Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 627South Africa
Unit 15 Rondevoux CC t/a Done Rite Services v Makgabo (A3075/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 627 (1 September 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
1 September 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Unit 15 Rondevoux CC t/a Done Rite Services v Makgabo (A3075/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 627 (1 September 2022)
Unit 15 Rondevoux CC t/a Done Rite Services v Makgabo (A3075/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 627 (1 September 2022)
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sino date 1 September 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
CASE
NUMBER:
A3075/2021
REPORTABLE: NO
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: NO
REVISED.
1 September 2 2022
In
the matter between:
UNIT
15 RONDEVOUX CC t/a DONE RITE SERVICES
Appellant
and
TUMI
MAKGABO
Respondent
CORAM:
WRIGHT J AND WILSON AJ
#####
##### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
WILSON
AJ
:
1
The appellant, “Done Rite”, is a building
contractor. The respondent, Ms. Makgabo, contracted Done Rite to
complete
building work on her home. The work encompassed the
wholesale renovation of two bathrooms, improvements to a garden
cottage and
a carport, the installation of a slider-stacker door and
upgrades to a swimming pool.
2
The contract price for this work was R190 513.38. The
parties agreed that Ms. Makgabo would pay for the work in two
instalments
– 60% upfront, and 40% on completion. Ms. Makgabo
paid the 60% deposit, which amounted to R114 308.03, and the work
commenced.
Ms. Makgabo later ordered further work to be done,
including the installation of a new kitchen floor. The cost of the
additional
work was R37 875.36.
3
The work commenced during March 2014. Done Rite agreed that it
would try to complete it in time for a party to celebrate Ms.
Makgabo’s
fortieth birthday. The party was to take place at Ms.
Makgabo’s home on 12 April. The work was not complete by that
time,
and Done Rite returned to Ms. Makgabo’s property during
the week of 14 April to carry on with it.
4
During that week, Ms. Makgabo says that she left the property
for a short time to get something from a hardware store to assist
with the work. On her return, she discovered that some of her
jewellery had gone missing. Ms. Makgabo immediately suspected Done
Rite’s workers of having stolen it, although it was later
accepted at trial that Done Rite’s workers were not the only
ones on site. Done Rite had engaged subcontractors to work on the
property, and another team of workers had been to the property
at
around that time to fix a ceiling that had been damaged by a burst
geyser.
5
It was never ultimately established who, if anyone, was
responsible for taking Ms. Makgabo’s jewellery. However, after
the
incident, Ms. Makgabo was no longer comfortable with allowing
Done Rite’s workers access to her home. Done Rite left the
property and was not allowed back on to it.
6
Trevor Millar, Done Rite’s owner, took the view that it
was futile to attempt to compel Ms. Makgabo to allow Done Rite back
on to the property to complete the work. He instead asserted the
right to be paid the rest of the contract price the parties had
agreed, less the value of some components of the work that had not
been started. This he reckoned at R97 305.61 over and above
the
deposit Ms. Makgabo had already paid. On 6 June 2014 and for a
fourteen day period only, he offered a 10% “retention”
to
allow Ms. Makgabo to get quotes from other contractors to finish off
components of the work that Done Rite had started, but
had been
unable to complete.
7
Ms Makgabo did not get other quotes. In response, Mr. Millar
demanded R92 440.33, being the balance due on the contract price
less a reduced “retention” of 5%. At trial Mr. Millar
would say that he did this because, in his view, the job at Ms.
Makgobo’s property was “95%” done. This was
reflected in Done Rite’s invoice dated 17 July 2014, which
is
annexed to its particulars of claim. Ms. Makgabo refused to pay the
amount demanded and did not respond to Mr. Millar’s
persistent
requests that she do so.
8
Done Rite then instituted action in the Randburg District
Court. Its particulars of claim allege that the work Ms. Makgabo
contracted
had been completed, and the outstanding contract balance –
R92 440.33 – was now due. It sought judgment for that
amount plus interest and costs.
