Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 114South Africa
Bye v Constantia Metering Services (Pty) Ltd and Others (31250/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 114 (6 February 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
6 February 2025
Headnotes
a 50% membership interest. The closed corporation was later converted to a company, and Mr. Bye (snr.) and Mr. A. Buckle likewise held 50% of the shares in the company.
Judgment
begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
>>
2025
>>
[2025] ZAGPPHC 114
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## Bye v Constantia Metering Services (Pty) Ltd and Others (31250/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 114 (6 February 2025)
Bye v Constantia Metering Services (Pty) Ltd and Others (31250/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 114 (6 February 2025)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2025_114.html
sino date 6 February 2025
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NO.:31250/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: Yes
Date: 31January
2025/6 February 2025
E van der Schyff
In
the matter between:
HERCULES
PHILLIP BYE
APPLICANT
and
CONSTANTIA
METERING SERVICES (PTY) LTD FIRST
RESPONDENT
ANDRÉ
CHARLES BUCKLE
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUAN
BUCKLE
THIRD RESPONDENT
STANLEY
BUCKLE
FOURTH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Van
der Schyff J
Introduction
[1]
The applicant, Mr. Hercules Phillip Bye
(“Mr. Bye”), approached the court for relief in terms of
section 163 of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the
Companies
Act&rdquo
;). He wants the court to declare that the actions of the
second, third, and fourth respondents (collectively referred to as
the
Buckle respondents”) were, or have had a result that is
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to and that unfairly disregards
his interests, and seeks ancillary relief. If the court finds that
section 163
of the
Companies Act does
not apply, Mr. Bye seeks an
interdict in the same terms as the ancillary relief sought.
[2]
Three main issues potentially stand to be
determined. The first is whether Mr. Bye made a case under
section
163
of the
Companies Act. If
he succeeds, the second issue that needs
to be determined is the remedy that should follow the declaration.
Only if the court is
convinced that his shares are to be bought out
does the issue of the value and valuation of shares come into play.
If the court
finds that Mr. Bye did not make out a case for relief in
terms of
section 163
of the
Companies Act, the
question is whether he
succeeded in making out a case in terms of the common law and met the
requirements for an interdict.
Section 163
of the
Companies Act
>
[3]
Section 163
is aimed at providing
protection against oppression or unfair prejudice in any one of three
described categories. A shareholder
or a director of a company may
apply to court for relief under this section in one of three
situations, namely, if:
i.
any act or omission of the company, or a
related person, has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial to, or that
unfairly disregards the interests of, the
applicant;
ii.
the business of the company, or a related
person, is being or has been carried on or conducted in a manner that
is oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards
the interests of the applicant; or
iii.
the powers of a director or prescribed
officer of the company, or a person related to the company, are being
or have been exercised
in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of the
applicant.
[4]
In each of these categories provided for in
the respective sub-sections of
section 163(1)
a different facet is
highlighted. In
section 163(1)(a)
the focus falls on the consequences
of the impugned conduct of a company or related person (collectively
referred to in this paragraph
as ‘the company’). Not only
the consequences of the impugned act or omission, but also the
performer of the act sets
this category aside. In
section 163(1)(b)
the manner or way in which the business of the company is conducted
is the gateway to seek relief under this section. In
section
163(1)(c)
the emphasis is on the manner in which the director or
prescribed officer of a company exercises their powers as director or
prescribed
officer. In all three categories the effect or result of
the identified actor’s acts must be oppressive or unfairly
prejudicial,
alternatively unfairly disregards the interests of the
applicant.
[5]
In
a recent judgment,
Technology
Corporate Management (Pty) Ltd and Others v De Sousa and Another,
[1]
the Supreme Court of Appeal comprehensively unpacked the scope of
section 252 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, the predecessor
of
section 163
of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
. The decision and
ratio
remain highly relevant to this matter. As Wallis JA pointed out,
decisions on
section 252
are of assistance in relation to cases
arising under
section 163(1)
, which substantially re-enacted it.
[2]
[6]
Although trite, it is necessary to
highlight the following principles enunciated in
TCM:
i.
The
relationship between a company and its members, and the members
inter
se
,
is contractual and based primarily on the memorandum of
incorporation. As a result, the views of the majority will ordinarily
prevail on any disputed issue;
[3]
ii.
The
legislature, however, vested courts with statutory power to override
the majority’s exercise of its contractual powers
to remedy
oppression or unfair prejudice caused to minority shareholders even
if the majority shareholders acted strictly in accordance
with the
contractual terms governing the shareholder relationship;
[4]
iii.
