Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 1496South Africa
Recycling and Economic Development Initiative of South Africa NPC v Siweya (5126/2021) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1496 (24 November 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
24 November 2023
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Recycling and Economic Development Initiative of South Africa NPC v Siweya (5126/2021) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1496 (24 November 2023)
Recycling and Economic Development Initiative of South Africa NPC v Siweya (5126/2021) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1496 (24 November 2023)
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sino date 24 November 2023
SAFLII
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Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 5126/2021
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE
24 November 2023
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
RECYCLING
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVE
OF SOUTH AFRICA NPC
Applicant
and
MALWANDLA
SOLLY SIWEYA
Respondent
JUDGMENT
CRUTCHFIELD
J:
[1]
The applicant, Recycling and Economic Development Initiative of South
Africa
NPC, sought delivery of a motor vehicle from the respondent,
Malwandla Solly Siweya.
[2]
The applicant alleged that it owned the vehicle in question, an Isuzu
KB motor
vehicle with registration number C[...] (‘the Isuzu’),
in the possession of the respondent. If the respondent did not
return
the Isuzu to the applicant, the latter claimed payment of damages of
R215 000.00. In addition, the applicant claimed
damages of
R21 627.19 per month pursuant to the respondent’s unlawful
use of the Isuzu in the interim, from 1 December
2019 to date of
return of the Isuzu to the applicant.
[3]
The respondent opposed the application and denied possession of the
Isuzu and
delivery thereof to him. The respondent denied that the
applicant had any claim to delivery of the vehicle or payment of
damages
from him.
[4]
The
applicant proved ownership of the Isuzu by way of a copy of the
certificate of registration. Accordingly, the
rei
vindicatio
entitled the applicant to claim the Isuzu wherever it might be
located and from whomsoever might be holding it.
[1]
[5]
The applicant alleged that the Isuzu was made available to the
respondent by
his employer, Kusaga Taka Consulting (Pty) Ltd (‘KTC’),
a company providing management services to the applicant.
Historically,
the applicant made at least two vehicles, including the
Isuzu, available to KTC.
[6]
Subsequently, KTC agreed to return the vehicles to the applicant, one
of which
had since been returned by the former driver thereof, Mr
Dube, to whom I refer herein under. The respondent, however, failed
to
return the Isuzu to the applicant.
[7]
The applicant relied upon a series of communications via the WhatsApp
messaging
platform, between a representative of the applicant, one Mr
Alexander Felix Erdmann (‘Mr Erdmann’) and the respondent
during December 2019, in which Mr Erdmann requested the
respondent to return the Isuzu to the applicant.
[8]
The respondent asked that the applicant sell the Isuzu to him, which
the applicant
declined to do. The respondent replied to the effect
that he was flying to Durban that day, returning on Thursday and “…
should be able to drop (the Isuzu) on Weekend”.
[9]
On 13 December 2019, Mr Erdmann contacted the respondent again
requesting
that he return the Isuzu to the applicant. The respondent
replied that he “said on weekend. Am currently in Northern Cape
coming back later tonight. Will drop it on Sunday”.
[10]
The respondent did not return the Isuzu over the weekend. Contact
with the respondent on 16 December
2019, resulted in his
replying that he “delayed due to my travel to Limpopo will
ensure is deliver kindest regards”.
[11]
Subsequent communication resulted in a promise by the respondent to
“confirm to you
this afternoon.” Notwithstanding, the
respondent failed to return the Isuzu to the applicant.
[12]
The respondent alleged that the Isuzu, upon his request, was
delivered not to him but to
his sister (Ms Ngoveni) by one Mr
Jan van Wyk on behalf of the applicant.
[13]
The respondent failed to provide confirmatory affidavits to his
answering affidavit from his
sister or from his brother, Mr Musi
Siweya, (to whom the respondent also alleged the Isuzu was handed),
or from Mr Jan van Wyk
who allegedly delivered the Isuzu to the
respondent’s brother and sister.
[14]
The respondent admitted having been contacted by Mr Erdmann but
alleged that the WhatsApp messages
relied upon by the applicant did
not emanate from his mobile phone or a device of his, and that the
applicant should show proof
that the WhatsApp messages were delivered
to his mobile phone. The respondent then proceeded to “note”
the WhatsApp
messages.
[15]
The respondent, however, did not deny the content of the WhatsApp
messages. Paragraph 15 of the
founding affidavit served to attach a
copy of the WhatsApp messages. The respondent admitted the
allegations in paragraph 15 and
simply required proof that the
messages were delivered to his phone. That was confirmed by Mr
Erdmann in the confirmatory affidavit
deposed to by him. The
respondent also admitted contact with Mr Erdmann at the relevant
date.
