Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 188South Africa
M.A.M (Born M) v M.D.M (007044/22) [2025] ZAGPPHC 188 (26 February 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
26 February 2025
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## M.A.M (Born M) v M.D.M (007044/22) [2025] ZAGPPHC 188 (26 February 2025)
M.A.M (Born M) v M.D.M (007044/22) [2025] ZAGPPHC 188 (26 February 2025)
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sino date 26 February 2025
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
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SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NUMBER: 007044/22
DATE:
26 February 2025.
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / NO
(3)
REVISED
DATE
SIGNATURE
M[...]
A[...] M[...] (BORN M[...])
PLAINTIFF
And
M[...]
D[...]
M[...]
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
MABUSE
J.
[1]
This matter came before me as a divorce action.
The Plaintiff issued summons against the Defendant on 28 July 2022
and claimed a
decree of divorce together with some ancillary relief.
[2] According to the
Joint Practice Minutes dated 21 August 2024:
[2.1] the jurisdiction of
the court was not in dispute nor was the identity of and particulars
of the parties.
[2.2]
the parties were married to each other in community of property on 1
April 2000 and remain so married.
[2.3] two children were
born of the said marriage, one of whom is a major while the other is
a female minor.
[2.4] the parties’
marriage relationship has completely fallen apart and therefore there
exist no reasonable prospects for
its normal restoration.
[2.5] that, in the
circumstances set out in paragraph 2.4 supra, an order of divorce
should be granted.
[2.6] that in the event
of a divorce, the parties’ joint estate should be divided.
[3]
According to the said Joint Practice Note, the issues in dispute
were:
[3.1]
whether the Plaintiff was entitled to spousal rehabilitation
maintenance.
[3.2]
Whether or not the Defendant’s loans taken out should be taken
into consideration in the division of the joint estate
as they were
taken without the Plaintiff’s signing or consent or knowledge.
The Defendant disagrees with this statement.
A common issue is
the division of the joint estate.
[3.3] Who of the parties
should bear the costs of the divorce action?
[4]
The parties began dating in 1993.
They were
married to each other in community of property on 1 April 2000,
according to the marriage certificate.
[4.2]
At the time of their marriage, the Plaintiff was employed at Standard
Bank of South Africa Ltd, as a Training Facilitator.
In 2007
this department was moved to Johannesburg. She decided against going
to Johannesburg with this department.
She first discussed her
department's move to Johannesburg with the Defendant.
She
made it clear to the Defendant that she did not prefer going to
Johannesburg. They agreed that she should not move with
the
department to Johannesburg and furthermore that the Defendant would
have to support the whole family. That is how the Plaintiff
became
unemployed since 2007.
[4.2] Even after she had
become unemployed, the Plaintiff tried her hand at some projects
without any success. She applied for work
and was employed at the
Defendant’s place of work at Tshwane Municipality.
[5] She testified that
she wants money:
[5.1] to start a business
[5.2] for maintenance of
herself and the children.
[5.3] to study, and,
[5.4] for petrol to fetch
the children from the child school.
[5.6] She has no money to
buy or rent a house.
[6]
The Defendant has been paying for her maintenance.
He began
with a monthly payment of R2000, which later increased to R3000.
Still the sum of R3000 was not sufficient.
In addition to providing R3000.00 monthly support for the
Plaintiff, the Defendant has also been covering school fees and
medical
aid for the entire family.
[7] She has a health
condition that requires regular medical treatment.
[8] If divorced, she
would need money for:
[8.1] groceries.
[8.2] the minor child’s
clothing.
[8.3] entertainment for
the minor child.
The family still stays
together in Mountain View.
[9]
She did not have any debts. Their house is paid up and so is the
Honda Ballad motor vehicle that she uses. She knows that the
Defendant has some debts whose details he
did not disclose to
her.
[10]
She holds the following qualifications: matriculation, a diploma in
Business Management, and an Advanced Certificate in Entrepreneurship.
She also enrolled with University of South Africa
to improve her qualifications but for financial reasons dropped out.
She took
the money that she was supposed to use for tuition fees and
used it to assist her adult son. The pension fund and retirement
annuity
are not in dispute. The Defendant is prepared to share them
with her.
[11]
The Plaintiff was the sole witness for her case. She had no witnesses
to call in support of her case. The testimony of the
Defendant
followed immediately after the Plaintiff had closed her case.
[12]
The Defendant, led by Advocate Botes, testified that, having married
the Plaintiff on 1 April 2000, two children, one a major
already and
the other still a minor, were born of the said marriage. The
Defendant had filed a counterclaim against the Plaintiff
in which he
had claimed, inter alia, custody and primary residence of the minor
child. In his evidence and on a question by Mr.
Botes, the Defendant
conceded that it would be in the best interest of the minor child if
its primary residence was awarded to
the Plaintiff.
Nevertheless,
he agreed to abide by the court's decision on the issue relating to
the child's primary residence.
[13] The Defendant was
against paying a sum of R7500 spousal maintenance for the Plaintiff
because of the conduct of the Plaintiff.
From 2014 up to the
day he testified he felt that he was no longer a husband at his
house. He and the Plaintiff have been living
in different rooms.
Secondly, the Plaintiff never washed his uniform. This was one of the
reasons he proffered why he was disinclined
to pay the Plaintiff
R7500.00 for spousal maintenance. He also testified that he will not
afford to pay the children R4500.00 each.
WHAT THE DEFENDANT DID
AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE DIVORCE SUMMONS
[14] Ever since he was
served with a copy of the combined summons initiating the divorce
action, he never stopped maintaining his
children and the Plaintiff.
