Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 69South Africa
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Phalane and Another (2019/25638) [2022] ZAGPJHC 69 (7 February 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
7 February 2022
Headnotes
judgment as well as an application in terms of Rule 46A of the Uniform Rules of Court to declare the immovable property of the defendants to be specially executable. [2] The summary judgment proceedings have been described as drastic and robust proceedings. In Joob Joob Investments v Stocks Mavundla Zek JV [2009] All SA 407(SCA) it was held that summary judgment proceedings are no longer extraordinary and the Rule must be applied properly. The summary
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Phalane and Another (2019/25638) [2022] ZAGPJHC 69 (7 February 2022)
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Phalane and Another (2019/25638) [2022] ZAGPJHC 69 (7 February 2022)
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
2019/25638
REPORTABLE:
NO /
YES
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO /
YES
REVISED.
7/2/2022
In
the matter between:
THE
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED Applicant
(Registration
Number: 1962/000738/06)
and
PAUL
PHALANE
First
Respondent
(Identity
Number: [....])
RHULANI
PHALANE
Second
Respondent
(Identity
Number: [....])
JUDGMENT
ABRAHAMS
AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an opposed application for summary
judgment
as well as an
application in terms of Rule 46A of the Uniform Rules of Court to
declare the immovable property of the defendants
to be specially
executable.
[2]
The summary judgment proceedings have been described as drastic and
robust proceedings. In
Joob
Joob Investments v Stocks Mavundla Zek JV
[2009]
All SA 407(SCA)
it
was held that summary judgment proceedings are no longer
extraordinary and the Rule must be applied properly. The summary
judgment
procedure exists for the applicant to obtain a speedy
judgment against the defendant in cases where the defendant has no
valid
defence to the claim. By short-circuiting an otherwise
potentially protracted trial, the applicant avoids incurring
unnecessary
costs associated therewith.
[3] Summary judgment
cannot be granted where it is clear that some ventilation of evidence
is required in order for the Court to
come to a decision. Adopting
this approach, the successful defendant who demonstrates a triable
defence is not excised from further
anticipated litigation. Thus the
defendant retains (all) his Constitutional Rights to access justice,
as enshrined in section 34
of the Constitution.
[4]
The Plaintiff is The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited.
[5]
The First Defendant is Paul Phelane and the Second Defendant is
Rhulane Phelane.
Background
and common cause facts
[6]
On 11th September 2007 the Plaintiff duly
represented concluded a Loan Agreement with the Defendants. In terms
of the Loan Agreement
the Plaintiff agreed to advance the sum of
R490,000 to the Defendants as a Home Loan.
[7] Pursuant to the Loan
Agreement, the Defendants caused a continuing covering mortgage bond
to be registered over immovable property
in favour of the Plaintiff.
[8] The immovable
property is the primary residence of the Defendants.
[9] The Defendants agreed
to repay the Plaintiff in monthly installments for a period of R360
months.
[10] The Defendants have
defaulted on their monthly payments and entered into a repayment
arrangement with the Plaintiff.
[11] On 22 July 2019 the
Plaintiff caused the combined summons to be issued. The Defendants
Plea was served on 30 January 2020.
[12] The Application for
Summary Judgment was served on 21 February 2020.
Points
in Limine
raised by the Defendants
First Point
in Limine
[13] The Application for
Summary Judgment was served out of time.
[14]
Rule 32 (2) (a)
of the Uniform Rules states
“
Within
15 days after the date of delivery of the plea, the plaintiff shall
deliver a notice of application for summary judgment,
together with
an affidavit made by the plaintiff or by any other person who can
swear positively to the facts.”
[15] The use of the word
“
shall
” make compliance with subrule (2)(a)
prescriptive and peremptory.
[16] The Defendants Plea
was served on 30 January 2020.
The Application was
served on 21 February 2020 and should have been served on 20 February
2020.
[17] The Application was
one day out of time. The Plaintiff contends in his Heads of Argument
that he will bring an application
of Condonation in terms od Rule 27
of the Uniform Rules. This Application was never brought.
Second Point
in Limine
[18] The Defendant argues
that the relief sought in the Application for Summary Judgment which
is a claim for R62 603, 04 is inconsistent
with that claimed in the
Plaintiff’s particulars of Claim which is a claim for R628
203,04. The Plaintiff contends that the
difference is due to a
typographical error and purely of a technical nature.
[19] In
Standard Bank
of South Africa v Roestof
2004 (2) SA 492
(W) at 496 F-H
it was held as follows:
“
A
reading of Rule 32 as a whole makes it plain that, once there is an
affidavit by the plaintiff, or someone acting on its behalf,
who can
swear positively to the facts verifying the cause of action and the
amount, if any, claimed, stating that in his opinion
there is no bona
fide defence to the action and that intention to defend was
delivered solely for the purposes of delay,
the plaintiff is entitled
to summary judgment unless the defendant has complied in some way or
other with the requirements of Rule
32(3). If the papers are not
technically correct due to some obvious and manifest error which
causes no prejudice to the defendant,
it is difficult to justify
an approach that refuses the application, especially in a case such
as the present one where a
reading of the defendant's affidavit
opposing summary judgment makes it clear beyond doubt that he knows
and appreciates the plaintiff's
case against him.”
