Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 1326South Africa
S v Khumalo and Another (SS 8/2023) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1326 (2 November 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
2 November 2023
Judgment
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## S v Khumalo and Another (SS 8/2023) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1326 (2 November 2023)
S v Khumalo and Another (SS 8/2023) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1326 (2 November 2023)
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sino date 2 November 2023
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: SS 8/2023
(1)
REPORTABLE: Yes
☐
/ No
☒
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: Yes
☐
/
No
☒
(3)
REVISED: Yes
☐
/ No
☒
Date: 02 November
2023
In the matter between:
THE STATE
and
KHUMALO,
NQOBILE
FIRST ACCUSED
NCUBE,
WELLINGTONG
SECOND ACCUSED
JUDGMENT ON SENTENCE
DU PLESSIS AJ
[1]
A church is a sanctity for people to find
refuge from the troubles of life, a place to belong, a community.
Likewise, a public street
in a suburb, especially around a spaza
shop, is a place for community, a public place, a place where people
meet. A home is a sanctuary.
The death of Pastor Unathi at his church
during the robbery, the random shooting of Mr Ngwenya who were on his
way to buy bread
with his three friends, and the shooting of Mr
Leketi as he returned home from an early dinner, has caused trauma
and heartbreak,
and robs society of spaces of refuge. The unlawful
possession of firearms is a common thread through this trauma.
[2]
Mr Khumalo and Mr Ncube, you were found
guilty of various offences. Mr Khumalo was found guilty on one count
of murder, read with
s 51(1)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1997
, 3 counts of robbery with aggravating circumstances, read with
s
51(2)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
; two counts of
attempted murder; one count of discharge of a firearm in a built-up
area of any public place; three counts of unlawful
possession of a
firearm; 4 counts of unlawful possession of ammunition.
[3]
Mr Ncube was found guilty on one count of
murder, read with
s 51(1)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1997
, three counts of robbery with aggravating circumstances, read
with
s 51(2)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
; two
counts of attempted murder; two counts of unlawful possession of a
firearm; and two counts of unlawful possession of ammunition.
[4]
What is thus left is to determine a
suitable sentence, a most arduous task of weighing up contradictory
factors and interests, all
the while aware of the impact this will
have on all the parties involved, Mr Khumalo and Mr Ncube included.
[5]
While the court exercises discretion when
imposing a sentence, this discretion is sometimes limited by the
legislature's prescripts
and judgments in higher courts.
[6]
Some
of the basic principles that are important in sentencing were stated
in
Rabie
v S
[1]
stated that
A judicial officer should
not approach punishment in a spirit of anger because, being a human
being, that will make it difficult
for him to achieve that delicate
balance between the crime, the criminal and the interest of society,
which his task and the objects
of punishment demands from him. Nor
should he strive for or after severity, or on the other hand,
surrender to misplaced pity.
While not flinching from firmness where
firmness is called for, he should apprach the stask with a huane and
compassionate understanding
of human frailties and the pressure of
society, which contributes to criminality.
Punishment should fit the
criminal as well as the crime, be fair to society, and be blended
with a measure of mercy according to
the circumstances.
[7]
These
elements were set out in
Zinn
v S
,
[2]
and require me to weigh up your personal circumstance, with the
crime's severity and the community's interest when determining
punishment. All the while, I do so being aware of the various
purposes of punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and
rehabilitation.
[8]
The
first limitation on the court's discretion is the minimum sentence
regime. In charging the accused, the State invoked the provisions
of
s 51(1)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act
[3
]
read with
Part 1
of Schedule 2 in respect of the murder, which
prescribes a minimum sentence of life imprisonment when the death of
the victim was
caused while the accused commit robbery with
aggravating circumstances.
[4]
They also relied on
s 51(2)
of the Act for the robbery, which
prescribes a minimum sentence of 15 years for robbery with
aggravating circumstances (including
involving the taking of a motor
vehicle).
[5]
Both of you were
informed of this.
[9]
The
court must impose the prescribed minimum sentence unless there are
substantial and compelling reasons to justify a departure
from it.
[6]
The legal position is set out in the well-known case of
S
v Malgas,
[7]
where the court made it clear that the sentence should be imposed
unless the cumulative effect of all the mitigating factors that
the
court can take into account when imposing the sentence would justify
the court in departing from the prescribed sentence in
a particular
case. In
S
v Dodo
[8]
the
court emphasised the proportionality between the offence and the
period of imprisonment by stating:
[38] To attempt to
justify any period of penal incarceration, let alone imprisonment for
life as in the present case, without inquiring
into the
proportionality between the offence and the period of imprisonment,
is to ignore, if not to deny, that which lies at the
very heart of
human dignity. Human beings are not commodities to which a price can
be attached; they are creatures with inherent
and infinite worth;
they ought to be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means
to an end. Where the length of a sentence,
which has been imposed
because of its general deterrent effect on others, bears no relation
to the gravity of the offence (in the
sense defined in paragraph 37
above) the offender is being used essentially as a means to another
end and the offender's dignity
assailed. So too where the reformative
effect of the punishment is predominant and the offender sentenced to
lengthy imprisonment,
principally because he cannot be reformed in a
shorter period, but the length of imprisonment bears no relationship
to what the
committed offence merits. Even in the absence of such
features, mere disproportionality between the offence and the period
of imprisonment
would also tend to treat the offender as a means to
an end, thereby denying the offender's humanity.
