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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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[2023] ZAGPJHC 1067
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## Fuel Retailers Association v Minister Of Energy and Others (28818/2014)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1067; [2023] 4 All SA 739 (GJ) (22 September 2023)
Fuel Retailers Association v Minister Of Energy and Others (28818/2014)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1067; [2023] 4 All SA 739 (GJ) (22 September 2023)
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sino date 22 September 2023
FLYNOTES:
ADMINISTRATIVE – Regulatory accounting system –
Adoption
and implementation
–
Lawfulness
–Wholesalers may not indirectly operate retail site or
exercise substantial control over it – Implemented
RAS
allows wholesalers and oil companies to do exactly that –
Rationale underlying prohibition on vertical integration
is
undermined – Object of government’s policy is
prevented from being achieved by manner of implementation –
RAS at odds with legislative regime and amenable to review –
Petroleum Products Act 120 of 1977
,
s 2A(5)(a).
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Case
No: 28818/2014
REPORTABLE
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
22.09.23
In the matter between:
THE
FUEL RETAILERS’
ASSOCIATION
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF ENERGY
First
Respondent
THE
CONTROLLER OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
Second
Respondent
THE SOUTH AFRICAN
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION
Third
Respondent
PETROSA
(SOC)
LTD
Fourth
Respondent
THE
RETAIL MOTOR INDUSTRY ORGANISATION
Fifth
Respondent
AMISTEC
(PTY) LTD T/A LIQUID FUELS WHOLESALERS
Sixth
Respondent
PETROLEUM
RETAILERS ALIGNMENT FORUM
Seventh Respondent
ROYALE
ENERGY
Eighth Respondent
NATIONAL
ENERGY REGULATOR OF SOUTH AFRICA
Ninth Respondent
Coram
:
Ingrid Opperman J
Heard
:
27 and 28 October 2023
Delivered
:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by email. The date
and time for
hand-down is deemed to be 14h00 on 22 September 2023
Summary
:
The Fuel Retailers Association applied to review and set aside a
decision to adopt and implement an accounting system for
the
Petroleum Sector (the RAS) – the RAS does not make provision in
its retail margin for Entrepreneurial Compensation (EC)
for retailers
in Company Owned and Retailer Operated (CORO) sites. The Department
of Mineral Resources and Energy (the DoE) contended
that the EC
should be negotiated from the CAPEX portion of the retail margin by
the oil companies forfeiting a portion of the CAPEX.
SAPIA contended
that the EC should be negotiated from the notional EC published in
the BSS Matrix annually which notional EC is
carved out from the
CAPEX - the court held that the retailers are as of right
entitled to EC and should not have to negotiate
with the oil
companies to ‘forfeit’ a part of the CAPEX -– court
held further
that a decision
which requires the parties to negotiate is not per se irrational but
a decision which requires parties to negotiate
where i) the
negotiating power is unequal; ii) the default position is that the
oil company (the more powerful contracting party)
must relinquish
something; and iii) no guidelines or factors have been put into place
to consider during this bargaining process,
is irrational –
court found that the model is fundamentally flawed for CORO sites as
the
RAS
Matrix’s Benchmark Service Station is a Retailer Owned Retailer
Operated (RORO) site – majority of service stations
in SA are
CORO sites – Benchmark Service Station should cater for this
reality.
Order
1.
Condonation for the applicant’s
failure to bring this review application within 180 days of the
original decision referred
to paragraph 2 hereof alternatively within
a reasonable time, is granted.
2.
The original decision of the first
respondent or her delegates [the Minister], taken in November 2013,
to implement the RAS without
providing for a ring-fenced
Entrepreneurial Compensation (EC) to be claimed exclusively by the
retailers in Company Owned Retailer
Operated (CORO) sites and/or
specifying the items to be claimed under the EC by retailers in CORO
sites, is reviewed and set aside.
3.
The determination of the treatment and
calculation of the EC for retailers in CORO sites as an allocation
within the retail margin
of the RAS (the determination) is referred
back to the first respondent [the Minister] to decide in accordance
with this Court’s
judgment, within a period of 9 months from
the date of this order.
4.
Pending the determination, the 2020 RAS
Benchmark Service Station Matrix and any subsequently issued (or yet
to be issued) Matrices
are to remain in force and effect.
5.
Pending the determination, the
status
quo
of the outcome of each CORO site
fuel retailer’s negotiation with its fuel supplier/landlord is
to be maintained and all new
agreements still to be concluded between
CORO site retailer’s and fuel suppliers/landlords are to be on
the basis that the
Minister’s decision has not been reviewed or
set aside.
6.
The first, second and third respondents are
to pay the costs of this application, jointly and severally, the one
paying the other
to be absolved such costs to include the costs of
two counsel where so employed.
JUDGMENT
INGRID OPPERMAN J
# Introduction
Introduction
[1]
The Applicant (
the
Fuel Retailers Association
) applies to
review and set aside the Minister of Energy’s (
the
Minister)
decision to adopt and
implement the Regulatory Accounting System for the Petroleum Sector
(
the RAS
)
to the extent that it establishes a retail margin for the activity of
selling petrol to end-users without providing a trading
margin, also
referred to as an Entrepreneurial Compensation (
EC
),
for retailers to compensate them for the dispensing services they
provide. The Minister and the Controller of Petroleum Products
(
the
Controller
) - the Second Respondent who
also holds the position of Deputy Director-General in the Department
of Mineral Resources and Energy
– (
the
DoE
) and the
South African Petroleum Industry Association (
SAPIA
),
the Third Respondent, oppose the application.
[2]
The Fuel Retailers Association represents
the small business-owners and entrepreneurs within the retail sector
who operate fuel
service stations across the country.
Key activities in
the fuel supply chain
[3]
The procurement of crude oil in South
Africa is not regulated, nor is the refining of crude oil. However,
government, through the
DoE, amongst others, regulates the price of
petrol at service stations. In this manner, government determines the
allowable returns
on investments in all petrol activities once it
leaves the refinery gate.
[4]
The key activities in the fuel supply
chain are: (a) refining which represents the large and
established oil companies; (b)
primary storage, which is the
storage of fuel within the refinery boundaries; (c) wholesale
operations which include the
primary distribution and marketing of
petroleum products; (d) secondary storage facilities which is
the storage of petroleum
products at storage facilities throughout
the country, (refined petroleum products are transported from
refineries to storage facilities
in bulk); (e) secondary
distribution, which is the distribution of fuel from secondary
storage facilities to points of sale;
(f) retailing which is
mostly the sale of petrol and diesel through a service station
network.
[5]
This application concerns, in the main,
this last stage i.e. retailing. Retailing is a licensed activity in
South Africa. Retail
stations typically also offer other petroleum
products like paraffin, lubricants and other related services such as
a convenience
store and car wash. Retail stations may be both owned
and operated by a retailer (a retailer owned retailer operator or
RORO
site)
but are far more commonly owned by one of the oil companies and
operated by a retailer (a company owned retailer operated
or
CORO
site). The distinction is important because
the retailer of a CORO site has additional costs that a RORO retailer
does not
have, including those associated with the lease and
franchise agreements concluded with the oil company that owns or
holds a long
lease over the site.
Background
[6]
Prior to December 2011, the fuel industry
was regulated based on the Marketing of Petroleum Activities Return
(‘
MPAR’
)
system and the guidelines thereto. The MPAR system employed a
methodology that permitted retailers to claim operating expenses
and
EC (entrepreneurial compensation) to compensate them for the service
they provide through the fuel retailing business. There
were several
difficulties associated with the MPAR system. This then led to the
appointment of Bates White, a company based in
Washington DC in the
USA, at the behest of the DoE to undertake a review of the petrol
price accounting system.
[7]
To implement certain of the Bates White
recommendations, the DoE (Department of Mineral Resources and Energy)
appointed the Institute
for Petroleum and Research (‘
the
IPSR’
) to develop recommendations
on the RAS (Regulatory Accounting System for the Petroleum Sector) to
enable the Minister to set the
activity-based margins for each level
on an annual basis. The report of the IPSR (Institute for Petroleum
and Research) recognised
that company owned retailer operated or CORO
sites are the majority in South Africa – both in number and in
terms of volume
of petrol sold. The ‘company’ in this
context is the oil company. Despite this, the report based its
Benchmark Service
Station (
BSS
)
on a retailer owned retailer operator or RORO site.
[8]
The DoE engaged in informal consultation
with stakeholders between 12 April 2011 and 21 November 2013. The DoE
established a RAS
technical Committee chaired by DoE representatives
comprising representatives of most stakeholders including retailers.
[9]
Between the introduction of RAS in December
2011 and its final implementation in December 2013, stakeholders were
afforded the opportunity
to align their contracts with the margins
set out in the RAS Matrix which would come into effect in December
2013.
[10]
Since no agreement on the need for
entrepreneurial compensation or EC had been reached by December 2011,
it was agreed in the RAS
Technical Committee that during the
transitional stage (the so-called
Rapid
RAS stage
), the RAS would provide for
entrepreneurial compensation or EC by carving out a portion of the
small stock premium and marketability
adjustment margins. Throughout
this transitional period, an amount of 17,9 cents per litre had been
identified and allocated in
the retail margin of the RAS as an
entrepreneurial compensation or EC amount. This arrangement was
agreed to, to ensure that entrepreneurial
compensation or EC could be
recovered, even though none had expressly been provided for in the
RAS model.
[11]
In December 2013, the Minister decided to
finally approve the RAS.
