Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 211South Africa
PUTCO (Pty) Limited v MEC for Roads and Transport, Gauteng and Others; Trustees for the Time Being of the Bus Industry Restructuring Fund and Another v Gauteng Department of Roads and Transport and Others (49674/2021; 51091/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 211 (11 April 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
11 April 2022
Judgment
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## PUTCO (Pty) Limited v MEC for Roads and Transport, Gauteng and Others; Trustees for the Time Being of the Bus Industry Restructuring Fund and Another v Gauteng Department of Roads and Transport and Others (49674/2021; 51091/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 211 (11 April 2022)
PUTCO (Pty) Limited v MEC for Roads and Transport, Gauteng and Others; Trustees for the Time Being of the Bus Industry Restructuring Fund and Another v Gauteng Department of Roads and Transport and Others (49674/2021; 51091/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 211 (11 April 2022)
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sino date 11 April 2022
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number:
49674/2021
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED.
NO
4/11/2022
In the matter between:
PUTCO
(PTY)
LIMITED
Applicant
And,
MEC
FOR ROADS AND TRANSPORT, GAUTENG
First Respondent
THE
MINISTER OF TRANSPORT
Second Respondent
AND
FORTY-ONE
OTHERS
Third to Forty- Third Respondents
Case
Number
: 51091/2021
In the matter between:
TRUSTEES
FOR THE TIME BEING
OF
First Respondent
THE BUS INDUSTRY
RESTRUCTURING FUND
SOUTHERN
AFRICAN BUS OPERATORS
Second Respondent
ASSOCIATION
And,
GAUTENG
DEPARTMENT OF ROADS AND TRANSPORT
First Respondent
NATIONAL
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
Second Respondent
MINISTER
OF
TRANSPORT
Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
FISHER J
Introduction
[1]
This is a combined
judgment dealing with two related cases both of which relate
to
contracting and regulation within the commuter bus industry.
Specifically, the applications relate to the MEC’s decision
to
put out to tender, on behalf of the Gauteng Provincial Government,
the supply of road based subsidised public commuter services
for
Gauteng in respect of Soweto, Hammanskraal,
Tembisa/Tsakane/Vosloorus, Soshanguve, Mabopane/Garankuwa, Sebokeng,
Orange Farm/Lenasia
and Atteridgeville/Mamelodi.
[2]
The first
application (‘the PUTCO application’) was brought by
PUTCO, who is the incumbent service provider, against the Department.
In terms of this application Putco seeks:
·
the review and setting aside of
the tender under the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 ("PAJA") and/or on the
ground of illegality;
·
alternatively, an interdict preventing
the MEC from pursuing the
tender any further; and
·
a declaratory order, inter alia,
to the effect that the MEC is not
permitted to put an opportunity to conclude subsidised service
contracts out to tender in terms
of section 42 of the National Land
Transport Act 5 of 2009 ("NLTA") until and unless there are
valid and compliant transport
plans and integrated public transport
networks, as defined in the NLTA, in place for the relevant areas.
[3]
The second of the
applications (‘the SABOA application’) was brought
by the
Trustees of the Bus Industry Restructuring Fund (the Fund) and the
Southern African Bus Operators Association (SABOA). These
applicants
are role players which represent the interests of unionised Labour in
the industry. They also seek the review and setting
aside of the
tender and align themselves with the causes of action raised by
Putco.
[4]
The MEC denies that
the tender is unlawful. He has also brought a counter-application
which spans both the Putco and SABOA applications. It is a
self-review by the MEC aimed at setting aside an agreement which was
concluded more than 20 years ago between Government and industry roll
players, including Putco and SABOA. This agreement which
has become
known in the industry as the Tripartite Agreement (‘TA’)
has formed an integral part of the regulatory and
contractual
environment in which the Government subsidised commuter bus industry
in South Africa operates and it is implicated
by the tender.
[5]
By agreement between
all parties the applications are dealt with together by
special
allocation, although they are not formally consolidated.
[6]
I
move to deal with the procedural background which has led to this
joint special hearing.