There
is a tension between the principle of majority rule and the power
ascribed to courts to intervene in a company’s affairs
on
equitable grounds;
[5]
iv.
The
enquiry is objective, and although motive is not always irrelevant,
proof is not required of a lack of
bona
fides
or an intention to cause prejudice.
[6]
An applicant cannot simply make a number of vague and generalised
allegations of unfairness or oppression. An applicant has to
establish the particular act or omission that has been committed or
that the affairs of the company have been conducted in the
manner so
alleged.
[7]
v.
When
reliance is placed on actions causing unfair prejudice, mere
prejudice is insufficient to invoke the remedy. The remedy is
only
available where unfair prejudice was caused, and the unfairness and
the prejudice must affect the shareholder;
[8]
vi.
Dissatisfaction
and disagreement or disapproval of the conduct of the business of a
company does not in itself mean that the member
has suffered unfair
prejudice. While the fact that there are irreconcilable differences
between shareholders may, in some circumstances,
justify an order for
the winding-up of a company, it is not, without more unfair
prejudice;
[9]
vii.
Courts
should be wary not to confer rights on minority shareholders that are
greater than, or differ from, the rights for which
they have
bargained and impose burdens on the majority that it did not
undertake to bear;
[10]
viii.
A
shareholder might find itself locked-in even where there is no
exclusion from participation in the affairs of the company, or
where
the exclusion was not unfair. It is not enough merely to show that
the relationship between the parties has irretrievably
broken down.
The legislature did not intend to provide a remedy to enable a
‘locked-in’ minority shareholder, without
more, to
require the company to buy him out at a price that he considers
adequately reflects the value of his shares;
[11]
ix.
The
mere fact that a minority shareholder wishes to exit the company and
claims to have lost trust and respect for the majority
shareholders
does not on its own mean that it has suffered unfair prejudice within
the ambit of
s 163.
One of the risks of conducting business with
others in a small private company is that leaving the business and
disposing of one’s
interest in it may be difficult ‘or
practically impossible’.
[12]
The
Companies Act does
not provide for a ‘general unilateral
right of withdrawal at the instance of a minority or dissentient
shareholder.’
[13]
x.
A
loss of faith, trust, and confidence in the majority shareholders
occasioned by the affairs of the company being mismanaged, and
a lack
of probity in the conduct of the company’s affairs may
constitute unfair prejudice.
[14]
[7]
In each matter where relief is sought under
section 163
, the factual context of that specific matter will dictate
the outcome.
Factual context
Common cause facts
[8]
The common cause facts preceding the
litigation are reasonably simple. Constantia Metering Services (Pty)
Ltd (“the company”
or “Constantia Metering”)
had its humble origins in Constantia Metering CC. The only members of
the closed corporation,
Mr. Bye (snr.) and Mr. A. Buckle, each held a
50% membership interest. The closed corporation was later converted
to a company,
and Mr. Bye (snr.) and Mr. A. Buckle likewise held 50%
of the shares in the company.
[9]
Mr. Bye (snr.) and Mr. A. Buckle agreed at
some point after their respective sons attained majority to divest
themselves of their
respective shares. The shareholding was divided
as follows during 2018, with the share certificates ostensibly issued
in February
2019:
i.
Mr. J. Buckle, the third respondent,
acquired a 40% shareholding;
ii.
Mr. S. Buckle, the fourth respondent,
acquired a 20% shareholding; and
iii.
Mr. Bye, the applicant, acquired a 40%
shareholding.
[10]
Different reasons are proffered by the
respective parties for the diminishing of the Bye family’s
shareholding in the company
and the Buckle family obtaining control
of the company through a collective majority shareholding. The reason
for the
status quo
is neither here nor there. The reality is that Mr. Bye currently
holds 40% of the shares in Constantia Metering, with the Buckle
brothers collectively holding 60% of the shares.
[11]
Mr. Bye (snr.) and Mr. A. Buckle were the
company's directors. Mr. Bye, the applicant, and Mr. Bye (snr.) were
employed by the company,
as was Mr. J. Buckle. Mr. Bye (snr.)
unfortunately passed away in December 2021, leaving Mr. A. Buckle the
sole remaining director.
After his father passed away, Mr. Bye
approached Mr. A. Buckle, the director of Constantia Metering. Mr.
Bye’s expectation
was that he would step into his father’s
shoes, both as far as his father’s employment with Constantia
Metering and
his directorship of the company were concerned.
