Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 1028South Africa
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited vs Mothuloe (20/21345) [2022] ZAGPJHC 1028 (19 December 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
19 December 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Standard Bank of South Africa Limited vs Mothuloe (20/21345) [2022] ZAGPJHC 1028 (19 December 2022)
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited vs Mothuloe (20/21345) [2022] ZAGPJHC 1028 (19 December 2022)
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sino date 19 December 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
number: 20/21345
Date
of hearing: 23 November 2022
Date
delivered: 19 December 2022
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED
In
the matter between:
THE
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED
Applicant
and
WYCLIFFE
ERNEST THIPE MOTHULOE
Respondent
JUDGMENT
KEMACK AJ:
1.
The applicant
applies for the final sequestration of the respondent’s estate,
a provisional sequestration order having been
granted on 10 November
2021.
2.
Section 12
of
the
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
sets out the requirements for a final
sequestration order. The court may grant such an order if it is
satisfied that the petitioning
creditor has established a liquidated
claim of at least R100
against
the debtor
; that the
debtor has committed an act of insolvency or is factually insolvent;
and that there is reason to believe that it will
be to the advantage
of creditors of the debtor if the debtor’s estate is
sequestrated. For a final order, these three elements
must be
established on a balance of probabilities.
3.
The applicant
relies on two unsatisfied judgments for its liquidated claims: the
first for R6,358,107.32 granted on 16 August 2016
under Gauteng
Division, Pretoria case number 42519/2016 (“the first
judgment”, annexure “FA2” to the founding
affidavit); and the second for R1,528,881.08 granted on 21 February
2018 under Gauteng Local Division, case number 2017/46489 (“the
second judgement”, annexure “FA9” to the founding
affidavit).
4.
In addition,
the applicant relies on a liquidated claim in the amount of
R4,479,476.26 under a loan agreement.
5.
The first
respondent’s attempts to obtain leave to appeal the two
judgments against him were unsuccessful, and those judgments
are
presently enforceable and unpaid. A judgment debt is clearly a
liquidated amount and the R7,886,988.40 total of the capital
amounts
in the two judgments is indisputable.
6.
It follows
that even without taking into account the third debt under the loan
agreement, the applicant has satisfied the first
requirement for a
final winding up order on a balance of probabilities.
7.
Section 9(1)
of the
Insolvency Act provides
for sequestration of a debtor “
who
has committed an act of insolvency, or is insolvent
”.
8.
Section 8(b)
of the
Insolvency Act states
that “
A
debtor commits an act of insolvency if a court has given judgment
against him and he fails, upon the demand of the officer whose
duty
it is to execute that judgment, to satisfy it or to indicate to that
officer disposable property sufficient to satisfy it,
or if it
appears from the return made by that officer that he has not found
sufficient disposable property to satisfy the judgment
.”
9.
Annexure
“FA14” to the founding affidavit is a warrant for
execution against movable property dated 2 March 2020, issued
by the
registrar of the High Court under the first judgment. Annexure “FA15”
is a Sheriff’s return of service
dated 25 March 2020, providing
details of an attempt to execute the warrant at the respondent’s
residence at 154 Senior Drive,
Northcliff, Johannesburg, on 18 March
2020. The return of service includes a handwritten note signed by the
respondent, stating
“
Def
informed that he has no assets to cover this writ therefore my return
of service will be of a nulla bona return
”.
10.
An act of
insolvency is sufficient for sequestration without the need to prove
actual or commercial insolvency, provided the respondent
does not
rebut the act of insolvency by producing admissible evidence that the
respondent’s assets actually exceed the respondent’s
liabilities.
11.
The respondent
neither denies this
nulla
bona
return, nor discloses evidence of assets sufficient to rebut the
presumption of insolvency created by it.
12.
The two
immovable properties which are the subjects of the first and second
judgments, are bonded to the applicant. The Northcliff
property to
which the first judgment relates has a market value of R5,900,000 and
a forced sale value of R3,875,000, while the
market value of the
Observatory property to which the second judgment refers is R985,000.
At best for the respondent, the combined
value of these immovable
assets is substantially lower than his total capital indebtedness
(excluding interest) to the applicant,
which amounts to
R12,366,464.70.
13.
The respondent
provides no evidence of other liquid assets. Rather, the respondent
relies for solvency on claims which he alleges
he has against the
Premier of North West Province for R20 million; against a person
named Neil David Rissik for R6,5 million; and
against his estranged
wife for R15 million.
14.
These claims
against third parties are baldly alleged without detail or
substantiation, and the respondent does not do sufficient
to satisfy
the court that these contingent claims should have the status of
assets in his estate for purposes of assessing solvency.
In any
event, until such time as those claims might be successfully
concluded and the amounts recovered, the respondent is commercially
insolvent in the sense that he is presently unable to pay his debts.
15.
The respondent
alleges that his indebtedness to the applicant for the Northcliff
house should be reduced by half because there has
been a termination
of the joint ownership of this property by him and nis estranged
wife. The respondent’s logic appears
to be that his wife’s
independent ownership of 50% of that property absolves the respondent
of 50% of the indebtedness under
the first judgment. It is not
necessary to decide this issue, because even after a deduction of
half the Northcliff indebtedness
from the respondent’s total
capital indebtedness to the applicant, the unpaid difference exceeds
his non-contingent assets.