Procedural
background
[7]
Putco
is the incumbent service provider for the services covered by the
tender and has been for decades.
[8]
In
order to put the tender out in the form required by the MEC it was
necessary first to obtain the concurrence of the Minister.
This is
because of there are prescribed requirements and model tender
documents developed under the NLTA in consultation with the
Minister
which apply universally to subsidised service contracts unless the
Minister agrees that an authority such as the MEC may
deviate from
the requirements in a specific case; and unless the deviation from
the model is agreed to in writing by the Minister.
[1]
[9]
The
MEC sought what he contends is the requisite approval for the
deviations in the proposed tender. The approval was purportedly
granted by the Minister.
[10]
The tender was
subsequently advertised during October 2021.
[11]
Putco and the applicants in the SABOA
applications launched their related applications simultaneously
during October 2021. The two applications are based on the same
factual complex and are similar in form. Each has been brought
in two
parts: a Part A which sought urgently to interdict the tender process
pending the determination of a review thereof and
a Part B which
sought the review of the tender and remedial relief.
[12]
Part A of the applications were heard
together as a matter of urgency before Mudau J who dismissed
this
part of the applications.
[13]
On 18 January 2022, the Deputy Judge
President (DJP) issued directives relating to conduct of
Part B of
the applications. Essentially the DJP set time limits for the filing
of the record of the impugned decisions in terms
of rule 53 and
further affidavits and allocated the cases for a special hearing of
the review applications. The MEC and the Minister
are the State
respondents in the matters; the individual tenderers have been joined
in the proceedings and the labour unions representing
implicated
employees in the industry are also part of the proceedings. Only one
of the tenderers, Litsamaiso (Pty) Ltd made submissions.
Such
submissions which were, in essence, an alignment with the case of the
MEC.
[14]
The applicants, having been
unsuccessful at interdicting the tender pending the review, continued
pursuing the tender process including receiving bids. But it has now
emerged that there has been contention in the ranks of the
State
respondents for some time.
[15]
On 1 February 2022, approximately a
month before the hearing of the review, the State Attorney,
wrote to
the attorneys for Putco, Bowman Gilfillan and for BIRF, and SABOA,
Werksmans for the purposes of proposing a settlement
which included
the removal of the matter from the roll on the basis that the tender
process would be put ‘on hold’.
The State Attorney –
on behalf of the MEC, referred to a ‘written communique’
from the Minister indicating that
‘he has withdrawn his
concurrence to advertise [the Tender].’
[16]
The State Attorney indicated that in
consequence the MEC undertook not to take any further steps
pertaining to the tender. It contended that the application had
therefore ‘become moot’ and should be removed from
the
roll. The suggestion appears to be that the tender process would be
halted indefinitely although this is not made clear.
[17]
The applicants deny that the MEC’s
undertaking to place the evaluation of bids on hold
renders the
reviews moot. They argue that the tender could be reinstated at any
time. The applicants are correct; even with the
MEC’s
indefinite undertaking, the tender document remains published, and
the tender process remains live albeit suspended.
[18]
The applicants contend that they
remain entitled to a final determination of the issues raised
in the
review applications.
[19]
The Minister's stated approach is
essentially that more planning needs to be done to ensure
that
contracts concluded pursuant to a tender process are sustainable from
a transport-planning and funding perspective. The Minister
in his
letter to the MEC refers to ‘ongoing discussions between the
[National] Department and the National Treasury’
that aim to
‘create a uniform national approach that gives effect to public
transport policy, while maximizing value to the
taxpayer. The
Minister says he requires more time to engage with National Treasury
and the Auditor-General in order to come up
with ‘a new
dispensation, underpinned by a sustainable public transport funding
model.’
[20]
It cannot be disputed by the MEC
that the purpose of his authority to put subsidised bus
routes out to
tender is inextricably linked to proper planning and sustainable
funding models.
[21]
Messrs Franklin SC and Ngubetobi SC
for Putco argue, correctly, that the Minister's letter is
a clear
indication that a sustainable funding and policy foundation is not in
place for the tender. The MEC does not dispute this.
