Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 1314South Africa
Makunyane v Minister of Police (2016/18398) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1314 (13 November 2023)
Headnotes
in the Supreme Court of Appeal as follows in Zealand v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another:[2] “[25] This is not something new in our law. It has long been firmly established in our common law that every interference with physical
Judgment
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## Makunyane v Minister of Police (2016/18398) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1314 (13 November 2023)
Makunyane v Minister of Police (2016/18398) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1314 (13 November 2023)
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sino date 13 November 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO
:
2016/18398
In the matter between:
GIVEN
MAKUNYANE
Plaintiff
And
MINISTER
OF POLICE
Defendant
JUDGMENT
# M VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN,
AJ:
M VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN,
AJ
:
# [1] This is a delictual
action for damages against the defendant instituted by the plaintiff
arising from the alleged unlawful arrest
and detention of the
plaintiff by members of the defendant, which arrest was effected
without a warrant. The onus is on the
defendant to prove on a
balance of probabilities that the plaintiff’s arrest and
detention was lawful.
[1] This is a delictual
action for damages against the defendant instituted by the plaintiff
arising from the alleged unlawful arrest
and detention of the
plaintiff by members of the defendant, which arrest was effected
without a warrant. The onus is on the
defendant to prove on a
balance of probabilities that the plaintiff’s arrest and
detention was lawful.
# [2] On the 26thof February 2016 at or near the corner of Grant Avenue and William
Road in Norwood, the plaintiff was arrested and detained by
members
of the South African Police Services who were acting within the
course and scope of their employment.
[2] On the 26
th
of February 2016 at or near the corner of Grant Avenue and William
Road in Norwood, the plaintiff was arrested and detained by
members
of the South African Police Services who were acting within the
course and scope of their employment.
# [3] The plaintiff was
arrested without a warrant of arrest for possession of suspected
stolen property.
[3] The plaintiff was
arrested without a warrant of arrest for possession of suspected
stolen property.
# [4] The plaintiff was
taken to the holding cells at the Norwood Police Station and was
detained there until his first appearance
at Court on the 29thof February 2016.
[4] The plaintiff was
taken to the holding cells at the Norwood Police Station and was
detained there until his first appearance
at Court on the 29
th
of February 2016.
# [5] He was detained for
approximately three days.
[5] He was detained for
approximately three days.
# [6] The plaintiff was
released on the 29thof February 2016 at the Hillbrow
Magistrate’s Court where the Prosecutor issued anolle
prosequi.
[6] The plaintiff was
released on the 29
th
of February 2016 at the Hillbrow
Magistrate’s Court where the Prosecutor issued a
nolle
prosequi
.
# [7]At
the hearing I requested the legal representatives to hold a further
pre-trial conference to curtail the issues before trial[1]and ultimately the issues were curtailed as follows:
[7]
At
the hearing I requested the legal representatives to hold a further
pre-trial conference to curtail the issues before trial
[1]
and ultimately the issues were curtailed as follows:
COMMON CAUSE ISSUES
# [8] The parties agreed
that the following issues are common cause issues between the
parties:
[8] The parties agreed
that the following issues are common cause issues between the
parties:
## [8.1] The plaintiff was
arrested without a warrant of arrest.
[8.1] The plaintiff was
arrested without a warrant of arrest.
## [8.2] The date of arrest:
26 February 2016.
[8.2] The date of arrest:
26 February 2016.
## [8.3] Duration of
detention: 3 days.
[8.3] Duration of
detention: 3 days.
## [8.4] Date of release: 29
February 2016.
[8.4] Date of release: 29
February 2016.
## [8.5] The Prosecutor
issued anolle prosequi.
[8.5] The Prosecutor
issued a
nolle prosequi
.
## [8.6] The alleged
suspected stolen property is a white Defy washing machine.
[8.6] The alleged
suspected stolen property is a white Defy washing machine.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
# [9] The issues in dispute
are the following:
[9] The issues in dispute
are the following:
## [9.1] The lawfulness of
the arrest.
[9.1] The lawfulness of
the arrest.
## [9.2] The lawfulness of
the detention.
[9.2] The lawfulness of
the detention.
QUANTUM
# [10] The parties
are of the view that, if the plaintiff succeeds 100% on the merits,
that the reasonable quantum in such event
is R150 000,00.
[10] The parties
are of the view that, if the plaintiff succeeds 100% on the merits,
that the reasonable quantum in such event
is R150 000,00.
# [11] Costs to be
awarded to the successful party on a party and party Magistrate’s
Court scale.
[11] Costs to be
awarded to the successful party on a party and party Magistrate’s
Court scale.
STATUS OF DOCUMENTS
# [12] The parties
agreed that the documents as uploaded on the CaseLines system may be
used.
[12] The parties
agreed that the documents as uploaded on the CaseLines system may be
used.
DUTY TO BEGIN
# [13] The defendant
has the duty to begin.
[13] The defendant
has the duty to begin.
# [14] The defendant
opened the proceedings and called the following witnesses:
[14] The defendant
opened the proceedings and called the following witnesses:
## [14.1] Captain Van
der Byl – the arresting officer;
[14.1] Captain Van
der Byl – the arresting officer;
## [14.2] Seargeant
Mathebula – the charging officer.
[14.2] Seargeant
Mathebula – the charging officer.
# [15] The plaintiff
called the following witnesses:
[15] The plaintiff
called the following witnesses:
## [15.1] Given
Makunyane, the plaintiff;
[15.1] Given
Makunyane, the plaintiff;
## [15.2] Nthakoana
Kutoane (the plaintiff’s wife).
[15.2] Nthakoana
Kutoane (the plaintiff’s wife).
ISSUES TO BE
DETERMINED
# [16] The issues I
am called upon to determine are the following:
[16] The issues I
am called upon to determine are the following:
## [16.1] Whether the
arrest of the plaintiff was lawful;
[16.1] Whether the
arrest of the plaintiff was lawful;
## [16.2] Whether the
detention of the plaintiff was lawful.
[16.2] Whether the
detention of the plaintiff was lawful.
# [17] The plaintiff
pronounced that the arrest of the plaintiff and detention was
unlawful whilst, the defendant pronounced
that the arrest and
detention of the plaintiff was lawful.
[17] The plaintiff
pronounced that the arrest of the plaintiff and detention was
unlawful whilst, the defendant pronounced
that the arrest and
detention of the plaintiff was lawful.
# [18] Before dealing
with the facts of the matter, it may be apposite to traverse and
consider firstly the applicable legislative
framework and the
applicable legal principles.
[18] Before dealing
with the facts of the matter, it may be apposite to traverse and
consider firstly the applicable legislative
framework and the
applicable legal principles.
# [19]An
arrest or detention isprima
faciewrongful.
Once the arrest and detention are admitted, as is the casein
casu,
the onus shifts on to the State to prove the lawfulness thereof and
it is for the defendant to allege and prove the lawfulness
of the
arrest and detention on a balance of probabilities.Inter
alia,
it was held in the Supreme Court of Appeal as follows inZealand
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another:[2]
[19]
An
arrest or detention is
prima
facie
wrongful.
Once the arrest and detention are admitted, as is the case
in
casu
,
the onus shifts on to the State to prove the lawfulness thereof and
it is for the defendant to allege and prove the lawfulness
of the
arrest and detention on a balance of probabilities.
Inter
alia
,
it was held in the Supreme Court of Appeal as follows in
Zealand
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another
:
[2]
“
[25]
This is not something new in our law. It has long been firmly
established in our common law that every interference with physical
liberty is prima facie unlawful. Thus, once the claimant establishes
that an interference has occurred, the burden falls upon the
person
causing that interference to establish a ground of justification.”
