Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 121South Africa
Wholesale Monitoring Services (Pty) Ltd v WM Digital Solutions (Pty) Ltd and Others (2020/13296) [2022] ZAGPJHC 121 (7 March 2022)
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liable for damages, or which could cause damages.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Wholesale Monitoring Services (Pty) Ltd v WM Digital Solutions (Pty) Ltd and Others (2020/13296) [2022] ZAGPJHC 121 (7 March 2022)
Wholesale Monitoring Services (Pty) Ltd v WM Digital Solutions (Pty) Ltd and Others (2020/13296) [2022] ZAGPJHC 121 (7 March 2022)
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sino date 7 March 2022
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
Case
no: 2020/13296
REPORTABLE:
YES
/ NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
REVISED.
7
March 2022
In
the matter between:
WHOLESALE
MONITORING SERVICES (PTY) LTD
Applicant
And
WM
DIGITAL SOLUTIONS (PTY)
LTD
1
st
Respondent
WADE
MOSTERT
2
nd
Respondent
ULTRA
LIQUORS (PTY)
LTD
3
rd
Respondent
ROBINSON
LIQUORS (PTY)
LTD
4
th
Respondent
Delivered:
This judgement was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected herein and is handed down electronically
by circulation to
the Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it
to the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for
hand-down is deemed to be 3 March 2022.
JUDGMENT
BEZUIDENHOUT
AJ:
[1]
In this matter the applicant sought to enforce a restraint provision
included in the
Alliance Partner Network Agreement (the agreement)
concluded between the 1
st
respondent and the applicant.
The applicant also demanded that the 1
st
respondent
account to it on the disgorgement of secret profits the 1
st
respondent is alleged to have made. The applicant further sought to
recover damages that it allegedly suffered because of the 1
st
respondent’s breach of the agreement.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The applicant described itself as an off-site CCTV monitoring
solutions company. Its
main business is the sale of monitoring and
surveillance equipment to businesses and households and off-site CCTV
camera monitoring
and perimeter detection services. The applicant
describes the 1
st
respondent business as similar if not
identical to that of the applicant.
[3]
The 2
nd
respondent described the 1
st
respondent’s business as consisting of the sale, installation
and maintenance of CCTV systems. This entails the provision
of CCTV
cameras, with or without hardware and software but does not include
off-site monitoring and perimeter detection services.
The 2
nd
respondent stated that the applicant would not sell and install CCTV
camera’s if the customer was not interested in off-site
monitoring and permitter detection services as well. According to the
2
nd
respondent the difference in the services the
applicant offered when compared to the 1
st
respondent was
that the 1
st
respondent did not offer off-site monitoring
and perimeter detection services.
[4]
According to the 2
nd
respondent when the applicant thus
approached the 1
st
respondent with an offer that the 1
st
respondent refers its clients to the applicant who required off-site
monitoring and perimeter detections services against the applicant
paying the 1
st
respondent a commission, it made commercial
sense and the 1
st
respondent accepted the offer.
[5]
It is common cause that the applicant and 1
st
respondent
concluded a written Alliance Partner Network Agreement on 10 February
2017 (the agreement). In terms of the agreement,
the applicant
appointed the 1
st
respondent as a non-exclusive
independent sales representative of the applicant for the purpose of
selling the applicants off-site
monitoring solutions to potential
customers in the Republic of South Africa.
[6]
According to the 2
nd
respondent, after entering into the
agreement, the applicant and 1
st
respondent each continued
to service its customers within the ambit of the services it rendered
prior to the conclusion of the
agreement but in addition the 1
st
respondent started marketing and selling the applicants off-site
monitoring and perimeter detection services; the installation
and set
up of the off-site monitoring and perimeter detection services were
done by the applicant.
BREACH
[10]
According to the applicant it came to its attention during or about
June 2019 that the 1
st
respondent had started selling its
own off-site monitoring solutions by offering the same or similar
products and services as the
applicant offered at a significantly
reduced rate while still being bound by the terms of the restraint
contained in clause 6 the
agreement.
[11]
In support of this allegation the applicant alleged that the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents had:
[11.1]
approached existing clients of the applicant and has solicited their
business by offering the same services as the
applicant and
undercutting the applicants prices;
[11.2]
Copied and are using the applicant’s intellectual property and
marketing material and placing this copied material
on the 1
st
respondent’s website;
[11.3]
Used the applicant’s propriety information in order to
springboard themselves and gain an unlawful advantage
in competing
with the applicant; and
[11.4]
Solicited and persuaded the applicants customers into doing business
directly with the 1
st
respondent rather than with the
Applicant, which is a breach of the agreement.
