinded.
14
Mr. Georgiades next contended that the recission application
is
res judicata
. However, I do not think that the question of
whether the fraudulent misrepresentation Mr. Mavudzi alleges led to
the judgment
sought to be rescinded has been determined before in
proceedings between these parties. The judgment of Fisher J in
Dube
did address that question, but Mr. Mavudzi was not a party to that
application.
15
Moreover, I do not think that it is wise to decide this
application on procedural grounds if that can be avoided. Mr. Mavudzi
and
his co-accused have shown themselves to be enthusiastic
litigators. To decide the matter on procedural grounds would be to
invite
Mr. Mavudzi to repackage his pre-occupation with the
lawfulness of his arrest, and to encourage him to pursue the issue
again in
another forum. I wish to do nothing to encourage that
outcome.
16
To emphasise: it has not been demonstrated that Mr. Majola
intentionally misled Du Plessis AJ. But even if it had, the alleged
misrepresentation
made no difference to Du Plessis AJ’s
decision to dismiss Mr. Mavudzi’s point
in limine
.
17
Mr. Mavudzi has been incarcerated for several years. He is
litigating an issue closely associated with pending criminal
proceedings.
He is doing so without the benefit of legal
representation. His aim is to be set free. In these circumstances, a
costs order against
him would be wholly inappropriate, even though
his arguments are manifestly lacking in merit.
18
For all these reasons, the application is dismissed, with each
party paying their own costs.
S D J WILSON
Judge of the High Court
This judgment was
prepared by Judge Wilson. It is handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties or their legal representatives
by email,
by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on Caselines,
and by publication of the judgment to the South African
Legal
Information Institute. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 26 June
2023.
HEARD ON: 2 June 2023
DECIDED ON: 26 June 2023
For
the Applicant:
In
person
For
the Respondent:
C
Georgiades SC
Instructed
by
the
State Attorney
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