# [20]The
defendant denies that the arrest was unlawful and pleads specifically
that the arrest was lawful in terms of section 40(1)(a),
(b) and (e)
of the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977 as amended[3](hereinafter referred to as “the
Criminal Procedure Act)
Section 40 of the Criminal Procedure Act reads as follows:
[20]
The
defendant denies that the arrest was unlawful and pleads specifically
that the arrest was lawful in terms of section 40(1)(a),
(b) and (e)
of the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977 as amended
[3]
(hereinafter referred to as “
the
Criminal Procedure Act
)
Section 40 of the Criminal Procedure Act reads as follows:
“
40(1)
A peace officer may without warrant arrest any person –
(a) who commits
or attempts to commit any offence in his presence;
(b) whom he
reasonably suspects of having committed an offence referred to in
Schedule 1, other than the offence of escaping
from lawful custody;
…
(e) who is found
in possession of anything which the peace officer reasonably suspects
to be stolen property or property dishonestly
obtained, and whom the
peace officer reasonably suspects of having committed an offence with
respect to such thing;”
# [21] The
jurisdictional facts for a section 40(1)(b) defence are that:
[21] The
jurisdictional facts for a section 40(1)(b) defence are that:
## [21.1] the arrestor
must be a peace officer;
[21.1] the arrestor
must be a peace officer;
## [21.2] the arrestor
must entertain a suspicion;
[21.2] the arrestor
must entertain a suspicion;
## [21.3] the
suspicion must be that the suspect (the arrestee) committed an
offence referred to in Schedule 1;
[21.3] the
suspicion must be that the suspect (the arrestee) committed an
offence referred to in Schedule 1;
## [21.4] the
suspicion must rest on reasonable grounds.
[21.4] the
suspicion must rest on reasonable grounds.
# [22]Once
these jurisdictional facts are present the discretion whether or not
to arrest arises.[4]
[22]
Once
these jurisdictional facts are present the discretion whether or not
to arrest arises.
[4]
# [23]A
person found in possession of property reasonably suspected to have
been stolen or acquired by dishonest means, can be arrested
without a
warrant provided that the peace officer reasonably suspects the
person to have committed an offence in connection with
the property.
The jurisdictional facts that have to be proven by the defendant who
relies on section 40(1)(e) as a defence
are the following:[5]
[23]
A
person found in possession of property reasonably suspected to have
been stolen or acquired by dishonest means, can be arrested
without a
warrant provided that the peace officer reasonably suspects the
person to have committed an offence in connection with
the property.
The jurisdictional facts that have to be proven by the defendant who
relies on section 40(1)(e) as a defence
are the following:
[5]
## [23.1] The arrestor
must be a peace officer;
[23.1] The arrestor
must be a peace officer;
## [23.2] The suspect
must be found in possession of the property;
[23.2] The suspect
must be found in possession of the property;
## [23.3] The arrestor
must entertain a suspicion that the property has been stolen or
illegally obtained;
[23.3] The arrestor
must entertain a suspicion that the property has been stolen or
illegally obtained;
## [23.4] The arrestor
must entertain a suspicion that the person found in possession of the
property has committed an offence
in respect of the property;
[23.4] The arrestor
must entertain a suspicion that the person found in possession of the
property has committed an offence
in respect of the property;
## [23.5] The
arrestor’s suspicion must rest on reasonable grounds.
[23.5] The
arrestor’s suspicion must rest on reasonable grounds.
# [24] It appears
from the heads of argument of the defendant’s counsel Mr Amojee
and from the defendant’s evidence
(witness evidence of Captain
van der Byl), that the defendant is in actual fact relying on a
defence as set out in section 40(1)(e)
of the Criminal Procedure Act.
[24] It appears
from the heads of argument of the defendant’s counsel Mr Amojee
and from the defendant’s evidence
(witness evidence of Captain
van der Byl), that the defendant is in actual fact relying on a
defence as set out in section 40(1)(e)
of the Criminal Procedure Act.
WHETHER OR NOT THE
ARREST AND DETENTION WAS UNLAWFUL
# [25]In
order to determine whether or not the defendant has discharged the
onus raised by its defence under section 40(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Act, the case ofMabona
and Another v Minister of Law and Order and Another[6]bears relevance. This case sets out the test to determine
whether or not a suspicion is reasonably entertained within the
meaning of section 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
when conducting an arrest without a warrant. The following
was
said in relation to how a reasonable suspicion is formed.
[25]
In
order to determine whether or not the defendant has discharged the
onus raised by its defence under section 40(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Act, the case of
Mabona
and Another v Minister of Law and Order and Another
[6]
bears relevance. This case sets out the test to determine
whether or not a suspicion is reasonably entertained within the
meaning of section 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
when conducting an arrest without a warrant. The following
was
said in relation to how a reasonable suspicion is formed.
“
Would
a reasonable man in the second defendant's position and possessed of
the same information have considered that there were
good and
sufficient grounds for suspecting that the plaintiffs were guilty of
conspiracy to commit robbery or possession of stolen
property knowing
it to have been stolen? It seems to me that in evaluating his
information a reasonable man would bear in mind
that the section
authorises drastic police action. It authorises an arrest on the
strength of a suspicion and without the need
to swear out a warrant,
i.e. something which otherwise would be an invasion of private rights
and personal liberty.
The
reasonable man will therefore analyse and assess the quality of the
information at his disposal critically, and he will not
accept it
lightly or without checking it where it can be checked. It is only
after an examination of this kind that he will allow
himself to
entertain a suspicion which will justify an arrest
.
This is not to say that the information at his disposal must be of
sufficiently high quality and cogency to engender in him a
conviction
that the suspect is in fact guilty. The section requires suspicion
but not certainty.
However,
the suspicion must be based upon solid grounds
.
Otherwise, it will be flighty or arbitrary, and not a reasonable
suspicion.”
[7]
(Emphasis
added)
# [26]The
same considerations apply in respect of section 40(1)(e).[8]
[26]
The
same considerations apply in respect of section 40(1)(e).
[8]
# [27]InMinister
of Police and Another v Du Plessis[9]it is stated that “Police
bear the onus to justify an arrest and detention.”
[27]
In
Minister
of Police and Another v Du Plessis
[9]
it is stated that “
Police
bear the onus to justify an arrest and detention
.”
# [28]InMinister
of Law and Order and others v Hurley and Another[10]the
Court stated the following:
[28]
In
Minister
of Law and Order and others v Hurley and Another
[10]
the
Court stated the following:
## “An
arrest constitutes an interference with the liberty of the individual
concerned, and it therefore seems to be fair and just to
require that
the person who arrested or caused the arrest of another person should
bear the onus of proving that his action was
justified in law.”
“
An
arrest constitutes an interference with the liberty of the individual
concerned, and it therefore seems to be fair and just to
require that
the person who arrested or caused the arrest of another person should
bear the onus of proving that his action was
justified in law.”
# [29]Furthermore,
in the case ofMjali
v Minister of Police,[11]it was held that our new Constitutional order, conscious of our
oppressive past, was designed to curb intrusions upon personal
liberty which has always, even during the dark days of apartheid,
been judicially valued, and to ensure that the excesses of the
past
would not recur. The right to liberty is inextricably linked to human
dignity. Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic
of South
Africa proclaims as founding values, human dignity, the achievement
of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms.
[29]
Furthermore,
in the case of
Mjali
v Minister of Police,
[11]
it was held that our new Constitutional order, conscious of our
oppressive past, was designed to curb intrusions upon personal
liberty which has always, even during the dark days of apartheid,
been judicially valued, and to ensure that the excesses of the
past
would not recur. The right to liberty is inextricably linked to human
dignity. Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic
of South
Africa proclaims as founding values, human dignity, the achievement
of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms.
# [30]InZealand
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development[12]the
Court held the following:
[30]
In
Zealand
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development
[12]
the
Court held the following:
“
The
Constitution enshrines the right to freedom and security of the
person, including the right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily
or without just cause, as well as the founding value of freedom.
Accordingly, it was sufficient in this case for the applicant
simply
to plead that he was unlawfully detained. This he did. The
respondents then bore the burden to justify the deprivation of
liberty, whatever form it may have taken.”
# [31] Section
50(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act reads as follows:
[31] Section
50(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act reads as follows:
“
50
Procedure after arrest
(1)(a) Any
person who is arrested with or without warrant for allegedly
committing an offence, or for any other reason, shall
as soon as
possible be brought to a police station or, in the case of an arrest
by warrant, to any other place which is expressly
mentioned in the
warrant.”
