Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 1297South Africa
Aludar 233 CC v Unlocked Properties 28 (Pty) Ltd (A3148/2021) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1297 (14 November 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
14 November 2023
Headnotes
judgment for that amount. He did so on the basis that the parties had contracted
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Aludar 233 CC v Unlocked Properties 28 (Pty) Ltd (A3148/2021) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1297 (14 November 2023)
Aludar 233 CC v Unlocked Properties 28 (Pty) Ltd (A3148/2021) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1297 (14 November 2023)
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sino date 14 November 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG)
#### Case
No.A3148/2021
Case
No.
A3148/2021
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
14/11/23
In the matter between:
ALUDAR
233 CC
Appellant
And
UNLOCKED
PROPERTIES 28 (PTY) LTD
Respondent
##### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
WILSON
J
:
1
The appellant, Aludar 233 CC (“Aludar”), rented
premises from the respondent, Unlocked Properties 28 (Pty) Ltd
(“Unlocked
Properties”). The lease between the parties
provided that the property was to be used as a nightclub, and only
for that purpose.
The lease was to run between 1 September 2019 and
30 August 2020.
2
On 18 March 2020, the government declared a National State of
Disaster in terms of
section 27
of the
Disaster Management Act 57 of
2002
. The purpose of the declaration was to enable the state to take
measures to curb the transmission of the Covid-19 virus. Those
measures were introduced by regulation, and they transformed most
South Africans’ daily lives for the weeks and months that
followed. At the core of the regulations were measures to curtail
social gatherings except between members of the same household.
Restaurants and bars were closed for an extended period, the sale of
alcohol was banned, and the operation of a nightclub was clearly
placed off-limits.
3
Faced with the extinction of any possibility of operating a
nightclub at the property, Aludar took the view that the lease had
been
terminated by supervening impossibility of performance. It
stopped paying rent from March 2020, and quit the property. In its
particulars
of claim in the court below, Unlocked Properties alleges
that Aludar vacated the property on 10 September 2020. In its plea,
Aludar
does not specifically admit that it left the property on that
date. It instead avers that the lease agreement was deemed to have
been cancelled on or about 18 April 2023. Aludar also pleads that it
would be contrary to public policy to hold it to the terms
of the
lease in circumstances where it had unforeseeably become impossible
to use the property as both parties had agreed it must
be used.
4
Unlocked Properties took the view that, notwithstanding the
impossibility of Aludar using the premises for the sole and exclusive
purpose for which it had been let, Aludar was still liable for the
rent that fell due under the lease between March and August
2020. It
sued in the court below for payment of that rent, in the sum of R141
460.51, plus interest and costs.
5
The Magistrate in the court below granted summary judgment for
that amount. He did so on the basis that the parties had contracted
out of the ordinary common law rule that a tenant can claim a
remission of rent if they are deprived of beneficial occupation of
a
property by
vis major
(superior force) or
causus fortuitous
(an unexpected mishap).
6
Aludar now appeals to us against this order. Summary judgment
is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only where there is no good
faith defence raised on the defendant’s plea. To put it another
way, a court that grants summary judgment must do so only
where the
plea raises no triable issue, or where the plaintiff has an
“unanswerable case” (see
First National Bank of South
Africa Ltd v Myburgh
2002 (4) SA 176
(C), paragraph 9).
7
I think that Unlocked Properties’ application for
summary judgment fell far short of that standard. It is true that
clause
G15.1.1 of the lease, on its face, excludes Aludar’s
claims “arising out of
vis major
or
causus
fortuitous
”, but I do not think
that completely answers the claim that the whole contract was voided
because it could no longer be performed
by either party. The effect
of the regulations was not just that Aludar could not operate a
nightclub. It was that Unlocked Properties
could not rent the
property for that purpose. Given that this was the only purpose for
which the parties agreed the property could
be used, the effect of
the regulations may well have been to void the whole contract. If
that is so, the exclusion clause upon
which Unlocked Properties
relied was voided too.
8
It is not as if it was open to Aludar to
simply change the use to which it intended to put the property. That
would have been impossible
without Unlocked Properties’
consent. In other words, Unlocked Properties did not let the property
to Aludar to be used for
a broad range of beneficial purposes. It
stipulated that the property was to be used solely and exclusively
for a purpose that
was unforeseeably declared illegal about halfway
through the initial period of the lease.
9
Mr. Paige-Green, who appeared for Unlocked
Properties, referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeal in
Butcher Shop and Grill CC v
Trustees for the time being of Bymyam Trust
2023 (5) SA 68
(SCA), but I do not think that decision helps us. The
main issue before the court in that case was whether a remission of
rent
could be claimed by a tenant where their sub-tenant had suffered
loss because they could not run a restaurant during the period
for
which the regulations applied. The situation in this case is
different. Aludar’s case is pressed on its own behalf, and
the
case in its plea is not that it is entitled to a remission of rent.
It is that the entire contract was voided by the fact that
the
regulations made it impossible for either party to perform their
obligations under it.
10
In this respect, I think the situation that
confronts us here has more to do with the facts in
World
Leisure Holidays (Pty) Ltd v Georges
2002 (5) SA 531
(W), in which a full court of this Division explored
the extent to which temporary impossibility of performance entitles a
party
to treat a contract as having been cancelled. In that case, the
court held that it could, but only “where the foundation of
the
contract has been destroyed”; where “all performance is
already, or would inevitably become, impossible”;
or where
“part of the performance has become, or would inevitably be,
impossible” and the party is not bound to accept
the remaining
performance (paragraph 8). In this case, whether any of these
situations applied was plainly a factual issue that
should have been
referred to trial.
11
Even if I am wrong in this respect, I think
that there are colourable public policy claims to be raised at trial
by Aludar. In my
view, evidence has to be led to explore whether, on
the facts of this case, it can be consistent with public policy to
allow a
party to enforce the terms of a lease during a period in
which everyone accepts that the underlying purpose of the contract
has
been rendered wholly unlawful.
12
In these circumstances, Unlocked
Properties’ case was far from “unanswerable”.
I
would make the following order –
12.1 The appeal
succeeds with costs.
12.2 The order of
the court below is set aside and substituted with an order dismissing
the application for summary judgment,
and granting Aludar leave to
defend, with costs to be costs in the trial.
S D J WILSON
Judge of the High Court
13
I agree, and it is so ordered.
A CRUTCHFIELD
Judge of the High Court
This judgment is handed
down electronically by circulation to the parties or their legal
representatives by email, by uploading
to Caselines, and by
publication of the judgment to the South African Legal Information
Institute. The date for hand-down is deemed
to be 14 November 2023.
HEARD ON: 19
October 2023
DECIDED ON: 14 November
2023
For the Appellant: HP
van Nieuwenhuizen
Instructed by Kavier
Guiness Inc
For the Respondent:
T Paige-Green
Instructed by Schindler’s
Attorneys
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