Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 1475South Africa
Phaleng-Podile v Dovey (A2023-005228) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1475 (27 December 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
27 December 2023
Headnotes
an unliquidated claim for damages must be pursued in action proceedings, and that this included a person
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Phaleng-Podile v Dovey (A2023-005228) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1475 (27 December 2023)
Phaleng-Podile v Dovey (A2023-005228) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1475 (27 December 2023)
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sino date 27 December 2023
FLYNOTES:
CIVIL
LAW – Defamation –
Action
proceedings
–
Appellant
and respondent engaging each other over Whatsapp group during
Covid-19 lockdown – Respondent stating that
appellant a
racist – High Court finding against appellant –
Appellant should have instituted action proceedings
at the outset
to deal not only with the damages and apology relief but also the
merits of the defamation claim – This
is not an exceptional
matter in which a “hybrid” procedure may be followed –
Appeal dismissed.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: A2023-005228
REPORTABLE:
No
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: No
REVISED:
No
Date:
27/12/2023
In
the matter between:
MMATLOU
HELLEN PHALENG-PODILE
Appellant
And
NORANNE
DOVEY
Respondent
JUDGMENT
YACOOB
J
: (Fisher and Mdalana-Mayisela concurring)
INTRODUCTION
1.
In March 2019, this country, and most of the world, were
subjected to extreme restriction of movement
and association, in
response to a lethal global pandemic to which there was no effective
scientific response for some months. These
unusual and unnatural
circumstances, both the disruption of ordinary lives and the fear of
the then rampant virus had an effect
on peoples’ livelihoods
and wellbeing that still has consequences now, almost four years
later.
2.
On 27 March 2020, on the first day of the National State of
Emergency, with the most stringent lockdown
measures in effect, an
exchange took place on a WhatsApp group of residents in a complex, of
which both the applicant and respondent
are members, which resulted
in the applicant instituting an application for relief relating to an
alleged defamation.
3.
The application was dismissed, with no costs order, by Todd AJ on 6
September 2022, leave to appeal granted
on 13 December 2022. The
matter now comes before us on appeal.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
AND INSTITUTION OF PROCEEDINGS
4.
Ms Phaleng-Podile, the applicant, was a trustee of the body corporate
of Ambiance, the complex in which
the parties live. She noticed two
men walking for exercise around the complex. At the time this was
forbidden by the regulations,
which required everyone to remain in
their homes. She posted a message on the WhatsApp group, which
at the time had some
42 members, reminding people that they should
“stay in their own yards or around their own sections”.
She noted that
there were two men walking around and that it should
be dealt with before floodgates open.
5.
Ms Dovey, the respondent, responded in a manner which can be
described as irascible. She stated that
it was only those two men,
and accused the applicant of wasting her time monitoring people
through her window. The engagement continued,
with Ms Phaleng-Podile
making comments which cast a slur on the intelligence of Ms Dovey,
while Ms Dovey continued to react angrily
and dismissively. Other
members of the group intervened, attempting to calm things down and
supporting Ms Phaleng-Podile’s
stance on the lockdown.
6.
Eventually, Ms Phaleng-Podile repeated her opinion that Ms Dovey was
less intelligent than the majority
of owners in the complex, adding
“[y]ou are a real joke shame (sic)”. To this Ms Dovey
responded “Nice- you racist”.
It is this comment which
has given rise to these proceedings. Ms Phaleng-Podile contends that
members of the WhatsApp group would
read the comment and conclude
that she was a racist, with serious consequences for her dignity and
reputation.
7.
The discussion continued with other members of the WhatsApp group
asking that the discussion calm down
and that people refrain from
personal attacks, and supporting the call to adhere to the lockdown
conditions.
8.
Ms Phaleng-Podile pleads that calling her a racist means that she is
disreputable and unfit for the various
roles that she fulfils, and
that it has the potential to cause her professional harm. She pleads
she is hurt, her self-worth and
dignity have been harmed, and she
feels belittled and humiliated.
9.
Ms Phaleng-Podile claims damages to assuage her wounded feeling, good
name and reputation, in the amount
of R500 000. She also seeks an
apology from Ms Dovey, on the same platform, the deletion of the
message, and an interdict to the
effect that Ms Dovey not defame her
again.
10.