# [32] Section
50(1)(c) and (d)(i) reads as follows:
[32] Section
50(1)(c) and (d)(i) reads as follows:
“
(c)
Subject to paragraph (d), if such an arrested person is not released
by reason that –
(i)
...
(ii) bail is
not granted to him or her in terms of section 59 or 59A,
he or she shall be
brought before a lower court as soon as reasonably possible, but not
later than 48 hours after the arrest.”
(d) If the period of
48 hours expires –
(i) outside
ordinary court hours or on a day which is not an ordinary court day,
the accused shall be brought before a lower
court not later than the
end of the first court day;”
# [33]Sergeant
Mathebula testified that the plaintiff told him that he was not in a
position to pay bail and therefore bail was not offered
to him. On
the evidence it is common cause that the plaintiff was brought before
the Hillbrow Magistrate’s Court the next
Court day being Monday
the 29thof
February 2016.[13]
[33]
Sergeant
Mathebula testified that the plaintiff told him that he was not in a
position to pay bail and therefore bail was not offered
to him. On
the evidence it is common cause that the plaintiff was brought before
the Hillbrow Magistrate’s Court the next
Court day being Monday
the 29
th
of
February 2016.
[13]
THE EVIDENCE
# [34] In view of my
judgment, I will not be repeating all the evidence led in Court.
The evidence of Captain van der
Byl, the arresting officer however
bears scrutiny.
[34] In view of my
judgment, I will not be repeating all the evidence led in Court.
The evidence of Captain van der
Byl, the arresting officer however
bears scrutiny.
The evidence of
Captain van der Byl – the arresting officer
# [35] Captain van
der Byl testified that he is currently employed as a Captain in the
MIC (Management Information Centre).
In February 2016 he was a
Warrant Officer in the Crime Prevention Unit at Norwood Police
Station. During October 2016 he
was promoted to Captain.
He commenced his services at the SAPS in January 1991. In
February 2016 he had been employed
in the SAPS for 25 years. He
held the rank as Warrant Officer for almost 17 years in February
2016. He was stationed
at Norwood Police Station throughout his
time as a Warrant Officer and patrolled in Norwood and specifically
in the precinct where
the plaintiff was arrested.
[35] Captain van
der Byl testified that he is currently employed as a Captain in the
MIC (Management Information Centre).
In February 2016 he was a
Warrant Officer in the Crime Prevention Unit at Norwood Police
Station. During October 2016 he
was promoted to Captain.
He commenced his services at the SAPS in January 1991. In
February 2016 he had been employed
in the SAPS for 25 years. He
held the rank as Warrant Officer for almost 17 years in February
2016. He was stationed
at Norwood Police Station throughout his
time as a Warrant Officer and patrolled in Norwood and specifically
in the precinct where
the plaintiff was arrested.
# [36] He testified
that he arrested the plaintiff on the 26thof February
2016 at 19h10 on the corner of William Road and Grant Avenue,
Norwood. A cluster group of the Crime Prevention
Unit were busy
with operations on Grant Avenue and William Road. The General
sought the parade for a crime prevention operation
task. On
that day he proceeded to the corner of William Road and Grant Avenue,
Norwood at approximately 19h00, a place where
“they sell
dagga and where there was also gambling”. That area
is a crime hotspot. He found the plaintiff standing on the
pavement a little down on William Avenue not
on the exact street.
He found him with a washing machine and a group of men next to him.
He approached him to find
out what he was doing there. He was
not alone - there was a couple of other “guys”around him (the plaintiff). Captain van der Byl testified that
it looked suspicious – the plaintiff standing there
with a
washing machine. The Captain testified that he (Captain van der
Byl) was not alone. Constable Mashaba, General
Ndaba was there
herself and Colonel Kuboni and other members of the SAPS were with
him. All of the members were in uniform
and they were driving
in vehicles which were marked. He was driving in a marked
bakkie. It had the SAPS markings and
a blue light on the roof.
[36] He testified
that he arrested the plaintiff on the 26
th
of February
2016 at 19h10 on the corner of William Road and Grant Avenue,
Norwood. A cluster group of the Crime Prevention
Unit were busy
with operations on Grant Avenue and William Road. The General
sought the parade for a crime prevention operation
task. On
that day he proceeded to the corner of William Road and Grant Avenue,
Norwood at approximately 19h00, a place where
“
they sell
dagga and where there was also gambling”
. That area
is a crime hotspot. He found the plaintiff standing on the
pavement a little down on William Avenue not
on the exact street.
He found him with a washing machine and a group of men next to him.
He approached him to find
out what he was doing there. He was
not alone - there was a couple of other “
guys”
around him (the plaintiff). Captain van der Byl testified that
it looked suspicious – the plaintiff standing there
with a
washing machine. The Captain testified that he (Captain van der
Byl) was not alone. Constable Mashaba, General
Ndaba was there
herself and Colonel Kuboni and other members of the SAPS were with
him. All of the members were in uniform
and they were driving
in vehicles which were marked. He was driving in a marked
bakkie. It had the SAPS markings and
a blue light on the roof.
# [37] The plaintiff
told Captain van der Byl that he was selling the washing machine.
Captain van der Byl asked him why
at this time of the night?
The plaintiff was very evasive according to Captain van der Byl.
Captain van der Byl read
the first two paragraphs from his
statement:
[37] The plaintiff
told Captain van der Byl that he was selling the washing machine.
Captain van der Byl asked him why
at this time of the night?
The plaintiff was very evasive according to Captain van der Byl.
Captain van der Byl read
the first two paragraphs from his
statement:
# “On
26 February 2016 at about 19h10 we were busy with an operation with
Hillbrow Cluster. I was in William Road nearest corner
Grant
Avenue, Norwood. I found Given Makunyane in William Road,
Norwood with a front loader washing machine.
“
On
26 February 2016 at about 19h10 we were busy with an operation with
Hillbrow Cluster. I was in William Road nearest corner
Grant
Avenue, Norwood. I found Given Makunyane in William Road,
Norwood with a front loader washing machine
.
# I approached him and
he told me that he is selling the machine.I asked him
where the machine comes from. He could not show me a receipt
for the machine.”
I approached him and
he told me that he is selling the machine
.
I asked him
where the machine comes from. He could not show me a receipt
for the machine.”
# [38] After that
Captain van der Byl warned the plaintiff and told him that he was
under arrest for suspected stolen property.
Captain van der Byl
testified that he had a reasonable suspicion because from the
plaintiff’s standing at that hotspot he
had a suspicion that
that machine was not his and that the machine comes from somewhere
else. He read from his statement
into the record again:
[38] After that
Captain van der Byl warned the plaintiff and told him that he was
under arrest for suspected stolen property.
Captain van der Byl
testified that he had a reasonable suspicion because from the
plaintiff’s standing at that hotspot he
had a suspicion that
that machine was not his and that the machine comes from somewhere
else. He read from his statement
into the record again:
“
I
find it strange for him to stand on the street with a washing machine
at that time and suspected it to be stolen property.
He didn’t
have a car to transport it.”
# [39] He also had a
reasonable suspicion that the machine was stolen, also having regard
to the way the plaintiff spoke –
the plaintiff was evasive and
did not give straight answers. It did not make sense at that
time of night – somebody
standing with a washing machine on the
corner. Also the plaintiff told Captain van der Byl that he was
going to sell it.
The Captain testified that nobody goes that
time of night to buy a washing machine. There is no business at
that time open
to buy a washing machine. Captain van der Byl’s
suspicion was that the plaintiff stole the machine from somewhere
else.
[39] He also had a
reasonable suspicion that the machine was stolen, also having regard
to the way the plaintiff spoke –
the plaintiff was evasive and
did not give straight answers. It did not make sense at that
time of night – somebody
standing with a washing machine on the
corner. Also the plaintiff told Captain van der Byl that he was
going to sell it.