[12]
Mr. A. Buckle, Constantia Metering’s
senior management, and the other shareholders did not share Mr. Bye’s
future plans.
The discord that flared up resulted in the termination
of Mr. Bye’s employment with Constantia Metering. Again,
whether Mr.
Bye resigned or was dismissed is neither here nor there
because a settlement was reached between Mr. Bye and the company that
allowed
for the severance of the employment relationship.
[13]
Mr. Bye ultimately indicated that he and
Constantia Metering should part ways. Mr. A. Buckle agreed. To enable
him to ascertain
the value of his shares, Mr. Bye requested the
company’s financial statements. Mr. Bye was provided with two
different sets
of financial statements for what he regards to be
corresponding periods of time. The existence of these two sets of
financial statements
seems to be the catalyst for this application.
The application primarily turns on the question of whether the
issuing and provision
of two sets of financial statements fall within
any or all the categories provided in
section 163(1).
[14]
To understand the finer nuances of the
factual context, it is necessary to consider the respective parties’
perspectives on
the events that preceded the litigation.
Mr. Bye’s
contentions
[15]
Mr. Bye portrays Constantia Metering as a
typical domestic company run by two families. He clearly seems to
have been under the
impression that he was his father’s heir,
so to speak, as far as Constantia Metering is concerned. His father
allegedly told
him he would take his position as director and
shareholder upon the former’s retirement. Mr. Bye was also
employed by Constantia
Metering since 2014 and trained by his father
to take over his position in Constantia Metering eventually.
[16]
Mr. Bye avers that Mr. A. Buckle, the
company’s sole director, controls the affairs of the first
respondent in conjunction
and with the assistance of his sons, the
third and fourth respondents.
[17]
After his father passed away, Mr. Bye
started making enquiries with Mr. A. Buckle regarding his future
participation in the company,
but it became apparent to him that the
Buckles had no intention of allowing him to participate further in
the company’s affairs
and that they were on a mission to
exclude him from being involved, participating or becoming a director
of Constantia Metering.
I pause to mention at this juncture that Mr.
Bye’s subjective impression is not supported by the objective
evidence presented
in the papers. There is, likewise, no evidence
supporting Mr. Bye’s perception that the Buckle respondents
‘vehemently
opposed and have done everything in their power to
prevent [him] from being involved in the affairs of Constantia,
especially with
respect to the financial affairs…’.
[18]
During this time of discord, Mr. Bye’s
employment relationship with Constantia Metering was severed. He
alleges he was dismissed
while the Buckle respondents aver that he
resigned. Be that as it may, a severance agreement was reached, and
neither party provided
sufficient detailed evidence to allow a
factual finding on this point. At best, it can be said that a factual
dispute exists regarding
this issue.
[19]
Due to Mr. Bye’s impression that he
was being excluded and victimised, and because his view that it was
merely a formality
for him to step in his father’s shoes was
not shared by the director and other shareholders, he requested
Constantia Metering’s
financial statements to enable him to
assess the value of his shares.
[20]
Mr. Bye regards Mr. A Buckle as an
authoritative, almost dictatorial, director who reigns his sons, the
remaining shareholders,
with an iron fist.
[21]
Mr. Bye submits that issuing two different
sets of financial statements for corresponding periods constitutes
breaches of specific
provisions of the
Companies Act and
the Income
Tax Act. This, he contends, illustrates a ‘
modus
operandi
’ he cannot associate
himself with as a future director and shareholder in fulfilling his
fiduciary duty towards the company.
Mr. Bye states later, in reply,
that he has no fiduciary duty towards the company in his capacity as
shareholder.
[22]
As a result of what Mr. Bye perceived to be
the irregularities appearing from the two sets of financial
statements, he concluded
that the only explanation for the two sets
of financial statements was that SARS was being defrauded, and he no
longer wanted to
pursue obtaining a directorship in the company and
being promoted to fulfill his father’s position in the company.
He subsequently
denied invitations to attend shareholders’
meetings and explained his decisions as follows:
‘
Having
experienced the oppressive and prejudicial manner in which the First
Respondent under the control of the Second Respondent
had treated me
since the passing of my late father, I had no doubt that my
attendance at any shareholders meeting would simply
be another
opportunity for me to be abused.’
[23]
Mr. Bye states in his founding affidavit
that he appointed Mr. J Ferreira as auditor to investigate the
irregularities that appear
in the company’s financial
statements. Mr. Ferreira responded in a letter, later confirmed under
oath, stating that he requires
various additional documentation and
information in order to prepare a final valuation report. He did not
express any view regarding
any perceived irregularity, save for
stating that no meaningful information can be extracted from the
documents supplied to him,
among others, because the general ledger
for the 2021 financial period does not correspond to the financial
statements provided.