[22]
It is thus argued on behalf of Putco
that it is irrational and unlawful for the MEC to continue
with the
tender in the circumstances. Mr Fourie SC on behalf of SABOA and the
Fund agrees.
[23]
Putco, SABOA and the Fund thus
demanded a withdrawal of the tender as opposed to the putting
on hold
of its evaluation.
[24]
The Minster has made no submissions.
Although he entered appearance to oppose Part B, he abided
the
Court’s decision in Part A.
[25]
The MEC argues that he cannot lawfully
withdraw the tender.
[26]
Obviously, the ex
post facto withdrawal of the Minister’s consent to the tender
is central to this matter and must be key
to a proper determination
of this matter.
[27]
In order to
properly understand the significance of the Minister’s
assertion that more planning is needed – both structurally
and
financially, it is helpful to understand the background to the
present legislative and contractual scheme which is operating
in the
commuter bus industry.
[28]
I move to
deal with how constitutional imperatives as to procurement have been
managed in the industry over the decades since the
achievement of
democracy.
The
legislative and contractual framework post 1994
[29]
Prior to the advent of South Africa's
democratic dispensation, the government provided subsidised
bus
transport to the public through life-long or ‘evergreen’
permits to select bus companies for the provision of these
services.
Putco was one such company.
[30]
The democratic administration adopted
a new policy direction requiring that all subsidised bus
contracts
ultimately be awarded through a competitive tender system.
[31]
As part of this process, incumbent
operators agreed to forgo their evergreen permits in return
for
temporary or Interim Contracts and the promise of competitive tender
processes in each province. Government recognised that
the life-long
permits could not simply be withdrawn or terminated. Accordingly, the
Interim Contracts were introduced and put in
place, as a bridging
mechanism between the evergreen permit system and the tendered
contract system.
[32]
Between 1998 and 2000, a number of
provinces successfully ran competitive tender processes and
awarded
new contracts replacing Interim Contracts. In the remaining areas,
such as Gauteng, the Interim Contracts have remained
in place.
[33]
During the late 1990’s and given
the serious labour implications that the transition from
the Interim
Contracts system to the competitive tender system would have in the
industry, an extensive consultation process was
entered into by
Government, Labour, and the bus companies. The result was the TA
which was concluded in 1999.
[34]
The TA was negotiated, drafted and
concluded between the then Minister of Transport (representing
the
nine provinces), SABOA representing employers within the passenger
transport industry and various labour unions representing
interested
employees in the industry.
[35]
The TA records the terms upon which
the parties agreed to undertake the process of replacing
the Interim
Contracts with new tendered contracts. Key terms for the purposes of
these applications were:
·
The TA included a right of first
refusal for incumbent operators and
this right was recognised and incorporated in the Interim Contracts
with such incumbents including
those with Putco now in issue.
·
The TA required that any
future tender process to replace the
Interim Contracts would include provisions limiting sub-contracting
and imposing levies on
successful tender bidders.
[36]
Pursuant to the conclusion of the TA,
the Fund was established as a Trust, inter alia, to assist
bus
operators financially with the payment of retrenchment and severance
payments to employees who are to be retrenched at the
end of the
Interim Contracts.
[37]
During 2006, the interested
trade unions sought to institute further negotiations to amend
the
terms of the TA to consider new developments. These negotiations were
ultimately unsuccessful and the parties agreed to retain
the TA in
its current form. Importantly, there was no suggestion at these
meetings by the Department that the TA was not binding.
[38]
Accordingly, the majority of the
Gauteng Interim Contracts, all with Putco, remained in
force, being
renewed from time to time by Government (and particularly, the
Minister acting on behalf of, inter alia, Gauteng province)
and the
bus operators. These relationships were ultimately governed by the
TA.
[39]
There are approximately thirty Interim
Contracts that remain in force throughout South Africa.
The stated
purpose of the Interim Contracts is to allow for an orderly and
staged transition to a competitive tender bidding process
and system.
The applicants allege that such a process is required for, inter
alia, the protection and preservation of thousands
of jobs within the
bus transportation industry.