The Litigation
History
[12]
In August of 2014, the Fuel Retailers
Association launched the current application in order to obtain
clarity on whether the EC
was accommodated within the RAS and to
compel the Minister to undertake the consultation process required to
properly regulate
the EC and setting aside the Minister’s
failure to decide whether to prohibit any business practice, method
of trading,
agreement, arrangement, scheme or understanding which has
the effect of allowing oil companies to recover from the EC
allocation
of the fuel retail margin. The debate at that stage, as
the Fuel Retailers Association understood it, was about the purpose
and
proper implementation of the retail margin and how the EC was to
be calculated and claimed by the retailers.
[13]
In answer to that application the DoE
contended that the RAS does not provide for an EC allocation at all
and that the RAS structure
leaves it to the investor (that is, the
owner of the asset at retail level – which is usually an oil
company) and the retailer
to negotiate what proportion of the
investor’s return on investment can be forfeited to the
retailer. The DoE explained that
the EC was only included in the
retail margin for the Rapid Ras stage to align commercial agreements
before the full RAS implementation
in December 2013. This resulted in
the need for the relief sought in prayer 1 of the notice of motion
falling away. Thereafter,
the stakeholders embarked on a further
consultation process which resulted in the relief sought in prayer 2
of the notice of motion
also falling away. After some
interlocutory skirmishes, the notice of motion was amended and
currently the Fuel Retailers
Association is seeking the substantive
relief formulated in paragraphs 5 and 7 of the amended notice of
motion only, such relief
being:
‘
5.
Reviewing and setting aside the original decision of the first
respondent or her delegates [the Minister], taken in November
2013,
to implement the RAS without providing for a ring-fenced EC to be
claimed exclusively by the retailers and/or specifying
the items to
be claimed under the EC by retailers;
……
..
7. Directing that
the determination of the treatment and calculation of the EC as an
allocation within the retail margin of
the RAS is referred back to
the first respondent [the Minister] to decide, in accordance with
this Court’s judgment, within
a period of three months from the
date of this order;’
[14]
It was made plain that the Fuel Retailers
Association were not pursuing a freedom of trade case and were thus
not persisting in
seeking the relief in paragraph 9 of the amended
notice of motion i.e. that the implementation of the RAS without an
allocated
and ring-fenced EC (or trading margin) to be claimed
exclusively by the retailers is a breach of section 9(3) of the
Constitution
and thus unlawful and invalid. Condonation insofar it
was necessary for the failure to have brought the review within 180
days
of the Minister’s decision alternatively a reasonable
time, was not opposed. I will endorse the agreement relating to
condonation.
The RAS
[15]
The RAS is a model and methodology that
stipulates the ‘margin’ (in cents per litre) that accrues
to each identified
activity along the retail petroleum value chain.
Regulated firms may not increase their prices in order to achieve
more than this
allowable profit margin. In this way, the
Government not only controls and determines the end-price of petrol
(which is directly
regulated through the publication of a regulated
pump price), but also the profit that can be earned by each sector
within the
petroleum retailing industry.
[16]
The RAS is contained in three documents:
(1) the Regulatory Margin Model Guidelines (
the
Guidelines
), (2) the Benchmark Service
Station RAS Matrix (
the RAS Matrix
)
and (3) the 15 principles governing the RAS (
the
Principles
).
[17]
The Guidelines set out the accounting
principles, policies, methods and definitions that stakeholders must
use when completing their
regulated returns for submission to the
DoE. The Controller contends that the RAS was introduced to
participants in the fuel industry
through the distribution of the
Guidelines.
[18]
Each year, the DoE publishes the RAS Matrix
which sets out the composition of the retail margin in real terms
(i.e. cents per litre).
[19]
The DoE has described the objects of RAS as
i) eliminating all possible cross-subsidisation between products and
between the different
activities in the value chain of fuel supply
and ii) promoting the investments in assets in the said value chain
by ring-fencing
these activities, applying an appropriate return on
investments, and providing for the recovery of allowable operating
costs.
[20]
The 15 RAS Principles are quoted in full
and are:
‘
1.
Economic principle
: The RAS is based on petrol
only and therefore eliminates cross-subsidisation between fuels and
market channels.
2.
Regulatory Rule. The RAS retail margin is based on a RORO site and
the full retail·margin will accrue to the service
station
operators. The allocation of the retail margin between operators and
investors is not regulated.
3.
The value of Opex and Capex of a BSS will be added into one line
item, "Retail margin" in the petrol price structures.
4.
Regulatory principle: Secondary Storage and Secondary
Distribution will be indicated as separate line items in the
petrol
price structures.
5.
The DoE will have the prerogative to request financial and
other data in line with the provisions of the Regulatory Accounts
Margin
Guidelines from any licensed wholesaler with the DoE and any
secondary storage owner licensed with the National Energy Regulator
of South Africa in order to determine RAS margins.
6.
RAS should be relevant, robust and transparent;
7.
RAS should promote efficiency through benchmarking;
8.
RAS should promote investment and growth through greater regulatory
certainty;
9.
RAS should minimise costs and market distortions;
10.
RAS should be clear, simple and practical for users, minimizing
regulatory burden.
11.
RAS methodology should be consistent, transparent and provide a fair
remuneration that promotes sustainable operations and investment
across the activities.
12.
Commercial arrangements between asset owners and asset operators are
not regulated from a price perspective.
13.
RAS should harmonise the methodology for calculating margins with the
methodology utilised by NERSA to calculate tariffs for
petroleum
pipelines and storage facilities.
14.
Wholesale margin will be indicated as a separate line item in the
petrol price structures.
15.
These principles are intended to provide insight and guidance into
the RAS methodology. They do not represent regulation
and do not
replace or supersede the various Acts and Regulations governing the
lndustry.
[21]
The RAS margins, together with
several other regulatory costs, inform the Minister’s
determination of the pump price of petrol
for the end consumer.
[22]
As mentioned, the RAS stipulates a margin
for each activity. This application is concerned only with the
margin allocated
to the retailing sector within the petroleum
industry. The retail margin includes a return on the capital
for the owner of
the assets portion (
CAPEX)
through which they can achieve a return on their
investment or capital expenditure in the assets required along the
petroleum value
chain (tanks, storage units, pumps, land and the
like), and an operating costs portion (
OPEX
)
which is a straight cost-recovery facet to compensate parties for the
costs involved in providing the services required along
the petroleum
value chain. The OPEX recovery is not a profit-making margin. It
covers costs such as labour and overheads incurred
by the service
station operator (the retailer) in distributing petrol without adding
a return or margin.
[23]
The RAS does not differentiate between RORO
and CORO sites but the margins it provides for are based on and
benchmarked against
a RORO site.
[24]
In theory, both the OPEX recovery and CAPEX
return will be recovered by a retailer in a RORO site. In a CORO
site, the retailer
will recover the OPEX and the oil company the
CAPEX return.
[25]
Business practices dictate that an entity
would not retail for cost recovery only. In the normal course, a
company or entity is
rewarded a profit commensurate with the risk
involved in that business.
[26]
The retailers’ margin on petrol can
never be more than the difference between the cost of the petrol
after all other stakeholders
have taken their margins, and the
regulated pump price. Retailers cannot increase their margin by
increasing the price of the petrol
that they sell because the
consumer petrol price is set by regulation. The fuel retailers
consequently have an extremely limited
scope to determine the trading
margin (and subsequent profit) earned per litre of petrol sold at
their fuel station.
What is an EC?
[27]
An entrepreneurial compensation allocation
(or trading margin) is a portion of the retail margin, over and above
the OPEX recovery,
that would be allocated to retailers to compensate
them for the provision of services associated with operating service
stations.
They ensure a return on a retailer’s risk and
investment in providing services.
[28]
The Fuel Retailers Association argues that
the RAS makes no provision for an EC for parties that do not own any
assets, and whose
business is purely a service-business. As
stated, most fuel retailers in the country fall into this category:
they do not
own the assets required to dispense fuel – they
lease them from wholesale oil companies under franchise and lease
agreements.
Under the RAS, these asset-less retailers can retain only
the OPEX portion of the retail margin which covers their operating
expenses.
[29]
There appears to be a disconnect between
the formal RAS methodology recorded in the documents and the
practical way the DoE expects
the model to operate.
[30]
The RAS methodology provides only for
a CAPEX and OPEX portion in the retail margin. The EC does not exist
as an element of the
retail margin at all. The RAS Matrix
consequently does not include any allocation that recognises and
compensates retailers
for the investment they have made in the
business of operating a retail station. In practice, however, the DoE
accommodates the
EC within the CAPEX portion of the retail margin. It
describes this as a ‘split’ of the CAPEX margin into the
EC and
the margin for the investor in the service station assets.
Each year, the DoE publishes the split in the full return on CAPEX
in
the RAS Matrix.
[31]
The DoE published a 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
and 2018 RAS Matrix. Each of these Matrices includes an EC referred
to herein as the
notional EC.
[32]
With reference to the 2015 RAS Matrix, the
notional EC can be identified as follows: The total retail margin is
161.7 cents per
litre. This comprises of i) the line items
constituting the OPEX margin contributions with a total of 90.3 cents
per litre; ii)
the line items constituting the CAPEX with a
total of 48 cents per litre. In the final sum, the CAPEX portion is
recorded as 71.4
cents per litre. This is because the notional EC
return of 23.4 cents per litre is included in the CAPEX portion of
the retail
margin to comprise the total CAPEX margin distribution.
[33]
In short: a portion of the CAPEX is carved
out and is labelled ‘EC’. This is reflected in the RAS
Matrix published by
the DoE. This is a recommendation/guideline
published by the DoE but one which appears to be adhered to by all
stakeholders. It
would also seem that this notional EC was brought
across from the transitional stage (the Rapid RAS stage).
