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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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[2022] ZAGPJHC 721
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## Mavuso and Another v Bolleurs and Others (2022/000833)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 721 (20 September 2022)
Mavuso and Another v Bolleurs and Others (2022/000833)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 721 (20 September 2022)
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sino date 20 September 2022
SAFLII Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
number: 2022-000833
Date
of hearing: 9 September 2022
Date
delivered: 20 September 2022
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES: NO
REVISED
20/09/2022
In
the application between:
MAVUSO,
SANDILE
First Applicant
ALL
OCCUPANTS OF THE PROPERTY
SITUATED
AT UNIT NUMBER 1 GUSTIL,
ON
181 BERTHA STREET, TURFONTEIN,
JOHANNESBURG
Second Applicant
And
BOLLEURS,
RICHARD GREGORY
First Respondent
BOLLEURS,
RICHARD GREGORY N.O.
Second Respondent
CITY
OF JOHANNESBURG METRO.
MUNICIPALITY
Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
SWANEPOEL
AJ:
[1]
This matter came before me on an urgent basis. On 13 June 2022
Malindi J granted an eviction order against applicants, in respect
of
a property owned by respondents, and which had been occupied by
applicants for a number of years. Applicants have launched a
rescission application against the eviction order on the basis that
it was allegedly erroneously sought and erroneously granted.
Subsequent to the launching of the rescission application respondents
executed the order, and evicted the applicants. They are
now
destitute and living on the streets. The exact nature of the relief
sought in this application is important to understand,
as it is
dispositive of the case. Applicants pray as follows:
"2.
That the first and second respondents' conduct, of
executing
the eviction order on the face of a pending rescission application,
is hereby declared unlawful.
3.
That the possession, occupation, use, enjoyment and control of the
immovable property described as Erf [....] Turfontein Township,
Registration Division I.R. Province of Gauteng situated at number 181
Bertha Street, Unit 1Gustill House, Turfontein, is hereby,
with
immediate effect, restored back to the applicants, pending the
finalization of the pending rescission application. "
[2]
It is also important to understand what this application is not
about. It is not an application to stay the eviction order,
as
applicant's counsel expressly conceded at the hearing of the matter.
Applicant's counsel argued the matter on the basis that
the filing of
the rescission application automatically suspended the execution of
the order by virtue of the provisions of rule
49 (1 1) of the Uniform
Rules. Applicant therefore argues that the execution of the order, in
the face of the rescission application,
was unlawful, and that
applicant and his family should be allowed to return to the premises.
In its heads of argument applicant
says the following:
"The
Honourable Court will, with respect, be referred to the provisions of
rule 49 (11) of the Rules of Court, which rule provides
as follows: -
"where
an appeal has been noted or an application for leave to appeal or to
rescind, correct, review or vary an order of court
has been made, the
operation and execution of the order in question shall be suspended
pending the decision of such appeal or application,
unless the court
which [gave] such order, on the application of a party, otherwise
directs. "
[3]
Applicant relies on the judgment of
Khoza
and Others v Body Corporate Ella Court
[1]
to
substantiate its argument that the order was automatically stayed. In
Khoza Notshe AJ considered the judgment in
United
Reflective Converters v Levine
[2]
in
which the court had held that rule 49 (11) was of no force and effect
insofar as it related to rescission applications. Notshe
AJ held that
United Reflective had been incorrectly decided, and he declined to
follow the judgment. The Court also made the following
obiter dictum:
"Even
if the aforesaid rule were to be held to be a substantive rule I
would still been obliged (sic) to consider whether the
common law
substantive rule as it stands should not have been developed and
extended to avoid irreparable prejudice to an applicant
for a
rescission of judgment"
[4]
In
Erstwhile
Tenants of Williston Court and Another v Lewray Investments (Pty) Ltd
(Pty) Ltd and Another
[3]
Meyer
J raised his doubts as to the correctness of Khoza. Nevertheless,
Khoza was decided on an interpretation of rule 49 (11),
and did not
hold that the common law should be developed to provide for an
automatic stay where there is a rescission application.
It is
therefore distinguishable from this matter.
[5]
The problem that applicants face is simple: rule 49 (11) was repealed
by Government Notice R 317 on 17 April 2015. That being
said, the
entire edifice of the application crumbles. I have expressly not been
asked to stay the order. I have also not been asked
to consider
whether the common law should be developed in such a manner that it
allows for the automatic stay of an order where
there is a rescission
application pending. The case that respondents were asked to meet was
simply that the eviction order was
already suspended by virtue of
rule 49 (1 1), which is obviously not the case.
[6]
Applicants have argued that Malindi J granted the eviction order in
error as he did not have sufficient information to determine
whether
the eviction would be just and equitable as is required by section 4
(7) of the PIE Act.