The Captain testified that nobody goes that
time of night to buy a washing machine. There is no business at
that time open
to buy a washing machine. Captain van der Byl’s
suspicion was that the plaintiff stole the machine from somewhere
else.
# [40] He testified
that he spoke only to the plaintiff as he wanted to find out about
the washing machine. Other members
of the SAPS that were with
him questioned the people standing with the plaintiff. He
testified that when they asked about
the washing machine the others
that were standing with the plaintiff pointed to the plaintiff and
said the washing machine was
his. The plaintiff himself kept
quiet. After the questioning Captain van der Byl told the
plaintiff that he was under
arrest for possession of suspected stolen
property. The plaintiff was angry at them. Captain van
der Byl then placed
him inside the police van. They also loaded
the washing machine and then they transported the plaintiff to the
Norwood police
cells. This was at approximately 19h30.
The Norwood Police Station is not very far from the corner of William
Road
and Grant Avenue, approximately 3 minutes away. Captain
van der Byl read into the record again from his statement:
[40] He testified
that he spoke only to the plaintiff as he wanted to find out about
the washing machine. Other members
of the SAPS that were with
him questioned the people standing with the plaintiff. He
testified that when they asked about
the washing machine the others
that were standing with the plaintiff pointed to the plaintiff and
said the washing machine was
his. The plaintiff himself kept
quiet. After the questioning Captain van der Byl told the
plaintiff that he was under
arrest for possession of suspected stolen
property. The plaintiff was angry at them. Captain van
der Byl then placed
him inside the police van. They also loaded
the washing machine and then they transported the plaintiff to the
Norwood police
cells. This was at approximately 19h30.
The Norwood Police Station is not very far from the corner of William
Road
and Grant Avenue, approximately 3 minutes away. Captain
van der Byl read into the record again from his statement:
“
I arrested
Given Makunyane for the possession of suspected stolen property and
transported him to the Norwood SAPS where I placed
him in the cells.
I handed the property in the SAP13/81/2/2016. SAP13 is for
property and the SAP14 is a cell register.”
# [41] Captain van
der Byl stated that the plaintiff did not have a clear explanation
for what he was doing with the property
at that time of night –
the plaintiff’s explanation that he was selling it did not make
sense. Captain van der
Byl stated that the plaintiff was
speaking to the General as well but that he could not hear what they
were saying. At that
time of his career he was a Warrant
Officer in that department for 17 years at the Police Station
approximately three minutes away
from the corner of Grant Avenue and
William Road. He knew the area well. This was a crime
hotspot. It was not
reasonable selling a washing machine in
that area at 19h10 at night. The plaintiff was the first person
that Captain van
der Byl ever found with a washing machine at that
time of night. He arrested him because of the reasonable belief
that the
washing machine was stolen and the plaintiff could not give
him a reasonable explanation. He did not have a warrant to
arrest
the plaintiff. He arrested the plaintiff in terms of
section 40(1)(e) – “one can arrest someone in terms of
that section if one has a reasonable suspicion that he has committed
a crime”.
[41] Captain van
der Byl stated that the plaintiff did not have a clear explanation
for what he was doing with the property
at that time of night –
the plaintiff’s explanation that he was selling it did not make
sense. Captain van der
Byl stated that the plaintiff was
speaking to the General as well but that he could not hear what they
were saying. At that
time of his career he was a Warrant
Officer in that department for 17 years at the Police Station
approximately three minutes away
from the corner of Grant Avenue and
William Road. He knew the area well. This was a crime
hotspot. It was not
reasonable selling a washing machine in
that area at 19h10 at night. The plaintiff was the first person
that Captain van
der Byl ever found with a washing machine at that
time of night. He arrested him because of the reasonable belief
that the
washing machine was stolen and the plaintiff could not give
him a reasonable explanation. He did not have a warrant to
arrest
the plaintiff. He arrested the plaintiff in terms of
section 40(1)(e) – “
one can arrest someone in terms of
that section if one has a reasonable suspicion that he has committed
a crime”
.
# [42] On a question
posed by the defendant’s counsel to Captain van der Byl,
whether with his experience of 17 years
as a Warrant Officer he could
assess situations reasonably, Captain van der Byl answered in the
affirmative and stated in his view,
he exercised his discretion
reasonably. After this he did not have any dealings with the
plaintiff. The cell guards
filled out the cell register.
He wrote his name and took him to the cells. He left and went
to register the crime docket.
[42] On a question
posed by the defendant’s counsel to Captain van der Byl,
whether with his experience of 17 years
as a Warrant Officer he could
assess situations reasonably, Captain van der Byl answered in the
affirmative and stated in his view,
he exercised his discretion
reasonably. After this he did not have any dealings with the
plaintiff. The cell guards
filled out the cell register.
He wrote his name and took him to the cells. He left and went
to register the crime docket.
# [43] At CaseLines
016-5 appears a notice of rights in terms of the Constitution.
It explains to the person who is arrested
about his constitutional
rights. The signature that appears on the right hand side of
the stamp is his signature. It
was dated the 26thof
February 2016 at 19h59. The Captain testified that this
document must be explained or read to every person that is arrested.
If they agree they then put their signature on the document.
Captain van der Byl then explained the rights to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff signed the document after his rights were explained.
[43] At CaseLines
016-5 appears a notice of rights in terms of the Constitution.
It explains to the person who is arrested
about his constitutional
rights. The signature that appears on the right hand side of
the stamp is his signature. It
was dated the 26
th
of
February 2016 at 19h59. The Captain testified that this
document must be explained or read to every person that is arrested.
If they agree they then put their signature on the document.
Captain van der Byl then explained the rights to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff signed the document after his rights were explained.
# [44] In
cross-examination Captain van der Byl again testified that the
plaintiff was arrested because he had a reasonable
suspicion that the
washing machine was not the plaintiff’s washing machine
“together with the explanation that the plaintiff gave”.
[44] In
cross-examination Captain van der Byl again testified that the
plaintiff was arrested because he had a reasonable
suspicion that the
washing machine was not the plaintiff’s washing machine
“
together with the explanation that the plaintiff gave”
.
# [45] In
cross-examination Captain van der Byl on a question posed by Ms
Lekwape as to why the plaintiff looked suspicious
to him, answered
that “when you look at them they look at you and then they
try to hide their faces”. The plaintiff turned around
from the Captain and was not facing the Captain. Ms Lekwape
questioned whether that was
all that elicited the reasonable
suspicion of the Captain.
[45] In
cross-examination Captain van der Byl on a question posed by Ms
Lekwape as to why the plaintiff looked suspicious
to him, answered
that “
when you look at them they look at you and then they
try to hide their faces”
. The plaintiff turned around
from the Captain and was not facing the Captain. Ms Lekwape
questioned whether that was
all that elicited the reasonable
suspicion of the Captain.
# [46] Captain van
der Byl in cross-examination said that he could not remember whether
there was a Woolworths in the vicinity
where the arrest took place
even though he worked in the area for the past 17 years and the
Norwood Police Station was three minutes
away from where the incident
occurred at the corner of Grant Avenue and William Road at the time
the incident occurred - even though
he did his rounds around there.
He stated that he could really not remember that far back. In
cross-examination Captain
van der Byl testified that he only
questioned the plaintiff as there was a big group and the other
members of the police questioned
the other people (referring to the
people around the plaintiff and in the area). They questioned
the people that “stood around him”.
[46] Captain van
der Byl in cross-examination said that he could not remember whether
there was a Woolworths in the vicinity
where the arrest took place
even though he worked in the area for the past 17 years and the
Norwood Police Station was three minutes
away from where the incident
occurred at the corner of Grant Avenue and William Road at the time
the incident occurred - even though
he did his rounds around there.
He stated that he could really not remember that far back. In
cross-examination Captain
van der Byl testified that he only
questioned the plaintiff as there was a big group and the other
members of the police questioned
the other people (referring to the
people around the plaintiff and in the area). They questioned
the people that “
stood around him”
.
# [47] Under
cross-examination a question was posed to the plaintiff whether he
questioned the people around the plaintiff as
to how the machine got
there and how they know that the machine was the plaintiff’s.