[40]
Eight of the thirty Interim
Contracts are currently in force and operative within Gauteng
province. These eight Interim Contracts account for over 80% of all
buses operational on Gauteng roads, and cover the transportation
of
over 200 000 commuters a day.
[41]
These eight Interim Contracts are
sought to be replaced through the impugned tender.
[42]
The eight Interim Contracts currently
operative in Gauteng, have, since 1998 and the conclusion
of the TA,
been periodically extended by agreement between the relevant bus
operators and government, the latter being represented
by the
Minister.
[43]
One of the most recent extensions of
an Interim Contract has occurred as recently as 2020, where
an
extension of the Interim Contract in question was agreed to by the
relevant negotiating parties, to be extended for a further
three year
period, until 2023.
[44]
As I have said, under the TA,
these Interim Contracts expressly include a right of first
refusal in
respect of the first round of tendering for the incumbent service
providers. This right of first refusal, which has
been included and
detailed in all eight Gauteng Interim Contracts, provides for the
termination of Interim Contracts by Government
on no less than three
months' notice and thereafter, provides the previous Interim Contract
bus operator(s) a preferential opportunity
to obtain the new first
Tendered Contracts.
[45]
This history having been sketched, I
now move to deal with the reviews in both applications.
The
applicants’ reviews
[46]
Central to the
reviews in both applications is the complaint that the MEC’s
decision to put the eight bus contracts out to
tender is unlawful
because it ignores the provincial Department's statutory and
contractual obligations.
[47]
Putco raises
six grounds of review:
·
First,
that the City of Johannesburg has not yet implemented integrated
public transport networks; and the MEC is not permitted
to put an
opportunity to conclude a subsidised service contract out to tender
in terms of section 42
[2]
of the
NLTA unless there are current integrated transport plans and
integrated public transport networks in place for the relevant
areas;
·
Second, that integrated transport plans are not in
place for all the municipal areas that are covered by the tender;
·
Third, the tender does not include Putco's right
of first refusal granted to it under extant contracts with the
Department;
·
Fourth, the tender document breaches the TA;
·
Fifth, the Department's decision to put the
contracts out to tender was procedurally unfair;
·
Sixth, a work-spread model included in the tender
document is unlawful and irrational.
[48]
The applicants in the SABOA
application argue that a tender process without recognition and
incorporation of the terms of the TA leaves the bus industry —
and particularly its labour force — vulnerable and unprepared
for the dramatic impact of the termination of the Interim Contracts.
They argue that the tender process is reviewable on this basis.
[49]
The applicants argue that the impugned
tender process will give rise to the very harm that government,
unions and the bus industry sought to avoid through the conclusion of
the TA.
[50]
Thus, foundational to both
applications are complaints about lack of planning and a tender
process which fails to take into account an entrenched legislative
and contractual scheme which has been implemented for decades.
[51]
A report published by City of
Johannesburg (COJ) in October 2020 in relation to the review
of and
redevelopment of an Integrated Public Transport Network (IPTN) for
the greater Johannesburg area forms part of the rule
53 record. The
report espouses a phased implementation plan which has as its objects
to:
·
‘Develop a transport model
that is appropriate for evaluating
IPTN design alternatives.
·
Use the transport model to evaluate
various IPTN options.
· Propose
a framework for measuring
IPTN sustainability, which transcends basic
financial metrics.
·
Propose a sustainable IPTN for
the City of Johannesburg.
·
Provide a phased implementation
plan for the period up to 2025.’
[52]
It emerges from the report that the
plan is ambitious and that much still needs to be done by
the COJ to
plan the IPTN.
[53]
A further document forming part of the
record is a 25 Year Integrated Transport Master Plan
for Gauteng
province. This Master Plan is dated November 2020. In it detailed
proposals for transport industry, including bus transport
is
diligently set out. An important part of the report is the Financing
Plan espoused therein. It emerges from the Master Plan
that funding
requirements fall woefully short of requirements in the system
envisaged.
[54]
The Minster’s protestations to
the MEC that he needs more time to engage with National
Treasury must
be seen in the context of the proposed planning in Gauteng and taken
seriously.