[20]
Relying on
Roestoff
, I find that no prejudice has been
caused to the Defendants by the technical flaw. The difference in the
amount is clearly a typographical
error as the correct amount is
reflected in paragraphs 22.2, 23.1 and 33.2.4 of the Plaintiff’s
Particulars of Claim the
technical flaw is cured.
Issues in Dispute
[21] The main issue that
are disputed between the parties is that the Plaintiff did not comply
with its obligations in the terms
of the Loan Agreement.
Analysis
of the evidence
[22]
The Plaintiff avers that it has complied with requirements of a
Summary Judgment in terms of Rule 32.
[23]
The Defendants submit that the Plaintiff did not comply with its
obligations in terms of the Home Loan Agreement.
[24]
It was held
Absa Bank Limited v Pocklingberg
(4116/2016)
[2017] ZAFSHC 27
(9 February 2017) that:
“
[17]
Summary judgment must be refused if the defendant discloses facts
which, accepting the truth thereof, or only if proved at
a trial in
due course, will constitute a defence (see Raphael and Co v Standard
Produce Co (Pty) Ltd
1951 (4) SA 244
(C) 245 E - G) While the
defendant must fully present the facts upon which his defence is
based, he need not deal in detail with
either that defence or the
evidence in support thereof (see: Absa Bank Ltd v Coventry
1998 (4)
SA 351
(N) 353 C - H). Defects in the opposing affidavits are not
necessarily fatal for the defendant as the court is entitled to adopt
a lenient approach to the allegations contained therein and it is
entitled to draw reasonable inferences from those allegations
(see
Koornklip Befeggings (Edms) Bpk v Allied Minerals Ltd
1970 (1) SA 674
(C) 678 E)”
[25]
There is a discrepancy in the amount of R490 000 that Plaintiff
claims was advanced the Defendants in terms of the Loan Agreement
and
the amount stated on the transaction history attached to the
application for summary judgment marked “A03” that
shows
that the Plaintiff only advanced R380 000 to Defendants.
[26]
The Plaintiff’s counsel argued that even if the amount advanced
to the Defendants is less than the amount on the Loan
Agreement that
the Defendant’s signature appears on the Home Loan Agreement,
and they are liable for that amount. This is
an issue for the trial
court to decide.
[27]
The Plaintiff has debited certain fees to the Defendants’
account which fees appears not be agreed on. The transaction
history
shows that the Plaintiff has debited “collection costs”
and “
garden fees
”. Counsel for the Plaintiff could
not shed light on what these fees are and argued that the amounts can
be deducted from
the amount claimed.
[28]
The interest rate in terms of the Home Loan Agreement is a variable
interest rate of 0,7% below the prime interest rate. The
Plaintiff
claims interest against the Defendants at a rate of 10% per annum
(being the prime lending rate at the time) from 2 October
2018. It is
clear that this interest rate does not constitute a rate of prime
minus 0,7%.
[29]
I find that the above discrepancies are triable issues that need to
be properly ventilated at a trial, and that accordingly
the
application for summary judgment is refused.
Costs
[30]
As a general rule the award of the costs remains in the discretion
of the Court. The general rule is that such costs should
follow
the result, being the successful litigant. being that costs
are awarded to a successful litigant. The usual costs orders
in
summary judgment applications is to reserve costs for determination
by the trial Court.
[31]
Rule 32 (9)
of the
Uniform Rules
provides that:
“
(9)
The court may at the hearing of such application make such order as
to costs as to it seems just: Provided that if -
(a) The plaintiff
makes an application under this rule, where the case is not within
the terms of subrule (1) or where the plaintiff,
in the opinion of
the court, knew that the defendant relied on a contention which would
entitle him to leave to defend, the court
may order that the action
be stayed until the plaintiff has paid the defendant’s costs,
and may further order that such costs
be taxed as between attorney
and client; and
(b) ….”
[32 The
purpose of the above subrule is, on the one hand, to discourage
unnecessary or unjustified applications for summary
judgment and, on
the other hand, to discourage defendants from setting up unreasonable
defences.
[33]
In my view the Plaintiff knew or ought reasonably to have known that
the Defendants contentions as contained in their plea
would entitle
them to leave to defend.
[34]
The Plaintiff has advanced no plausible ground why it proceeded to
bring the present application in the light of the Defendants
contention nor why it persisted with the application up to this
point. The Plaintiff knew that he was out of time with the
Application
for Summary Judgment and undertook in his Heads of
Argument that he would bring an Application for condonation in terms
of Rule
27 of the Uniform Rules. This was not done.
[35]
These costs could have been avoided by the Plaintiff. The Defendants
are ordinary citizens as opposed to Plaintiff which is
one of the
largest banking institutions in South Africa. I see no reason why the
Defendant should be out of pocket in this application.
This is the
proper case for showing displeasure at the conduct of the Plaintiff
by mulcting it with costs of this application.
ORDER
In
a result, I make the following order:
1.
The application for summary judgment is
dismissed with costs.
2.
The application to declare the immovable
property executable is dismissed with costs.
3.
Costs are to be taxed on a scale as between
an attorney and client scale.
_______________
L
C ABRAHAMS
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
COUNSEL
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
ADV M AMOJEE
PLAINTIFF’S
ATTORNEY:
STRAUSS DALY INC
COUNSEL
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
ADV L ACKER
DEFENDANT’S
ATTORNEYS:
A DU PLESSIS ATTORNEYS
DATE
OF HEARING:
9/11/2021
DATE
OF JUDGMENT:
7/2/2022
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