begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2023
>>
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1325
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## Khomo v Road Accident Fund (00667/2017)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1325 (15 November 2023)
Khomo v Road Accident Fund (00667/2017)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1325 (15 November 2023)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2023_1325.html
sino date 15 November 2023
FLYNOTES:
RAF – RAF 1 form –
Treating
medical practitioner
–
Medical
report section of RAF1 form completed by private doctor instead of
treating doctor or hospital superintendent –
Requirements of
section 24(2)(a) of
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996
–
Private doctor had hospital records and was in adequate position
to complete report – Hospital and other records
accompanied
RAF1 form when claim was lodged – Sufficient information for
Fund to investigate the claim – There
has been substantial
compliance with the section.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number: 00667/2017
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/ NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/
NO
(3)
REVISED: YES/
NO
DATE:
15/11/2023
In
the matter between:
KHOMO
MALESHOANA EVELENA
Plaintiff
and
THE
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
Defendant
Summary:
Section 24(2)(a) of
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of
1996
– Meaning of substantial compliance – Purpose and
objectives of
section 24(2)(a)
requirements. The plaintiff lodged a
claim for compensation with the Road Accident Fund (the Fund) after
being injured as a pedestrian
in a motor vehicle accident. The
medical report section of the RAF1 form was completed by a private
doctor instead of the treating
doctor or hospital superintendent or
his or her representative as required by
section 24(2)(a)
of the
Road
Accident Fund Act. The
Fund objected to the validity of the claim on
this basis. The plaintiff argued that there had been substantial
compliance with
section 24(2)(a)
as the private doctor had the
hospital records and was in an adequate position to complete the
report. Moreover, these hospital
and other records accompanied the
RAF1 form when the claim was lodged.
Held: Considering the
purpose and objectives of
section 24(2)(a)
, there has been
substantial compliance with this section. The completed RAF1 form
together with the submitted hospital records
provided sufficient
information for the Fund to investigate the claim.
Held further: The steps
required by
section 24(2)(a)
before another doctor can complete the
form are directory in nature. The Fund's objection in terms of
section 24(5)
did not preclude a finding of substantial compliance.
The special plea was
dismissed and the claim found not to have prescribed.
JUDGMENT
STRYDOM, J
Introduction
[1]
On 25 January 2017, the plaintiff issued a summons
against the Road Accident Fund (the Fund) claiming compensation for
injuries
allegedly sustained on 2 June 2016, when she as a
pedestrian, was hit by a motor vehicle driven by the insured driver.
[2]
On 23 August 2016, with the assistance of her
attorney, the plaintiff lodged a claim with the Fund by submitting
the prescribed
RAF1 form. On 6 September 2016, the Fund objected to
the validity of the claim by writing to the plaintiff’s
attorney stating
the reason for the objection to be as follows:
“
1.
The Medical section of the RAF 1 form has not been completed by the
treating doctor in terms of
Section 24(2)(a)
of the Act. Prescription
is not looming.”
[3]
and further—
“
This
claim will remain invalid until such time as the defect has been
rectified and your claim substantially complies with the Act.”
[4]
After
the summons was served, the Fund entered an appearance to defend and
filed a special plea. It was pleaded that upon lodging
of the
plaintiff’s claim on 23 August 2016, the plaintiff failed to
comply with the requirements of section 24(2)(a) of the
Road Accident
Fund Act
[1]
(the Act) in that
the medical practitioner and\or superintendent failed to complete the
medical report on the prescribed form in
terms of section 24(2)(a) of
the Act. It was further pleaded that prescription was not imminent as
envisaged by section 24(2)(a)
of the Act in that the collision
occurred on 02 June 2016, and to date of the plea, the plaintiff has
failed, refused, and/or neglected
to remedy the above non-compliance.
It was prayed that the plaintiff’s claim be dismissed with
costs.
[5]
The plaintiff replicated. She denied that she
failed to meet section 24(2)(a) and pleaded that she complied
therewith and further
that the said provision is directive rather
than peremptory. She pleaded further as follows:
2.
The said section 24(2)(a) only requires of another medical
practitioner to “
…
fully
satisfy himself or herself…. or the nature and treatment of
the bodily injuries in respect of which the claim relates.
”
3.