[16]
The applicant relied upon the respondent’s agreement to deliver
the Isuzu to the applicant
in terms of the WhatsApp messages of
December 2019, which agreement did not depend on the respondent being
in possession of the
vehicle. Accordingly, the respondent’s
breach of the WhatsApp agreement allegedly resulted in the applicant
sustaining damages.
[17]
Turning to the issues at hand, a respondent answering to a founding
affidavit may admit, deny
or confess and avoid the applicant’s
averments. Noting an allegation is not one of the available options
in terms of the
rule. Furthermore, noting an allegation does not
amount to a denial of that allegation. Accordingly, noting an
allegation ought
to be construed as an admission of that allegation.
[18]
It is well
established that a litigant’s mere denial in general terms of
an allegation without engaging with that allegation,
is not
sufficient to constitute a
bona
fide
dispute
of fact.
[2]
A court is entitled,
in circumstances where a litigant does not deal adequately with
averments made on the papers, to take a robust
common sense approach
to the averments. The respondent before me did not truly grapple with
or deny the applicant’s detailed
averments regarding the
WhatsApp messages. The respondent admitted contact by Mr Erdmann,
admitted the content of the WhatsApp
messages, and did not deny the
WhatsApp messages but merely noted them.
[19]
In the light of the respondent’s admission of contact by
Mr Erdmann, his noting of
the WhatsApp messages and admission of the
content of the WhatsApp messages, the allegation that the applicant
should provide proof
that the messages were sent to his mobile phone
were contradictory and incongruous. The respondent in fact admitted
receipt of
the WhatsApp messages given that he admitted contact by Mr
Erdmann.
[20]
The SCA in
Wightman
t/a J W Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd,
[3]
stated that “a real, genuine and
bona
fide
dispute
of fact can exist only where the court is satisfied that the party
who purports to raise the dispute has in his affidavit
seriously and
unambiguously addressed the fact said to be disputed.”
[21]
Given the manner in which the respondent dealt with the critical
allegations regarding the WhatsApp
communications and his receipt or
otherwise of those messages on his mobile phone, (facts that lay
purely within his knowledge),
the respondent failed to answer
“seriously and unambiguously” to those allegations. The
respondent did not lay a basis
for disputing the veracity or the
accuracy of the applicant’s averments or that the messages
received from the respondent’s
mobile telephone or alternate
device, were in fact sent by him.
[22]
The
respondent necessarily possessed knowledge of the messages and was
able to provide an answer or evidence to the contrary if
the
applicant’s allegations were not true or accurate. Instead of
doing so, the respondent chose to base his argument regarding
the
WhatsApp messages on an “ambiguous denial.”
[4]
[23]
In the circumstances, the respondent’s averments
regarding the WhatsApp messages
were insufficient to constitute a
denial and did not amount to a genuine and
bona fide
dispute
of fact in respect of the WhatsApp communications received and / or
sent by him.
[24]
Furthermore, the respondent must be taken to have admitted the
WhatsApp messages.
[25]
This court
dealt in
Jansen
van Rensburg v Kitchen Brand
[5]
with the admissibility of WhatsApp messages. The learned acting
judge
[6]
referred to the
unreported judgment of the SCA in
Kgapaoa
v Matlala
[7]
in which the SCA dealt with the legal value of WhatsApp communication
messages and accepted that agreements concluded by way of
WhatsApp
messages were valid.
[26]
Furthermore,
the learned acting judge
[8]
referred to
Spring
Forest Trading 599 CC v Woolbury (Pty) Ltd t/a Eco Wash &
Another,
[9]
in which the SCA confirmed the legal validity of the use of email and
a typescript name as a signature, when varying or cancelling
a
contract that contained a non-variation clause.
[27]
The test
for admissibility is relevance. Digital messages are admissible if
they are relevant.
[10]
The
applicant relied on the WhatsApp communications as being relevant not
only to show the respondent’s possession of the
Isuzu but also
to demonstrate his agreement to deliver or return the Isuzu to the
applicant wherever the Isuzu might be. Accordingly,
the applicant
relied upon the agreement concluded by WhatsApp messages, that the
respondent would deliver the Isuzu to the applicant.
[28]
Thus, the WhatsApp message are directly relevant to the issues at
hand and are admissible.