9
In her plea, Ms. Makgabo denied that the work had been
finished. She furthermore alleged that the work that had been done
was defective.
She purported to cancel her contract with Done Rite,
and reserved her right to sue for damages.
10
After hearing evidence, the trial Magistrate took the view
that the work had not been finished, and that the work that had been
done was not completed in a “workmanlike manner”. He
dismissed Done Rite’s claim in its entirety, with costs.
11
Done Rite now appeals. Mr. Carstens, who appeared for Done
Rite before us, conceded at the outset of his argument that Done
Rite’s
pleaded case – that the contract balance was due
because the work charged for had been finished – was not the
case
being pressed on appeal, and was not the case Done Rite had
pressed at trial.
12
Done Rite in fact accepts – and it accepted at trial –
that the work it charged for on its 17 July 2014 invoice was not
the
balance due on the full value of the work Ms. Makgabo contracted. The
R92 440.33 Done Rite claims was merely the value
of the
unfinished work Done Rite actually did before it was excluded from
the property.
13
Accordingly, the issue in this appeal is whether Done Rite’s
unpleaded claim for the value of its work ought to have succeeded.
That issue boils down to two questions. The first is whether we can
overlook the fact that the claim now pressed was not the claim
made
out in Done Rite’s particulars. The second is whether the
evidence led at trial established that Done Rite was entitled
to the
amount it sought.
The
unpleaded case
14
Neither party outlined the true nature of their dispute in the
pleadings. Done Rite claimed payment on “completion of the
contractual work as agreed” even though it turned out to be
common cause that the work was not completed. Ms. Makgabo pleaded
that “there were various defects in the works which renders the
works incomplete”, even though it was not seriously
disputed at
trial that Ms. Makgabo excluded Done Rite from the property before
the work could be finished. There was also no serious
dispute that
whatever faults Done Rite left behind could have been addressed had
it been allowed back on to the property to do
so.
15
The real dispute in this case is whether Done Rite was
entitled to payment for the work it had done at the time it was
excluded
from the property. When Ms. Makgabo ordered Done Rite off
the property, she repudiated her contract with it. That being so,
Done
Rite had an election: cancel the contract and sue for damages,
or claim specific performance.
16
Done Rite chose to claim specific performance, but its
particulars of claim pleaded a rather confused case. The performance
it alleged
in its particulars – completion of all the work that
it was contracted to do – was not the performance it actually
rendered. Nor was the value of the performance Done Rite claimed in
its particulars actually the value of the completed work. It
was in
fact Done Rite’s reckoning of the value of its work at the
point Done Rite was excluded from Ms. Makgabo’s property.
17
For these reasons, Done Rite’s true claim was left
substantially unpleaded. These difficulties notwithstanding, however,
the
trial court ought in my view to have been alive to, and to have
considered, Done Rite’s unpleaded claim for the value of the
work it did.
18
It is trite that a party will be kept strictly to its
pleadings “where any departure would cause prejudice or would
prevent
full enquiry” (
Robinson v Randfontein Estates GM Co
Ltd
1925 AD 173
at 198). However, where the evidence covers an
unpleaded claim fully, “that is, where there is no reasonable
ground for thinking
that further examination of the facts might lead
to a different conclusion, the Court is entitled to, and generally
should, treat
the issue as if it had been expressly and timeously
raised” (
Middleton v Car
1949 (2) SA 374
(A) at 385).
The Supreme Court of Appeal has recently re-affirmed this approach to
unpleaded issues, albeit while disallowing an
unpleaded claim (see
MJ
K v II K
[2022] ZASCA 116
(28 July 2022) at paragraphs 21 to 23).
19
There could, in this case, have been no real doubt about what
Done Rite’s claim really was on the evidence led at trial.
20
Nor was there any appreciable prejudice to Ms. Makgabo arising
from Done Rite’s failure to plead that claim properly. Ms.