The Act does not require of the said medical doctor to physically
examine the Plaintiff.
4.
The Plaintiff does not have to wait until his or her claim is facing
prescription before he or she can utilize the services of
a different
or other doctor as per section 24(2)(a) is unconstitutional as it
undermines the Plaintiff’s right in terms of
the bill of rights
in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 0f 1996,
section 33 (just administrative action) and
it further unfairly
delays the Plaintiff’s rights to have this matter finalized
timeously which also delays his rights of
access to the courts as per
section 34 of the constitution.”
[6]
After
the matter was allocated to me for hearing, the parties agreed,
pursuant to Rule 33(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court, that
the
special plea be adjudicated prior to and separately from the
remaining issues and I made an order to that effect. The court
was
asked to decide the special plea on the pleaded allegations and
common cause facts. The parties agreed that the validity of
the
plaintiff's claim turns on whether the claim lodged with the Fund on
23 August 2023 was valid. Therefore, if the court finds
that the
claim lodged was invalid, it follows that the claim has prescribed
under section 23(1) of the Act.
[2]
[7]
The court was informed that the 3-year period
ended on 1 June 2019. It was further agreed that if the special plea
was not upheld
then the matter should be postponed
sine
die
, providing the Fund and the
plaintiff with an opportunity to explore the possibility of
settlement of the claim.
[8]
After argument on the special plea, the court
reserved judgment and started to prepare same. It was then only that
I realised that
portions of the RAF1 form, completed by Dr Hovis in
the manuscript, were illegible. Further, Mr Malema, during argument
referred
to hospital records, and other documents, which were
allegedly handed in together with the RAF1 when the claim was lodged.
I enquired
from the parties whether they could provide me with a
document that contained an agreed version of what Dr Hovis noted and
indicate
to the court whether it is disputed that the hospital
records and other documents accompanied the RAF1 claim. If these
issues remained
contentious then the court would require oral
evidence. Only thereafter a judgment can be handed down on the
special plea.
[9]
The parties uploaded onto CaseLines a joint
submission dealing with these issues. At the resumed hearing of
the matter, it
was placed on record, in line with the joint
submission, that Dr Hovis could not be traced and that the parties
could not assist
the court with the reading of certain manuscript
portions contained on the RAF1 form. It was, however, agreed that the
RAF1 form
was lodged accompanied by the hospital records and other
documents. Further documents were by consent between the parties
uploaded
onto CaseLines and it was agreed that this court could
accept these documents as part of the evidence in this matter to
decide
the special plea.
[10]
These documents are:
1.
A letter from the plaintiff’s attorney, MB
Mabunda Incorporated, dated 5 July 2016, addressed to Dr A J
Hovis, in which
he was requested to complete the RAF1 claim form. In
the letter, it was stated that attached to the letter were copies of
hospital
records from Tembisa Hospital, as well as a consent form.
2.
A letter from the plaintiff’s attorney, MB
Mabunda Incorporated, dated 4 October 2016, addressed to Tembisa
Hospital, requesting
completion of the attached RAF1 form.
3.
The lodgement letter dated 11 August 2016, from
the plaintiff’s attorney, addressed to the Chief Executive
Officer of the
Fund. In this letter it was stated that the following
documents were enclosed: A duly completed RAF 1 claim form; a copy of
the
claimant’s Identity Document; copies of hospital records;
special power of attorney; hospital consent form and termination
of
mandate. This letter bears the stamp of the Fund, dated 23 August
2016.
[11]
The decision here revolves around the question if
the plaintiff substantially complied with the prescribes of section
24(2)(a).
As no evidence was led to decide this, the evidential
matrix must be established. For this purpose, further common cause
facts
need to be stated:
1.
The medical report (section 22) of the RAF1 form
was not completed by the treating medical practitioner or the
superintendent at
the Tembisa Hospital where the plaintiff was
treated for about 5 days from the date of the accident.
2.
Section 22 of the RAF1 form was completed by Dr
A.J. Hovis, a private practitioner, on 8 July 2016. He had at his
disposal the hospital
records of the plaintiff.
3.
The RAF1 form, the hospital records, and other
documentation were received by the Fund on 23 August 2016.
4.
On 6 September 2016, the fund objected to the
validity of the form, more particularly as section 22, was not
completed by the treating
medical practitioner or superintendent or a
representative at the Tembisa Hospital but by another doctor.