[12]
The applicant’s attorney addressed a letter of demand to the
1
st
respondent in June 2019, demanding that the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondent provide it with an undertaking to
adhere to the restraint within 5 business days of demand, failing
which the applicant
would be required to take further legal action.
[13]
According to the applicant, on 19 August 2019, a director of the
applicant met with the Managing
Director of the 3
rd
respondent (the 3
rd
and 4
th
respondent was
according to the applicant two of its customers) as it has come to
his attention that the 1
st
respondent had entered into an
agreement with the 3
rd
respondent to offer him the same
services as the applicant offered. The applicants Managing Director
alluded the 3
rd
respondents’ Managing Director to
the agreement concluded between the applicant and 1
st
respondent and after the meeting, provided him with a copy of the
agreement.
[14]
On 23 August 2019, the Managing Director of the 3
rd
respondent notified the applicant that it would “follow
through” with the agreement with the 1
st
respondent to provide off-site monitoring services
[1]
to the 3
rd
respondent.
[15]
On 24 August 2019, the applicant cancelled the agreement with the 1
st
respondent.
[16]
On 23 January 2020, the applicant received an email from the 3
rd
respondent indicating that it wanted to terminate 3 of the 3
rd
respondent’s agreements with the applicant.
[17]
On the same date, in an effort to improve its services, the applicant
requested the 3
rd
respondent to provide it with its
reasons for the termination of its agreements. The 3
rd
Respondent responded by stating that it had a new service provider
that would attend to the installation, maintenance and monitoring
of
its sites. The 3
rd
respondent identified the 1
st
respondent as the “new” service provider.
[18]
The 2
nd
respondent pleaded that the 3
rd
and 4
th
respondents were the 1
st
respondent’s customers and
the applicant in reply conceded that historically they were. The 2
nd
respondent stated that the 3
rd
respondent was dissatisfied
with the services the applicant rendered and that they drew the
applicant’s attention thereto.
The 3
rd
respondent
approached the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents with a
request that they refer them to a different off-site monitoring and
perimeter detection service provider. The
1
st
respondent
referred the applicant to an entity known as WM Surveillance (Pty)
Ltd which was registered on 27 June 2019 and changed
its name to TTK
Surveillance (Pty) Ltd on 2 July 2020. According to the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents they have no ties to either TTK
Surveillance or WM Surveillance.
ISSUES
TO BE DECIDED
[18]
According to the applicant the issues for determination are whether:
[18.1]
The applicant is entitled to accounting as set out in prayer 7 of the
notice of motion; and
[18.2]
Whether the 1
st
respondent has breached the agreement by
soliciting the custom of the applicants’ customers (without
deciding the quantum
which must be referred for oral evidence).
[19]
According to the 1
st
respondent the issues to be decided
are the following:
[19.1]
Whether a clear right to the interdictory relief exists and whether
there is an injury committed or apprehended;
[19.2]
Whether the applicant has a right to receive an account; and
[19.3]
Whether there was a breach of the agreement for which the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents could be held liable for damages, or
which could cause damages.
INTERDICTORY
RELIEF
[30]
With regard to the interdictory relief the applicant indicated that
it accepted the 1
st
respondents tender and that it was
therefore entitled to the relief as prayed for in prayers 1, 3 and 4.
The applicant indicated
that it did not persist with relief as prayed
for in prayers 2, 5 and 6 of the notice of motion.
[31]
The 1
st
respondent argued that the clear right on which
the applicant depended for its interdictory relief would have
terminated though
the efflux of time at the end of August 2020 and as
such the applicant would not have been entitled to the interdictory
relief
beyond the 12-month period.
[32]
The Court is mindful of the fact that the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents had tendered and consented to the interdictory relief in
their answering affidavit and that the applicant has accepted
same.
However, the applicant is seeking a final interdict without any
termination date.
[33]
Having had regard to the papers, the applicant in its founding
affidavit did not motivate why
it wanted to deviate from and extent
the 12-month period for the protection of its confidential
information and non-circumvention
clause beyond what the parties had
agreed upon and recorded in the agreement. In the agreement the
parties recorded a 12-month
period which would commence to run from
date of termination of the agreement for whatever reason.