[55]
It appears generally that a lack
of governmental planning as to the integration of transport
networks
has formed a basis in these proceedings for complaints as to
non-compliance with the contractual and legislative scheme
which is
presently in force.
[56]
The terms of the TA are not in dispute
and neither is it in dispute that the applicants have
vested rights
arising out of the TA. It is common cause that the impugned tender
process has failed to take account of these rights.
[57]
Thus the only approach open to the MEC
in the context of the complaints relating to the failure
to comply
with the TA is to attempt set aside the TA. Hence the counterclaim.
[58]
Whilst there may or may not be merit
in the MEC’s claim that the TA is unconstitutional,
the
challenge to the validity of the TA is patently reactive.
[59]
In
Tasima
, Khampepe J, writing
for the majority, cautioned that an organ of state will only be
permitted to rely on a reactive challenge
to escape the effects of
its own decision if ‘its reasons for doing so are sound, and
there is no unwarranted delay.’
[60]
The delay on any version is
unprecedented. The reasons for the self-review in the context of
these applications are questionable and expedient. Furthermore, the
MEC does not respond to allegation that nothing in the Rule
53 record
shows that the MEC considered the TA when it decided to embark on the
tender process and when it decided the terms and
parameters of the
tender. This in itself may be a ground for review.
[61]
The Minister’s concession that
more planning is needed and the consequent withdrawal of
his approval
for the tender has brought about a something of a sea-change in the
applications.
I turn to examine the implications
of this concession and withdrawal on the relief sought in the
applications.
What is the
implication of the Minister’s withdrawal of consent?
[62]
The MEC has agreed
to the Minister’s request that the tender be put on hold
indefinitely. He contends however that he is not
at liberty to
withdraw the tender. His argument is essentially that the tender was
validly put out with the necessary approval
and the Minister is not
legally entitled to simply withdraw his consent.
[63]
The
MEC argues that the only solution is for the Minister to self-review
his earlier decision to give the written consent. Failing
this
decision being set aside argues the MEC, the Minister’s
approval of the tender stands on the basis of the
Oudekraal
[3]
principle.
[64]
The argument
then devolves into a semantic standoff - the applicants argue that
the Minister has taken a decision to withdraw the
consent. That
decision, argue the applicants, stands until it is set aside. The MEC
in response questions whether the Minister
is empowered to withdraw
the consent.
[65]
But these
administrative contortions are a distraction from the real issue. It
seems that there is general agreement between the
MEC and the
Minister to the effect that there needs to be further planning of a
structural and financial nature before a valid
tender process can
ensue. The Ministers approach entails a concession that the
Minister’s consent, which was purportedly
provided under
section 42(6), was ill considered.
[66]
Rationally, this
further planning is likely to engage at least some of the issues in
the application. Thus, the tender being ‘on
hold’ as
opposed to at an end, will create a tangled backdrop to such further
planning which is currently underway at a high
level and is, on the
Minister’s assertion, to be treated as a priority.
[67]
It is, to my mind,
entirely unhelpful and unnecessary for these issues of
constitutionality to be determined now. Were this to Court
make
findings as to the validity or otherwise of contracts which form the
basis for historical planning this would, to my mind,
adversely
affect the process.
[68]
However, it is
clearly in the interests of all the parties that clarity be obtained
on the process which now stands inchoate and
subject to the further
review of one or another of the Minister’s decisions. As I have
said the Minister did not oppose an
interim order pending the review
and made no submissions in relation to the final relief.
[69]
It seems that,
whilst the MEC must make a show of espousing the constitutionality of
the tender process, he has his own doubts.
Given the policy -centric
and planning-dependant environment in which the tender is to be
evaluated, a proper process cannot be
run without the Minister’s
buy-in and proceeding with the tender in the circumstances is an
exercise in futility.
[70]
I thus move to a
discussion of the appropriate relief.
Discussion
[71]
It appears that the
MEC has made clear that he feels himself caught in an administrative
quagmire. Having shot the bolt of what
seems, on reflection, to have
been an ill-advised tender process he has taken the view that he is
not able to reverse it without
controversy. The Minister appears to
acknowledge that he mistakenly gave his consent in the first place.