[34]
The DoE has left it to the retailers and
the oil companies to negotiate as there are different business models
in the petroleum
space. The Controller explained this in October 2013
as follows:
‘…
..Both
parties would know what is due to them when they engage in
discussions to align the agreement with RAS as expected…..’.
[35]
The issue in part is whether the EC is to
be left to the parties to negotiate or whether the Minister should
regulate how much is
to go to either party or to, at the very least,
provide the factors which ought to be considered when negotiating
this split.
[36]
In sum:
36.1
The RAS does not provide for an EC.
36.2
RAS leaves it to the investor and the
retailer to decide what portion of the investor’s return on
investment (CAPEX) it can
afford to forfeit to the retailer.
36.3
There is no express provision in any of the
Guidelines, Matrices or Principles which entitles the retailers to
claim an EC from
the CAPEX margin.
36.4
A notional EC is carved out from the pure
CAPEX by the DoE and published annually in the RAS Matrix.
36.5
This notional EC published by the DoE is,
in practice, split between oil company and retailer in negotiation.
Nature of the
decision
[37]
The decision to implement the RAS was taken
on 25 November 2013, when the Minister approved and signed the
following recommendation:
‘
The
implementation of the RAS margins into the retail price structure of
petrol; and
The margins applicable to
the wholesale price structures of diesel and IP.’
[38]
The first question which falls for
determination is whether the Minister’s decision is executive
action or a policy decision
that is exempt from judicial review under
PAJA.
[39]
In
SARFU
,
[1]
the Constitutional Court held that in determining whether a
particular act constitutes administrative action, the inquiry should
focus on the nature of the power exercised and not the identity of
the actor. The Constitutional Court stressed that the
mere fact
that the decision-maker is part of the executive arm of government
does not mean that the action is executive.
The relevant
question is whether the task itself is administrative. In this
regard, the focus of the enquiry must be the
“
nature
of the power
”
the
decision-maker is exercising.
[2]
The Court went on to note a number of other considerations that may
be relevant to determining “
which
side of the line a particular action falls
”:
‘
The
source
of
the power, though not necessarily decisive, is a relevant factor. So,
too, is the
nature
of
the power, its
subject-matter,
whether it involves the
exercise of a
public duty
and how closely it is
related
on
the one hand
to policy matters
,
which are not administrative, and on the other
to
the implementation of legislation
,
which is.’ (emphasis provided)
[40]
The
Court held that when a senior member of the executive is engaged in
the implementation of legislation, that will ordinarily
constitute
administrative action. The jurisprudence following from the
SARFU decision has established that the implementation
of legislation
by the Executive is an administrative function.
[3]
[41]
In
Permanent
Secretary of the Department of Education of the Government of the
Eastern Cape Province and Another v Ed-U-College
[4]
the
Constitutional Court distinguished between the essentially political
functions of formulating policy and initiating legislation,
on the
one hand, with the implementation of legislation, which is typically
administrative, on the other.
[5]
[42]
O’Regan J explained the difference
between policy formulation in the broad (political) sense and in the
narrower (administrative)
sense. The Court held that the Provincial
Government’s decision to adopt a particular subsidy formula and
the mechanism for
allocations was “
policy
formulation in the narrow sense or within the framework of
legislation
” and was thus
administrative action.
[43]
The
mere fact that a decision is underpinned by policy does not exclude
it from the realm of administrative action. O’Regan
J in
Ed-U-College
noted
that it is quite possible for action to be administrative even when
it has political implications.
[6]
Our courts have also accepted that certain types of policy decisions
– although not having the force of law – will
constitute
administrative action and be susceptible to review under PAJA.
In
Greys
Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Public Works and
Others
[7]
the
SCA rejected the argument that the Minister’s decision to let
waterfront property was a policy decision. Nugent
JA found that
it was a case of
policy
execution
rather
than
policy
formation
and
was thus administrative action. Nugent JA stated “
there
will be few administrative acts that are devoid of underlying policy
– indeed, administrative action is most often the
implementation of policy that has been given legal effect
.”
[8]
[44]
The Minister’s power to approve the
RAS is sourced in the Petroleum Products Act 120 of 1977 (
Petroleum
Products Act
), as amended, which
empowers the Minister to regulate various aspects of the liquid fuels
industry.
Section 2(1)(c)
and (d) provide:
‘
The
Minister may by regulation or by notice in writing served on any
person, whether personally or by post, and any person authorized
thereto by the Minister may by such notice so served—
…
(c)
prescribe the price, or a maximum or minimum price, or a maximum and
minimum price, at which any petroleum
product may be sold or bought
by any person, and conditions under which the selling or buying of
petroleum products other than
in accordance with the prescribed,
maximum or minimum price may take place.
(d)
regulate in such
manner as he may deem fit, or prohibit, any business practice, method
of trading, agreement, arrangement, scheme
or understanding which, in
the opinion of the Minister, is calculated—
(i)
to influence, or which may have the effect of influencing, directly
or indirectly, the purchase or selling
price of petroleum products at
any outlet; or
(ii) to
cause, or which may have the effect of causing, directly or
indirectly, an increase in the price referred
to in paragraph (c).”
[45]
The RAS Matrix, Guidelines and Principles
are documents that are produced and published by the Minister under
that provision of
the
Petroleum Products Act.
[46
]
The Minister implements legislation when
approving a pricing mechanism that regulates the price and conditions
under which a person
can buy and sell petroleum products. The
decision is administrative in nature as it inherently has an external
legal effect
and implicates the rights of all stakeholders in the
petroleum supply chain. This is so, even though it is informed by the
underlying
policy of the DoE.
[47]
It is common cause from the papers that the
idea was that something would be created which is binding. So,
although it is not a
regulation, it is clear that the Minister
expected everyone to run
their operations
in accordance with the RAS model and one asks if this were not
binding and constituted advice only, why would everyone
get involved?
Of great significance is the fact that the RAS model is used to
determine the regulated retail price. RAS was a way
to achieve a
range of policy considerations which preceded it. It was preceded by
a white paper and a host of other policy building
blocks which were
already in place. This was not executive action; it was the
fulfilling of a statutory role.
[48]
But
even if I were wrong on finding that this decision is administrative
action, there is no dispute that a legality review would
still be
available to the Fuel Retailers Association. By virtue of my findings
herein, it matters not whether the Minister’s
decision is
labelled as executive action which is exempt from judicial review
under PAJA or whether the decision may be reviewed
under the
principle of legality. In this latter regard (the legality route) I
am conscious of being constrained in the following
respects: This
court may only evaluate whether the RAS is
rationally
connected to its objective
of
enabling cost recovery and profit sharing for both the owner of fuel
station assets (mostly the oil companies) and the retailers.
This
court may not interfere with that decision merely because there may
be another way to achieve cost recovery and profit sharing
–
namely by including the EC in the RAS expressly and allocating it in
fixed proportions as between the fuel retailer and
the oil company.
This court also may not interfere with the decision because it would
prefer the alternative if it were in the
position of the Minister.
[9]
This court will thus endeavour to ascertain whether the means
employed are
rationally
related to the purpose
for
which the power was conferred.
[49]
The Minister’s decision falls to be
reviewed and set aside on any one or more of the following grounds,
all of which I find
impugn the decision taken:
Errors – Bates
White Report
[50]
The DoE explains that the RAS was initially
conceived through the Bates White report. The key
recommendation was for the DoE
to implement a revised pricing system
based on ‘revenue requirement principles’ and which would
allocate costs to ring-fenced
activities within the petroleum supply
chain. Within the context of the broader recommendation, Bates White
made specific recommendations
on the calculation of the retail
margin. Most importantly, it recommended that the DoE consider
the
possibility of different retail margins
for differently situated retailers, and recommended further
assessment of the impacts of
the proposed model on the viability of
service stations.
[51]
Recommendation 9 of the Bates White report
provided:
‘
Retail
margin – calculate the retail margin based on a benchmark
service station:
a Initiate a
retail service station benchmarking analysis to establish appropriate
compensation for the return on fuel-related
retail assets.
b Consider the
possibility of different retail margins e.g. for rural versus urban
service stations.
c Include in the study an
assessment of industry impacts, including effects of the aggregate
retail asset return, the viability
of service stations and
implications for provision of services in different areas.’
[52]
Bates White provided these specific
recommendations regarding the determination of the retail margin
because it had identified several
risks with the new model. At
paragraph 4.2.1 of the Report, Bates White warned that the new
methodology may have uncertain
impacts on retailers, and particularly
CORO retailers (who, it seems obvious, would be in an unequal
bargaining position with the
oil company):
‘
The
retail margin will include a return component for fuel-related retail
assets. ... We propose that the retail asset return
component
be determined through a benchmarking survey of retail service
stations. Rather than provide for a return on total
industry
assets, which could exacerbate investment incentive problems, the
methodology would aim to provide an appropriate return
for an
‘efficient’ benchmark service station. The supporting
analysis would have to assess what level of efficiency
should be
supported, and
estimate
the impacts of the methodology on the viability of service stations,
the provision of retail services in non-urban areas,
and the likely
effects on owners and operators.
As part of the impact
assessment, it should be recognised that by shifting the retail asset
return from the wholesale margin (received
by the oil company) to the
retail margin (received by the retail operators)
the new approach
will cause the oil companies to extract their returns from increased
franchise and rental fees.
If the aggregate return to oil
companies implied by the return component of the retail margin is
less than the return they
have achieved under the current system (and
which presumably was factored into their investment decisions),
some
retail operators might find themselves at a disadvantage.
’
(emphasis provided)
[53]
The DoE contracted the IPSR to conduct the
analysis and establish appropriate compensation for the return on
fuel-related retail
assets. There is no evidence that the DoE
considered the possibility of different retail margins or conducted
the recommended study
on the industry impacts and retailer
viability. There is nothing before this Court that explains why
the DoE decided to reject
or disregard these recommendations by Bates
White.