Makgabo faced a claim calculated as the value of the work at the
point Done Rite left her property. She defended the claim not only
on
the basis that the work was unfinished, but also on the basis that
the work was defective. In other words, what was placed in
issue at
trial was not just whether the work was finished, but also the
quality and value of the work actually done.
21
Moreover, Ms. Makgabo was clearly put on notice that the true
nature of Done Rite’s claim was for the value of the work done.
This was adverted to in Done Rite’s counsel’s opening
address at trial. Ms. Makgabo was also led, by her own counsel,
on
the issue of whether she ought to have paid more than 60% of the
contract price for the work done at the point Done Rite left
her
property. She was emphatic that “the work [Done Rite] did do
had been paid for by the 60% deposit”. Whether or
not that is
correct, it demonstrates that Ms. Makgabo and her legal
representatives were alive, at trial, to the possibility of
a
judgment for the value of the unfinished work.
22
In addition, both parties called experts. The experts gave
detailed evidence about the state of the work. It is difficult to see
what further evidence could have been led at trial to illuminate a
claim for the value of the work done.
Should
Done Rite’s claim have succeeded?
23
Stripped to its essence, Done Rite’s claim was really
one of
quantum meruit
. Claims for
quantum meruit
(very
loosely “as much as is warranted”), seek fair and
reasonable remuneration for the value of work actually done
on a
partially fulfilled agreement, where that value has not been fixed in
the contract governing the work. It is for the plaintiff
to prove
both the extent of the work done and its value. A court must be
convinced that the amount of fair and reasonable remuneration
due
“can be sufficiently certainly fixed on the evidence”, or
else no award can be made (
Middleton v Carr
1949 (2) SA 374
(A) at 386).
24
Mr. Carstens staked his case on a schedule introduced as
Exhibit “C” at trial. That schedule quantified what Mr.
Millar
said was the value of the work actually done at Ms. Makgabo’s
house. The schedule took the total contract price, including
the
additional work agreed, and subtracted the components of the work
that were never started. A credit of R16 775.10 was
given to Ms
Makgabo for “work not done”. The schedule then deducted a
10% “retention” of R9 730.56
from the resulting
amount as an allowance for what Mr. Millar claimed were very minor
issues – or “snags” –
that remained to be
addressed at the time Done Rite was ordered off the property.
Ultimately, this schedule valued the work done
at the property at
R87 575.05, including VAT. This schedule does not reflect the
reduced “retention” allowance
of 5% on which Mr. Millar
was to calculate the amount demanded in Done Rite’s 17 July
2014 invoice.
25
These calculations inevitably raise the question of exactly
what stage Done Rite’s work had reached at the time its workers
were ordered off Ms. Makgabo’s property. Done Rite’s
expert, Harold Hollander, a civil engineer with fairly extensive
experience of large building projects, gave evidence at trial that
the work appeared to be in its final stages when Done Rite left.
He
characterised the work left undone as easily finished in a short
time, and at a very low cost.
26
Critically, none of Mr. Hollander’s conclusions was
seriously challenged in cross-examination. Nor was a positive account
of the true state of completion of the work put to him on Ms.
Makgabo’s behalf. Although Clive Smith, who gave expert
evidence
for Ms. Makgabo, took a more serious view of the work left
undone, he made a series of concessions under cross-examination that
much of the unfinished work amounted to snags, though perhaps more
serious snags than Mr. Hollander had suggested.
27
For the rest, Mr. Smith conceded that the more serious defects
that he identified – for example the fact that a door to the
garden cottage had been installed too low – were likely the
result of previous poor building work, and not faults in the
work
performed by Done Rite. While he was critical of Done Rite’s
failure to point these defects out to Ms. Makgabo, Mr.
Smith could
not attribute them directly to Done Rite’s work. Mr. Smith’s
criticism must of course be evaluated against
Done Rite’s
sudden expulsion from the property during the week of 14 April 2014.
We do not know whether, but for that explusion,
Done Rite would
eventually have advised Ms. Makgabo of the apparently previously
defective work.