Ms Dovey in her papers took issue with the probity of the evidence,
which was in the form of screenshots of parts of the WhatsApp
conversation. She goes as far as disputing the admissibility of
screenshots of what are alleged to be her own statements, and not
confirming or denying whether she made those posts, and only
acknowledging the contents quoted in the Founding Affidavit to the
extent that they are consonant with the screenshot. Despite this, she
still alleges justifications for the posts. She also criticises
Ms
Phaleng-Podile’s allegations of the National Lockdown as
hearsay, despite the fact that it is something that is of public
record.
11.
This approach by Ms Dovey must be criticised. It is not an
appropriate way in which to litigate. Where it is alleged that a
defendant said or posted something, the defendant must admit or deny
having posted it.
12.
In her Answering Affidavit Ms Dovey raised the point that a claim for
damages had to be founded in action proceedings, not motion
proceedings, and submitted that the case for damages had not been
made out because evidence had not been adduced. She also submitted
that there was no evidence of malice on her part.
13.
Ms Dovey denies that her comment was made with the intention to
defame Ms Phaleng-Podile. She suggests that Ms Phaleng-Podile
has
also harmed her by calling her stupid, that she will instituted
action proceedings for satisfaction of this harm, and that
Ms
Phaleng-Podile is therefore equally indebted to her. There is no
evidence that those proceedings have been instituted. She contends
that the statement was one of opinion, not fact, but rather a fair
comment, and that it would have been interpreted that way by
those
reading it.
14.
According to Ms Dovey, her comment was fair because in a previous, in
person, engagement with Ms Dovey, Ms Phaleng-Podile told
her children
not to play with Ms Dovey’s children because they are white and
do not go to the same church, and because Ms
Phaleng-Podile took
exception to a comment by a white member of the scheme that the only
efficient trustee was one who happened
to be the only white trustee.
15.
Ms Dovey also contends that she has apologised through her attorneys
to Ms Phaleng-Podile. Perusal of the apology shows that
it is not an
apology at all.
16.
Ms Dovey points out that the WhatsApp group now no longer exists. Ms
Phaleng-Podile accepts this, but still wants an apology
on the
platform. The implication is that a new WhatsApp group was created.
17.
Ms Phaleng-Podile in reply states that the comment about Ms Dovey’s
children was manufactured. She alleges that there
was an issue within
the body corporate in which allusions were made to efficiency and
that there was a racist undertone, and that
raising the issue does
not make her a racist. In any event, she submits that those
allegations by Ms Dovey are irrelevant.
THE
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A QUO
18.
Todd AJ found that, taking the context of the exchange into
account, the comment not have served to lower the Ms Phaleng-Podile
in the estimation of right-thinking members of society, although
calling someone a racist does have “a meaning that is capable
of defaming”.
19.
Todd AJ found that an
iniuria
could have been pleaded, but had
not been, although on the papers there may have been sufficient
evidence to establish that claim.
However, it was never pleaded that
a reasonable person would have been insulted by the conduct, and
therefore the objective element
of iniuria had not been pleaded. Todd
AJ commented that any damages he may have awarded would have been
much smaller than the R500
000 claimed by Ms Phaleng-Podile.
20.
As far as the interdict and apology were concerned, Todd AJ found
that these were founded on the defamation claim, and that,
having
found that there was no defamation, those would fall away.
21.
The written
argument submitted on Ms Dovey’s behalf in the court
a
quo
relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Economic
Freedom Fighters v Manuel
(“
EFF
”),
[1]
in which the SCA held that an unliquidated claim for damages must be
pursued in action proceedings, and that this included a person
seeking compensation for a defamatory statement. It was submitted
that Ms Dovey had a defence, the prospects of which had to be
decided
by the trial court, and therefore that the application should be
dismissed because Ms Phaleng-Podile had elected to follow
the wrong
procedure.
22.
At the hearing of the matter in the court
a quo
, the question
of whether the correct procedure was followed was given some
attention. The transcript of proceedings has been included
in the
record of appeal. Mr Shongwe, for Ms Phaleng-Podile, submitted that
the question of damages could be referred to oral evidence,
but that
the court nevertheless could, and should, determine the question
whether there is defamation. He relied for this on the
EFF
case.
23.
The court appeared to be of the view that it was in a position to
deal with defamation if it found that there were damages.
In fact,
the court stated in the hearing that what was being claimed was a
solatium
, rather than quantifiable damages on which evidence
would be led.
24.
Mr Mudimeli submitted for Ms Dovey that, rather than referring the
question of damages to oral evidence, the application should
be
dismissed, because the applicant herself was an attorney and ought to
have known that a claim for damages should be action proceedings,
and
because his client did not have the resources to litigate endlessly.