[54]
The warnings raised by Bates White were
never put before the Minister for her consideration and decision.
Instead, the Minister
was provided with – and thus relied on –
an inaccurate summary of the Bates White report in the October 2011
Recommendation.
The Recommendation document
excluded
the very important provisos and warnings contained
in the Bates White report and did not explain that Bates White had
recommended
further work in respect of the retail margin.
[55]
If the Minister and the Controller had
properly applied their minds to the Bates White report, they would
have realised that Bates
White recommended a model that sought to
ensure that “
regulated firms must
be able to recover their costs
,
including a fair return on their capital investment
.
”
It made no provision at all for a fair return on the business
of operating a fuel retail service station. Bates
White assumed that
in all cases, the retailer would be in a position to claim the full
operating margin, as well as the margin
providing a return on capital
investment. But this is the case only for RORO service
stations, where the same entity owns
the assets, and incurs the
operating costs arising from the retailing activity. The model makes
no provision for CORO service stations
– where retail operators
do not own any capital assets. These retailers cannot secure a
return on their investment
in operating the retail business.
This is crucial because CORO sites predominate in South Africa –
both in number and
in terms of volume of petrol sold.
[56]
The model adopted by the DoE and the
Minister was mismatched to the realities of the South African fuel
retail sector. Its
implications were that CORO site operators
would inevitably be undercompensated for their operations.
[57]
It means, in short, that the DoE proceeded
with the implementation of a pricing model based on only a selective
reading of the recommendations
of Bates White. It disregarded the
clear warnings raised by Bates White, failed to undertake the
assessments of retailer viability
proposed by Bates White, and failed
to consider the rationality of a regulatory scheme that assumed all
retailers owned the assets
required for the retailing activity –
when this was not the case.
The
Minister was also not informed of these cautionary factors in
recommending the final adoption and implementation of RAS.
That, in turn, meant that the Minister could not take them into
account at all. The Minister’s decision was accordingly
procedurally unfair
[10]
and irrational
[11]
as a result.
Errors – IPSR
Report
[58]
The DoE alleges that following the Bates
White Report, it appointed IPSR to conduct investigations into the
pricing methodologies.
IPSR investigated and developed the RAS margin
models. The DoE states that it drafted the terms of reference based
on the Bates
White Report which the Minister accepted.
[59]
The Controller stated that the DoE and the
Minister were satisfied that IPSR’s analysis and the
recommendations were “
appropriate,
practical and relevant to the requirements of the fuel retail
sector”.
[60]
This statement is difficult to comprehend
considering the serious concerns raised by the IPSR and the issues
flagged as requiring
additional research and analysis.
[61]
The Controller is mistaken when he
summarizes the IPSR findings and recommendations as follows:
‘
Although
the IPSR has referred to the fact that the retail margin should also
have a third component, namely the EC, its methodology
does not
include the EC in the final retail calculation as the retail margin
is based on a RORO site. The IPSR, taking cognisance
of CORO
sites, indicated that stakeholders should determine that portion of
the margins to be treated as an EC.’
[62]
The
implication that the IPSR made a decision not to include the EC in
the retail margin is incorrect. The IPSR was not mandated
to consider
whether or not to include the EC in the retail margin. The DoE only
proceeded with the first of the three Bates White
recommendations.
[12]
The Terms of Reference required IPSR to “
formulate
the appropriate rate of return for service station assets based on a
Capital Asset Pricing Model
.”
In other words, the IPSR mandate was limited to the question of
determining the characteristics of the benchmark
service station, and
the appropriate rate of return for service station assets. The
report determined the methodology for
calculating CAPEX. When
stakeholders raised concerns about the failure of the model to
include an entrepreneurial portion in the
retail margin, the IPSR
repeatedly stated that it was limited by its terms of reference.
[63]
It
is also incorrect that the IPSR recommended that the trading margin
be negotiated between retailers and wholesalers. The IPSR
made it
quite clear that the proposal that the CAPEX portion of the retail
margin be ‘split’ between wholesalers and
retailers (to
accommodate an EC) would require additional work beyond its mandate.
It also emphasised that the split would
have to be based on ‘
sound
economic logic
’
.
The report notes that ‘
there
is scope for the investment margin to be reasonably split between
investor and entrepreneur. This would require further work
and would
have to be studied separately as it is outside the scope of the Terms
of Reference for Project ME 686
.’
[13]
[64]
In response to concerns that the model
‘
makes no provision for an
appropriate return on the retail activity
’
and
‘
would challenge the prohibition
on vertical integration’
, the
IPSR noted:
‘
The
proposal to split the investment margin into investor and operator
elements is outside the scope of the terms of reference of
ME 686.’
[65]
Despite its limited mandate, the IPSR noted
at several places in the report that the model with only an
investment margin and an
operating cost margin based on a RORO
station, would be flawed. The IPSR recorded that most retail sites
were CORO sites, and that
retailers had proposed that the retail
margin be split into three components.
‘
In
consultative meetings between the oil companies and dealers there
have been suggestions that the retail margin be split into
three
components, namely, retail investment margin, entrepreneurial margin
and a dealer margin. The rationale for the split
in the retail
margin is that the bulk of the existing retail sites are leased sites
and not dealer owned sites and the Benchmark
Service Station is
premised on the fact that the site is a new dealer owned site.’
[66]
The IPSR accepted that for the
benchmark service station to be implemented to account for the
reality of the retail sector in South
Africa, the margin would have
to be split into three components – but it considered that
split to be outside the scope of
its project.
‘
The
split in the BSS margin between the investor margin and the dealer /
operator margin covers the investment and recovery of costs
margin
for a BSS site. It therefore constitutes two components of the
BSS margin
.
In
order for the BSS to be implemented within the reality of the retail
sector in South Africa where the majority of service stations
are
leased sites whose volume throughput is 70% of total retail volume,
the margin of the BSS would have to be split into three
components,
namely, investor, operator and operations (costs).
This would only be able to occur if the
investment
margin were split into two components to reward investors and
operators to reward entrepreneurship of the dealers on
leased sites.
There is scope for the investment margin to be reasonably split
between the investor and the entrepreneur. This would
require
further work and would have to be studied separately as it is outside
the scope of the terms of reference for Project ME
686.
…
In the final analysis the
methodology employed to split the investor related margin of the BSS
between the investor and operator
would have to be based on sound
economic logic for the BSS model to be successfully implemented as
part of the regulatory dispensation
in the future.’ (emphasis
provided)
[67]
The IPSR also warned that the RAS
would lead to
de facto
vertical integration – the very issue that
the new model sought to resolve:
‘
there
is a compelling case to be made that dealers who are entrepreneurs
should receive some form of entrepreneurial compensation
over and
above the normal salary compensation for their investment and
efficient functioning of the service station.
If the dealers are only granted normal salary compensation then they
would become
de facto
managers of the
respective oil companies leading to vertical integration of the
retail service station sector. Moreover, there
would be no
business incentive for entrepreneurs to enter the service station
industry as dealers if there is no entrepreneurial
incentive in
comparison to other small franchised businesses whose return could
possibly be greater. (emphasis provided)
[68]
The Report continued at page 12:
‘
This
new system if implemented without further work on an appropriate
split of margin between investors and dealers of leased sites
would
mean that the investment portion of the margin would be retained by
the investor and operational cost margin would be retained
by the
dealer of a leased service station. This would mean that dealers
would effectively become managers of leased retail service
stations
and only recover their costs thereby commencing a process of
de
facto
vertical
integration of the vast majority of service stations. ….
This means that from an
economic perspective the proposed split accommodates the oil
companies that develop service stations as
well as the dealer owned
dealer operated service stations.
The BSS is premised on the
fact that a single set of assets that facilitates the sale of
regulated petroleum products would make
up the site, but in reality,
the bulk of the assets on the leased sites are not owned by the
dealer and hence the proposed split
in the retail margin. The
split in the retail margin would mean that those who invest would
receive a commensurate return
on that investment while those who
operate the site should receive entrepreneurial compensation and cost
recovery for operational
viability.’
(emphasis provided)
[69]
The reasoning cannot be faulted. Why
a retailer owned retailer operated (RORO) service station was ever
chosen as a benchmark when
it is the less common form of business in
the South African industry is not explained. Ultimately, the IPSR
left the issue of entrepreneurial
compensation open. In
conclusion, it said:
‘
there
are a number of ways of dealing with the problem, ranging from
allowing market forces to settle the matter to a regulatory
solution. The former would mean that the oil companies would
not find suitable dealers for leased sites if all that is being
offered by the oil company to a retail entrepreneur is a salary and
cost related margin. On the other hand, if it is not
an issue
which can be amicably resolved commercially between the oil companies
and the dealers therefore resulting in the new margin
mechanism not
being implemented then a regulatory intervention may be required to
assist the parties to find a way forward.’
[70]
The Controller says that it noted the
concerns raised by Bates White and the IPSR. But the DoE
disregarded these concerns
because “
the
majority of refining wholesalers gave the full EC to its appointed
retail service operators, as reflected in the annual benchmark
service station CAPEX matrix concluded by the Department
.”
This is not the case.
A model based on a
RORO retail site is irrational
[71]
The
IPSR made it quite clear that there were serious risks associated
with a model based on the assumption that all retailers were
RORO
operators, when this was not the reality. The current model meant
that CORO retailers would only be able to recover operational
costs.
