Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 648South Africa
Orkin v Bellissimo Homeowners Association (RF) NPC and Another (2020/12341) [2022] ZAGPJHC 648 (6 September 2022)
Headnotes
as early as 25 January 2018 the Applicant had been told as follows by the Bellisimo Homeowners Association: “There will not be 24-hour security for the estate at this point, nor any security guard appointed therewith and you are not granted any permission whatsoever to appoint your own security and this issue will be addressed at the next AGM meeting.”
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Orkin v Bellissimo Homeowners Association (RF) NPC and Another (2020/12341) [2022] ZAGPJHC 648 (6 September 2022)
Orkin v Bellissimo Homeowners Association (RF) NPC and Another (2020/12341) [2022] ZAGPJHC 648 (6 September 2022)
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sino date 6 September 2022
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
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SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
2020/12341
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED.
6/09/2022
In
the matter between:
NADINE
ORKIN
Applicant
and
BELLISSIMO
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (RF) NPC
First Respondent
MAFADI
MANAGEMENT AND LETTING SALES
Second Respondent
(PTY)
LTD
(Registration
Number: 2010/018485/07)
Delivered:
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation
to the
Parties / their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. The
date of the
judgment is deemed to be 6 September 2022.
JUDGMENT
# MALINDI J
MALINDI J
Introduction
[1]
This dispute arises out of the following basic facts.
[2]
The Applicant is the occupier of one of six units in the complex. At
the time of occupation
none of the other units were occupied. No
security had at the time been provided to the complex. The Applicant
apparently complained
about the lack of security and in her
correspondence with the Bellissimo Homeowners Association (“the
First Respondent”)
she received the following correspondence
dated 25 January 2018:
“
There
will not be 24-hour security for the estate at this point, nor any
security guard appointed therewith and you are not granted
any
permission whatsoever to appoint your own security and this issue
will be addressed at the next AGM meeting
.”
[3]
Later, the parties had agreed on or about 19 April 2018 that the
Applicant may employ
her own guard on the premises subject to her
being responsible for:
3.1.
The payment of the guard
3.2.
The payment of electricity
3.3.
The payment of water
3.4.
Interior maintenance of the guard house
3.5.
Any/or all expenses relating to the said
security being present in the guard house.
[4]
This is the agreement that the Respondents sought to cancel on 2
September 2020 after
receipt of the Community Schemes Ombud Services
(CSOS) award which found in their favour that the Applicant had no
permission to
employ a private security guard and for the security
guard to use the First Respondent’s premises.
[5]
This purported cancellation, if proper, has no bearing on the urgent
application and
the undertakings made subsequent to its postponement.
Background
[6]
On 28 May 2020, the Applicant issued a notice of motion in which the
following relief
is sought:
6.1.
Dispensing with their Rules and forms of service as prescribed by the
Rules and dealing with this matter as one
of agency in terms of Rule
6(12).
6.2. That the
Applicant be restored of their possession of the guard and ablutions
therewith situated on the communal
property at [....] A [....]
Street, Sandown (“the premises”).
6.3. That the
Applicant be restored of their possession of the key to the gate
motor to the premises.
6.4. That the
Respondents be ordered and directed to allow the Applicant and her
staff, employees, customers and visitors
access to the guardhouse.
6.5. That, in
the event of the Respondents failing to restore the Applicants
possession of the aforementioned premises
by 18h00 on 2 June 2020,
that the Sheriff of the Honourable Court and/or his deputy, in whose
area the premises is situated, be
and is authorized, mandated and
directed to take such reasonable and necessary steps to restore
position of their premises to the
applicants to give effect to
paragraphs one to four above.
6.6. That the
Respondents pay the costs of this application on the attorney and
client scale.
6.7. Such
further and/or alternative relief as this Honourable Court may deem
just, fair and equitable.
[7]
The Respondents were required to notify the Applicants attorneys by
17h00 on Friday
29 May 2020 of any intention to oppose the
application and to file answering affidavits if any by 17h00 on 29
May 2020. The matter
was set down for hearing at 10h00 on 2 June
2020. The first and second Respondents filed their notices of
intention to oppose duly
on 28 May 2022.