[29]
Turning to the respondent’s allegation that the Isuzu was
delivered to his sister and was
in her possession, the respondent
provided a statement by one Mr Bafana Dube (‘Mr Dube’), a
colleague of the respondent
who also received delivery of an isuzu
vehicle in circumstances akin to those of the respondent. Mr Dube
stated in his statement
relied upon by the respondent, that the
respondent received delivery of the Isuzu. Mr Dube, upon request by
the applicant, returned
the vehicle delivered to him, to the
applicant.
[30]
The respondent did not provide any documentary evidence of delivery
of the Isuzu to his sister
in his answering affidavit. Nor did
the respondent furnish any evidence that the Isuzu was handed over to
his sister by Mr
Jan van Wyk or that Mr Herman Erdmann agreed to the
respondent’s alleged request that the Isuzu be made available
to his
sister. The respondent did not furnish confirmatory affidavits
from his brother to whom the vehicle was allegedly delivered together
with his sister, or his sister or Mr Jan van Wyk. No explanation was
furnished by the respondent in his answering affidavit for
the
absence of those necessary confirmatory affidavits.
[31]
The matter was called before me on Monday, 20 February 2023. New
legal representation appeared
on behalf of the respondent requesting
that the matter stand down or possibly be postponed. I allowed the
matter to stand down
for hearing until Thursday, 23 February
2023 at 10h00, at which time I heard the matter. The respondent’s
legal representatives,
on the evening of 22 February 2023,
uploaded a supplementary affidavit by the respondent on caselines.
The supplementary affidavit
came to the attention of the applicant’s
legal representatives after the close of business on Wednesday,
22 February
2023, at a time when it was not possible for them to
contact the respondent’s previous legal representatives in
respect of
certain averments made in the respondent’s
supplementary affidavit.
[32]
The last paragraph of the supplementary affidavit referred to
confirmatory affidavits of the
respondent’s brother and sister
respectively, attached to the supplementary affidavit. The
confirmatory affidavits sought
to confirm the delivery and possession
of the Isuzu as alleged by the respondent in his answering affidavit.
[33]
The admission of a supplementary affidavit is an indulgence to be
sought from and given by a
court on good cause shown by the party
seeking the indulgence. One of the essential requirements of good
cause is an explanation
from the party seeking the indulgence, the
respondent, as to the delay in providing the confirmatory affidavits,
some two years
after the fact.
[34]
The respondent did not explain his failure to provide the
confirmatory affidavits under his answering
affidavit. Nor did the
respondent explain why the confirmatory affidavits were furnished two
years later. The respondent saw fit
to simply annex the confirmatory
affidavits without explanation and to do so after business hours. As
a result, the respondent
prevented the applicant from investigating
the confirmatory affidavits and deprived the applicant of a fair
procedure.
[35]
A two year delay in providing a confirmatory affidavit to an
allegation that is material to the
determination of a matter, is not
acceptable. The absence of any explanation whatsoever for the failure
to make those affidavits
available as annexures to the answering
affidavit, the absence of any explanation for the delay of two years
and the extremely
late provision of those confirmatory affidavits,
results in it not being just for this Court to exercise its
discretion in favour
of the respondent.
[36]
Accordingly, the confirmatory affidavits of the respondent’s
brother and sister are not
admitted and I do not take cognisance
thereof for purposes of determining this matter.
[37]
The applicant attached to its replying affidavit, confirmatory
affidavits of Mr Herman Erdmann,
Mr Alex Erdmann and Mr Jan van Wyk,
supporting the applicant’s version that the applicant did not
agree to deliver the Isuzu
to the respondent’s sister and
denying that the Isuzu was delivered to the respondent’s
sister. Accordingly, the applicant
produced positive evidence that
there was no agreement to deliver the vehicle to the respondent’s
sister and confirming that
the vehicle was not delivered to the
respondent’s sister but to the respondent.
[38]
The facts
referred to above make it apparent that there was no genuine or
bona
fide
dispute
of fact in respect of the delivery or possession of the Isuzu. The
respondent’s version that the Isuzu was delivered
on behalf of
the applicant to his sister was farfetched, untenable and palpably
implausible.
[11]
[39]
In the
circumstances, the respondent’s version that the vehicle was
delivered to his sister, fell within the provisions of
Wightman
[12]
as being capable of rejection on the papers. Hence, I am justified in
rejecting the respondent’s version on the papers before
me, as
I do.
[40]
Whether or not the WhatsApp messages impliedly served as an admission
of the respondent’s
possession of the Isuzu, those messages
manifestly evidenced an agreement by the respondent to deliver the
Isuzu (whether or not
it was in his possession) to the applicant. The
latter is entitled to rely upon the respondent’s agreement to
deliver the
Isuzu, as indeed it does
[41]
In the result, the respondent’s obligation to return the Isuzu
to the applicant in terms
of the WhatsApp agreement is valid and
enforceable whether or not the Isuzu was delivered to the respondent
by the applicant initially.