5.
After the objection the plaintiff’s attorney
addressed a letter to the Fund, dated 4 October 2016, requesting the
completion
of the RAF1 claim form.
6.
The RAF 1 form was never amended or substituted
until summons was issued or even thereafter.
Applicable legal
prescripts
[12]
It is trite law that a claim for compensation and
the accompanying medical report must be set out in the prescribed
form being the
RAF 1 form in compliance with section 24(1) of the
Act.
[13]
Section 24 of the Act provides as follows in the
relevant parts:
“
24.
Procedure
—
(1)
A claim for compensation and accompanying medical report under
section 17 (1) shall —
(a)
be set out in the prescribed form, which shall be completed in all
its particulars;
…
(
2)(a)
The
medical report shall be completed on the prescribed form by the
medical practitioner who treated the deceased or injured person
for
the bodily injuries sustained in the accident from which the claim
arises
,
or by the superintendent (or his or her representative) of the
hospital where the deceased or injured person was treated for such
bodily injuries: Provided that,
if
the medical practitioner or superintendent (or his or her
representative) concerned fails to complete the medical report on
request within a reasonable time and it appears that as a result of
the passage of time the claim concerned may become prescribed,
the
medical report may be completed by another medical practitioner who
has fully satisfied himself or herself regarding the cause
of the
death or the nature and treatment of the bodily injuries in respect
of which the claim is made.
”
(Own
emphasis)
[14]
The plaintiff has a right to lodge a claim with
the defendant and is required to do so within the prescriptive
period. In the present
case, the plaintiff’s completed RAF1
claim form and accompanying documents were lodged with the Fund,
which objected, within
60 days of the lodgement of the documents,
according to its letter dated 6 September 2016 to the validity of the
claim because
the medical section of the RAF 1 form had not been
completed by the treating doctor in terms of Section 24(2)(a) of the
Act.
[15]
Section 24(2)(a) is clear in its terms that the
mentioned persons at the hospital should complete section 22 in the
RAF1 form. Only
if such people fail to complete such medical report
upon request, within a reasonable time and, as a result of the
passage of time,
the claim may become prescribed then the medical
report may be completed by another medical practitioner who has fully
satisfied
himself or herself regarding the nature and treatment of
the bodily injuries of which the claim is made.
[16]
As far as this claim is concerned the prescripts
of section 24(2)(a) were not followed. The treating medical
practitioner, or someone
else at the hospital as prescribed, has not
completed the medical section. A request made to Tembisa Hospital for
these people
to complete the RAF1 form was only made after the
objection from the Fund. Further, other jurisdictional facts before
another medical
practitioner could complete the RAF1 form were not
present. As no request was made before the objection, the reasonable
period
could not be determined. Prescription of the claim could not
have been an issue as the prescription period was far in the future.
The other medical practitioner, Dr Hovis, was requested on 5 July
2016 and completed the medical section on the RAF1 form on 8
July
2016 already. That was just over a month after the accident.
Approximately 2 years and 9 months remained before the claim
would
prescribe.
[17]
The plaintiff, for a reason unknown to this court,
must have decided or was advised, to approach a private medical
practitioner
rather than to approach the hospital where she was
treated, for assistance in filling in the medical report. Only after
the objection
by the Fund, Tembisa Hospital was requested to complete
the form. There is no evidence before this court as to whether this
was
done or not.
[18]
Counsel for the plaintiff based his argument, not
on the interpretation of section 24(2)(a) of the Act as such, but
rather on a
submission that the plaintiff substantially complied with
the prescripts of the Act. He argued that Dr Hovis had at his
disposal
the hospital records of the plaintiff and was in as good a
position as the hospital personnel to have completed the form. It was
submitted that the court should overlook the fact that the medical
report was not completed by the treating doctor or other personnel
at
Tembisa Hospital. Fact is, the medical report was filled in by a
doctor who had at his disposal all available hospital records.
This
doctor would have been entitled to complete the RAF1 form, albeit,
only if the jurisdictional facts stipulated in section
24(2)(a) were
met.
