Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 685South Africa
ABSA Bank Limited v Lucent Properties 18 CC (13088/2017) [2022] ZAGPJHC 685 (13 September 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
13 September 2022
Headnotes
as follows: “The degree of proof required when an application is made for a final order is higher than that for the grant of a provisional order. In the former case a mere prima facie case need be established wherein the Court before it will grant a final order must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that such a case has been made out by the Applicant seeking confirmation of the provisional order.”
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## ABSA Bank Limited v Lucent Properties 18 CC (13088/2017) [2022] ZAGPJHC 685 (13 September 2022)
ABSA Bank Limited v Lucent Properties 18 CC (13088/2017) [2022] ZAGPJHC 685 (13 September 2022)
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sino date 13 September 2022
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 13088/2017
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED.
13/9/2022
In the matter between:
ABSA
BANK
LIMITED
Applicant
And
LUCENT
PROPERTIES 18
CC
Respondent
(Registration number 2008/217919/23)
JUDGMENT
MAKUME,
J
:
[1]
The Applicant seeks an order placing the Respondent under final
winding up in the
hands of the Master.
[2]
The application was issued in the year 2017 and on receipt thereof
the Respondent
entered appearance to oppose during April 2017 through
its attorneys. Shortly during May 2017 Respondent appointed a second
set
of attorneys replacing the first one.
[3]
The second set of attorneys Messrs Vally-Chagan and Another served a
notice in terms
of Rule 35(12) on the Applicant which was responded
to.
[4]
The application for winding up the Respondent was set down for
hearing on the unopposed
roll for the 8
th
November 2017
due to the Respondent having failed to file its answering affidavit.
[5]
The Respondent challenged the notice of set down alleging that it had
not been given
the statutory period of 15 days to consider the
Applicant’s responses to the Rule 35(12) notice.
[6]
Eventually the Respondent filed its answering affidavit on the 28
th
November 2017 in which it raised the following defences:
6.1 That the
Applicant had failed to serve the application on its employees as
well as at SARS in contravention
of Section 9(4A) of the Insolvency
Act 24 of 1936 (as amended).
6.2 That there are
material disputes of fact which the Applicant ought to have foreseen
and not to proceed by
way of motion proceedings. The Respondent
maintains that the dispute of facts are the following:
6.2.1 The
Applicant’s
locus standi
as a creditor i.e. whether its
claims are
bona fide
disputed on reasonable grounds.
6.2.2 Whether the
amounts were due and payable when the application was issued.
6.2.3 The value of the secured
property.
6.2.4 Whether
liquidation will be to the advantage of creditors.
6.2.5 Whether the
Respondent is unable to pay its debts and actually insolvent.
6.2.6 Whether it is
just and equitable that a winding up order be granted.
6.2.7 Whether the
application is an abuse of court process.
[7]
In the answering affidavit the Respondent admits having obtained
commercial property
finance from the Applicant in the amount of
R10 700 000.00 which amount was used in acquiring two
properties namely Erf
[....] and Erf [....] Wynberg.
[8]
On the 2
nd
March 2020 before Mudau J a settlement
agreement was made an order of court between the parties in which the
following was recorded:
8.1 The Respondent
acknowledged itself to be truly and lawfully indebted to the
Applicant in the sum of R12 330 838.10
plus interest at the
rate of 9.75% to be calculated from 5
th
February 2020 to
date of payment.
8.2 The Respondent
acknowledged that the said amount was due and payable it further
consented to judgment in the
said amount and for an order of
executability in respect of the two properties mentioned in paragraph
7 above.
8.3 In the
settlement agreement the Respondent undertook to pay the agreed
capital amount as follows:
8.3.1 By issuing a
guarantee in the amount of R9 500 000.00 (Nine Million Five
Hundred Thousand Rand) before
20 April 2020.
8.3.2 Payment of the
guaranteed amount on date of transfer of property to be sold into the
Trust Account of Tim
Du Toit & Co. Inc being the Applicant’s
attorneys of record.
8.3.3 In paragraph 9
of the settlement agreement it is stated that “Should the
Respondent fail to effect
payment as set out herein above and or fail
to comply with the conditions set out hereinabove, for any reason
whatsoever the full
outstanding amount will remain due and payable.
The Applicant will be entitled within its full discretion to re-enrol
the Liquidation
application. The Respondent hereby withdraws its
opposition and waives all defences in its answering affidavit. In the
event of
default, the Applicant shall be entitled to re-enrol the
Liquidation application on the unopposed roll within 10 days’
notice
to the Respondent.”
[9]
It is common cause that the Respondent failed to comply with the
terms of the settlement
agreement as a result the Applicant as it was
entitled to re-enrolled the Liquidation application for hearing on
the unopposed
roll. The affidavit seeking such re-enrolment is dated
the 25
th
November 2020.
[10] On
the 6
th
June 2022 a provisional winding up order was
granted placing the Respondent in the hands of the Master. In the
said order the Applicant
was further directed to file an affidavit
within 10 days after the date of that order confirming that it had
complied with Section
197B of the Labour Relations Act 1996 by
providing a copy of the winding up application to the employees of
the Respondent.
[11] It
was further ordered that the copy of the order be served in
accordance with the provisions
of Section 346A of the Company Act
which section provides for service on the Trade Union as well as on
the employees by affixing
on a notice board or at the entrance to the
business premises of the Respondent.