[10]
With this background, the court will now
evaluate the personal circumstances of the offenders, their crimes,
and the interest of
society in determining whether there are reasons
to depart from the minimum sentence provisions and to determine the
punishment
for the other crimes.
# The personal
circumstances of Mr Khumalo and Mr Ncube
The personal
circumstances of Mr Khumalo and Mr Ncube
[11]
Mr Khumalo, I know you are 33, married, and
have three children aged 8, 3 and 2. You left school fairly early in
the third form.
Before you were arrested, you fixed electronic
appliances for about R1800 per day. You maintained your family with
this income.
[12]
Mr Ncube, you are 37 years old, married,
and have a 2-year-old child. Like Mr Khumalo, you left school
relatively early in grade
7. Before you were arrested, you worked as
a mechanic for your brother, earning around R300 per day.
[13]
Both of you are first offenders, both
maintain their minor children, and both spent over a year in prison
awaiting finalisation
of the matter. Other than your age, nothing
indicates their chances of rehabilitation. The State argued that
there is nothing special
about your circumstances; in other words,
nothing that is substantial and compelling to deviate from the
minimum sentence.
[14]
Much more I do not know, other than that
you are not just the crimes that you committed. You are entitled to
be treated with dignity
and not be reduced to your crimes. You are
not a mere means to an end, meaning the punishment cannot only be
given to make sure
that other do not commit the same crimes, or to
satisfy the retribution that the victims might want. While that is
part of the
reason for punishing you, I am more concerned about the
danger you pose to society and the importance of incarcerating you to
ensure
the safety of an already traumatised community.
# The
crimes
The
crimes
[15]
The offences of murder and attempted murder
which you have been convicted for are severe, including utilising
firearms to intimidate
people into robbing them and assaulting them.
In the instance of Mr Ngwenya, he did not resist. He and his friends
were walking
down the street to buy bread when they were merely in
the way of armed robbers, who decided to shoot him in the face. As
for the
attempted murder of Mr Leketi, it involved shooting a person
who was fleeing after being robbed of their cell phone. Mr Leketi did
not resist. He did not endanger any lives; he was trying to find
refuge from the real danger and was shot in the back. In the case
of
Pastor Unathi, it involved killing him as he exited his church
praying while the congregants were robbed of their belongings
inside
the church. All these crimes were made possible by the crime of
unlawful possession of arms and ammunition that seems to
be too
easily accessible.
[16]
We
do not know who fired the shot that killed the pastor and can, for
that reason, not know their thought process to determine whether
there was premeditation or not.
[9]
That is why you are guilty of murder through common purpose: robbing
a church with firearms, knowing and accepting that there is
a
possibility to utilise the firearms during the robbery, and when
using the firearms, that someone may be killed. It was argued
on your
behalf that since the pastor was shot only once, that life would be a
harsh sentence in this case. This was based on
S
v Khumalo
[10]
, which stated that the punishment must fit the criminal and the
crime, and justice must be done with mercy, not with a sledgehammer.
I have considered this argument seriously, but I am not convinced
that shooting someone only once is substantial and compelling
enough
to depart from the minimum sentencing. In this case, the
vulnerability of churchgoers and the fact that there was no evidence
that the pastor resisted the robbery is rather aggravating.
# The interest of society
The interest of society
[17]
Our Constitution emphasises the right to
life and the right to human dignity. It also binds you, Mr Khumalo
and Mr Ncube, and requires
that you, too, respect the life of others
and their human dignity. Killing someone is the most extreme form of
disregarding the
humanity of others. The disregard for the lives of
others is not something that this court will tolerate. And while I
cannot force
you to respect the lives of others, I must hold you
accountable for the consequences of your choices to disregard the
humanity
of others.
[18]
Armed
robbery threatens the fabric of our society.
[11]
As stated in the beginning, a church is often the place of safety for
people seeking sanctuary from the turbulence of life. Should
such
spiritual sanctities and communities of belonging become so unsafe
that people fear going there, it will have dire consequences
for us
as a society. The callousness of entering such a space with firearms,
robbing congregants of their belongings and not hesitating
to use the
firearm in the commission of the offence leading to the death of a
beloved pastor and the assault of two congregants
must be
appropriately addressed in sentencing.
[19]
Likewise, the interest and safety of people
doing everyday things like buying bread and returning home from
dinner should not become
a lifelong trauma of staring death in the
eyes. The impact of these crimes is severe.