[72]
As Ms Nkosi-Thomas
SC for the MEC has put it – the MEC is bound to follow the
course which has been set ‘unless he is
interdicted by this
Court’.
[73]
I thus move on to a
consideration of the interdictory relief sought by Putco.
Interdictory relief
[74]
This relief was
introduced by Putco by the amendment of its notice of motion
following the disclosure that the Minister no longer
lent his support
to the tender process.
[75]
The applicants in
the SABOA application also support such relief.
[76]
The applicants have
a clear right to just administrative action. The harm that will
befall the applicants as key industry players
and representatives is
clear. If this inchoate tender process which is not supported by
National Government is allowed to proceed
to its inevitable fate of
not being capable of financial and structural realisation –
many years of litigation are likely
to follow with the attendant
expense and frustration and inability to properly conduct business
which comes with such litigation.
[77]
The
applicants’ right to just administrative action is frustrated
by the continuation of the tender process in the circumstances.
[78]
To my mind, the
review relief is not, in the circumstances of this case, the
appropriate remedy and Putco has made out a case for
an interdict.
[79]
Putco seeks, further relief in the
form of a declarator. I move to deal with this relief.
Declaratory relief
[80]
It is sought that I
declare that the National and Provincial Departments are not
permitted to put an opportunity to conclude a subsidised
service
contract out to tender in terms of
section 42
of the
National Land
Transport Act unless
and until there are current integrated transport
plans and integrated public transport networks in place for the
relevant areas.
[81]
Mr Franklin
argues that the declaratory relief would bring certainty to this
question, which would be beneficial for Putco and others
in a similar
position.
[82]
To
my mind, I do not have jurisdiction under
section 21(c)
[4]
of the Superior Courts Act
[5]
to
grant the declaratory relief sought. It is not the function of this
Court to act in a consulting or advisory function.
[83]
However, even if I
am wrong and I do have such jurisdiction, I would not exercise my
discretion in favour of making such a declaration.
[84]
Such a declaration
could serve to constrain the further exercise of the Minister, MEC
and Treasury as to the carrying out of their
respective
administrative functions and this would be unfortunate.
[85]
The fact that
National Treasury has not been joined in the application for such
relief is to my mind also a fatal impediment to
the seeking of such
relief.
Conclusion
[86]
The case
changed dramatically with the Minister’s withdrawal of his
consent to the tender process. The MEC was left with a
process which
was, on the expressed attitude of the Minster alone, assailable.
[87]
Even if the MEC is
correct that the Minister’s withdrawal stands until set aside –
this does not change the fact that
the tender process is, on any
version, not capable of proper realisation without the approval of
the National Government.
[88]
The review in the
SABOA application is overtaken by the interdict. I understood the
applicants in the SABOA application to align
themselves with Putco’s
amended relief. It is thus appropriate that the interdict be granted
under the rubric of alternative
relief in the SABOA application.
Costs
[89]
The applicants had
no choice but to bring these applications. The MEC, in light of the
ex post facto acknowledgment of unreadiness
and the withdrawal of
approval by National Government, can hardly assert that the impugned
tender process was not ill-considered
in the first place.
[90]
In relation to the
opposition of
Litsamaiso
it is my view that
its level of engagement was not such as to attract an adverse costs
order. Its opposition essentially constituted
an endorsement of the
MEC’s argument and as such, to the extent that any new issues
arose from such opposition, same were
negligible. To my mind it has
not shown that it is entitled to any costs.
[91]
The first and
second respondents should pay the costs of the applicants. The issues
raised were complex. However, I am not persuaded
that the costs of
three counsel should be allowed.
Order
[92]
I make the following orders:
In
case number 49674/21 (Putco application):
1.
The first and second respondents are interdicted from taking
any
further action in the advancement of the impugned tender.
2.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
3.
The first and second defendants are to pay the costs of the
applicants such costs to include the costs of two counsel.
In
case number 51091/21 (SABOA application):
1.