[12] In
his affidavit dated the 12
th
August 2022 the Applicant’s
attorneys a Mr W du Randt says that service of the order on the
employees, the Trade Union, SARS
and the office of the Master was
effected by the Sheriff. He attached the Sheriff’s returns of
service.
[13] On
the 21
st
June 2022 the Respondent filed its second
affidavit opposing the confirmation of the provisional winding up
order granted on the
6
th
June 2022.
[14] In
this second affidavit the Respondent through the mouth of Mr T
Ventouris its sole member now
says the following:
14.1 That the Applicant has
failed to comply with the directive that the provisional order be
served on the Respondent’s
employees accordingly that the
application is defective and should be dismissed.
14.2 That the Applicant’s
attorneys Mr WA Du Randt had no authority to act for the Applicant
when he served the application
during November 2017.
14.3 Mr Ventouris queries the
validity of the return of service marked Annexure A and in respect of
the notice of motion.
14.4 The Sheriff of the Court
failed to ascertain if the employees of the Respondent were
represented by a Trade Union.
14.5 The Respondent says it has ten
(10) employees comprising of two drivers,
one security guard, four ironers and
two packers and a cleaning lady.
14.6 He as the Respondent did
inform his employees about the winding up.
[15]
Other than this technical defence the Respondent has failed to raise
factual dispute in his affidavit
opposing the granting of a final
order of Liquidation. What remains is whether the Applicant has
established on a balance of probabilities
that a final order should
be granted.
[16] In
the matter of
Paarwater V South Sahara Investments (Pty) Ltd
[2005] 4 ALL SA 185
(SCA)
the court held as follows:
“
The degree
of proof required when an application is made for a final order is
higher than that for the grant of a provisional order.
In the former
case a mere prima facie case need be established wherein the Court
before it will grant a final order must be satisfied
on a balance of
probabilities that such a case has been made out by the Applicant
seeking confirmation of the provisional order.”
[17] In
this matter the Respondent admitted liability to the Applicant in the
amount of R12 330 838
.18 together with interest. In the
settlement agreement that was made an order of Court he abandoned all
defences that he had raised
prior to the gravity of the provisional
order. In its second affidavit the Respondent seems to be making a
big issue on the fact
of service of the provisional order on the
employees and the Trade Union.
[18] The
Respondent has failed to identify the employees and where they could
be found to enable the
Sheriff to effect service. In the absence of
any co-operation from him as the employer the Sheriff’s return
remains unchallenged.
The
SCA in the mater of EB Steam Co (Pty)
Ltd v Eskom Holdings Soc Limited
[2015] (2) SA 256
(SCA)
was
faced with a similar defence wherein the Sheriff had served the
application on the employees by affixing same to the front
door of
the registered office of the Respondent’s company. The
Respondent’s company argued that the Section 346 A required
that such services should be by way of affixing on the Notice Board
not the front door.
[19] The
Court held that whilst it is correct that the requirements to furnish
the application to
persons specified in Section 346 (4A) was
peremptory it is so that the methods stipulated in Section 346 (4A)
(a)(ii) for furnishing
the application to employees were merely
directory. To “furnish” the application meant to make
available in a manner
that was reasonably likely to make it
accessible to the named person.
[20] The
Respondent raised new defences challenging the authority of the
Applicant’s attorneys
it also challenged the identity of the
Applicant. He also challenged the mortgage bond itself and says it is
not proof of the Respondent’s
indebted. Mr Ventouris says that
the Respondent’s indebtedness to the Applicant has been
securitised as a result the indebtedness
had been discharged. Lastly
he contends that the Applicant’s certificate of balance does
not establish a
prima facie
case.
[21] All
these new defence are trumped by the settlement agreement which was
made an order of Court
which had not been set aside. In that order
the Respondent not only admitted indebtedness but also abandoned all
defences. When
he signed the settlement agreement he was duly
represented by a law firm and he cannot be heard to say that he was
not told or
advised about his or the Respondent’s rights. He
has not pleaded duress when he signed in fact he has avoided saying
anything
about the settlement agreement.
[22]
There is in my view no merit in the new defences worth considering
and same are rejected. The
parties concluded a compromise agreement
which was made an order of Court. Accordingly, the parties adjusted
their difference by
mutual consent. The Respondent waived whatever
rights it may have had in relation to any dispute and acknowledged
indebtedness
in the amount of R12 330 823.18 which amount
the Respondent is unable to pay.
[23] I
do not deem it necessary to deal with the other issues raised namely
the Rule 7(1) issue, the
identity issue, the mortgage bond issue, the
securitisation issue and lastly the certificate issue as I do not
think they will
affect my final verdict namely that the Respondent is
unable to pay its admitted debt and should then be placed under a
final winding
up order. In the result I make the following order:
ORDER
i)
The
Respondent is hereby placed under final winding up in the hands of
the Master.
ii)
The
costs of this application shall be the costs in the winding up of the
Respondent.
Dated
at Johannesburg on this 14 day of September 2022
M
A MAKUME
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
DATE OF
HEARING
: 26 AUGUST 2022
DATE OF
JUDGMENT
: 13 SEPTEMBER 2022
FOR
APPLICANT
: Adv Horn
INSTRUCTED
BY
: Messrs Tim Du Toit Attorneys
FOR
RESPONDENT
: In person
INSTRUCTED
BY
: Mr T Ventoris (member of Respondent)
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