[8]
On 29 May 2020 the parties agreed that the matter be removed from the
roll and the
costs of the application be reserved. This was confirmed
by the Respondents’ attorneys’ letter of 29 May 2020. The
also undertook that the Applicant will be provided with access to the
guard house as well as a copy of the key to the gate motor.
This
undertaking satisfied the Applicant’s main prayer in the Notice
of Motion. Paragraph 3 of the letter reads as follows,
“
Please
confirm that the matter will be postponed sine die, with costs
reserved
.”
[9]
On
m
21
m
June
m
2021,
the Applicant launched a new application, an interlocutory
application, seeking an order that the Respondents be directed
to pay
the costs that were reserved on 2 June 2020 as taxed and allowed in
the sum of R31 120.26. The Applicant sought further
that the
costs of that application for enforcing the costs order be paid on a
punitive scale between attorney and own client. The
application was
opposed. The interlocutory application for costs is the subject of
this hearing.
Analysis
[10]
The parties have agreed that the main issue for determination is
whether the Respondents are
liable for the costs of the urgent
application of 2 June 2020. The Respondents’ main defence
against the payment of the costs
of 2 June 2020 is that subsequent to
that date, that is 15 July 2020, the CSOS adjudicated a complaint
laid by the Applicant prior
to the urgent application and held that
as early as 25 January 2018 the Applicant had been told as follows by
the Bellisimo Homeowners
Association:
“
There
will not be 24-hour security for the estate at this point, nor any
security guard appointed therewith and you are not granted
any
permission whatsoever to appoint your own security and this issue
will be addressed at the next AGM meeting.
”
[11]
Further, the Second Respondent submits that it is not bound by the
First Respondents undertaking
to pay the said costs even if this
Court finds that the Applicant is entitled to the costs of the urgent
application. This aspect
is dealt with below.
[12]
In paragraph 24 of the Applicant’s replying affidavit it is
stated as follows:
“
It
is correct that no order was made in the urgent spoliation
application due to its omission from the roll but it was nevertheless
agreed that costs of the urgent spoliation application including then
agreed to reserved costs of the hearing be paid by the Respondents
was agreed to or taxed
.”
[13]
Furthermore, at paragraph 25, the Applicant states as follows:
“
As
aforesaid, the CSOS award came to the attention of the Respondents on
or about 23 July 2020 and the Respondents tender to pay
my party and
party costs of the urgent application inclusive of the reserved costs
of the hearing date was made on 12 and 25 August
2020 in terms of an
Annexure “FA4” with no reference at all to the CSOS
award, and with no qualifications, other than
that I provide the
Respondents with a bill costs which they would either settle, if
satisfied therewith or require that same be
taxed
.”
[14]
It is common cause that the award of the CSOS came to the attention
of the Respondents on 23
July 2020. The First Respondent contends at
paragraph 16 of the First Respondent’s answering affidavit that
it is on this
basis that it does not think that it is responsible to
pay the Applicant’s costs. On 12 August 2020 the Respondents’
attorneys’ tendered the costs of the urgent application on a
party and party scale. On 25 August 2020 the same attorney confirmed
that the tender to pay the costs in terms of the letter of 12 August
2020 “includes the reasonable reserved costs for having
the
matter postponed
sine die
.”
[15]
On 28 May 2021 the Second Respondent wrote a letter to the
Applicant’s attorneys stating
that the Second Respondent denies
that it has tendered any payment towards costs in this matter. The
letter is signed by their
attorney, Marcel Fourie, now writing under
the name of a different law firm. It is clear from the correspondence
leading to this
denial that Marcel Fourie was at all times writing on
behalf of the First and Second Respondents. The Second Respondent
cannot
deny at this stage that it is bound by the undertaking in
which costs were tendered on 12 August 2020 and confirmed on 25
August
2020.
[16]
The defence that the Respondents are not liable for costs of the
urgent application of 2 June
2020 because the CSOS found against the
applicant on 15 July 2020 does not hold water. The question is
whether at the time of the
urgent application the Applicant was
entitled to bring the application. It is clear that the Applicant was
entitled to bring the
application at the time and that a finding
against the Applicant at a later stage was against what they prayed
for in the urgent
application is irrelevant.