The reality of the retail sector meant that the retail margin should
be split into three components. The methodology for
calculating this
split, IPSR opined, should be based on sound economic logic and would
require additional research and analysis
and further work was
required to ascertain the consequences of the new model on asset-less
fuel retailers. This was the information
before the DoE when the
decision to implement the final RAS was recommended. There is
nothing in the papers before this Court
that demonstrates that the
DoE properly applied its mind to these warnings – or even
communicated this information fully
to the Minister. By
necessary implication, she was precluded from taking these materially
relevant considerations into account
before deciding to implement the
final RAS
[14]
.
[72]
The Minister was not informed of the
consequences of a regulatory model that did not include a trading
margin for CORO retailers.
She was not informed of the fact that on
this model, CORO retailers were only able to recover the costs of
operations, and would
earn no profit margin at all (as of right) from
the risk and investment into the business of operating the fuel
station.
[73]
The Recommendation stated:
‘
The
partial implementation phase was not without any challenges.
The retail margin model does not make provision for a split
in what
accrues to the service station operator nor the investor into the
retail assets. The disagreement between the oil
companies and
retailers on this matter took longer than expected as retailers
wanted the Department to regulate the component of
the Retail
margin. However, the split of the retail margin is not
regulated by the Department and that position has been
communicated
in writing to all stakeholders.’
[74]
The Recommendation did not disclose any of
the Fuel Retailers Association’s concerns about the EC and the
need for a ring-fenced
trading margin. The Minister was not provided
with the documents or minutes of the RAS Technical meeting disclosing
the extent
of the dispute regarding the EC and its consequences.
[75]
There
was a failure to properly consider the impact of the RAS on CORO
retailers and to deal with the specific concerns raised by
the Fuel
Retailers Association.
[15]
[76]
The
Minister was bound to act procedurally fairly. A decision taken in
ignorance of, or without sufficient regard to, materially
relevant
considerations is procedurally unfair and procedurally
irrational.
[16]
[77]
It is clear from the
Rule 53
Record
and the Controllers’ affidavits that the Minister took the
decision to approve the full implementation of the RAS
in ignorance
of materially relevant considerations regarding the trading margin,
and expressly raised by Bates White, IPSR and
the Fuel Retailers
Association. The decision falls to be set aside on this basis
alone.
[78]
In other regulated contexts, where
retailers within the supply chain do not own the assets, the
regulatory scheme provides for a
trading margin to compensate traders
for the services they provide. In the case of piped gas, NERSA
regulates the piped-gas value
chain. The methodology adopted by NERSA
includes a trading margin as compensation for the trader. This
is because traders
are involved in the purchase and sale of gas, and
do not own any of the related upstream infrastructure. In the case of
liquefied
petroleum gas, the Minister regulates the value chain in
accordance with the
Petroleum Products Act. The
maximum retail
price comprises of a number of components but includes a retail
margin equal to 15% of the purchase price.
The Fuel Retailers
Association procured an analysis of the impact of the implementation
of the RAS from an independent expert,
Genesis Analytics. (Genesis’
expertise has not been challenged, nor has expert evidence been put
up to refute its views.)
Genesis notes that this is an example of
where the retail price includes both a return on assets to provide
the service, as well
as margin on the fuel sold by the retailing
entity. Genesis notes: “
This
ensures that traders of LPG that do not own cylinder filling assets
required for retail distribution are still able to earn
a margin on
the sale of fuel
.”
[79]
By approving the RAS model without
the proper allocation of the EC, the DoE has created a regulatory
framework that strictly licences
and regulates retailers, but does
not provide for a return on their investment in the business of
operating a fuel station and
puts them at the mercy of the
negotiating position of the oil companies. This position is
inconsistent with the DoE’s general
approach to regulation of
the retail sector. The DoE’s licencing regime recognises and
regulates two forms of investment
in the retail sector: the capital
investment in the assets required to operate a fuel station and the
investment required to operate
the business. Retailers must
acquire a retail licence, and the owners of retail assets must
acquire a site licence.
Despite this, the RAS only provides a
profit margin for the
owners
of the retail assets. It makes no provision
for a trading margin to accrue to the
operators
of service stations – despite the fact that
they are bound by the licencing and regulatory scheme.
Retailers are taken
into account in some parts of the regulatory
framework, but completely disregarded in others without good reason.
[80]
The focus on assets - to the exclusion of
other services provided within the supply chain - means that CORO
retail station operators
are completely disregarded.
[81]
The DoE accepts that CORO retailers should
be compensated in some form. The DoE’s RAS fact sheet
says:
‘
The
RAS technical team agreed during the development of the BSS model
that an entrepreneurial compensation should be predetermined
as a
reward for the operator of the assets.’
[82]
The DoE has adopted a methodology that is
mismatched to the realities on the ground and which cannot secure
that reward which its
technical team agreed should be predetermined
as a reward for the operator (not the owner alone) of the asset,
which is consistent
with the general policy of promoting small and
medium sized enterprises and enabling those with no capital but their
capacity to
work hard and build a business through dedication and
entrepreneurial energy, and the decision to adopt a model at odds
with the
technical team’s agreement accordingly falls to be set
aside.
Does RAS achieve
its objectives
[83]
The Department has adopted a pricing
methodology that includes only CAPEX and OPEX recoveries in the
retail margin, and excludes
a trading margin for retailers over and
above those allocations. It then ‘tacks on’ a
notional trading margin
which it publishes in the Matrices. However,
it tells industry stakeholders that retailers must negotiate with oil
companies to
carve out an entrepreneurial compensation amount out of
the CAPEX portion of the retail margin. It expressly disavows the
existence
of an EC and even a notional EC. The implications of
leaving this to market forces where those forces are so heavily
tilted in
favour of the oil company are understandably seen as
disastrous by the retailers.
[84]
A regulatory scheme without an allocated
trading margin means that retailers are undercompensated for the risk
they assume when
running the business of a petrol station, and for
the fuel-dispensing service they provide.
[85]
Retailers cannot increase their
margin by increasing the price of the petrol that they sell because
the consumer petrol price (that
is, the pump price) is set by
regulation.
[86]
The IPSR explains the economic pressures on
fuel retailers and the crucial role played by the retail margin in
ensuring that retailers
can earn a profit and sustain their business:
“
There
is a clear distinction between the owners of service station (the
investors) where the industry is capital intensive due to
low margins
and high equipment and building standards, and the operator or dealer
where the industry is labour intensive as full
service is required.
Its profitability is a function of high volume sales. Hence the
dealer’s margin is crucial
in determining the profitability of
the retail service station
.
Secondly
the retail margin on petrol, the main product, is prescribed by
government within which the dealer needs to cover all costs
of
running the service station and ensuring an optimum level of service,
product availability and safety. As the price of
petrol is
fixed there is no scope for the dealer to increase prices should
costs rise. The dealer or retailer needs to keep
operating
costs down in order to maximise profitability and here the dealer
margin is adjusted according to the Retail Margin Model.
However, equally no one is able to start a price war and only the
price of diesel which is not fixed by government is able to be
discounted on the forecourt. On-going economic developments of
the retail service station of other non-petroleum activities
such as
convenience stores, eateries and the sale of non-controlled products
have also contributed to the profitability of the
retail service
station.”
[17]
[87]
In its first report, Genesis
concludes that the ‘
current
framing of the RAS with respect to the retail margin does not
allocate a specific return for CORO service stations, resulting
in
regulatory uncertainty and lack of sustainability in this part of the
value chain
.’ The RAS
methodology allocates no return for the risk that they take on the
business, precisely because it does not
include a trading margin or
EC.
[88]
The DoE adopts the position that
although there is no formal provision for the EC, retailers can
negotiate an EC from the CAPEX
portion of the retail margin that
accrues to the asset-owner.
[89]
The Department provides a cents per litre
figure on the RAS Matrix each year, but accepts that the margin
received by each retailer
notionally depends on their commercial
negotiation with the asset investor who must decide which portion of
the CAPEX it will ‘forfeit’.
[90]
The Department had decided that
retailers must fend for themselves within this strictly regulated
industry, and persuade the asset-owners
to forfeit a portion of the
CAPEX margin. The Department is content to allow the ‘split’
in the CAPEX portion
of the retail margin to be subject to the
“commercial negotiation” or market forces between oil
companies and retailers.
It contends that it has done enough because
the EC is published in the matrix to assist retailers to negotiate
with oil companies
and to increase their bargaining power. Quite how
this assistance is achieved without the force of law is a mystery to
me.
[91]
The DoE’s attitude displays
some naivety. The commercial realties of asset-less retailers
operating within a highly regulated
environment negotiating for a
share of the CAPEX margin with their backs against the wall and no
legal force behind their demands
is an unenviable position in which
to be.
[92]
The structure of the retail margin means
that the oil companies are entitled - on paper - to the full CAPEX
portion of the retail
margin. There is no obligation on oil
companies to “forfeit” any of the CAPEX portion of the
margin to retailers.
In fact, any decision by oil companies to
“forfeit” a portion of the CAPEX margin means that the
oil companies will
be unable to fully recover their return on
investment in the assets. Genesis concludes that “…
it is likely that neither party in a
CORO arrangement is given an adequate regulated return.
”
[93]
The commercial reality and
power relations within the industry mean that the fate of the
retailers is entirely in the hands of the
oil companies. The DoE
recognises this power imbalance and the fact that retailers have very
little leverage in these negotiations.
The oil companies can refuse
to recognise the EC and claim the entire CAPEX for themselves.
Oil companies can also recognise
the EC, but - since the ‘forfeit’
of the CAPEX portion of the margin leads to under recovery - take
steps to claim
(directly or indirectly) a portion of the notional EC
through additional line items for their own benefit.