[34]
The agreement was cancelled in August 2019; therefore the 12-month
period would have terminated
in August 2020. When the matter was
argued in October 2021, the applicant had the benefit of the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents undertaking for a period in excess of
12-months, there is no justification in seeking that the undertaking
run for
another 12-month period from date of the granting of the
order.
[35]
Having said that, the applicant’s Counsel indicated that the
applicant will not be seeking
prayer 2 any longer, which meant that
the interdict would be a perpetual restraining order. This is drastic
relief which will not
be granted lightly, and the applicant has not
made out a case for such drastic relief in its papers.
[36]
The Court therefore decline to make the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents tenders an order of Court and issue no order with regards
to prayer 1,3 and 4 as the relief has become academic due
to the
12-month period the parties had agreed upon in the agreement having
terminated in August 2020 and there on the affidavits
filed of record
not being any reason why the period must be extended further than the
agreed upon 12 months form date of termination
of the agreement.
DAMAGES
AND BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT
[37]
The applicant bases the breach of the agreement on clause 6 of the
agreement.
[38]
Clause 6 reads as follows:
‘
6.
Confidentiality and Non-Circumvention
6.1 For the duration of
this Agreement and for a period of 12 (twelve) months following
termination thereof by either Party and
for whatever reason:
6.1.1.
…..
6.1.2 The Alliance
Partner hereby undertakes, not at anytime, whether directly or
indirectly to:
6.1.2.1
endeavour to or actually circumvent WMS in relation to the provision
of good and / or services, similar to the Product; and / or
6.1.2.2
save as provided for in this Agreement, negotiate directly or
indirectly,
with any of WMS’s suppliers, customers and/or
business contracts or partners whose details are disclosed as a
result of this
Agreement or with whom the Alliance Partner might have
become acquainted with in the course of the implementation of this
Agreement;
and/or
6.1.2.3
take any action which would result in the dealing with any of WMS’s
suppliers, customers and business contacts or partners to the
exclusion of WMS.’
[39]
In clause 1.1 customer is defined as: ‘…. potential
customers in the Republic of
South Africa’.
[40]
In clause 2.1 of the agreement it stipulates that: ‘the
Alliance Partner shall, in terms
of this Agreement, on a
non-exclusive basis, actively market the Product to the Customers
with the aim of securing as many
new
Customers as possible for
the benefit of both parties.’
[41]
At paragraph 21 of the founding affidavit the applicant pleaded that:
‘The First Respondent
was provided with a confidential customer
list in order to facilitate the sale of the Applicant’s
products and services to
customers of the Applicant.’ The
applicant did not plead who provided this list to the 1
st
respondent or when it was provided to it. The 2
nd
respondent denied that the applicant ever provided the 1
st
respondent with a customer list.
[42]
The applicant then pleaded that the 2
nd
respondent as the
‘face’ of the 1
st
respondent performed in
terms of the agreement by actively marketing and selling the
applicant’s product to customers and
received commission.
[43]
The applicant proceeded and stated that the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents had access to the applicant’s customers and
developed a relationship of trust with these customers.
[44]
The applicant pleaded that the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents had access to the order history of each customer of the
applicant
[2]
. The applicant then
stated that the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents approached existing clients of the applicant and have
solicited their business by undercutting the applicant’s
prices.
[45]
The applicant stated that the 3
rd
and 4
th
respondents was one of the applicant’s key customers, it sold
monitoring equipment and rendered services to various of its
outlets.
[46]
The breach of the agreement is then described as follows: in June
2019 it came to the applicant’s
attention that 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents had started selling its own off-site
monitoring solutions by offering the same or similar products and
services as
the applicant at a significantly reduced rate while still
bound by the terms of the restraint as contained in the agreement.
According
to the applicant this constituted a clear breach of the
terms of the agreement.
[47]
Although the applicant did not plead the cancellation of the
agreement in the founding affidavit
the agreement was cancelled in
August 2019 by the applicant.
[48]
In January 2020 the 3
rd
respondent gave notice of the
termination of the (the last) 3 agreements of its outlets (11
agreements having been cancelled in
June / August 2019).
[49]
One of the applicant’s defences to the applicant’s
allegation of breach of the agreement
is that it had not breach the
agreement as the 3
rd
respondent was not a customer as
defined in the agreement. To this end the argument was that only new
customers to both the applicant
and 1
st
respondent could
fall under section 6 if the definition of customer is read with
clause 2.1 and 6.1.2.3.