[19]
For
the submission that there was substantial compliance with section
24(2)(a), counsel relied on the decision of
Pretorius
v Road Accident Fund
where
the RAF1 form lodged was incomplete. Despite this shortcoming the
court found that the claim made in terms of the form was
not
necessarily invalid so long as there was substantial compliance with
legislative requirements
[3]
. It
was found that the incomplete form should be read together with
accompanying hospital records and it should be considered whether
these documents provided sufficient information to the Fund to
investigate the claim.
[20]
The
court was also referred to the SCA decision of
Road
Accident Fund v Busuku
[4]
where Eksteen AJA, stated the following:
“
[I]n
respect of the submission of a claim this Court, in Pithey, [
Pithey
v Road Accident Fund
[2014]
ZASCA 55
;
2014 (4) SA 112
(SCA) para 19] held: ‘
It
has been held in a long line of cases that the requirement relating
to the submission of the claim form is peremptory and that
the
prescribed requirements concerning the completeness of the form are
directory, meaning that substantial compliance with such
requirements
suffices. As to the latter requirement this court in “SA Eagle
Insurance Co Limited v Pretorius” reiterated
that the test for
substantial compliance is an objective one.
’
This
approach is confirmed by the terms of the form which says in part 20
that substantial compliance is required in regard to
inter
alia
the
medical report”.
[21]
In
Busuku
the
issue was the incompleteness of the form and not who filled in the
medical report, section 22, of the form. From paragraph
3 of
this judgment, it appears that the portion of the form which provides
for the medical report was not completed at all. It
was submitted
that a copy of the original records of the Mthatha Hospital, which
reflected particulars of the claimant’s
hospitalization, the
medical assessment of the claimant’s condition from time to
time, medical treatment received, and surgical
procedures carried
out, together with the identity of the doctors involved therein, were
sufficient for the Fund to consider and
investigate the claim. The
court followed the
ratio
in
Pithey
v Road Accident Fund
[5]
where it was found that the submission of the claim form was
peremptory but the prescribed requirements for the completeness of
the form was directory, meaning substantial compliance will suffice.
The court found as follows:
“
The
hospital records were submitted together with the claim in order to
enable the Fund to investigate the significance of the injuries
sustained by Mr Busuku. They contained most of the information called
for in the RAF 1 form. In my view, furnishing medical records
constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of s 24 in
this case. There was no suggestion that any significant information
demanded by the form was missing.”
[6]
[22]
As found in
Busuku,
it comes down to the purpose of the
legislative requirement. In this sense, the court analysed the object
for the requirements of
completeness of the RAF1 form, and found as
follows:
“
I
have referred earlier to the objectives of the Act and the approach
to its interpretation. In the context of the Act the purpose
of the
early submission of the claim form is to enable the Fund to
investigate the merits of a plaintiff’s claim in order
to
consider its approach to the pending litigation before costs are
incurred. By parity of reasoning the medical report is intended
to
enable it at an early stage to investigate the cause and seriousness
of a plaintiff’s alleged injuries in order to make
an offer to
settle the claim, if so advised. Section 24(2) seeks to ensure
the reliability of the information provided, primarily
to protect the
Fund against fraud, by requiring the form to be completed by the
treating doctor, the superintendent of the hospital
or their
representative, as the case may be. In the event of their failure to
comply, the form may be completed by another doctor
who has satisfied
himself of the nature and treatment of the injury. Where, one might
rightly ask, would the superintendent of
the hospital, or any other
doctor, source such information from? It seems to me that they could
only acquire such information from
the hospital records.
The
RAF 1 form does not call for detailed information. It is not
intended, of itself, to enable the Fund to assess the quantum of
the
plaintiff’s claim. It seeks to enable it to investigate the
impact of the injuries sustained. In order to do so the RAF
1 form
requires the disclosure of information to guide and facilitate the
investigation. On the first page of the ‘medical
report’
section of the form it seeks particulars of any emergency transport
which had been required; whether the plaintiff
had been hospitalized,
and if so, whether he was in ICU. All of this was contained in the
hospital records. The third page of the
report requires the provision
of particulars of the medical facilities where treatment was received
and the identity of practitioners
who treated the plaintiff. This,
too, was recorded in the hospital records.”