[17]
Furthermore, since 29 May 2020 when the parties agreed that the
matter be removed from that roll
and be postponed
sine
die
it was on the basis that the Applicant is entitled to bring the
application. The postponement
sine
die
only pertained to the question of costs, which costs they
subsequently tendered to pay on 12 August 2020. That the CSOS ruling
was apparently in favour of the First Respondent does not change the
legal position that the Respondents were not entitled to take
the law
into their own hands by dispossessing the Applicant of the services
of the security guard and the relevant premises without
following due
process. The spoliation remedy would have lost urgency if the
Applicant waited for the outcome of the CSOS award
which had no set
date. The principle is established in our law as was stated in the
case of
Street
Pole Ads Durban (Pty) Ltd and Another v Ethekwini Municipality
[1]
where it was stated: “
That
is because good title is irrelevant; the claim to spoliatory relief
arises solely from an procedural deprivation of possession
.”
Therefore, the Applicant was entitled to approach the court on an
urgent basis on 2 June 2020.
[18]
I have also considered the submissions by the Respondents to the
effect that because the matter
had not been placed on the roll on 2
June 2020 and that therefore there was no court order postponing the
matter
sine die
and awarding costs to the applicant, the
Applicant is not entitled to the costs of the day. Paradoxically, the
Respondents do not
challenge that fact that the matter had become
postponed
sine die
, but only that there was no cost order made
against them. In other words, they accept part of the agreement
between themselves
and the Applicant but reject the part pertaining
to costs. I am satisfied that all relevant procedures had been
followed, including
setting the matter down for 2 June 2020 and
uploading relevant documents on to CaseLines, save for the fact that
the matter was
not placed on the roll for 2 June. 2020. This fact is
the last step that needed to be taken in an otherwise properly
prosecuted
case. In addition, the Respondents had agreed with the
Applicants on the removal of the matter and that it be postponed
sine
die
before 2 June 2020. That agreement governed the relationship
between the parties from then up to, and including the undertakings
of 12 August and 25 August 2022 regarding the tender of costs for the
urgent application and costs of the interlocutory application
to
enforce the agreement on the costs.
Conclusion
[19]
As is apparent from the discussion above, both Respondents are bound
by the agreement between
the parties that the urgent application of 2
June 2020 be removed from the roll and be postponed
sine die
,
costs having been reserved. That the matter did not appear on the
roll on the date of hearing is of no consequence in the context
of
that urgent application. The fact that the CSOS had found in favour
of the Respondents regarding the individual utilization
of a security
guard and use of the First Respondent’s premises on 15 July
2020 is irrelevant to the Applicants entitlement
at the time to
launch an urgent application to set aside the unlawful deprivation of
the premises from the Applicant. Furthermore,
as stated above, the
Second Respondents submission that it is not bound by the undertaking
to pay costs as contained in the correspondence
of 12 and 25 August
2020 does not avail it. Both parties had been represented by the same
attorneys. The relevant correspondence
was at all times on behalf of
the two Respondents without distinction. The Respondents’
conduct after all the undertakings
were made requires that the Court
express its disapproval of their conduct. Their conduct is solely
based on the fact that they
were exonerated by the award of the CSOS
and that they were entitled to cancel the prior agreement between the
parties that the
Applicant may engage the services of a private
security guard and have access to the premises. They should have been
better advised.
[13]
In the circumstances the following order is made:
1.
The Respondents, jointly and severally, the
one paying the other to be absolved, are to pay the reserved costs of
the urgent application
on 2 June 2022, as taxed and allowed in the
sum of R31 120.26;
2.
The Respondents, jointly and severally, the
one paying the other to be absolved, are to pay the costs of this
interlocutory application
on the scale of attorney and client.
G
MALINDI J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Appearances
For
the applicants:
Adv. RJ Bouwer
Instructed
by:
Martin-Patlansky Attorneys
For
the first and second respondents:
Adv. S. Jackson
Instructed
by:
Hinrichsen Attorneys
Date
of hearing:
11 March 2022
Date
of judgment:
6 September 2022
[1]
[2008] ZAGPHC 33
;
2008
(5) SA 290
(SCA) at 15.
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