[50]
Having regard to the background facts as pleaded by the 1
st
respondent, with which it does not appear the applicant took issue
with, both parties continued to run their respective businesses
with
the 1
st
respondent having to market and sell the
applicant’s products in addition. The applicant retained its
databases, suppliers
and customers and the 1
st
respondent
it’s databases, suppliers, and customers. There was no
amalgamation of businesses.
[51]
Having regard to the way the applicant pleaded its case in the
founding affidavit, the applicant
was concerned with the protection
of its customers, suppliers and databases which on its version was
made available to the 1
st
respondent and to which the 1
st
respondent had access to.
[52]
Having regard to clause 6 it would also appear that the aim of this
clause was to protect the
applicant’s confidential information
and to afford the applicant protection against interference from the
1
st
respondent as it does not afford the 1
st
respondent any protection from interference by the applicant or abuse
by the applicant of the 1
st
respondents’
confidential information.
[53]
In order then to determine who were WMS customers as referred to in
clause 6 it is not necessary
to interrogate clause 1.1 and 2.1 as the
1
st
respondent admitted to it referring the 3
rd
respondent to the applicant post the conclusion of the agreement and
being entitled and or paid commission.
[54]
For convenience sake clause 6.1.2.2. was rearranged so it makes
reference to the applicant and
1
st
respondent and read as
follows: For the duration of this agreement and for a period of 12
months following termination hereof by
either party and for whatever
reason, the 1
st
respondent hereby undertakes, not at any
time, whether directly or indirectly, save as provided for in this
agreement, to negotiate
directly or indirectly, with any of the
applicant’s suppliers, customers and/or business contracts or
partners whose details
are disclosed as a result of this agreement or
with whom the 1
st
respondent might have become acquainted
with in the course of the implementation of this agreement.
[55]
As the 3
rd
respondent was historically the 1
st
respondent’s customer and not the applicants the 1
st
respondent did not become acquainted with the 3
rd
respondent due to any of the 3
rd
respondent’s
details being disclosed to it as a result of the agreement, neither
has the 1
st
respondent become acquainted to the 3
rd
respondent in the course of the implementation of the agreement. It
was the applicant who became acquainted with the 3
rd
respondent and its details were disclosed by the 1
st
respondent to the applicant as a result of the agreement. Therefore
clause 6.1.2.2 does not find application in this instance.
[56]
Doing the same with clause 6.1.2.1. it would thus read as follows:
For the duration of this agreement
and for a period of 12 months
following termination hereof by either party and for whatever reason
the 1
st
respondent hereby undertakes, not at any time,
whether directly or indirectly, save as provided for in this
agreement, endeavour
to or actually circumvent WMS in relation to the
provision of good and / or services, similar to the product.
[57]
Neither party has address me on the meaning or interpretation of the
word circumvent. From consulting
the dictionaries, the description of
‘to avoid something by managing to go around it’ or
‘manage to get around
especially with ingenuity and stratagem’
appears to be the most fitting definition of what circumvent in this
instance would
mean.
[58]
In line with the above it is also the applicant’s case that the
1
st
respondent met with the 3
rd
respondent,
offered it the same or similar product to that of the applicant and
undercut the applicant’s prices (the applicant
depends mainly
on hearsay evidence and documentary evidence which has not been
properly introduced in its founding affidavit to
support these
allegations).
[59]
The 1
st
respondent denied that it offered the 3
rd
respondent the same or similar product to that of the applicant and
that it undercut the applicant’s prices. On the 1
st
respondent’s version, the 3
rd
respondent was
dissatisfied with the applicant’s services, the 1
st
respondent notified the applicant of same, the 3
rd
respondent was going to terminate its services with the applicant and
as such it asked the 1
st
respondent, to refer it to a
different service provider, which the 1
st
respondent then
did. The 2
nd
respondent denied that the 1
st
respondent rendered or offering to render off-site monitoring and
perimeter detection services and having any ties to the entity
it
referred the 3
rd
respondent to.
[60]
There is a material dispute of fact which cannot be resolved on the
papers.
[61]
The applicant requested that only the issue of the quantification be
referred to trail. A piece
meal adjudication of the issue of the
breach and damages is not desirable for a variety of reasons one of
it being that motion
proceedings were not designed for the
adjudication of these types of disputes, and two that there is a real
possibility that evidence
might come to the fore during oral
testimony which might impact on the merits and so forth. The whole of
the issue of breach and
quantification of the agreement will thus be
referred to trail.