[7]
[23]
Relying on this decision the plaintiff’s
counsel contended that there has been substantial compliance with
section 24(4)(2)(a)
of the Act, as the medical practitioner who
completed the medical report was fully informed about the injuries
and treatment of
the plaintiff. He had access to the hospital records
and accompanying documentation same which the treating doctor would
have considered.
Although the jurisdictional facts were not met, to
wit, a request was not made to the hospital to complete the medical
report,
a reasonable period could thus not have lapsed and with
prescription looming, were not met this should be overlooked.
Moreover,
when the RAF1 form was lodged the hospital records and
other documentation were attached to the RAF1 form when the claim was
lodged.
[24]
On behalf of the plaintiff, it was argued that
because the defendant failed to cure the defect in the medical
section after objection,
the RAF 1 form could not be deemed to be
valid in all respects, and the claim had consequently prescribed.
[25]
The plaintiff, in this matter, caused the RAF1
form to be completed and submitted the form with the hospital
records. The plaintiff
is thus in a better position than the claimant
in
Busuku
where
the medical report in the RAF1 form was left blank. In both cases,
the hospital reports were furnished. The difference in
the matter
before this court is that in terms of section 24(5) an objection was
raised by the Fund to the validity of the RAF1
form, objecting to the
person who filled in the medical report on the form and indicating
that the jurisdictional requirements
was not met before a private
practitioner could complete the form.
[26]
The question arises whether the fact that the form
was not completed by the treating doctor or personnel at Tembisa
Hospital, even
after objection, means that there was nevertheless
substantial compliance with section 24(2)(a) of the Act. In my view,
the objection
itself does mean that there was not substantial
compliance with the prescripts of the Act. The Fund might have been
wrong to have
objected as compliance might have been substantial.
[27]
If an RAF1 form where the medical report section
was left blank, but which was accompanied by hospital reports, was
found to be
in substantial compliance with section 24(2)(a), as was
found in
Busuku,
it
can hardly be found that a completed form lodged, completed by a
private medical practitioner and accompanied by hospital records
does
not constitute substantial compliance with the section. This despite
the fact that the steps to be taken to get in the position
to make
use of the services of another medical practitioner, as set out in
section 24(2)(a) were not met. Consequently, I am of
the view that
the jurisdictional requirements that should be present before another
medical practitioner can complete the RAF1
form is not peremptory but
directory.
[28]
Even though certain manuscript writing of the RAF1
form by Dr Hovis was illegible this does not render the form invalid.
The common
cause facts indicate that Dr Hovis was provided with the
hospital records, and he must have used these records to complete the
medical section. But apart from this, even if the medical report
section was left blank, as in
Busuku,
the deciding factor is what was handed to the Fund
with the RAF1 form. In this case, it was a full set of hospital
records, and
that in itself should suffice to establish substantial
compliance with section 24(2)(a).
[29]
In my view, considering the purpose of section
24(2)(a) as referred to in
Busuku,
there
was substantial compliance with this section. If the RAF1 form lodged
was considered, together with the hospital records,
there was
sufficient information available to the Fund to investigate and
consider the claim. The finding of this court is that
the plaintiff
in lodging her claim substantially complied with section 24(2)(a) of
the Act.
[30]
This being the case the special plea stands to be
dismissed, with costs. Consequently, the claim of the plaintiff has
not prescribed.
[31]
The following order is made:
Order
1.
The special plea is dismissed with costs.
2.
The matter is postponed
sine
die.
R. STRYDOM, J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
For the Plaintiff:
Mr. J.V.M.
Malema
Instructed
by: MB
Mabunda
Inc
For
the Defendant: Ms.
J. Mhlanga
Instructed
by: The
State Attorney
Date
of Hearing: 10
November 2023
Date
of Judgment: 15
November 2023
[1]
56 of
1996.
[2]
Section
23(1) of the Act states that a claim, “shall prescribe upon
the expiry of a period of three years from the date
upon which the
cause of action arose.”
[3]
Pretorius v Road
Accident Fund
[2019]
ZAGPJHC 293.
[4]
Road
Accident Fund v Busuku
[2020]
ZASCA 158
at para 14 (“
Busuku
”
).
[5]
Pithey
v Road Accident Fund
[2014]
ZASCA 55
;
2014 (4) SA 112
SCA.
[6]
Id at
para 18.
[7]
Busuku
at
paras 15 and 16.
sino noindex
make_database footer start