Captain van der Byl said that
he only asked one question and that is
whose machine is it and the other people pointed at the plaintiff.
[47] Under
cross-examination a question was posed to the plaintiff whether he
questioned the people around the plaintiff as
to how the machine got
there and how they know that the machine was the plaintiff’s.
Captain van der Byl said that
he only asked one question and that is
whose machine is it and the other people pointed at the plaintiff.
# [48] Captain van
der Byl testified in cross-examination that when the cluster group
approached the plaintiff, he did not run
away. He was just
standing there according to Captain van der Byl avoiding eye
contact. On a question posed in cross-examination
whether in
his experience a person who is in possession of suspected stolen
property when they see the police approaching individually
or in a
convoy would run away, Captain van der Byl answered that “they
are not scared of the police anymore”. They do not
run away anymore in his experience.
[48] Captain van
der Byl testified in cross-examination that when the cluster group
approached the plaintiff, he did not run
away. He was just
standing there according to Captain van der Byl avoiding eye
contact. On a question posed in cross-examination
whether in
his experience a person who is in possession of suspected stolen
property when they see the police approaching individually
or in a
convoy would run away, Captain van der Byl answered that “
they
are not scared of the police anymore”
. They do not
run away anymore in his experience.
# [49] The Captain
furthermore testified in cross-examination that the plaintiff told
Captain van der Byl that he was selling
the machine. This was
not all he was saying. Captain van der Byl could not understand
what else he was saying as the
plaintiff also spoke in another
language (Sepedi). When asked whether Captain van der Byl asked
his colleagues what the plaintiff
said to them they told him that he
was lying. On a question posed to Captain van der Byl as to
whether Captain van der Byl
asked the other members what exactly the
plaintiff said, Captain van der Byl responded by saying that “they
told me that the plaintiff had changed his story”.
Captain van der Byl did not ask his colleagues to tell him exactly
what the plaintiff was saying. On a question posed
by the Court
to Mr Amojee (the defendant’s counsel) whether the members of
the SAPS referred to would be testifying he answered
that only
Captain van der Byl, the arresting officer, and Sergeant Mathebula,
the charging officer, would be called and that no
other members would
be called “to confirm Captain van der Byl’s
evidence”.
[49] The Captain
furthermore testified in cross-examination that the plaintiff told
Captain van der Byl that he was selling
the machine. This was
not all he was saying. Captain van der Byl could not understand
what else he was saying as the
plaintiff also spoke in another
language (Sepedi). When asked whether Captain van der Byl asked
his colleagues what the plaintiff
said to them they told him that he
was lying. On a question posed to Captain van der Byl as to
whether Captain van der Byl
asked the other members what exactly the
plaintiff said, Captain van der Byl responded by saying that “
they
told me that the plaintiff had changed his story”
.
Captain van der Byl did not ask his colleagues to tell him exactly
what the plaintiff was saying. On a question posed
by the Court
to Mr Amojee (the defendant’s counsel) whether the members of
the SAPS referred to would be testifying he answered
that only
Captain van der Byl, the arresting officer, and Sergeant Mathebula,
the charging officer, would be called and that no
other members would
be called “
to confirm Captain van der Byl’s
evidence”
.
# [50] The
plaintiff’s version was put to Captain van der Byl that it was
the plaintiff’s machine. It was
put to Captain van der
Byl that the reason why the plaintiff did not have transport was that
he had asked a friend to drop him
off there with the machine at the
corner of Grant Avenue and William Road. Captain van der Byl
answered in the negative and
said that the plaintiff had never told
him this. He recalled the plaintiff saying that he is waiting
for a friend.
He did not hear him to say that a friend dropped
him off. Captain van der Byl was questioned by Ms Lekwape as to
why for
the first time we are hearing that the plaintiff told him
that he was waiting for a friend was heard in cross-examination as
this
does not appear in his statement. Captain van der Byl
responded that which he heard from the other translators he did not
write in his statement, as he himself could not understand the
language. The question was then asked as to why Captain van der
Byl
did not write in his statement that he only wrote certain things in
his statement and not what was said by the plaintiff to
other members
of the police.
[50] The
plaintiff’s version was put to Captain van der Byl that it was
the plaintiff’s machine. It was
put to Captain van der
Byl that the reason why the plaintiff did not have transport was that
he had asked a friend to drop him
off there with the machine at the
corner of Grant Avenue and William Road. Captain van der Byl
answered in the negative and
said that the plaintiff had never told
him this. He recalled the plaintiff saying that he is waiting
for a friend.
He did not hear him to say that a friend dropped
him off. Captain van der Byl was questioned by Ms Lekwape as to
why for
the first time we are hearing that the plaintiff told him
that he was waiting for a friend was heard in cross-examination as
this
does not appear in his statement. Captain van der Byl
responded that which he heard from the other translators he did not
write in his statement, as he himself could not understand the
language. The question was then asked as to why Captain van der
Byl
did not write in his statement that he only wrote certain things in
his statement and not what was said by the plaintiff to
other members
of the police.
# [51] On a question
posed by Ms Lekwape in cross-examination that arresting the plaintiff
was not the only way one could have
brought him before Court, Captain
van der Byl answered “We never confirmed his home address so
we had to wait for the detective on standby to confirm his home
address”. Captain van der Byl testified that the
plaintiff just said he stayed in Orange Grove.
[51] On a question
posed by Ms Lekwape in cross-examination that arresting the plaintiff
was not the only way one could have
brought him before Court, Captain
van der Byl answered “
We never confirmed his home address so
we had to wait for the detective on standby to confirm his home
address”
. Captain van der Byl testified that the
plaintiff just said he stayed in Orange Grove.
# [52] It was put to
Captain van der Byl in cross-examination that the plaintiff denied
having been told of any rights with
reference to the notice of rights
document at CaseLines 016-5. Captain van der Byl’s
response was that he agreed that
he understood the rights. It
is his signature on the document.
[52] It was put to
Captain van der Byl in cross-examination that the plaintiff denied
having been told of any rights with
reference to the notice of rights
document at CaseLines 016-5. Captain van der Byl’s
response was that he agreed that
he understood the rights. It
is his signature on the document.
# [53] It was put to
Captain van der Byl that the plaintiff will testify that he was
waiting at the time for someone working
at Woolworths that was open
at the time. There is a lady that works at Woolworths that
closes at 20h00. He was waiting
there for the lady to “knock
off”. That lady was going to arrange transport for
herself “to take the machine”. The response
by Captain van der Byl was he never told him that he was waiting for
a lady from Woolworths. On a question
that was posed to Captain
van der Byl about what made him suspicious at the time – the
response was that there was no businesses
open at the time that was
dealing in washing machines. Captain van der Byl further
responded that Woolworths do not buy washing
machines. A
question was posed to Captain van der Byl whether the witness said to
Captain van der Byl that he was going to
sell the machine to a
business that was “operating”in washing
machines. The response was no.
[53] It was put to
Captain van der Byl that the plaintiff will testify that he was
waiting at the time for someone working
at Woolworths that was open
at the time. There is a lady that works at Woolworths that
closes at 20h00. He was waiting
there for the lady to “
knock
off”
. That lady was going to arrange transport for
herself “
to take the machine”
. The response
by Captain van der Byl was he never told him that he was waiting for
a lady from Woolworths. On a question
that was posed to Captain
van der Byl about what made him suspicious at the time – the
response was that there was no businesses
open at the time that was
dealing in washing machines. Captain van der Byl further
responded that Woolworths do not buy washing
machines. A
question was posed to Captain van der Byl whether the witness said to
Captain van der Byl that he was going to
sell the machine to a
business that was “
operating”
in washing
machines. The response was no.
# [54] Under
cross-examination it was further put to Captain van der Byl that the
plaintiff told Captain van der Byl that his
wife was at home and that
the SAPS could verify from his wife that the machine is his.
The Captain answered by saying “He didn’t tell me to
see his wife. He was evasive.”
