Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 554South Africa
ABSA Bank Limited v Mahlaba & Others (3321/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 554 (16 August 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
16 August 2022
Headnotes
Summary: Opposed PIE Act eviction application – factual dispute relating to grounds of opposition – respondent’s version rejected as far-fetched – application for the eviction from primary residence granted.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## ABSA Bank Limited v Mahlaba & Others (3321/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 554 (16 August 2022)
ABSA Bank Limited v Mahlaba & Others (3321/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 554 (16 August 2022)
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sino date 16 August 2022
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO
:
3321/2021
DATE
:
16
th
august 2022
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
NO
REVISED:
In the matter between:
ABSA
BANK LIMITED
Applicant
And
MAHLABA
,
FRANS
SIPHO
First Respondent
ALL PERSONS RESIDING
AT THE PROPERTY
UNDER THE CONTROL AND
AUTHORITY OF
THE
FIRST
RESPONDENT
Second Respondent
CITY OF JOHANNESBURG
METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
Third Respondent
Coram:
Adams J
Heard
:
15 August 2022
Delivered:
16 August 2022
Summary:
Opposed PIE Act eviction application –
factual dispute relating to grounds of opposition –
respondent’s version rejected as far-fetched –
application
for the eviction from primary residence granted.
ORDER
(1)
The first and second respondents and all
other occupiers of the applicant's property, being Erf [....], W
[....] Township, Gauteng
Province, situate at [....] A [....] P
[....] Road, W [....] (‘the applicant’s property’),
be and are hereby
evicted from the said property.
(2)
The first and second respondents and all
other occupiers of the premises shall vacate the applicant’s
property on or before
the 30
th
of September 2022.
(3)
In the event that the respondents and the
other occupiers of the premises not vacating the applicant’s
property on or before
the 30
th
of September 2022, the Sheriff of this Court or his lawfully
appointed deputy be and is hereby authorized and directed to
forthwith
evict the respondents and all other occupiers from the said
property.
(4)
The first and second respondents, jointly
and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, shall pay the
applicant’s
cost of this application.
JUDGMENT
Adams J:
[1].
In this
opposed application, the applicant, who is the owner of Erf [....], W
[....] Township, Registration Division JR, Gauteng
Province, situate
at [....] A [....] P [....] Road, W [....] (‘the
applicant’s property’ or ‘the property’),
applies for an order evicting from the said property the first and
second respondents, whom they allege are unlawful occupiers
of same.
[2].
The applicant
became the registered owner of the property on 31 July 2018, after
having purchased same at a sale in execution on
19 September 2017,
pursuant to a foreclosure order against the previous owner of the
said property in favour of the applicant on
20 February 2017. The
applicant was the bondholder over the property and, in effect,
purchased the property pursuant to a judgment
it obtained against the
previous owner. All the same, it is not disputed that, at all
relevant times, the applicant owned the property.
Prior to the
property being registered in the name of the applicant, the previous
owner had sold during 2007 the property to the
first respondent, who
bizarrely had paid the purchase price before the property had been
registered into his name. In the end,
it appears that the first
respondent had been defrauded in that he parted with the purchase
price and never received, in return,
ownership of the property.
[3].
The first and
second respondents oppose the application on the basis of an
agreement allegedly concluded between the first respondent
and the
applicant during January 2019. In terms of this agreement, so the
first respondent alleges, it was ‘resolved’
and agreed
that the applicant would reimburse him for certain improvements he
effected to the property after he and his family
took occupation
during 2007. In terms of this agreement, they were only required, so
the respondents aver, to vacate the property
two months after they
had been compensated for the improvements to the property. This
agreement, according to the respondents,
was subsequently confirmed
at a meeting with the applicant’s attorneys during December
2019,
[4].
This agreement
is denied by the applicant, who confirms that certain discussions
took place between the parties with a view to resolving
the issues
between them. However, so the applicant contends, those were only
discussions, which did not result in any final agreement
being
concluded.
[5].
The first
respondent contends that his version is corroborated by the
correspondence exchanged at the relevant time between the
legal
representatives and the surrounding circumstances. In that regard,
the respondents rely heavily of a communiqué addressed
on 11
December 2019 to his attorney by the applicant’s attorneys,
which, according to the first respondent, confirms the
terms of the
settlement. This is however not born out by the contents of the said
communication, which reads as follows: -
‘
Further
to our meeting at my office on 11 December 2019, I confirm:
1.
Your client
has agreed that my client’s valuator can inspect the property
to establish the condition of improvements.