25.
Having found that the statement was not defamatory, Todd AJ dismissed
the application. He did not deal with the question of
the correct
procedure at all, presumably on the basis that, having found there
was no defamation, damages did not enter the equation
and there was
no need to consider the question.
26.
Todd AJ granted leave to appeal his judgment on the basis that there
was a reasonable prospect that another court might come
to a
different conclusion than he did regarding whether the statement was
defamatory.
THE
APPEAL
27.
Ms Phaleng-Podile notes seven grounds of appeal, contending that the
court
a quo
erred as set out below.
27.1.
By finding that the parties were engaging
in similar tone, by
equating attacks on intelligence with calling someone a racist, and
by ignoring that Ms Dovey’s tone
of engagement from the outset
was aggressive.
27.2.
In finding that Ms Dovey’s comment
was intended to insult and
offend, and was not defamatory.
27.3.
By commenting that it was more probable
that Ms Phaleng-Podile’s
own insulting statements addressed to Ms Dovey would have lowered Ms
Phaleng-Podile in the estimation
of right-thinking members of
society, and in fact by finding that Ms Phaleng-Podile’s
statements were insulting.
27.4.
By only considering whether the members
of the WhatsApp group would
think less of Ms Phaleng-Podile as a result of Ms Dovey’s
statement, and ignoring “the
effects the racist label would
continue to have out there”.
27.5.
By ignoring the deeper meaning of calling
someone a racist, that is
that the person engages in immoral or dishonourable conduct, by
discriminating among people on the basis
of race, and the effect this
would have on Ms Phaleng-Podile’s reputation.
27.6.
By ignoring the reasons suggested by Ms
Dovey as justification for
her comment, which then would give the comment more defamatory value.
27.7.
By finding that no case had been made out
for interdictory relief, in
particular that there was no evidence of continuing harm.
28.
In the notice of appeal the relief that is sought is the setting
aside of the court
a quo
’s order and the substitution of
an order granting damages of R500 000, an apology, and an interdict.
29.
Mr Shongwe in his written argument distils the issues before us into
two points:
29.1.
whether the
court
a
quo
correctly went “above and beyond” the test laid out in
Le
Roux v Dey
,
[2]
and
29.2.
whether the court
a quo
correctly found that in the context of
the WhatsApp exchange, the use of the word “racist” had
not been defamatory.
30.
Mr Shongwe conflates the second point into whether Ms Dovey was
justified in labelling Ms Phaleng-Podile a racist, but that
is not
the inquiry, nor did the court
a quo
make any such finding. It
must be noted that a finding that a statement is not defamatory does
not mean that the publication of
that statement is justified or
correct.
31.
He also submitted that Todd AJ erred by not deciding the matter only
in accordance with Ms Dovey’s defence, because Ms
Dovey has
plainly not made out a case for fair comment. This submission is
obviously misguided. Before considering a defence, a
court must
decide whether the plaintiff has made out a case, and that is what
Todd AJ has done.
32.
Mr Shongwe then deals in detail with the question of the correct
procedure, in particular with reference to the
EFF
case, and
Rule 17(2) of the Uniform Rules of Court, which require a person
claiming unliquidated damages to use a long form summons
and file
particulars of claim. He acknowledges that it is settled law that a
defamation suit in which damages are claimed ought
to be prosecuted
by way of action. He acknowledges that Ms Phaleng-Podile, like Mr
Manuel in the
EFF
case, did not provide sufficient detail in
relation to the harm suffered. He therefore requests that the
question of damages, together
with the apology, be referred to oral
evidence, as the SCA did in the
EFF
case.
33.
Mr Shongwe then submitted that the appropriate relief is a
declaratory order that the statement is defamatory, an interdict,
and
a referral to oral evidence of the questions of damages and an
apology or retraction.
34.
At the hearing of the appeal, the question of the appropriate
procedure was the primary focus. The question was whether, having
instituted application proceedings, knowing full well that action
proceedings ought to have been instituted, and despite the problem
having been pointed out in the answering affidavit, and despite
failing to seek a referral to oral evidence or a separation of
issues
when the
EFF
judgment came out in 2020, the appellant now can
take advantage of a change of approach, and seek a referral to oral
evidence.
35.
The primary submission relied on by Mr Shongwe in this regard was
that it was acceptable to bring an application for relief
based on
defamation if there is no dispute of fact.