[94]
This is what transpired during the
transitional period. In the RAS technical meeting of 14 August 2013
the Department acknowledged
that the oil companies were
under-recovering under the RAS methodology, and that they were using
the entrepreneurial compensation
element to “recover costs”.
These concerns were not communicated to the Minister. The meeting of
October 2013 recorded
that three of the major oil companies refused
to accept that the notional EC would accrue to the retailers.
[95]
In the face of this evidence, the
DoE’s statements that CORO retailers are accommodated within
the RAS by the notional EC
is simply not correct. The retailers
are forced to operate within a regulatory scheme that makes no
provision at all for
a secured profit margin on their investment in
the business of operating a service station.
[96]
The DoE itself seems to live in hope
that the disputes will simply go away. It has said that it has
expected industry associations
to “
resolve
areas of dispute and disagreement amongst its membership
alternatively, rely on the dispute resolution mechanisms to keep
the
operations of this industry within the policy framework that
Government has set
”
[97]
Unfortunately, the Genesis analysis reveals
that the very structure of the RAS - the framework itself – is
the source of the
problem. Without a change to the RAS, there
can be no fair resolution to these disputes, either generally or on
an individual
basis because the absence of recognition of a right to
EC (as opposed to a mere hope that an oil company will part with some
of
its CAPEX recovery) leaves the one party without any power with
which to negotiate and in circumstances like that to expect
negotiation
to resolve the problem is irrational.
[98]
Simply put, the RAS is incapable of giving
effect to its objects of providing a fair return to the participants
in the retail sector,
and avoiding cross-subsidisation of
activities. It is irrational to the extent that it excludes a
trading margin from the
retail margin, it leaves one category of
participant without a fair return.
Commercial
negotiation of the EC
[99]
To recap: the RAS model does not include an
EC, a trading margin allocated to operators to compensate them for
the business risk
of running a service station. The retail margin
includes only a
CAPEX
and
an
OPEX.
There is
nothing in the BSS RAS Matrix, principles or guidelines that entitles
the retailers to claim a portion of the CAPEX margin
(at least
insofar as CORO sites are concerned). Indeed, the RAS
Guidelines explain that the calculation of the retail margin
“…
comprises two components: the investment
margin [capex] and the petrol operating margin [opex].”
The
Minister’s and the Controller’s position is quite clear.
It states that:
“…
RAS is
made up of capex and opex. Capex includes the investors’ return
on assets. There is no provision in RAS for an EC (or
a notional EC).
The current RAS structure leaves it to the investor and retailer to
decide what portion of the investor’s
return on investment it
can afford to forfeit to the retailer.”
[100]
It thus comes down to it having to be
negotiated under circumstances where, in terms of the RAS
methodology, the entire CAPEX is
supposed to go to the investor (oil
company). This is to be achieved in the following manner:
“
What
remains is for investors and retailers to negotiate the terms of
their commercial arrangements in line with the approved RAS
methodology and the Sector Code as opposed to the Minister
over-regulating the industry.”
[101]
The hesitancy to over-regulate when the
situation cries out for regulation is inexplicable. The RAS
methodology does not regulate
the Entrepreneurial Compensation at
all.
“…
The
expectation is that the apportionment of recovery of a rate of return
must be aligned to the quantum of investment
and
other factors
taken into account in the
commercial agreement between the investor and the retailer.”
(emphasis added)
[102]
There is no guidance of what these other
factors must be and oil companies are, in the present situation, at
large to simply refuse
to forfeit (to use the DoE’s
terminology) any part of their CAPEX recovery.
[103]
The Fuel Retailers Association argue that
the aforegoing is contrary to the objectives of RAS; that there is no
certainty, no transparency
and that the model does not prevent
vertical integration, which it should. This leads to the conclusion
that the RAS is premised
on a fundamentally irrational decision
because it is incapable of achieving the stated objectives of RAS.
[104]
The Controller now alleges that the Fuel
Retailers Association agreed to the final implementation of the RAS -
including the fact
that the EC would be subject to negotiation
between the investors and retailers.
[105]
This
is not correct. Despite what the Controller now says in the
affidavits, the Fuel Retailers Association repeatedly
[18]
and persistently stressed that the regulatory model without a trading
margin would have catastrophic consequences for retailers.
[106]
At
the time the Minister took the decision many retailers took the view
that they had a right to the full notional EC; certain of
the
wholesalers were refusing to acknowledge the retailers’ right
to any portion of the CAPEX margin as a notional EC; SAPIA
had taken
the position that there was no EC component in the retail margin; the
retailers continued to insist that an EC was required.
At best for
the Respondents, a dispute exists about whether there was consensus
on excluding the EC from the RAS. I will thus accept,
as I must, the
version of the Respondents.
[19]
This does, however, not preclude the current challenge for a host of
reasons not least of which is that this agreement did
not form part
of the Minister’s decision-making process. It is the decision
not to regulate the split of the retail margin
between fuel retailers
and the fuel companies in CORO sites that is at the heart of this
review application.
[107]
The
assertion of the existence of the agreement by the DoE, an agreement
not drawn to the Minister’s decision, exposes the
fact that the
Minister failed to properly consider the impact of the RAS on CORO
retailers and to deal with the specific concerns
raised by the Fuel
Retailers Association.
[20]
According to the DoE there was no issue left as it had been resolved
by agreement between the relevant stakeholders. Thus nothing
for the
Minister to consider on that front.
[108]
The
Minister was bound to act procedurally fairly. As I have observed and
as is well supported by authority and the wording of PAJA,
a decision
taken in ignorance of, or without sufficient regard to, materially
relevant considerations is procedurally unfair and
procedurally
irrational.
[21]
[109]
Ms
le Roux SC representing SAPIA argued that what is missing in the Fuel
Retailers Association’s case before this Court is
evidence to
show that these commercial negotiations have failed to give rise to
adequate compensation for the retail operators
and the owners of
retail assets respectively. SAPIA argues that precisely what that
relationship entails and what costs must be
recovered will vary from
site to site.
They
submit that the parties will negotiate and strike a commercial deal
to allocate income
as
needed between them considering their individual circumstances and
that the DoE’s decision to enable these bespoke outcomes
is
thus rationally connected to the cost recovery objective of the RAS.
They contend that failing to prescribe an EC for fuel retailers
in
the RAS is rationally connected to these objectives where there is a
diversity of different commercial arrangements between
retailers and
asset owners, and a range of different levels and types of asset
investment that must be recovered.
This,
they contend, satisfies the test in
Albutt,
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
and
Democratic
Alliance
[22]
.
[110]
The Fuel Retailers Association contends
that the use of RORO sites as the model operating fuel station in the
RAS excludes from
consideration the lease agreements, branding
agreements and service level agreements entered into by fuel
retailers who operate
CORO sites.
It
contends that these increase fuel retailers’ costs, which are
then under-recovered in the commercial negotiation required
under the
RAS.
[111]
Ms
le Roux SC, representing SAPIA, emphasized the inadequacy of the
evidence of this under-recovery before the Court. She placed
much
emphasis on the fact that retailers have multiple income streams,
including the sales from the forecourt shop, diesel, car
wash, to
name but a few. The current complaint relates to the sale of petrol
alone. She pointed out that not a single set of financial
statements
has been included in these papers evidencing the contention that the
failure to regulate the EC, threatens the viability
of retailers. It
was contended that no evidence has been placed before this court that
retailers and company owners cannot negotiate.
That being so, this
court cannot conclude that every CORO site is unviable or that ‘
the
regulatory scheme imposed by RAS exacerbates existing barriers to
entry for historically disadvantaged South Africans and, as
a result,
serves to exclude (rather than promote) new retailers entering the
market.’
To
support this argument SAPIA referred to the outcome of 6 negotiations
(out of some 3000 retailers comprising the membership of
the Fuel
Retailers Association). These do not show that retailers are excluded
and evidences a range of R0,05 to R0,16 of the available
R0,203
notional EC
[23]
.
[112]
Ms le Roux argued that not a shred of
evidence had been placed before this court that a retailer was unable
to reach agreement or
that a retailer had no option but to agree on
R0,0 of the notional EC and that the oil company was unwilling to
‘forfeit’
any of the R0,203 of the notional EC. There was
thus no evidence that the negotiations always worked against the
retailers. Of
the 6 affidavits before me, the lowest is 5 cents of
the 20 cents available (25% of the notional EC) and the highest is 16
cents
of the 20 cents (80% of the notional EC) available. She
submitted that negotiations certainly did not always go in one
direction.
These submissions fail to persuade.
[113]
The DoE expressly disavows the existence of
an EC and a notional EC. It contends that the stakeholders had agreed
that there would
be no EC in the RAS . The retailers are thus forced
to work within a regulatory scheme that makes no provision at all for
a secured
profit margin on their investment in the business of
operating a service station. The DoE contends that an EC should be
negotiated
by the retailers and the oil companies from the entire
CAPEX margin. Yet what the oil companies start their negotiations
with,
is only the notional EC and not the entire CAPEX margin as
suggested by the DoE. The notional EC should of course be for the
benefit
of the retailers in its entirety (if all the line items for a
CORO site had been properly allocated and factored in which we know
is not the case as the RAS has been premised on a RORO site). What 5
of the 6 affidavits demonstrate is that the oil companies
‘clawed
back’ and recovered their costs from what might otherwise have
been the profits of the retailers.
[114]
The
Petroleum Products Act acknowledges
an
unequal bargaining position. Recently, the Constitutional Court
emphasised the importance of transforming the petroleum industry:
‘
to
ensure that unequal bargaining power in the industry was addressed
for those doing business in that industry, as well as empowering
historically disadvantaged South Africans in the petroleum and liquid
fuels industry.’