[4]
That
may be so, but that unfortunately does not assist their case before
me. I cannot find for the applicants given the relief sought,
and on
the basis that the application was brought before me,
[7]
That, however, is not the end of the matter. Section 26 (1) of the
Constitution enshrines the right to access to adequate housing:
"26
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. "
[8]
Section 26 (2) provides that the state must take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available resources,
to
achieve the realization of the abovementioned right.
[9]
Section 28 (1) of the Constitution relates to the rights of children,
which includes the right to shelter, and to be protected
from
maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation. Section 28 (2) lays down
the principle that a child's best interests are paramount
in every
matter concerning the child.
[10]
In this case at least one of the applicant's children (there are two
major children who are studying) is a minor, being 12
years old and
in Grade 6. The entire family is now living on the streets. I cannot,
as upper guardian of minor children, close
my eyes to the devastating
effect the eviction has had on the family, but no doubt especially on
the minor child.
[11]
In
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v
Grootboom and Others
2001 (1) SA 46
(CC)
the Constitutional Court
considered the obligation of the State, including that of local
authorities, to provide access to housing
to a desperately poor
community, and shelter to children in terms of section 28. The Court
said:
"But
section 26 is not the only provision relevant to a decision as to
whether state action at any particular level of government
is
reasonable and consistent with the Constitution. The proposition that
rights are interrelated and are all equally important
is not merely a
theoretical postulate. The concept has immense human and practical
significance in a society founded on human dignity,
equality and
freedom. It is fundamental to an evaluation of the reasonableness of
state action that account be taken of the inherent
dignity of human
beings. The Constitution will be worth infinitely less than its paper
if the reasonableness of state action concerned
with housing is
determined without regard to the fundamental constitutional value of
human dignity. Section 26, read in the context
of the Bill of Rights
as a whole, must mean that the respondents have a right to reasonable
action by the state in all circumstances
and with particular regard
to human dignity. In short, I emphasise that human beings are
required to be treated as human beings.
This is the backdrop against
which the conduct of the respondents towards the appellants must be
seen. "
[5]
[121
And further.
"Neither
section 26 nor section 28 entitles the respondents to claim shelter
or housing immediately upon demand. The High Court
order ought
therefore not to have been made. However, section 26 does oblige the
state to devise and implement a coherent, coordinated
programme
designed to meet its section 26 obligations. The programme that has
been adopted and was in force in the Cape Metro at
the time that this
application was brought, fell short of the obligations imposed upon
the state by section 26(2) in that it failed
to provide for any form
of relief to those desperately in need of access to housing. '
[6]
[13]
Having found that there is no right, in terms of section 26 and 28 of
the Constitution to demand immediate shelter, the Court
nevertheless
made the following order:
(a)
Section 26(2) of the Constitution requires the state to devise and
implement within its available resources a comprehensive
and
coordinated programme progressively to realise the right of access to
adequate housing.
(b)
The programme must include reasonable measures such as, but not
necessarily limited to, those contemplated in the Accelerated
Managed
Land Settlement Programme, to provide relief for people who have no
access to land, no roof over their heads, and who are
living in
intolerable conditions or crisis situations. "
[14]
The eviction application was served on the City of Johannesburg on 18
January 2022. The application was heard, and the eviction
order was
granted, on 13 June 2022. Unfortunately, the City chose not to
participate in the matter, and there was no evidence before
the court
hearing the eviction application as to alternative accommodation that
may have been available to the applicant and his
family.
[15]
Grootboom held that applicant may not be entitled to emergency
shelter, but that the State must set plans in motion to assist
such
persons. I believe that it is thus important, especially given the
fact that one of the persons left homeless by the eviction
is a
child, that the City should state what plans it has in place for such
emergency situations, and whether it can render assistance
to the
applicant and his family.
[16]
Consequently,
I make the following order:
[16.1]
The City of Johannesburg shall furnish a report to the Court by 23
September 2022 on the availability of emergency accommodation
wherein
applicant and his family may be accommodated.
[16.2]
The application is postponed to 26 September 2022 for finalization.
[16.3]
Applicant shall serve this judgment at the office of the Chief Law
Officer of the City of Johannesburg by 16hOO on 20 September
2022.
SWANEPOEL
AJ
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT,
JOHANNESBURG
COUNSEL
FOR APPLICANT:
COUNSEL
FOR APPLICANT:
ATTORNEY
FOR APPLICANT:
NJ Belcher Attorneys
COUNSEL
FOR RESPONDENT:
Adv. T Mkhize
ATTORNEYS
FOR RESPONDENT:
SSLR Inc.
DATE
HEARD:
9 September 2022
DATE
OF
JUDGMENT:
20 September 2022
[1]
[2008] ZAGPHC
[2]
1988 (4) SA 460 (W)
[3]
2016 (6) SA 466 (GJ)
[4]
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction
from, and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act,1998
[5]
At para 83
[6]
At para 93
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