[54] Under
cross-examination it was further put to Captain van der Byl that the
plaintiff told Captain van der Byl that his
wife was at home and that
the SAPS could verify from his wife that the machine is his.
The Captain answered by saying “
He didn’t tell me to
see his wife. He was evasive.”
# [55] In
re-examination Captain van der Byl said he had a reasonable suspicion
as a result of not only the fact that the plaintiff
did not have a
car but also the time of night and that he was avoiding eye contact –
that time of night who would actually
buy a washing machine. It
was strange if you sell a washing machine it would usually be during
the day. “You would usually sell it through Junk Mail
or advertise if you want to sell it”. Housebreaking
and theft are common in the area and was also common in 2016.
He has been in the area since 1996 and
he saw many businesses change
around in the area. Captain van der Byl further testified that
it would not be reasonable to
expect him to recall whether there was
a Woolworths in the area. He responded by saying no.
Captain van der Byl testified
that just because one hears from the
bystanders that it is his machine does not mean that it is his
machine. Saying that
it is his machine was not sufficient and
that is why he requested a receipt, which the plaintiff was unable to
produce.
[55] In
re-examination Captain van der Byl said he had a reasonable suspicion
as a result of not only the fact that the plaintiff
did not have a
car but also the time of night and that he was avoiding eye contact –
that time of night who would actually
buy a washing machine. It
was strange if you sell a washing machine it would usually be during
the day. “
You would usually sell it through Junk Mail
or advertise if you want to sell it”
. Housebreaking
and theft are common in the area and was also common in 2016.
He has been in the area since 1996 and
he saw many businesses change
around in the area. Captain van der Byl further testified that
it would not be reasonable to
expect him to recall whether there was
a Woolworths in the area. He responded by saying no.
Captain van der Byl testified
that just because one hears from the
bystanders that it is his machine does not mean that it is his
machine. Saying that
it is his machine was not sufficient and
that is why he requested a receipt, which the plaintiff was unable to
produce.
# [56] In
re-examination Captain van der Byl further testified that criminals
look at your first move and then avoid eye contact.
He thinks
the machine is about 1.2 metres. He cannot speculate. The
machine was about 1.2 metres tall and maybe half
a metre wide.
It might be that the plaintiff stole it somewhere to take it
somewhere. It is normal to patrol there
in the vicinity of
where the plaintiff was arrested approximately ten times a day by
members of his police station.
[56] In
re-examination Captain van der Byl further testified that criminals
look at your first move and then avoid eye contact.
He thinks
the machine is about 1.2 metres. He cannot speculate. The
machine was about 1.2 metres tall and maybe half
a metre wide.
It might be that the plaintiff stole it somewhere to take it
somewhere. It is normal to patrol there
in the vicinity of
where the plaintiff was arrested approximately ten times a day by
members of his police station.
# [57] In
re-examination Captain van der Byl further answered that he would
have put it in his statement if he was informed
by the plaintiff that
he was selling the washing machine to a lady in Woolworths at 20h00
if it was told to him at the time.
[57] In
re-examination Captain van der Byl further answered that he would
have put it in his statement if he was informed
by the plaintiff that
he was selling the washing machine to a lady in Woolworths at 20h00
if it was told to him at the time.
# [58] The Court
posed the question to Captain van der Byl as to whether he asked the
plaintiff where he got the washing machine
from. Captain van
der Byl responded that the plaintiff did not want to answer and just
said it was his. The plaintiff
looked at him when he said that.
*
[58] The Court
posed the question to Captain van der Byl as to whether he asked the
plaintiff where he got the washing machine
from. Captain van
der Byl responded that the plaintiff did not want to answer and just
said it was his. The plaintiff
looked at him when he said that.
*
EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE
WITH REFERENCE TO THE APPLICABLE LAW
# [59]The
Court inThusi
S’Bonelo Vukani v Minister of Police[14]cited
the case ofNkambule
v Minister of Law and Order[15]which held that when a peace officer holds an initial suspicion, he
must take steps to have it confirmed in order for the suspicion
to be
a reasonable one for him to arrest the plaintiff.
[59]
The
Court in
Thusi
S’Bonelo Vukani v Minister of Police
[14]
cited
the case of
Nkambule
v Minister of Law and Order
[15]
which held that when a peace officer holds an initial suspicion, he
must take steps to have it confirmed in order for the suspicion
to be
a reasonable one for him to arrest the plaintiff.
“
[29]
There was no evidence of any steps which were taken to verify the
allegations made by the two security guards.
[30] The
arresting officer lacked any reasonable suspicion to arrest the
plaintiff nor to detain him. In my view the plaintiff’s
arrest and detention was unlawful.
[31] There is
no evidence as to why it was necessary to detain him for that period
either.
[32] The
deprivation of ones liberty is a serious matter. Such arbitrary
acts by the police, only serves to build distrust
and erodes
confidence of the public in those entrusted to keep the peace and
ensure public security and safety.”
# [60]InMatebese
v Minister of Police[16]it was held that it is trite that police officers purporting to act
in terms of section 40(1)(b) of the Act should investigate
exculpatory explanations offered by a suspect before they can form a
reasonable suspicion for the purpose of lawful arrest.[17]
[60]
In
Matebese
v Minister of Police
[16]
it was held that it is trite that police officers purporting to act
in terms of section 40(1)(b) of the Act should investigate
exculpatory explanations offered by a suspect before they can form a
reasonable suspicion for the purpose of lawful arrest.
[17]
# [61]It
was held by our Courts that it is expected of a reasonable person to
analyse and weigh the quantity of information available
critically
and only thereafter, and having checked what can be checked, will he
form a mature suspicion that will justify an arrest.[18]
[61]
It
was held by our Courts that it is expected of a reasonable person to
analyse and weigh the quantity of information available
critically
and only thereafter, and having checked what can be checked, will he
form a mature suspicion that will justify an arrest.
[18]
# [62]Writing
for the Constitutional Court inMahlangu
and Another v Minister of Police,[19]Tshiqi J was compelled to include in the judgment a fairly lengthy
excerpt from the decision ofBotha
v Minister of Safety and Security, January v Minister of Safety
Security:[20]
[62]
Writing
for the Constitutional Court in
Mahlangu
and Another v Minister of Police
,
[19]
Tshiqi J was compelled to include in the judgment a fairly lengthy
excerpt from the decision of
Botha
v Minister of Safety and Security, January v Minister of Safety
Security
:
[20]
“
It is also
trite law that in a case where the Minister of Safety and Security
(as defendant) is being sued for unlawful arrest and
detention and
does not deny the arrest and detention, the onus to justify the
lawfulness of the detention rests on the defendant
and the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant on the basis of the provisions of
section 12(1) of the Constitution. … These
provisions,
therefore, place an obligation on police officials who are bestowed
with duties to arrest and detain persons charged
with and/or
suspected of the commission of criminal offences, to establish before
detaining the person, the justification and lawfulness
of such arrest
and detention. …”
# [63]In
the case ofMahlangu
and Another v Minister of Police[21]theConstitutional
Court further held that the prism through which liability for
unlawful arrest and detention should be considered
is the
constitutional right guaranteed in section 12(1) not to be
arbitrarily deprived of freedom and security of the person.
The
right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause
applies to all persons in the Republic of South Africa.[22]These rights, together with the right to human dignity, are
fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. The
State
is required to respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights, as
well as all other fundamental rights. These are
also part of
the founding values upon which the South African Constitutional state
is built.
[63]
In
the case of
Mahlangu
and Another v Minister of Police
[21]
the
Constitutional
Court further held that the prism through which liability for
unlawful arrest and detention should be considered
is the
constitutional right guaranteed in section 12(1) not to be
arbitrarily deprived of freedom and security of the person.
The
right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause
applies to all persons in the Republic of South Africa.
[22]
These rights, together with the right to human dignity, are
fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. The
State
is required to respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights, as
well as all other fundamental rights. These are
also part of
the founding values upon which the South African Constitutional state
is built.