16.
It follows
that the applicant has satisfied the second requirement for a final
sequestration order, on a balance of probabilities.
17.
Regarding
benefit to creditors, the insolvent’s version is that his
tangible assets are the Observatory Property and half
the value of
the Northcliff property. The Observatory property was sold in
execution for R985,000, and half the forced sale value
of R3,875,000
for the Northcliff Property is R1,937,500. Their combined value is
R2,929,506: applied to payment of the total of
R12,366,464.70 for the
first and second judgments and the loan indebtedness, the result is a
potential dividend of 23 cents in
the rand. Moreover, there will be
additional benefit to creditors if a trustee in final sequestration
uncovers further assets in
the respondent’s estate.
18.
The court is
accordingly satisfied that on a balance of probabilities, final
winding up will result in benefit to creditors.
19.
It remains to
consider the defences raised by the respondent, which is done in the
following paragraphs.
That
the applicant failed to comply with
sections 10
and
12
of the
Insolvency Act, by
seeking a sequestration order rather than a
provisional sequestration order in the notice of motion
20.
It is the
practice in these courts to grant a provisional sequestration order
pending an application for a final sequestration order,
even though
the notice of motion does not expressly request a provisional
sequestration order.
21.
In accordance
with that practice, a provisional sequestration order was granted in
this matter. This defence accordingly has no
merit.
That the
applicant failed to file a security certificate as required by
section 9(3)(b)
of the
Insolvency Act
22.
>
The
applicant’s certificate of tendered security is part of the
record.
23.
The respondent
did not persist with this line of defence during the hearing. It is
not a valid defence.
That the
applicant’s claims are not liquidated
24.
Both the first
and second judgments are incontestably for payment of liquid amounts.
Since one liquidated claim exceeding R100 is
sufficient for a
sequestration order, this defence cannot succeed.
That a
sequestration order will have equal and competing rights with the 20
November 2019 court order terminating joint ownership
of the
Northcliff property by the applicant and his wife
25.
There is no
dispute regarding the existence of the 20 November 2019 judgment.
26.
That judgment,
however, does not affect or prevent the sequestration of the
respondent. The trustee of the insolvent estate will
be required to
determine what assets are owned wholly or partly by the applicant and
wholly or partly by his estranged wife, and
will deal with those
assets or the applicable portions of those assets accordingly.
Non-joinder
of the respondent’s estranged wife
27.
The respondent
did not deliver heads of argument for this hearing. Rather, on 21
November 2022 the respondent produced a “notice
to take a point
of law” referring specifically to “non-joinder” of
a necessary party. This refers to the respondent’s
wife, Dr Neo
Brenda Mothuloe. To avoid confusion, this judgment refers to her as
the respondent’s wife.
28.
The
respondent’s argument was that his wife should be joined as a
necessary party to this application, not on account of how
a final
sequestration order might affect her rights, but on the basis that
she has sufficient assets to settle the applicant’s
claims and
thereby avoid the respondent’s final sequestration.
29.
This argument
has no merit. The sequestration application is against the respondent
alone and he has no entitlement to join his
wife in the hope of
inducing her to use her assets to pay the applicant.
30.
In
De
Jager Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mark
1952 (3) SA 471 (W), the court decided that a spouse of a person
defending a sequestration application has no direct and substantial
interest in the application, and rejected a similar defence of
non-joinder.
31.
Section 21
of
the
Insolvency Act provides
that the property of the spouse of a
sequestrated person vests in the trustee as if it were the property
of the sequestrated estate,
subject to the spouse whose estate has
not been sequestrated having the right to prove that such property is
the property of that
spouse alone. and should therefore be excluded
from the sequestrated estate. In
Harksen
v Lane NO and Others
[1997] ZACC 12
;
1998 (1) SA 300
(CC), the Constitutional Court considered and upheld
the constitutionality of
section 21
, without considering or
overruling the
De
Jager
judgment.
32.
In the
Harksen
judgment, the Constitutional Court did not deal with the issue of
whether the
De
Jager
judgment remains good law under the South African Constitution.
33.
It is not
necessary to consider that issue in this judgment, however, because
the respondent himself served an application on his
wife for her
joinder as a party to this sequestration application, and on 17
October 2022 her attorneys delivered a notice of her
intention to
oppose the joinder application.
34.
There can be
no clearer indication that the respondent’s wife is aware of
this application, and has made a positive election
to not be joined
as a party to it. Accordingly, insofar as she has rights worthy of
protection, the procedure under
section 21
of the
Insolvency Act will
be available to her.
35.
As the
respondent’s wife knows of and objects to being a party to this
application, the non-joinder defence cannot succeed.
36.
For these
reasons the court orders as follows:
36.1.
The
respondent’s estate is finally sequestrated;
36.2.
The costs of
the sequestration application are to be costs in the sequestration.
KEMACK AJ
ACTING JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT,
JOHANNESBURG
COUNSEL FOR
APPLICANT: Adv
L Acker
ATTORNEY
FOR APPLICANT: Claassen
Inc. Attorneys
COUNSEL FOR
RESPONDENTS: Adv
R. Maphutha
ATTORNEY FOR
RESPONDENT: MSMM
Attorneys
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