[24]
[115]
Ms le Roux contended that the demands
of the retailers were unrealistic. In support of this argument she
referred to the evidence
of Mr Mbonambi stating that he had
anticipated making a reasonable profit and that he would be able to
make a return of 32%. She
pointed out that no evidence has been
placed before me as to what would constitute a reasonable return but
that as a rule of thumb
and in her view, it would be fair to suggest
that a return of between 10 and 15% would be considered a good return
and 32% unreasonably
high.
[116]
In my view, the grievance of the
retailers is more fundamental. They contend that the existence of any
profit they earn is at the
whim of the oil companies and that a model
which permits this is at odds with the objectives sought to be
achieved by RAS. The
retailers are forced to operate within a
regulatory scheme that makes no provision at all for a secured profit
margin on their
investment in the business of operating a service
station. In my view, the retailers should, as of right, be entitled
to a profit
on their sales of petrol only.
[117]
The understanding of the DoE and the
understanding of SAPIA are at odds with one another. The DoE contends
that the retailers and
the oil companies should negotiate an EC from
the entire CAPEX portion of the retail margin whereas SAPIA contend
that an EC needs
to be negotiated from the notional EC published in
the RAS matrices. This confusion appears to have been brought about
because
the DoE seeks to avoid any conflict regarding the EC. A
ring-fenced EC within the retail margin in the formal RAS documents
is
avoided. On that approach, the full CAPEX of the retail margin
accrues to the oil companies (in CORO sites). At the same time the
DoE appears to want to appease the retailers by acknowledging the
need for an EC as part of the regulatory scheme, suggesting that
it
should be derived from the CAPEX portion of the retail margin. It
does this by taking the margin allocated to two unrelated
elements
within the CAPEX margin: the small stock premium and the
marketability adjustment each of which in fact relates to, and
compensates asset owners for particular capital investments. This
results in the oil companies contending that they are entitled
to
‘claw back’ some of the EC, as evidenced in the 5
supporting affidavits of Messrs Khoza, Nkosi, Nonkwebo, Mbonambi
and
Mbatha.
[118]
Even if retailers were in a reasonable
position to negotiate with the oil companies that supply them (which
they are not), the inevitable
outcome of the DoE’s decision to
allow the EC to be determined by the commercial negotiations is that
either the retailers
are under-compensated (because they cannot
procure an adequate return for their retail activities), or the
asset-owners are under-compensated
(because they have allowed
retailers to take an EC out of the CAPEX that they would otherwise be
entitled to). This flaw in the
RAS means that it is arbitrary and
incapable of giving effect to the objectives that it was designed to
achieve.
[119]
As mentioned, the Fuel Retailers
Association commissioned reports from Genesis. The second report
(which was abandoned by the Fuel
Retailers Association) was
commissioned to report on the impact of RAS. A survey was done and of
the 3000 members of the Fuel Retailers
Association only 53 responded
and of those, only 30 were CORO sites. So, although it was abandoned,
SAPIA argued that it should
be considered for the following reasons:
It was commissioned for the reason of supporting the application; If
it were a problem
that retailers were unable to reach agreement or
that negotiations always favoured the oil companies, this survey
would have revealed
this or if there were a problem in practice, the
retailers would have queued to voice their grievances. Although this
argument
on the face of it seems attractive it ignores the realities
of the retailers being that they are, at least, breaking even because
of the OPEX component. But that is not what they are entitled to. The
retailers are entitled (as of right) to an EC on their petrol
sales.
[120]
It is correct that of the 6
affidavits (of the potential 3000 members of the Fuel Retailers
Association) not one suggests that they
need certainty on the EC
component failing which they will become unviable. It is unlikely
that on the evidence before this court,
this can be contended because
this court knows that petrol is not the only stream of income and the
overall performance of a station
might present a positive picture.
[121]
The DoE has adopted a margin-setting
scheme that excludes any EC for retailers over and above the CAPEX
and OPEX portions of the
retail margin. It ‘tacks on’
a notional trading margin by telling industry stakeholders that
retailers can negotiate
with oil companies to carve out an EC amount
out of the CAPEX portion of the retail margin. This scheme is flawed
in that it is
arbitrary. The oil companies are expected to ‘forfeit’
a portion of the CAPEX margin under circumstances where it is
recognised that there is unequal bargaining power. With what, one
asks, must the retailers bargain?
[122]
Confronted with this dilemma and with the
proposition that the default position is that the oil companies take
the entire notional
EC, Ms le Roux argued that there was ‘no
default’ position as the notional EC is the sum total of what
is available
and if the parties cannot agree, no agreement is
concluded. I am not convinced by that construction of the model: the
position
seems to be that it is a ‘take it or leave it’
situation. The retailer either accepts what is on offer from the oil
company, or it must walk away from the transaction. That is how the
model is designed.
[123]
To look at what the negotiations actually
yielded is of limited assistance if one accepts, as I do, that the
negotiation power is
unequal, for the reasons that I have set out
herein.
[124]
Mr Quixley representing the Fuel Retailers
Association, argued that a decision which requires the parties to
negotiate, where no
guidelines or factors have been put in place as
to how the negotiation should be conducted, is fundamentally
irrational. In my
view, the distinction he draws is crucial. The
argument is not that negotiation per se is irrational. Clearly it is
not. A decision
which requires parties to negotiate where i) the
negotiating power is unequal; ii) the default position is that the
oil company
(the more powerful contracting party) must relinquish
something; and iii) no guidelines or factors have been put into place
to
consider during this bargaining process, is naïve to the
point of irrationality. The fact that the retailers in practice
manage
to limp along despite this constraint cannot transform the
decision from an irrational one to a rational one.
[125]
The DoE’s position is that the
industry should negotiate the EC and if it fails, it will regulate
it. Mr Bokaba SC, representing
the DoE drew attention to the
following feature in the IPRS report that
‘…
if
all that is being offered by the oil company to a retail entrepreneur
is a salary and cost related margin’
,
oil companies would not find suitable dealers. That may be so, but
the model cannot be designed to, in principle, not provide
an EC to
the retailer at all, particularly as the retailer is up against the
statutory price maximum, the retailer can pass no
increase on to the
consumer, being the last one in the line, the last link in the value
chain. The retailer is the most vulnerable
to being negotiated
downward, the need for regulatory protection in the form of a
regulated EC could not be more self-evident,
and to deny the
structural flaw by pointing to instances where the structural flaw
has not manifested itself particularly harshly
is to deny the
inherent and logical flaw in the model on anecdotal evidence.
[126]
The jackal should be entitled to its share
in the kill because to ask the lion whether it will share its kill
with the jackal without
some protection of its minimum position, will
result the jackal in having to be satisfied with the scraps or walk
away hungry.
[127]
Both Mr Bokaba and Ms le Roux
emphasied that this model has been implemented now for 9 years
and that after 9 years of implementation,
only 6 affidavits were
attached (not one of which shows that the retailers were incapable of
negotiating an EC) and no financials
were attached to support a 0
margin of profit. I do not accept that that is a necessary element of
a cause of action based on irrationality
or a failure to take account
of relevant matter. Ms Le Roux argued most strenuously that without
evidence this court cannot conclude
that the lack of a regulated EC,
leads to an unviable service station. She submitted that there
is no evidence that market
forces are incapable of managing the
viability of ensuring reasonable compensation or of commercial
failure due to an inadequate
EC. She argued that there is no
evidence that on the sale of petrol alone, retailers are unviable and
finally, that there
is no evidence that if the EC is regulated, it
will affect viability.
[128]
The Fuel Retailers Association contends
that negotiation is fundamentally unworkable and an anathema to the
model in respect of
a CORO site. For all the reasons traversed thus
far, I agree.
[129]
Returning
to the point made by the Constitutional Court,
[25]
the
Petroleum Products Act acknowledges
an unequal bargaining
position in the industry. The model should allow for the
circumstances of the majority of sites. To leave
it to the investor
and the retailer to decide what portion of the CAPEX the investor can
afford to ‘forfeit’ to the
retailer under circumstances
where it is accepted that the bargaining power is unequal, is
irrational.
[130]
Ms le Roux argued that additional
compensation may always be desirable but submitted that that is not
the test that this Court must
apply.
I
disagree. Retailers are, as of right, entitled to be adequately
compensated. As things presently stand, the default position is
that
either the retailer takes what is on offer, or walks away and no
agreement is concluded. When pressed on the ‘default’
position during argument, Ms le Roux argued that there was no
‘default’ position. That is incorrect. The starting point
is that the investor (oil company) must forfeit part of the CAPEX.
The RAS does not provide for an EC at all. That is the default.
There
is no express provision in any of the Guidelines, Matrices or
Principles which entitles the retailers to claim an EC from
the CAPEX
margin. There is not even provision for the notional EC which is
published annually which does not have any legal force.
No-one is
bound by the notional EC published in the RAS Matrix annually. The
stakeholders appear to adhere to it but that does
not entitle the
retailers to any portion of it.
[131]
The legal position is: The EC is said
by respondents to be part of the CAPEX, but the retailers have no
entitlement to it. No considerations
have been identified which can
guide the industry in this regard. It does not avail SAPIA to argue
that the insufficiency of evidence
demonstrates that negotiation
works in practice. In my view, it shows no more than that the
retailers ‘make do’. What
else would they do? The
retailers are entitled to be compensated and are entitled to an EC
based on a CORO model where the considerations
informing the EC are
identified.
## The
RAS with a notional EC enables vertical integration
The
RAS with a notional EC enables vertical integration
[132]
One of the key tenets of the government’s
policy and legislation in petroleum products sector is that licensed
wholesalers
may not operate at the retail level of the fuel supply
chain.