# [64] The defendantin casuregarding the arrest sought to only proffer the
evidence of a single witness in relation to the lawfulness of the
arrest namely
that of Captain van der Byl, although on the
defendant’s own version there were other SAPS members of
Captain van der Byl’s
crew present who actually also questioned
the plaintiff. The defendant chose not to call any of the other
members of the
SAPS who questioned the plaintiff so as to cast
further light on the reasonableness of the arrest. The
arresting officer
only heard a certain portion of the explanation and
did not hear the explanation, which was given in another language
that the
arresting officer could not understand. The arresting
officer formed a suspicion based on an incomplete explanation.
[64] The defendant
in casu
regarding the arrest sought to only proffer the
evidence of a single witness in relation to the lawfulness of the
arrest namely
that of Captain van der Byl, although on the
defendant’s own version there were other SAPS members of
Captain van der Byl’s
crew present who actually also questioned
the plaintiff. The defendant chose not to call any of the other
members of the
SAPS who questioned the plaintiff so as to cast
further light on the reasonableness of the arrest. The
arresting officer
only heard a certain portion of the explanation and
did not hear the explanation, which was given in another language
that the
arresting officer could not understand. The arresting
officer formed a suspicion based on an incomplete explanation.
# [65] The defendant
bore the onus to show that the arrest was lawful. The defendant
on its own version as proffered by
Captain van der Byl had
insufficient grounds to objectively justify a reasonable suspicion,
which could easily have been checked.
Captain van der Byl could
critically have analysed the information at his disposal to determine
whether his suspicion was based
upon solid grounds that could justify
the arrest of the plaintiff. Captain van der Byl testified that
he did not enquire
from his colleagues who were with him what the
plaintiff was explaining to them. The only response he received
from them
was that the plaintiff “was lying”.
He did not enquire from his colleagues as to why they say that the
plaintiff was lying. Captain van der Byl did not
analyse and
assess the quality of the information at his disposal critically and
he failed to check the information and as such
a suspicion cannot
justify an arrest. To further form a suspicion as he testified
based thereon that the plaintiff stood
on the street with a washing
machine at that time of night being 19h10 for which he could not show
a receipt and that when questioned
by Captain van der Byl the
plaintiff could not look him in the eye and looked down and was
evasive, does not constitute a reasonable
suspicion. This was
not enough to formulate a reasonable suspicion.
[65] The defendant
bore the onus to show that the arrest was lawful. The defendant
on its own version as proffered by
Captain van der Byl had
insufficient grounds to objectively justify a reasonable suspicion,
which could easily have been checked.
Captain van der Byl could
critically have analysed the information at his disposal to determine
whether his suspicion was based
upon solid grounds that could justify
the arrest of the plaintiff. Captain van der Byl testified that
he did not enquire
from his colleagues who were with him what the
plaintiff was explaining to them. The only response he received
from them
was that the plaintiff “
was lying”
.
He did not enquire from his colleagues as to why they say that the
plaintiff was lying. Captain van der Byl did not
analyse and
assess the quality of the information at his disposal critically and
he failed to check the information and as such
a suspicion cannot
justify an arrest. To further form a suspicion as he testified
based thereon that the plaintiff stood
on the street with a washing
machine at that time of night being 19h10 for which he could not show
a receipt and that when questioned
by Captain van der Byl the
plaintiff could not look him in the eye and looked down and was
evasive, does not constitute a reasonable
suspicion. This was
not enough to formulate a reasonable suspicion.
# [66] The defendant
had every opportunity to prove the lawfulness of the arrest.
There were several SAPS witnesses the
defendant could have called to
give information in relation to what lies were told, the extent of
the lying and it could have set
out a basis for their suspicion,
which they failed to do. It appears that there was further evidence
to justify the suspicion,
but the defendant simply failed to lead the
evidence. The only evidence the defendant led was that the
plaintiff had a washing
machine next to him on the street at 19h10 at
night and looked suspicious in that he did not make eye contact,
looked down and
that Captain van der Byl’s colleagues told him
that the plaintiff was lying.
[66] The defendant
had every opportunity to prove the lawfulness of the arrest.
There were several SAPS witnesses the
defendant could have called to
give information in relation to what lies were told, the extent of
the lying and it could have set
out a basis for their suspicion,
which they failed to do. It appears that there was further evidence
to justify the suspicion,
but the defendant simply failed to lead the
evidence. The only evidence the defendant led was that the
plaintiff had a washing
machine next to him on the street at 19h10 at
night and looked suspicious in that he did not make eye contact,
looked down and
that Captain van der Byl’s colleagues told him
that the plaintiff was lying.
# [67] I therefore
find that the defendant had insufficient grounds to objectively
justify a reasonable suspicion, that its
suspicion was not based upon
solid grounds that could justify the arrest of the plaintiff and as
such I find that the arrest of
the plaintiff was unlawful and the
onus was not discharged by the defendant.
[67] I therefore
find that the defendant had insufficient grounds to objectively
justify a reasonable suspicion, that its
suspicion was not based upon
solid grounds that could justify the arrest of the plaintiff and as
such I find that the arrest of
the plaintiff was unlawful and the
onus was not discharged by the defendant.
# [68]In
casuit
must follow that the subsequent detention of the plaintiff was also
unlawful. InMjali[23]it was stated:
[68]
In
casu
it
must follow that the subsequent detention of the plaintiff was also
unlawful. In
Mjali
[23]
it was stated:
“
[26]
It is my view that the justification of detention after an arrest
until first appearance in court continues to rest on
the Police. …”
# [69]The
lawfulness (or not) of the detention is dependent on a finding with
regard to the lawfulness (or not) of the arrest in those
cases where
the detention had been a result of the arrest and therefore
interlinked with each other.[24]When an arrest is unlawful the ensuing detention of the arrested
person will also be unlawful.[25]
[69]
The
lawfulness (or not) of the detention is dependent on a finding with
regard to the lawfulness (or not) of the arrest in those
cases where
the detention had been a result of the arrest and therefore
interlinked with each other.
[24]
When an arrest is unlawful the ensuing detention of the arrested
person will also be unlawful.
[25]
# [70]Justification
for the detention that follows an arrest until a detainee’s
first appearance in Court continues to rest on the
Police.[26]
[70]
Justification
for the detention that follows an arrest until a detainee’s
first appearance in Court continues to rest on the
Police.
[26]
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE
PLAINTIFF’S CASE
# [71] Mr Amojee
correctly argued that there were various discrepancies,
inconsistencies and contradictions in the plaintiff’s
evidence. It is so that the plaintiff did not star in his own
evidence. His evidence was unreliable and there were
many
inconsistencies.
[71] Mr Amojee
correctly argued that there were various discrepancies,
inconsistencies and contradictions in the plaintiff’s
evidence. It is so that the plaintiff did not star in his own
evidence. His evidence was unreliable and there were
many
inconsistencies.
# [72] The plaintiff
was also the last witness to testify even after his wife had
testified. There were a number of discrepancies
between the
evidence of his wife and the evidence of the plaintiff. There
were also a number of new allegations that came
to light when he
testified, which was not put to the defendant’s witnesses.
The Court accordingly does not accept the
new evidence proffered by
the plaintiff when he testified, which evidence was not put to the
defendant’s witnesses.
[72] The plaintiff
was also the last witness to testify even after his wife had
testified. There were a number of discrepancies
between the
evidence of his wife and the evidence of the plaintiff. There
were also a number of new allegations that came
to light when he
testified, which was not put to the defendant’s witnesses.
The Court accordingly does not accept the
new evidence proffered by
the plaintiff when he testified, which evidence was not put to the
defendant’s witnesses.
# [73] Mr Amojee has
highlighted the new evidence that was not put to the defendant’s
witnesses in his heads of argument.
[73] Mr Amojee has
highlighted the new evidence that was not put to the defendant’s
witnesses in his heads of argument.
# [74] Mr Amojee has
further highlighted the inconsistencies and discrepancies in the
plaintiff’s version in his heads
of argument. I, however,
find that whilst there were inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s
version, the inconsistencies
in the plaintiff’s case relates to
secondary evidence and is not material to the questions, which I have
to determine namely
whether the arrest and subsequent detention was
lawful or not.