2.
Once my client
is in possession of the valuator’s report they will consider
paying your client the invoices that are relevant
to the improvements
for the relevant period.
3.
Should there
be any dispute regarding the invoices, we will endeavour to resolve
this directly and depending on the amount in dispute.
4.
Once my client
has paid your client, he and everyone who occupies the property under
or through him will vacate the property within
two months after the
payment has been effected to his account.’
[6].
As correctly
submitted by Adv Maxwell, who appeared on behalf of the applicant,
the contents of this correspondence do not confirm
that an agreement
had been concluded between the parties, as alleged by the first
respondent. Far from it. In fact, if anything,
and at best for the
respondents, this piece of correspondence confirms nothing more than
an unenforceable ‘agreement to agree’.
[7].
In
any event, the factual dispute between the parties, if indeed there
is one, can and should be decided in favour of the applicant
on the
basis of the principles enunciated in
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Limited
[1]
.
If regard is had to the wording of the above communication, it has to
be said that the version of the first respondent is untenable
–
it can and should be rejected on the papers as far-fetched. The
question is simply this: why would the applicant enter
into an
agreement as vague and uncertain as he one alleged by the first
respondent with more questions than answers.
[8].
The general
rule is that a court will only accept those facts alleged by the
applicant which accord with the respondent's version
of events. The
exceptions to this general rule are that the court may accept the
applicant’s version of the facts where the
respondent's denial
of the applicant's factual allegations does not raise a real,
genuine, or
bona
fide
dispute of fact. Secondly, the court will base its order on the facts
alleged by the applicant when the respondent's version is
so
far-fetched or untenable as to be rejected on the papers.
[9].
It is
necessary to adopt a robust, common-sense approach to a dispute on
motion. If not, the effective functioning of the Court
can be
hamstrung and circumvented by the most simple and blatant stratagem.
A Court should not hesitate to decide an issue of fact
on affidavit
merely because it may be difficult to do so. Justice can be defeated
or seriously impeded and delayed by an over-fastidious
approach to a
dispute raised in affidavits.
[10].
Applying these
principles, I reject the version of the first respondent, as I do the
defence by the first respondent based on the
alleged lien he enjoyed
as a result of the improvements which he effected to the property.
The respondents have, in my view, not
made out a case based on the
lien. No evidence in support of a lien has been presented by the
first respondent.
[11].
Accordingly,
the relief sought by the applicant should be granted.
Costs
[12].
The
general rule in matters of costs is that the successful party should
be given his costs, and this rule should not be departed
from except
where there are good grounds for doing so, such as misconduct on the
part of the successful party or other exceptional
circumstances. See:
Myers
v Abramson
[2]
.
[13].
I can think of no reason why I should
deviate from this general rule.
[14].
I therefore intend awarding costs against
the first and second respondents in favour of the applicant.
Order
[15].
Accordingly, I make the following order: -
(1)
The first and second respondents and all
other occupiers of the applicant's property, being Erf [....],
W [....] Township,
Gauteng Province, situate at [....] A [....] P
[....] Road, W [....] (‘the applicant’s property’),
be and are
hereby evicted from the said property.
(2)
The first and second respondents and all
other occupiers of the premises shall vacate the applicant’s
property on or before
the 30
th
of September 2022.
(3)
In the event that the respondents and the
other occupiers of the premises not vacating the applicant’s
property on or before
the 30
th
of September 2022, the Sheriff of this Court or his lawfully
appointed deputy be and is hereby authorized and directed to
forthwith
evict the respondents and all other occupiers from the said
property.
(4)
The first and second respondents, jointly
and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, shall pay the
applicant’s
cost of this application.
L R ADAMS
Judge of the High
Court of South Africa
Gauteng
Division, Johannesburg
HEARD
ON:
15
th
August 2022
JUDGMENT
DATE:
16
th
August 2022
FOR
THE APPLICANT:
Advocate J K Maxwell
INSTRUCTED
BY:
Alan Jacobs Attorneys, Melrose Arch,
Johannesburg
FOR THE FIRST AND
SECOND RESPONDENTS:
Adv Maputa
INSTRUCTED
BY:
K Montjane Attorneys, Tembisa
FOR
THE THIRD RESPONDENT:
No
Appearance
INSTRUCTED
BY:
No Appearance
[1]
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Limited
1984 (3) SA 623 (A).
[2]
Myers
v Abramson
,
1951(3) SA 438 (C) at 455.
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