[62]
In addition, the applicant seeks to hold the 2
nd
respondent personally liable on what appears to be fiduciary grounds.
The applicant and 1
st
respondent’s relationship
arise out of the agreement concluded between the applicant and 1
st
respondent. The applicant pleaded that 1
st
respondent owed
the applicant a fiduciary duty arising out of the principal agent
relationship, and I will deal with this further
on in this judgment.
The applicant did not plead any contractual relationship between the
applicant and 2
nd
respondent. The applicant seems to base
its claim for damages against the 2
nd
respondent on the
fiduciary relationship between the applicant and the 2
nd
respondent, but it is unclear what the legal basis for that is. The
1
st
and 2
nd
respondent were in an employment
relationship and a fiduciary duty existed between the two of them and
the 1
st
respondent would ordinarily be liable for the acts
of its employees however the applicant does not seem to base its
cause of action
thereon.
AGENCY
AND ACCOUNTING
[63]
In terms of prayer 7 of the notice of motion, the applicant demand of
the 1
st
respondent that it account to it with regard to of
all profits earned by the 1
st
respondent on CCTV camera’s,
perimeter detection and off-site monitoring solutions and all
off-site monitoring and perimeter
detection services rendered.
[64]
The applicant’s demand for an account arises in the context of
the allegation that the
1
st
respondent made a secret
profit to which the 1
st
respondent, as the applicant’s
agent, was not entitled to. The secret profits the 1
st
respondent would have appropriated stems from the allegation that the
1
st
respondent poached the applicant’s customers. In
the event of the 1
st
respondent having poached the
applicants’ customers, the applicant aver it would have
suffered losses.
[65]
It would thus appear that the applicant’s demand that the 1
st
respondent account to it, is to verify whether the 1
st
respondent had breached the agreement and to what extent the 1
st
respondent has benefitted therefrom if it has breached the agreement.
[66]
Prior to ordering the 1
st
respondent to account for profit
made it must be established whether the 1
st
respondent had
indeed poached the applicant’s customers. The applicant would
not without be entitled to demand an account
for secret profits made
without and allegation of untoward conduct by the 1
st
respondent.
[67]
In Any Name 451 (Pty) Ltd v Capespan (Pty) Ltd (9922/2005) [2011)
ZAWCHC 570 (23 September 2011)
Binns Ward J
stated that: ‘There is, however, no general principle of law
that when one party does not know how much he is
owed by another he
can call upon the latter to render an account.’ And referred to
the matter of Rectifier and Communication
Systems (Pty) Ltd v
Harrison and Others
1981 (2) SA 283
(C) at 287 fin – 288B in
this regard.
[68]
At paragraph 6 he dealt with the requirements for a statement as
follows: ‘In order to
establish an entitlement to a statement
of account, as claimed, the plaintiff had to prove either (i) that
the defendant had been
obliged in terms of a relevant fiduciary duty
to account the companies in the manner sought, or (ii) that the
defendant was contractually
bound to the companies to render such an
account, or (iii) that there was a statutory obligation on the
defendant to render the
account.’ and referred to the matters
of Absa Bank Bpk v Janse Van Rensburg
2002 (3) SA 701
(SCA) at para
15; Maitland Cattle Dealers (Pty) Ltd v Lyons
1943 WLD 1
at p. 19
(per Millin J).
[69]
He then stated that: ‘No magic attaches to the expression
‘fiduciary duty’.
The existence of a fiduciary duty, and
its nature and extent, are questions of fact to be adduced from a
thorough consideration
of the substance of the applicable
relationship and any relevant circumstances which affect the
operation of that relationship.
Furthermore, the existence of a
fiduciary relationship can be an incident of a contract - agency
affords a typical example –
and thus there is scope for an
overlap between categories (i) and (ii) aforementioned. The terms of
a contract may therefore create
and define the nature and extent of a
fiduciary relationship or duty, including the extent of any attendant
duty to account. In
the current matter the plaintiff relied on the
contractual relationship between the companies and the defendant –
broadly
characterised by it during the trial as one of agency, or of
‘trust’ – as the basis for the alleged duty on the
defendant to provide an improved accounting. The focus was therefore
on the identification of the applicable contract(s) and the
pertinent
terms thereof.”