The first and second respondents are interdicted from taking
any
further action in the advancement of the impugned tender.
2.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
3.
The first and second defendants are to pay the costs of the
applicants such costs to include the costs of two counsel.
FISHER
J
HIGH
COURT JUDGE
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Date
of Hearing:
17-18 March 2022.
Judgment
Delivered:
11
April 2022.
APPEARANCES:
In
case number 49674/21 (Putco application):
For
the Applicant
: Adv A
E Franklin SC.
Adv T N Ngcukaitobi SC.
Adv J Mitchell.
Instructed
by
:
Bowmans Gilfillan Inc.
For
the 1
st
Respondent
:
Adv L Nkosi-Thomas SC.
Adv N Ntuli.
Adv T Makola.
Instructed
by
:
The State Attorney.
For
the 43
rd
Respondent
:
Adv M Kgomongwe.
Instructed
by
:
SGA Law Africa Attorneys.
In
case number 51091/21 (SABOA application):
For
the Applicants
: Adv G Fourie SC.
Adv F Hobden.
Adv N Ndlovu.
Instructed
by
:
Werksmans Attorneys.
For
the 1
st
Respondent
:
Adv L Nkosi-Thomas SC.
Adv N Ntuli.
Adv T Makola.
Instructed
by
:
The State Attorney.
[1]
Section
42(6).
[2]
Section 42 reads as follows:
‘
42.
Subsidised service contracts.—
(1)
The contracting authorities must take steps within the prescribed
period and in the prescribed manner before expiry of contracts
contemplated in subsection (2) (a), (b) or (c) to put arrangements
in place for the services to be put out to tender so that
the
services can continue without interruption.
(2)
If after expiry of-
(a)
a negotiated contract concluded under section 41;
(b)
a subsidised service contract concluded under this section; or
(c)
a negotiated contract, interim contract, current tendered contract
or subsidised service contract concluded in terms of the
Transition
Act, or any extension thereof, the relevant services may continue to
be subsidised, this must be done in terms of
a subsidised service
contract concluded in terms of this section.
(3)
Where a contract referred to in subsection (2) (a), (b) or (c) has
expired and no arrangements have been put in place to put
the
services out to tender, or such arrangements are unsatisfactory or
inadequate in the Minister's opinion, the Minister must
forthwith
enter into negotiations with the contracting authorities, the
National Treasury and the Auditor-General with a view
to ensuring
compliance with this Act and legislation on financial and
procurement issues.
(4)
Only a contracting authority may enter into a subsidised service
contract with an operator, and only if the services to be
operated
in terms thereof, have been put out to public tendering and awarded
by the entering into of a contract in accordance
with prescribed
procedures in accordance with other applicable national or
provincial laws.
(5)
The validity period of a subsidised service contract must not exceed
seven years.
(6)
The Minister may, in consultation with the MECs—
(a)
prescribe requirements for tender and contract documents to be used
for subsidised service contracts which must be binding
on
contracting authorties, unless the Minister agrees that an authority
may deviate from the requirements in a specific case;
and
(b)
provide model tender and contract documents, and publish them in the
Gazette, for subsidised service contracts as a requirement
for
contracting authorities, who may not deviate from the model tender
and contract documents, unless this is agreed to in writing
by the
Minister, but those documents may differ for different authorities
or situations.
(7)
The model tender and contract documents published in terms of the
Transition Act shall cease to apply as from the date of
commencement
of this Act.
[3]
It is a principle of law that , subject to the effect of permissible
collateral challenges, administrative decisions stand to
be
recognised as valid unless and until they are set aside on judicial
review; see Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City ofCape
Town and
Others
2004 (6) SA 222
(SCA), especially at para 26- 27.
[4]
Section
21(1) reads as follows in relevant part:
’
Persons over whom and
matters in relation to which Divisions have jurisdiction
(1)
A
Division … has the power-
(a) …;
(b) …;
(c) in
its discretion, and at the instance of any interested person, to
enquire into and determine any existing,
future or contingent right
or obligation, notwithstanding that such person cannot claim any
relief consequential upon the determination.
[5]
Act 10 0f 2013.
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