Mr. Ferreira provided an extensive list of
documents he required.
[24]
In reply, Mr. Bye provided further expert
evidence by including a report from Mr. A. Prakke, a forensic
auditor. Mr. Prakke confirmed
the objectives of the report were,
among others, to establish the integrity of the two sets of annual
financial statements for
the accounting period ending 28 February
2021 and to establish whether the directors were diligent in the
execution of their duties
when preparing the financial statements. He
stated that he was not mandated to investigate whether the directors
complied with
the prescripts of the
Companies Act.
[25
]
Mr. Prakke concluded, without providing any
basis whatsoever for his finding that the approval of the two sets of
financial statements
was –
‘
done
to mislead the actual financial state of CMS’s financial
status, including having a further effect that SARS could not
determine the correct obligations and, therefore, the fiscus.’
[26]
Mr. Prakke states that further
investigation, particularly the Accounting Officer report, would
reveal the factual extent of such
discrepancy. He then reflects on
what he coins ‘misrepresentations’ and explains, among
others, that the financial
statements are solely based on the
‘accrual basis’.
The Buckle
respondents’ submissions
[27]
The Buckle respondents’ answering
affidavit contains a significant portion of irrelevant information. I
deal only with the
aspects therein that I regard of significance to
this application.
[28]
Mr. A. Bucke vehemently denies that
Constantia Metering is a domestic company resembling a partnership.
He claims the respective
shareholding belies such a contention. The
shareholding is indicative of the control exerted by the Buckle
shareholders.
[29]
The second highly relevant portion of the
answering affidavit is the explanation proffered for the existence
and purpose of the
impugned sets of financial statements. Mr. A.
Buckle informs that ABSA and First Rand Bank informed Constantia
Metering that the
banks changed their respective accounting policies
and methodologies and required financial statements drawn in
accordance with
those methodologies. Both financial institutions were
provided with statements drawn in accordance with this methodology
and with
the statements destined for SARS. Mr. A. Buckle denied that
SARS was being defrauded.
[30]
The Buckle respondents submitted the
confirmatory affidavit of Mr. Van Dyk, Constantia Metering’s
accountant. He confirmed
that the existence of a second set of
financials is simply a requirement of the relevant bankers. He
explained that Constantia
Metering’s accounting records were
initially done using the ‘cash basis’ accounting method.
Therefore, it did
not recognise trading debtors and creditors, but
only income and expenses when the cash is realised. The banks,
however,
required that debtors and creditors be accounted for, and a
new set of statements was prepared for the banks using the ‘accrual
basis’ of accounting.
Discussion
[31]
That Mr. Bye and, at least, Mr. A Buckle do
not see eye to eye is evident from the voluminous answering,
replying, and conditional
supplementary affidavits. As indicated
above in the discussion regarding
section 163
, the mere existence of
acrimony between a director of a company and a shareholder is not, in
itself, enough to invoke the relief
provided by the section.
[32]
The underlying tension that existed between
the Bye and Buckle role players, expressed to some extent by Mr. A.
Buckle, came to
a head when Mr. Bye approached Mr. A. Buckle,
demanding what he regarded as his ‘rightful place’ in the
company. Mr.
Bye did not complain of any behavior or incidents that
preceded his father’s passing.
[33]
I fail to find any objective evidence
indicating any acts or omissions that resulted in Mr. Bye being
oppressed or unfairly prejudiced
or that his interests were unfairly
disregarded when Mr. A Buckle dismissed the succession plan proposed
by him. Not only did Mr.
Bye not call for the matter to be discussed
at a shareholders’ meeting, but the company, its director, and
shareholders also
were not bound to realise Mr. Bye’s
subjective expectations. His view that it was a mere formality that
he would succeed
his father as director, is not supported by the
terms of the company’s memorandum of incorporation that
provides for the
election of directors. The dismissal of his proposal
by the company’s director cannot be the basis for a finding
that the
respondents did not want Mr. Bye involved as a shareholder.
[34]
Mr. Bye cannot complain of being excluded
from the company’s business as shareholder when he elected, for
whatever reason,
not to participate in shareholders’ meetings.
[35]
Having regard to the non-existent basis for
invoking
section 163(1)
based on the interaction between Mr. Bye and
the company, its director, and his fellow shareholders, it is
understandable that
counsel representing Mr. Bye focused his address
almost solely on the ostensible effect, and impact of the existence
of two sets
of financial statements for corresponding time periods on
Mr. Bye’s future involvement in Constantia Metering.
