Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 1195South Africa
Banda and Another v Xenforce Proprietary Limited (008220/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1195 (23 October 2023)
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Banda and Another v Xenforce Proprietary Limited (008220/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1195 (23 October 2023)
Banda and Another v Xenforce Proprietary Limited (008220/2022) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1195 (23 October 2023)
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sino date 23 October 2023
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO:
008220/2022
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES
REVISED
23/10/23
In the matter between:
SIPHAMANDLA
BONGANI BANDA
FIRST
PLAINTIFF
NOXOLO
LINDA BANDA
SECOND
PLAINTIFF
And
XENFORCE
PROPRIETARY LIMITED
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
TWALA, J
[1] The defendant
has taken an exception against the plaintiffs’ amended
particulars of claim to the summons dated the
26
th
of
October 2022 in that they lack the averments necessary to sustain the
cause of action and/or are vague and embarrassing and/or
are bad in
law.
[2] The genesis of this
case arose when on the 23
rd
of March 2020 the plaintiffs
and the defendant concluded a written agreement whereby the
plaintiffs employed the defendant to erect
a dwelling on the property
known and described as Erf […] Midstream Estate, Extension 68,
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality,
Gauteng, Midstream Ridge (“the
property”)
.
[3] The plaintiffs allege
that they (the plaintiffs) performed in terms of agreement, but the
defendant breached the terms of the
agreement in that it failed to
deliver a dwelling on the property that is constructed in a proper
and workmanlike manner that complies
with the Housing Consumers
Protection Measures Act.
[1]
It
is alleged further that the defendant has failed to rectify the
faults and defects after having been served with a 30 days notice
to
do so.
[4] It is further alleged
that as a result of the defendant’s failure to remedy the
breach, the plaintiffs and the defendant
concluded an oral agreement
in February 2021, whereby it was agreed that the defendant would send
its contractors to the property
of the plaintiffs to remedy the
faults and defects. It was a term of the agreement that for
each day the defendant’s
contractors failed to arrive at the
plaintiffs’ property, it will be levied a penalty in the sum of
R 2 500.00. On the 17
th
of May 2021, the defendant further
concluded another oral agreement whereby it was agreed that it will
pay the plaintiffs a sum
of R 19 824.00 being for electrical
faults, building levies, furniture removal and for two weeks rental.
[5] It is trite that an
exception that a pleading does not disclose a cause of action strikes
at the formulation of the cause of
action and its legal validity. The
complaint is not directed at a particular paragraph in the pleading
but at the pleading as a
whole, which must be demonstrated to be
lacking the necessary averments to sustain a cause of action.
Furthermore, it is trite
that exceptions should be dealt with
sensibly since they provide a useful mechanism to weed out cases
without legal merit. However,
an overly technical approach should be
avoided because it destroys the usefulness of the exception
procedure
.
[2]
[6] Recently, the Supreme
Court of Appeal in
Luke
M Tembani and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and
Another
[3]
referring to the authority quoted above stated the following:
“
[14] Whilst
exceptions provide a useful mechanism ‘to weed out cases
without legal merit’, it is nonetheless necessary
that they be
dealt with sensibly. It is where pleadings are so vague that it is
impossible to determine the nature of the claim
or where pleadings
are bad in law in that their contents do not support a discernible
and legally recognised cause of action, that
exception is competent.
The burden rests on an excipient, who must establish that on every
interpretation that can reasonably be
attached to it, the pleading is
excipiable. The test is whether on all possible readings of the facts
no cause of action may be
made out; it being for the excipient to
satisfy the court that the conclusion of law for which the plaintiff
contends cannot be
supported on every interpretation that can be put
upon the facts.”
[7] As regards the first
ground of the defendant’s complaint, there is no merit in the
argument that the plaintiffs pleaded
two mutually exclusive positions
by alleging that the defendant failed to undertake maintenance works
and then immediately acknowledge
that there is no dispute that it
undertook the necessary maintenance work. The plaintiffs pleaded
that, although the defendant
performed the works, it has failed to
deliver a dwelling that meets the requirements of the Housing
Consumers Protection Measures
Act and, a dwelling that is constructed
in a proper and workmanlike manner. Therefore, there is no ambiguity
in this pleading or
vagueness which makes it impossible for the
defendant to plead.
[8] It is a
misconstruction of the plaintiffs’ particulars of claim, as
amended, to say that the plaintiffs are claiming specific
performance
and/or damages without giving a breakdown as to how the amount
claimed is computed. Furthermore, there is no merit
in the contention
that the plaintiffs’ claim is based on a written agreement
which has been annexed to the particulars of
claim which has a clause
that any changes or alterations to the agreement shall be of no force
or effect unless reduced to writing,
(the non-variation clause). The
plaintiffs do not rely on the initial agreement between the parties
for the claims, but on the
subsequent oral agreements concluded by
the parties after the defendant had breached the written agreement
and failed to remedy
the breach.
[9] The two oral
agreements are completely independent of the initial written
agreement and do not purport to be amending the terms
thereof. It was
agreed between the parties that, should the contractors of the
defendant fail to attend to the property of the
plaintiffs on any
day, the defendant shall be liable to a levy of R 2 500.00. This is a
separate contract entered into after the
defendant breached the
initial written contract and therefore does not purport to amend that
contract. It is my respectful view
therefore that the amounts on
claims B and C of the particulars of claim are not damages but are
based on the oral agreements.
[10] The oral agreement
concluded in February 2021 is between the plaintiffs and the
defendant. The doctrine of privity of contract,
as contended by the
defendant, does not arise in as far as the contractors of the
defendant are concerned. The plaintiffs are not
claiming anything
against the contractors for they do not have any agreement with them
but are claiming against the defendant as
it undertook, in the oral
agreement, that it will pay R 2 500.00 as a penalty for each day
that its contractors do not avail
themselves at the property of the
plaintiffs. Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege that they have
performed in terms of the agreement
by paying the construction price
– thus there is no merit in the defendant’s argument that
the plaintiffs say they
have performed but established no facts that
necessitates that conclusion.
[11 I am of the
considered view therefore that there is no merit in the complaint
raised by the defendant and the exception
falls to be dismissed.
[12] In the
circumstances, I make the following order:
1. The exception is
dismissed with costs.
TWALA M L
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION
Delivered:
This
judgment and order were prepared and authored by the Judge whose name
is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation
to
Parties / their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on Case Lines. The
date of the
order is deemed to be the 23
rd
of October 2023.
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:
Adv. Phaladi
Instructed by:
Fluxmans Incorporated
Tel: 011 328 1814
bduma@fluxmans.com
For the Defendant:
Mr J Meyer
Instructed by:
Meyer and Partners
Attorneys Inc
Tel: 012 653 8445
junior@meyerattorneys.co.za
Date of Hearing:
9
th
of October 2023
Date of Judgment: 23
rd
of October 2023
[1]
95 of 1998.
[2]
See in this regard
Telematrix
(Pty) Ltd v Advertising Standards Authority SA
[2005]
ZASCA 73; [2006] 1 ALL SA 6 (SCA); 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA).
[3]
[2022] ZASCA 70
;
2023 (1) SA 432
(SCA) (20 May 2022).
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