[70]
The applicant and 1
st
respondent’s relationship were
also an incidence of a contract and that in this case categories (i)
and (ii) will overlap
and that the terms of the contract may
therefore create and define the nature and extent of the fiduciary
relationship and or duty.
[71]
At paragraph 60 of the same judgment he also dealt with the issue of
‘agent and agency’
and I quote: ‘The defendant’s
counsel emphasised the distinction between the loose sense in which
the word ‘agent’
is often employed and its connotation in
law. They supported their submissions in this respect with the
following quotations from
De Villiers & Mackintosh The Law of
Agency in South Africa 3 rd ed., which are apposite: ‘[An agent
is] a person who
has authority to act for and on behalf of another
(called the principal) in contracting legal relations with third
parties; the
agent represents the principal and creates, alters, or
discharges legal obligations of a contractual nature between the
latter
and third parties.’ and ‘The specific
characteristic of agency in the legal sense is the authority
conferred on the
agent to make binding contracts on behalf of his
principal. An agent is sometimes defined as one who has authority to
act for another,
but while such a definition may describe persons who
do not possess the distinguishing characteristic referred to and are
nevertheless
popularly termed ‘agents’ (such as, for
example, the ‘estate’ or ‘house agent’), it
is for
legal purposes inexact. A person who has authority to act for
another cannot be regarded in law as an agent unless that authority
covers the creation of contractual obligations between his principal
and the third party. To the extent to which an ‘agent’
is
required to perform non-juristic acts (i.e. acts which do not have
the effect of bringing his principal into legal relations
with third
parties), he ceases to be an agent and becomes a servant or
independent contractor… From this point of view an
agent may
be defined as a servant or independent contractor who brings his
principal into binding legal relations with third parties.
His
capacity as agent exists in law only for the time during which he is
representing his principal in the formation of contractual
obligations with third parties.’
[72]
Despite the 2
nd
respondent not taking issue with the
applicant’s allegation that the 1
st
respondent was
its agent, there is not much in the founding affidavit which tends to
support the notion that the relationship between
the applicant and
1
st
respondent was indeed one of principal and agent as
the existence, The scope of the 1
st
respondents mandate
was not fully canvassed in the founding affidavit and the agreement
itself contains clauses which impacts on
the principal agent
relationship which the applicant has not dealt with in its founding
affidavit. In the 1
st
paragraph of the agreement the 1
st
respondent is identified as and independent contractor, which seems
to suggest a purely contractual relationship.
[73]
The facts and evidence placed before this Court with regard to the
issue of agency and accounting
demand that this matter be referred to
trail alongside the issue of the breach to trail so that the issues
can be properly thrashed
out in pleadings and the different phases
leading up to the trail.
COSTS
[74]
Costs is best reserved to be dealt with at trail.
WHEREFORE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.
Prayers 7, 8, 9 and 10 pertaining to the
issues of breach of contract and damages and the rendering of an
account, statement and
debatement and disgorgement of profit are
referred to trail.
2.
The applicants Notice of Motion shall stand
as a simple summons and the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents notice of intention to oppose stands as a notice of
intention to defend. The applicant is ordered to file its declaration
within 30 days of this order, and thereafter the normal times for
filing of all subsequent pleadings and notices will apply as
per the
Rules of Court.
3.
Costs reserved.
______________________
J
M BEZUIDENHOUT AJ
Acting
Judge of the High Court
APPEARANCES:
DATE
OF HEARING
: 21 October 2021
DATE
OF JUDGMENT
: 07 March 2022
APPLICANT’S
REPRESENTATIVE
: Adv LM Spiller
APPLICANT’S
ATTORNEY
: Witz Inc
1
st
and 2
nd
RESPONDENTS REPRESENTATIVE
: Adv HP van Nieuwenhuyzen
1
st
and 2
nd
RESPONDENTS ATTORNEY
: Eugene Marias Attorneys
[1]
It
needs be noted that the applicant did not plead that the 1
st
respondent terminated any agreements at this stage. It is only at
par 71 that the applicant attaches annexure FA 10 to quantify
its
damages where cancellation dates appear in the schedule, but the 1
st
and 2
nd
respondents indicated that they took issue with par 71. From the
schedule it is evident the 3
rd
respondent cancelled 11 of its 14 agreements with the applicant in
August 2019.
[2]
FA
par 25.2 p 001-16
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