36.
After the
hearing of the appeal, Wilson J handed down judgment in the matter of
Ndlozi v
Media 24 t/a Daily Sun and Others
(
Ndlozi
).
[3]
Mr Shongwe commendably, and without waiting for a request from the
court, submitted additional written submissions dealing with
this
judgment.
37.
In that case, Dr Ndlozi brought application proceedings on the basis
of allegedly defamatory statements, and Wilson J found
that, in the
circumstances of that case, there was no reason why the question of
whether the statements were defamatory and unlawful
could not be
dealt with, and the prayers for an apology and damages be postponed
and referred to oral evidence. That is, in fact
what Wilson J did.
38.
Wilson J found that the
EFF
judgment did not prevent this,
because although the SCA commented that it is not ordinarily
acceptable to bring an application for
“some immediate relief”
with damages to be referred to oral evidence or determined at a later
stage, it did in fact
permit that in that case – the court
upheld the finding that the statements were defamatory, and referred
the damages and
apology to oral evidence, because of the “exceptional
circumstances” of that case – in particular because there
was no objection or allegation of prejudice by the EFF.
39.
Wilson J found that the procedure could be adopted in “exceptional”
cases where there would be no prejudice to parties’
procedural
rights. The exceptional nature of the
Ndlozi
case lay in there
being no real dispute of fact, in the fact that the interdictory
relief being sought should not have to await
the determination of
damages, and that the court in
Ndlozi
was not called upon to
decide whether there was intention on the respondents’ part.
40.
Mr Shongwe submits that Ms Phaleng-Podile is in the same position as
Mr Manuel and, specifically, Dr Ndlozi, and therefore should
be
entitled to the same benefit of a referral of the damages to oral
evidence.
41.
I disagree with Mr Shongwe’s submission for the following
reasons.
42.
Firstly, Ms Dovey objected to the procedure adopted from the outset.
This has been set out in detail above. It was also specifically
submitted on her behalf at the hearing in the court
a quo
that
she could not litigate endlessly and that a referral to oral evidence
would be unfair.
43.
Secondly, the question of a referral to oral evidence was something
that Ms Phaleng-Podile and her team were aware of even before
the
replying affidavit was filed. Certainly they were aware well before
the date of the hearing in the court
a quo
, Mr Mudimeli having
referred to the
EFF
judgment in his written argument.
44.
Thirdly, unlike in the case of
Ndlozi
, Ms Dovey’s
intention is very much part of what the court had to consider, and
did consider. Ms Dovey’s intention to
defame is in fact pleaded
in the Founding Affidavit. This is something that, in my view, could
only be properly examined in oral
evidence.
45.
Fourthly, an examination of the notice of appeal and the main written
argument on appeal reveals that there are some issues
which, if they
were to have been considered in the manner in which Mr Shongwe
submits they ought to have been considered, should
have been the
subject of oral evidence.
46.
Under the rubric of the fourth ground of appeal, the submission is
made that the court, in finding that the members of the WhatsApp
group were not inclined to think less of Ms Phaleng-Podile as a
result of Ms Dovey’s comment, did not consider and
underestimated
the external negative effects of the statement, and
the continuing effects “out there”. There was no evidence
at all
in the papers of the effects “out there”, and in
fact that evidence, as well as what the inclination of members of the
WhatsApp group were, is something that ought to have been placed
before the court in oral evidence so that it could have been properly
scrutinized and evaluated.
47.
For these reasons, I find that Ms Phaleng-Podile should have
instituted action proceedings at the outset, to deal not only with
the damages and apology relief but also the merits of the defamation
claim. This is not an exceptional matter in which a “hybrid”
procedure may be followed.
48.
Although I find against Ms Phaleng-Podile on a different basis than
did Todd AJ, this means that the appeal must fail.
49.
I make the following order:
“
The appeal is
dismissed.”
S.
YACOOB
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
I
concur.
D FISHER
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
JOHANNESBURG
I
concur.
MMP MDALANA-MAYISELA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Appearances
Counsel
for the appellant:
CM
Shongwe
Instructed
by:
Phaleng-Podile
Attorneys
For
the respondent:
No
appearance
Date
of hearing:
30
August 2023
Date
of judgment:
27
December 2023
[1]
2021
(3) SA 425
SCA
[2]
Le
Roux and Others v Dey
2011
(3) SA 274 (CC)
[3]
(21/25599)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1040 (19 September 2023).
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