Accordingly, the applicant is entitled to
the order sought by it that the respondent deliver the Isuzu to the
applicant.
[42]
In the event of the respondent’s failure to deliver the Isuzu
to the applicant within five
days of the delivery of this judgment,
and the Sheriff is unable to effect delivery to of the Isuzu to the
applicant, the latter
alleged that it was entitled to damages.
[43]
The respondent denied the applicant’s entitlement to damages
but did not place the quantum
claimed by the applicant in dispute.
The applicant is entitled to damages pursuant to the respondent’s
failure to abide by
the agreement to deliver the Isuzu to the
applicant, or if the respondent fails to deliver the Isuzu to the
applicant consequent
upon the order herein.
[44]
The quantum
equates to the value of the Isuzu to the applicant.
[13]
That is the amount that the applicant would have received if the
respondent had complied with his obligations under the agreement
to
deliver the Isuzu to the applicant.
[45]
The
applicant established the value of the Isuzu as its insurance value,
being an amount of R215 000.00.
[14]
The respondent did not genuinely dispute the amount of the
applicant’s damages.
[46]
Additionally, the applicant alleged that the respondent had been
enriched and the applicant impoverished
by the respondent’s
unlawful use of the vehicle in the interim. The applicant relied upon
the reasonable rental costs of
the vehicle, being the sum of
R21 627.19, from 1 December 2019 to date of return of the
Isuzu to the applicant. The applicant
is entitled to the damages
incurred by it pursuant to the respondent’s continued unlawful
use of the Isuzu.
[47]
In the circumstances, the applicant is entitled to the relief sought
by it in the notice of motion.
[48]
By virtue of the aforementioned, I grant the following order:
1.
The respondent is ordered to deliver the Isuzu motor vehicle having
registration number
C[...] 7[...] (‘the Isuzu’) to the
applicant within five days of the date of this judgment.
2.
In the event of the respondent failing to deliver the Isuzu to the
applicant as ordered
in paragraph 1 above, the Sheriff of this court
is authorised and directed to effect delivery of the Isuzu to the
applicant.
3.
In the event of the respondent failing to deliver the Isuzu to the
applicant as ordered
in paragraph 1 above and the Sheriff failing to
effect delivery of the Isuzu to the applicant as ordered in paragraph
2 above,
the respondent is ordered to pay R215 000.00 to the
applicant, together with interest at the prescribed rate
a tempore morae
until date of payment.
4.
The respondent is ordered to pay R21 627.19 per month from
1 December 2019
to date of delivery of the Isuzu to the
applicant, alternatively to date of payment of R215 000.00 to
the applicant by the
respondent, whichever is the first occurring.
5.
The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the application.
CRUTCHFIELD
J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION
JOHANNESBURG
Delivered:
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation
to the
Parties / their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. The
date of the
judgment is deemed to be 24 November 2023.
FOR
THE APPLICANT:
Mr G
Cooper
INSTRUCTED
BY:
Cliffe
Dekker Hofmeyr Inc
FOR
THE RESPONDENT:
Mr
Luthuli
INSTRUCTED
BY:
T T S
Attorneys Inc
DATE
OF THE HEARING:
20 &
23 February 2023
DATE
OF JUDGMENT:
24
November 2023
[1]
Chetty
v Naidoo
1974
(3) SA 13
(A).
[2]
Soffiantini
v Mould
1956
(4) SA 115 (E).
[3]
Wightman
t/a J W Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd
[2008] ZASCA 6
;
2008
(3) SA 371
(SCA) [13] (‘
Wightman
’)
[4]
Wightman
supra
.
[5]
Jansen
van Rensburg v Kitchenbrand
2021
JDR 2494 (GJ) (‘Kitchenbrand’).
[6]
Kitchenbrand
id
para
[31].
[7]
Kgapaoa
v Matlala
2019
JDR 2365 (SCA).
[8]
Kitchenbrand
note 5
above para [32].
[9]
Spring
Forest Trading 599 CC v Wilberry (Pty) Ltd t/a Eco Wash &
Another
2015 (2) SA 118 (SCA).
[10]
State
v Baleka
as
referred to in
Kitchenbrand
id at [33].
[11]
Wightman
note 3
above.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Rossouw
NO v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa
[2013]
ZASCA 106
at para
[13]
.
[14]
CaseLines 005-25.
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