Section 2A(5)(a)
of the
Petroleum Products Act consequently
prohibits licensed wholesalers,
among others, from engaging in a business practice, method of
trading, agreement, arrangement,
scheme or understanding that is
aimed at or would result in their holding a retail licence.
[133]
The policy is aimed at limiting vertical
integration and creating opportunities for small business in the
industry, especially for
historically disadvantaged South Africans.
Indeed, the Controller describes one of the objectives underlying the
RAS as follows:
“
A
related policy objective is that of providing certainty to investors
with regard to the return on assets throughout the petroleum
value
chain, whilst pursuing the objective of delinking the vertical
integration of the industry to reflect a separation between
wholesale
operations and the retail services aspect of the industry.”
[134]
Despite the prohibition on vertical
integration, wholesalers are permitted to own retail assets –
in order to lease them to
retailers - and to earn a return on those
assets. But they may not indirectly operate the retail site or
exercise substantial control
over it.
[135]
Yet, RAS in its current form
allows wholesalers and the oil companies to do exactly that: The
inclusion of only a notional EC as
a part of the CAPEX allocation of
the retail margin means that the oil companies can either refuse to
recognise the EC (and claim
the entire CAPEX for themselves) or take
steps to claim (directly or indirectly) a portion of it through
additional line items
for their own benefit. Because of the
power differential between oil companies and fuel retailers, they are
able to insist
on the margin that retailers will recover from the
notional EC. In effect, they determine the margins and profits
that CORO
stations are able to make, and thus exercise substantial
control over or interfere with their operations. That, in turn,
contributes to greater vertical integration, rather than reducing it.
In effect, licenced wholesalers who own the retail site and
assets,
can determine the profits earned by retailers. They accordingly
exercise substantial control over the operations
of retailers.
They are also able to secure a profit from the retailing activity.
Thus, the rationale underlying the prohibition
on vertical
integration is undermined, the object of government’s policy s
prevented from being achieved by the manner in
which it is
implemented. The implementation therefore is irrational.
[136]
It means that the RAS undermines one of the
purposes that it sought to achieve, or enables that which the
legislation prohibits.
On either basis, it is at odds with the
legislative regime and amenable to review.
Remedy
[137]
This
court may grant any order that is just and equitable.
[26]
PAJA empowers this court with a discretion.
[138]
The
applicant did not persist in seeking a declaration of invalidity even
though the default position is ordinarily to set aside
unlawful
administrative action.
[27]
This is so as the applicant conceded, correctly in my view, as
submitted by Ms le Roux, that if this court were minded to remit
the
issue of the EC back to the Minister, the appropriate order would be
one which maintains the
status
quo
of
the outcome of each fuel retailer’s negotiation with its fuel
supplier/landlord. Clearly such a holding pattern while the
DoE
reconsiders the position is preferable as it will ensure contractual
stability and will eliminate commercial uncertainty. This
is what I
seek to achieve in the order that I intend making.
[139]
I do not agree that the new
model would only need to make changes in respect of the retail
margin, in order to introduce a trading
margin which is a discreet
amendment that can quickly and relatively easily be affected. It may
well ultimately be so but as I
see things what would be required is
that the IPSR (if they are going to be employed again) will have to
be given a wider mandate
to report on a model for CORO sites. That
recommendation will have to be traversed with all stakeholders and
the Minister will
have to decide whether the RAS in its amended form
is to be implemented. I thus disagree with the applicant that it
would require
approximately three months’ work. It is for this
reason that I have afforded the process a period of 9 months.
[140]
In preserving the status quo
pending the finalisation of the process, little uncertainty is caused
in the industry thereby minimising
prejudice. Retailers of CORO sites
entering the market for the first time and concluding new agreements
will be required to negotiate
an EC with the oil
company/investor/fuel supplier/ landlord from the notional EC
published in the RAS Matrix annually.
Order
I accordingly grant the
following order:
140.1
Condonation for the applicant’s
failure to bring this review application within 180 days of the
original decision referred
to in paragraph 140.2 hereof
alternatively within a reasonable time, is granted.
140.2
The original decision of the first
respondent or her delegates [the Minister], taken in November 2013,
to implement the RAS without
providing for a ring-fenced
Entrepreneurial Compensation (EC) to be claimed exclusively by the
retailers in Company Owned Retailer
Operated (CORO) sites and/or
specifying the items to be claimed under the EC by retailers in CORO
sites, is reviewed and set aside.
140.3
The determination of the treatment and
calculation of the EC for retailers in CORO sites as an allocation
within the retail margin
of the RAS (the determination) is referred
back to the first respondent [the Minister] to decide in accordance
with this Court’s
judgment, within a period of 9 months from
the date of this order.
140.4
Pending the determination, the 2020 RAS
Benchmark Service Station Matrix and any subsequently issued (or yet
to be issued) Matrices
are to remain in force and effect.
140.5
Pending the determination, the
status
quo
of the outcome of each CORO site
fuel retailer’s negotiation with its fuel supplier/landlord is
to be maintained and all new
agreements still to be concluded between
CORO site retailer’s and fuel suppliers/landlords are to be on
the basis that the
Minister’s decision has not been reviewed or
set aside.
140.6
The first, second and third respondents are
to pay the costs of this application, jointly and severally, the one
paying the other
to be absolved such costs to include the costs of
two counsel where so employed.
___________________________
I OPPERMAN
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng
Division, Johannesburg
Counsel for the
applicant: Adv G Quixley and Adv F Hobden
(Heads of argument
prepared by Adv R Bhana SC, Adv I Goodman and Adv F Hobden)
Instructed by: Seton
Smith & Associates
Counsel for the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents: Adv TJB Bokaba SC, Adv B Morris and
Adv T Pooe
Instructed by: The State
Attorney
Counsel for the 3
rd
respondent: Adv MM le Roux SC
Instructed by: Fasken
Attorneys
Date of hearing: 27 and
28 October 2022
Date
of Judgment: 22 September 2023
[1]
President
of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union
2000 (1) SA 1 (CC).
[2]
SARFU
at para 141.
[3]
In
Janse
van Rensburg NO v Minister of Trade and Industry NO
2001
(1) SA 29
(CC) the Court found that the Minister’s powers to
suspend the activities of a company and to attach or freeze its
assets
was subject to
section 33
and therefore administrative
action. Similarly, in
Premier,
Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided
Schools, Eastern Transvaal
1999 (2) SA 91
(CC) at para 38, the Constitutional Court held that
the decision of the Premier of Mpumalanga Province to withdraw state
bursaries
from state-aided schools amounts to administrative action.
[4]
2001
(2) SA 1 (CC)
[5]
See
paragraph 18:
“
Policy
may be formulated by the executive outside of a legislative
framework. For example, the executive may determine a policy
on road
and rail transportation, or on tertiary education. The formulation
of such policy involves a political decision and will
generally not
constitute administrative action. However, policy may also be
formulated in a narrower sense where a member of
the executive is
implementing legislation. The formulation of policy in the exercise
of such powers may often constitute administrative
action.”
[6]
Ed-U-College
at para 17.
[7]
2005
(6) SA 313 (SCA)
[8]
Greys
Marine
at para 27.
[9]
Albutt
v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
2010
(3) SA 293
(CC) at para [51]
[10]
Violating
section 6(2)(c)
of PAJA
[11]
Violating
section 6(2)(f)(ii)
of PAJA
[12]
“
Initiate
a retail service station benchmarking analysis to establish
appropriate compensation for the return on fuel-related retail
assets
”.
[13]
IPSR
Report, p104.
[14]
Violating
Section 6(2)(e)(iii)
of PAJA
[15]
Minister
of Health & another v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd & others
[2005] ZACC 14
; ,
2006 (8) BCLR 872
(CC) (30 September 2005)
at
paras [191], [391], [393], [400] and [402]
[16]
Democratic
Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
,
2013 (1) SA 248
(CC) at paras [36] and [39]
[17]
IPRS
Report, 020-343, p7.
[18]
In
a letter of 7 November 2012 to Mr Maake; Minutes of a RAS meeting on
13 March 2013 reflects the oil companies’
professed
intention to claim a share of the EC, there allegedly not being
grounds to substantiate the quantum thereof;
The
Draft Minutes of the meeting of 10 April 2013 record the clear
disagreement between the oil companies and the retailers regarding
the manner in which the CAPEX margin and the notional EC should be
shared. It also records the DoE’s position, at
that
stage, that the notional EC should accrue to the retailer and that
any wholesaler seeking to claim a portion of the EC must
provide an
evidentiary basis for it;
[19]
Plascon
Evans Paints. There was no request that this dispute be referred to
the hearing of oral evidence or that such determination
in favour of
the Fuel Retailers Association would be dispositive of this issue.
[20]
Minister
of Health & another v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd & others
[2005] ZACC 14
; ,
2006 (8) BCLR 872
(CC) (30 September 2005) at paras [191], [391],
[393], [400] and [402]
[21]
Democratic
Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
,
2013 (1) SA 248
(CC) at paras [36] and [39]
[22]
Supra
[23]
The
Matrix as at December 2013 was referenced – ‘FA1’
– 001-23 in which the Capex margin distribution
is reflected
as R0,203 and the EC as R0,401
[24]
Rissik
Street One Stop CC t/a Rissik Street Engen and Another v Engen
Petroleum Ltd
[2023]
ZACC 4
; see too
Business
Zone 1010 CCt/a Emmarentia Convenience Ventre v Engen Petroleum Ltd
2017 (6) BCLR 773 (CC)
[25]
Footnote
24
[26]
Section
8
of PAJA read with section 172 of the Constitution
[27]
Aquila
Steel (S Africa) (Pty) Limited v Minister of Mineral Resources
,
2019 (3) SA 621
(CC) at para 108
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