[36]
Although it is evident that the sets of
financial statements are not identical and that certain discrepancies
exist, no case is
made out that the company’s affairs are
mismanaged or that there is a lack of probity on behalf of the
director. Mr. Prakke
states that more information is needed to
establish the factual extent of the discrepancies. The respondents
provided a cogent
explanation, supported by their expert witness, for
the existence not only of the two sets of financial statements but
also for
the existing discrepancies. On the papers filed of record,
no finding is justified on this aspect. In light of this evidence
provided
in answer by the respondents, I cannot find that the
existence of the two sets of financial statements, without more, is
indicative
of dishonesty or a failure to act ethically. For the
same reasons, I cannot find, as a fact, that sections of the
Companies Act or
Income Tax Act were contravened.
[37]
I can, likewise, not find, as urged to do
in the heads of the argument, that Mr. A. Buckle is a delinquent
director. I pause to
note that this relief is not sought in the
notice of motion.
[38]
As for the contention that Constantia
Metering is a domestic company, there is no indication on the papers
that any personal relationship
of trust existed between the
shareholders and directors, even before Mr. Bye (snr.)’s
passing, similar to that existing between
partners in regard to the
partnership business. Mr. Bye failed to establish that Constantia
Metering (Pty) Ltd is a company akin
to a partnership. The
shareholding is not held equally, and there is no evidence that the
respective families would be treated
equally. A friendly relationship
between the respective is not a prerequisite to the running of the
company’s affairs, and
the destruction of the trust
relationship between Mr. Bye and Mr. A. Buckle will not result in a
deadlock, nor that there is no
longer a reasonable possibility of
running the company consistently with the basic arrangement between
the members.
Interdictory relief
[39]
The applicant’s failure to make out a
case that the existence of two sets of financial statements is
evidence of irregular
and unlawful conduct is also fatal to the
application for interdictory relief. Mr. Bye, additionally, did not
make out a case that
he, as a shareholder, is likely to suffer
irreparable harm if the relief sought is not granted.
Miscellaneous
[40]
The parties agreed
inter
partes
that the late filing of the
answering and replying affidavits be condoned, and that the
conditional supplementary affidavit filed
by the respondents be
accepted into evidence.
Costs
[41]
The principle that costs follow success
applies. Having regard to the nature of the application and the
complexity thereof, it is
fair and just if costs are awarded on
Scale B.
ORDER
In
the result, the following order is granted:
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
The applicant is to pay the costs of the first to fourth
respondents on Scale B.
E van der Schyff
Judge of the High Court
Delivered:
This judgment is handed down electronically by uploading it to the
electronic file of this matter on CaseLines.
For the applicant:
Adv. S.D. Wagener
SC
Instructed by:
Geyser Van Rooyen
Attorneys
For the first to
fourth respondents:
Adv. S. W. Davies
Instructed by:
JW Wessels &
Partners Inc.
Date of the
hearing:
21 January 2025
Date of judgment:
31 January 2025
Revised:
6 February 2025
[1]
2024
(5) SA 57
(SCA), hereafter referred to as
TCM
.
[2]
TCM,
supra,
at
para [29].
[3]
TCM,
supra
,
at para [75].
[4]
TCM,
supra
,
at para [76].
[5]
TCM,
supra
,
at para [82].
[6]
TCM,
supra
,
at para [80].
[7]
TCM,
supra
,
at para [113].
[8]
TCM,
supra
,
at para [80].
[9]
TCM,
supra
,
at para [81].
[10]
TCM,
supra
,
at para [94].
[11]
TCM,
supra
,
at para [95].
[12]
TCM,
supra
,
at para [97].
[13]
TCM,
supra
,
at para [100].
[14]
TCM,
supra
,
at para [111].
sino noindex
make_database footer start
Similar Cases
A.W.F v K.S.R (052216/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 503 (16 May 2025)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 503High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)98% similar
F.W.J.B v B.B and Others (076420/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1152 (16 October 2025)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 1152High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)98% similar
Sello and Another v South African Pharmacy Council (073747/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 821 (25 August 2025)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 821High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)98% similar
G.J.N v M.C (34350/2020) [2025] ZAGPPHC 329 (24 March 2025)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 329High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)98% similar
South African Reserve Bank v JAG Import Export (Pty) Limited (2022-007728) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1213 (24 November 2025)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 1213High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)98% similar