28
The expert evidence is accordingly consistent with Mr.
Millar’s assertion that the work was 95% complete at the time
Done
Rite was ordered off the property.
29
That said, there is one minor piece of evidence that was not
clear at the trial. Mr Millar was adamant that the work Done Rite had
commenced on the property had been “95% done”. In the
same breath, however, he said that “R5 000 could have
finished the job” or words to that effect. He also did not
reconcile the R16 775 credit for work not done as he had
set in
out Exhibit C with the R5 000 (R5 700 after VAT is
included) that he claimed at trial it would take to finish
the work.
The evidence at trial on this point was vague.
30
As I have said, Done Rite bears the onus of proving the value
of the
quantum meruit
it claims. Accordingly, the obscurities
to which I have referred must operate in Ms. Makgabo’s favour.
The result must be
that the appropriate amount to be awarded to Done
Rite should be calculated by adding the original contract price
(R190 513.38)
to the agreed extras (R37 875.36) and then
subtracting the credit for work not done on Exhibit C (R16 775.10),
the amount
Mr. Millar conceded at trial would be necessary to
complete the work (R5 700) and the amount Ms. Makgabo actually
paid (R114 308.03).
31
This calculation leaves a balance due to Done Rite of
R91 605.61.
32
I accept that the evidence discloses that Ms. Makgabo had to
contend with what appears to have been a significant leak in one of
the bathrooms just after Done Rite left. However, it was not
established at trial that the leak required anything more than minor
work to rectify – in other words that it was anything more than
an ordinary snag rather than truly defective workmanship.
It was also
open to Ms. Makgabo to have Done Rite or another contractor attend to
the leak. It is not clear from the evidence when
or whether she did
so, and what the cost of doing so was.
33
Moreover, while Ms. Makgabo’s admitted failure to get
quotes from other builders to finish the job when Mr. Millar gave her
the opportunity to do so cannot in itself be held against her, it
left her short of evidence which could possibly have been obtained
when events were fresh. Her expert’s report was compiled much
later – around two years after Done Rite left the property.
That evidence must obviously be treated with a degree of
circumspection.
34
Ultimately, therefore, there was nothing to gainsay Done
Rite’s version that the work was in its final stages at the
time
it was ordered off the property. It is, in my view, entitled to
the proven value of the work it had done up until that point.
35
In its invoice of 17 July 2014 Done Rite claimed interest at
8% compounded monthly. That is wholly unreasonable. In its summons,
Done Rite moderated its claim to interest at 8% per annum. There is
no reason why it ought not to be awarded interest at this rate,
and
from 18 July 2014.
36
For all these reasons, the appeal should succeed. The
Magistrate ought to have identified the true ambit of the dispute
before him,
and to have given judgment in Done Rite’s favour on
that dispute.
Order
37
In this court, the record of appeal was filed late. The
application to condone its late filing was unopposed. We granted
condonation
at the outset of the appeal hearing, but I will record
our order in what follows.
38
Accordingly I would make the following order –
38.1 The late
filing of the appeal record is condoned, with each party paying their
own costs.
38.2 The
appeal is upheld with costs.
38.3 The
order of the trial court is set aside and replaced with the following
order –
“
1. The defendant
is directed to pay to the plaintiff the sum of R91 605.61, plus
interest at 8% per annum from 18 July 2014
to date of payment.
2. The defendant is to
pay the plaintiff’s costs of suit, including the costs of one
junior counsel”.
S
D J WILSON
Acting
Judge of the High Court
WRIGHT
J:
39
I agree and it is so ordered.
pp
G C WRIGHT
Judge
of the High Court
HEARD
ON:
25 August 2022
DECIDED
ON:
1 September 2022
For
the Appellant:
JC Carstens
Instructed by
Erasmus
De Klerk Inc.
For
the Respondent:
SJ Meintjies
(Heads of Argument drawn
by AC Roestorf)
Instructed by Retief and
SJ Meintjies Inc.
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