[74] Mr Amojee has
further highlighted the inconsistencies and discrepancies in the
plaintiff’s version in his heads
of argument. I, however,
find that whilst there were inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s
version, the inconsistencies
in the plaintiff’s case relates to
secondary evidence and is not material to the questions, which I have
to determine namely
whether the arrest and subsequent detention was
lawful or not.
# [75] In light of
the fact that the defendant had the onus and failed to prove its onus
in relation to the lawfulness of the
arrest and detention, based on
the defendant’s own version, I find that the arrest and
subsequent detention of the plaintiff
was unlawful.
[75] In light of
the fact that the defendant had the onus and failed to prove its onus
in relation to the lawfulness of the
arrest and detention, based on
the defendant’s own version, I find that the arrest and
subsequent detention of the plaintiff
was unlawful.
QUANTUM
# [76]In
view of the fact that the parties have agreed as is evident from the
supplementary pre-trial minutes dated the 25thof
July 2023 that if the plaintiff succeeds 100% on the merits, that a
reasonable quantum in such an event is R150 000,00.
I do
not intend to deviate from this amount as agreed upon between the
parties in this regard. The amount is also in line
with ruling
case law in this regard.[27]
[76]
In
view of the fact that the parties have agreed as is evident from the
supplementary pre-trial minutes dated the 25
th
of
July 2023 that if the plaintiff succeeds 100% on the merits, that a
reasonable quantum in such an event is R150 000,00.
I do
not intend to deviate from this amount as agreed upon between the
parties in this regard. The amount is also in line
with ruling
case law in this regard.
[27]
COSTS
# [77]Although
the issue of costs is in my discretion and it is also in my
discretion whether to grant costs on a High Court scale (even
in
circumstances where the quantum falls under the Magistrate’s
Court’s jurisdiction),[28]I also do not intend to deviate from what the parties agreed upon in
awarding costs to the successful party on a party and
party
Magistrate’s Court scale.
[77]
Although
the issue of costs is in my discretion and it is also in my
discretion whether to grant costs on a High Court scale (even
in
circumstances where the quantum falls under the Magistrate’s
Court’s jurisdiction),
[28]
I also do not intend to deviate from what the parties agreed upon in
awarding costs to the successful party on a party and
party
Magistrate’s Court scale.
ORDER
# [78] In the result
I make the following order in relation to general damages for the
unlawful arrest and detention of the
plaintiff:
[78] In the result
I make the following order in relation to general damages for the
unlawful arrest and detention of the
plaintiff:
## [78.1] The
defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff the sum of R150 000,00.
[78.1] The
defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff the sum of R150 000,00.
## [78.2] Interest on
the aforesaid amount at the prime lending rate from date of judgment
to date of final payment.
[78.2] Interest on
the aforesaid amount at the prime lending rate from date of judgment
to date of final payment.
## [78.3]
The defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff’s costs on a party
and party Magistrate’s Court scale, including
the costs of
counsel.
[78.3]
The defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff’s costs on a party
and party Magistrate’s Court scale, including
the costs of
counsel.
M VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN
Acting Judge of the
High Court of South Africa
Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg
Delivered
: This
judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation
to the
Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. The
date for
hand-down is deemed to be on 13 November 2023.
HEARD ON:
25, 26, 27 and 28 July
and 24 August 2023
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
13 November 2023
FOR PLAINTIFF:
Matshidiso J Lekwape
Tel: (011) 282-3700 /
072 771 5751
E-mail:
tsebalek@gmail.com
INSTRUCTED BY:
Lechaba Tlaweng Inc.
Jacob Lechaba
Tel: (011) 678-0121
E-mail:
tlawen@tlawenglechabainc.co.za
FOR DEFENDANTS:
Advocate M Amojee
Tel: 081 349 7635
E-mail:
amojee@counsel.co.za
INSTRUCTED BY:
The State Attorney
Johannesburg
Ref: Mrs S N Bila
Tel: (011) 330-7822
E-mail:
sbedrow@justice.gov.za
##
[1]
Signed Pre-Trial Minutes dated 25 July 2023, CaseLines,
022-20 to 022-23
[2]
Zealand
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another
[2008] ZACC 3
;
2008
(4) SA 458
(SCA) at paragraph 25. Also see
Zealand
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another
[2008] ZACC 3
;
2008
(6) BCLR 601
(CC) and
Minister
of Law and Order and Others v Hurley and Another
1986
(3) SA 568 (A)
[3]
Paragraph 3.2, Plea, CaseLines 006-2
[4]
Duncan
v Minister of Law and Order
1986
(2) SA 805
(A) at 818G-H;
Minister
of Safety and Security v Sekhoto and Another
2011
(1) SACR 315
(SCA) at 6 and 28;
Moses
v Minister of Safety and Security
(Unreported
GJ Case No. 6983/2013, 20 February 2015 at 16.2);
Madiseng
v Minister of Safety and Security
(Unreported
GP Case No. A515/10, 31 March 2016 at 18);
Baloy
v Minister of Police and Another
(Unreported
GP Case No. A77844/2014, 23 September 2016 at 15-16) and
Mlilwana
v Minister of Police
(Unreported
Case No. 2212/2012, 20 May 2017 at 11)
[5]
Sethapelo
v Minister of Police
2015
JDR 0952 GP at 25
[6]
1988 (2) SA 654
(SE) at 658E-G
[7]
Also see
Nkanbule
v Minister of Law and Order
1993
(1) SA 848
(T);
Mjali
v Minister of Police
(Case
No. 2223, 2226 and 2227/2016 [2020] ZAECMHC 49 (29 September 2020)
[8]
Minister
of Police and Another v Miller
(1037/18
2019 ZASCA 165
, 29 November 2019)
[9]
2014 (1) SACR 2017
SCA at paragraphs 14-17
[10]
1986 (3) SA 568
(A) at 589E-F
[11]
Mjali
v Minister of Police
(Case
No. 2223, 2226 and 2227/2016 [2020] ZAECMHC 49 (29 September 2020)
at paragraph 24
[12]
2008 (4) SA 458 (CC)
[13]
This however is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s particulars
of claim where it is alleged that the plaintiff had never
appeared
before any Court of law and was released from the Parkview Police
Station, paragraph 7.3, CaseLines 003-6
[14]
2023 ZAGPJHC 638 (5 June 2023)
[15]
1993 (1) SACR 434
(TPD);
Lifa
v Minister of Police and Others
(2020/17691)
[2022 ZAGPJHC 795
[2023] 1 All SA 132
(GJ) (17 October 2022)
[16]
(2224/2017) [2019] ZAECPEHC 37 (18 June 2019)
[17]
Louw
and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others
2006
2 SACR 178
(T);
Liebenberg
v Minister of Safety and Security
[2009]
ZAGPPHC 88 (18 June 2004)
[18]
Mabona
supra
[19]
[2021] ZACC 10
;
2021 (7) BCLR 698
(CC);
2021 (2) SACR 595
(CC) (14
May 2021)
[20]
2012 (1) SACR 305 (ECP)
[21]
Supra
at 24
[22]
Also see
Shabalala
v Minister of Police and Another
(323/2021)
[2023] ZAMPMHC 6 (2 March 2023)
[23]
Supra
at paragraph 26
[24]
Sekhoto
supra;
Mahlongwana
v Kwatinidubu Town Committee
1991
(1) SACR 669
(E) at 18J
[25]
Mahlakoane
v Minister of Safety and Security and Others
(Unreported
GP Case No. A628/2012, 8 September 2016 at 30 and
Sheefeni
v Council of the Municipality of Windhoek
2015
(4) NR 1170
HC at 11-12
[26]
Zweni
v Minister of Police and Another
(Unreported
ECP Case No. 2629/2013, 4 October 2016 at 19)
[27]
Mjali
v Minister of Police
supra
at
paragraphs 54 and further;
Madingana
v Minister of Police
(3411/2021)
[2023] ZAECGHC 29, 4 April 2023
[28]
Mjali
v Minister of Police
supra
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