[20]
This was evident from the testimony of
Paster Siya, who has known Pastor Unathi for over ten years through
church structures from
his university days. He described the pastor
as the oldest of four siblings, who took care of some of the
siblings. His death shocked
many people. He started the church in
Cosmo City with members who loved him. His death was a horrible loss
for people in the ministry,
with many people left with unanswered
questions and still mourning the loss. This was also evident when Ms
Mpofu testified, visibly
still shaken by the murder.
[21]
During the trial, Mr Leketi testified that
he had to move out of his house, as he could not return to it after
the trauma. At the
same time, his family lived in fear for his life.
Mr Ngwenya still suffers from the trauma and is fearful of
everything, including
fireworks, having to relive the near ending of
his life every time he walks past the shop. The prevalence of extreme
violent crime
in our society is concerning, and the trauma impact on
the victims and their loved ones is immense.
[22]
It is furthermore in the interest of
society to condemn the unlawful use of firearms.
# Conclusion
Conclusion
[23]
I have contemplated all these factors the last few
days, focusing on the required mercy and the need for society to be
safe. It
would have been easier for the court to show mercy if there
was some admittance to the wrongdoing, taking responsibility for the
deeds, or indications that rehabilitation is possible. That does not
mean that I have abandoned the idea of mercy; it merely means
that it
has less influence on my decision.
[24]
My decision, as stated, is influenced by the high
prevalence of very violent crime in our society, which impacts
significantly on
the psychological well-being of our community. Human
life has become worth a cell phone and a few other belongings of
church congregants.
In the rare occasion that wrongdoers are caught
and tried, it is important to hold them accountable for their
actions. Actions
have consequences.
[25]
I have thus considered your circumstances and
could not find anything substantial and compelling that will allow me
to depart from
imposing the minimum sentences. The mercy that I can
show is letting the sentences I am imposing run concurrently rather
than cumulatively.
[26]
As for the charges of wielding a firearm, the
unlawful possession of an arm and the unlawful possession of
ammunition, I have considered
the central role this played in
committing your offences. This implies that in some instances, like
robbery, possessing the firearm
already plays a central role and will
be considered together when imposing the sentence.
# Order
Order
[27]
I, therefore, make the following order:
1.
Accused 1:
a.
On
count 1, 9, 13 robbery with aggravating circumstances read with
s
51(2)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
, you are
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment each;
b.
On
count 2 and 5, attempted murder of Constable Leketi and Mr Ngwenya,
you are sentenced to 8 years each;
c.
On
count 7, 11, 14 unlawful possession of an arm, and count 6, discharge
of a firearm in a built-up area of any public place, all
taken as one
for purposes of sentencing, you are sentenced to 10 years;
d.
On
count 8, 12, 15, 16 unlawful possession of ammunition, taken together
for purpose of sentencing, you are sentence to 3 years.
e.
On
count 10, murder, read with
s 51(1)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act
105 of 1997
, you are sentenced to life imprisonment.
f.
The
sentences in respect of all counts will run concurrently in terms of
the provisions of s 280(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act
51 of 1977.
g.
You
are declared unfit to possess a firearm.
2.
Accused 2
a.
On
count 1, 9, 13 robbery with aggravating circumstances read with
s
51(2)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
, you are
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment each;
b.
On
count 2 and 5, attempted murder of Constable Leketi and Mr Ngwenya,
you are sentenced to 8 years each;
c.
On
count 11, 14 unlawful possession of an arm, all taken as one for
purposes of sentencing, you are sentenced to 10 years;
d.
On
count 12, 15 unlawful possession of ammunition, taken together for
sentencing, you are sentenced to 3 years.
e.
On
count 10, murder, read with
s 51(1)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act
105 of 1997
, you are sentenced to life imprisonment.
f.
The
sentences in respect of all counts will run concurrently in terms of
the provisions of
s 280(2)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
.
g.
You
are declared unfit to possess a firearm.
WJ DU PLESSIS
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
Delivered: This
judgement is handed down electronically by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter on CaseLines.
It will be sent to the
parties/their legal representatives by email.
Counsel for the
State: Adv
A de Klerk
Counsel for the
accused: Ms
S Bovu
Instructed
by: Legal
Aid South Africa
Date
of the hearing: 24
October 2023
Date of delivery of
judgment:
02
November 2023
[1]
1975
(4) SA 855
(A) at 862G.
[2]
1969
(2) SA 537 (A).
[3]
105
of 1997.
[4]
Part
I
Schedule 2 (c)(ii).
[5]
Part
II
Schedule 2.
[6]
S
51(3)(a)
of
the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
.
[7]
[2001]
3 All SA 220 (A).
[8]
[2001]
ZACC 16.
[9]
S
v Ratau
2023 (2) SACR 40 (MM).
[10]
1973
3 SA 279
A.
[11]
S
v Langeni
[2011]
ZAECGHC 42.
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