He earns two different amounts per month. He earns between R47,000
per month and R52,000 per month
He pays:
[14.1] the Plaintiff
R5000 per month for groceries for the whole family.
[14.2] the Plaintiff
R3000 per month for her own use.
14.3] the two children
R1000 each per month. This money is paid directly into each child's
bank account.
[14.4] The whole family
is still on his medical scheme.
He
undertook to keep the children on his medical scheme.
Quite
clearly, the word “
children”
includes even the adult child. We have no evidence that this child
will accept this arrangement. His voice on this subject has
not been
heard. It is better that he be omitted from these arrangements, in
the absence of any input from him.
HIS TENDER
He
is prepared to continue paying the minor children R1000.00 per month
each.
Sometimes he buys his daughter clothes.
Seeing in this regard page 13-07 on case lines, the Plaintiffs
Capitec bank account. He
sends part of his registration fees to his
mother to pay.
Since
his wife stopped working in 2007, he has been responsible for paying
the water and electricity bills. Of course, it is to
be expected that
because since the Plaintiff has not been working since 2007, he
should be expected to pay all the municipality
debts.
The
wife has not tendered any evidence that she has been paying and has
also not denied that the Defendant pays for these utilities.
He is
prepared to retain his children on his medical scheme in accordance
with the Rules and Regulation of his medical scheme.
[17]
He pays for petrol for motor vehicles. In this regard the
Plaintiff has admitted that she drives a Honda Ballade.
She
needs petrol for it.
She has not testified that
she puts petrol into the motor vehicle with her own money.
She
has not testified that she receives money for petrol from other
sources. The court would accept that the Defendant covers petrol
and
maintenance costs for all vehicles. He also pays insurance covers for
all the motor vehicles.
[18]
He pays for the tracker and the insurance premiums for the motor
vehicles.
He also pays for the house insurance.
The
Plaintiff is not restricted to using the Honda Ballade. She has an
unhindered right to use the other motor vehicles.
He agrees to
divide their joint estate equally between them.
He
paid his son’s tuition fees through his wife.
AFTER
THE DIVORCE
[19]
Concerning their position after divorce, the Defendant requests to
stay in the common home for 3 months before moving out,
allowing his
wife and children to continue living there.
During
this period of three months, he will be expecting his employer to pay
out the Plaintiff’s one-half of her share of
his R7.7 million
pension. The Plaintiff is also entitled to 50% of his retirement
annuity.
[20] He does not want to
pay the costs of the divorce action. The Plaintiff claims spousal
maintenance for the rest of her life.
He resists this claim.
Since
2007, the family has had a housekeeper, even though the Plaintiff has
been unemployed during that time.
There is no
evidence as to why it was necessary for the family to have a
housekeeper while the Plaintiff was unemployed and available
to do
household chores and why she did not do any household chores.
According to him, if the Plaintiff receives half of his
pension benefits, she should not be entitled to any spousal
maintenance.
[22]
Plaintiff asked to be retained in the Defendant’s medical
scheme. The Defendant was not against her wish.
The issue was
that granting the wish would be inconsistent with the rules of his
medical scheme.
According to the medical scheme
rules, a member cannot retain, on his medical scheme, a person he is
not married to, unless such
a person is his descendant. Once it comes
to the knowledge of the employer that he is divorced, the Plaintiff
will be automatically
removed from his medical scheme.
[23]
Attempts to
mediate in the parties’ marital problems or to solve the
parties’ problems.
According
to the Defendant, he and the Plaintiff tried all steps to find a
solution to their marital problems.
They first used
counselling to resolve their disputes and then sought help from their
parents to address their issues.
By parents they
mean each party’s parents. Thirdly, they used church
counsellors for that purpose too. The elders came and
read the
principles of marriage to them, but still the Plaintiff was unmoved
in her resolve. He also tried to save their marriage
by talking to
his wife to solve their problems but doing that was like trying to
drain water from a rock. All else failed because
of the Plaintiff’s
determination not to solve their problems but to divorce him. The
Plaintiff seemed to have been encouraged
in this regard by the fact
that she had an older sister who had divorced and had come back home.
That is why she was not so keen
on solving their marriage.
He allocated two bank
cards to the Plaintiff to use. As far as he was concerned the
Plaintiff had unfettered use of those cards.
SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE
[25]
One of the issues that the parties requested the court to determine
was whether the Plaintiff is entitled to spousal maintenance.
One of
the fundamental principles concerning spousal maintenance is that
only a person in need can demand maintenance from someone
capable of
providing it.
To receive maintenance, one must claim it.
After
the divorce one spouse might have to continue providing financial
support to the other, especially if there are disparities
in their
incomes or when one spouse sacrificed his or her career opportunities
for the family. During the marriage spouses are
obliged to adequately
support the family through their work and assets. If one spouse
is entrusted with household management,
they usually fulfill their
maintenance obligations through it and often the associated care of
the children.
[26]
In her particulars of claim, the Plaintiff has claimed maintenance
for herself in the amount of R7500.00 per month.
The Plaintiff
has not specified the type of maintenance requested.
In
our law, there are four kinds of spousal maintenance, each one with
its own characteristics. These four kinds of spousal maintenance
are:
[26.1] token maintenance.
[26.2] interim
maintenance.
[26.3] rehabilitative
maintenance: and,
[26.4] permanent or
lifelong maintenance,
and each one of these
types is designed for a unique purpose.
Marriage
per se does not, however, automatically entitle a spouse to support.
I am satisfied that the Plaintiff neither requests token
maintenance nor seeks interim relief.
The
Plaintiff does not seek token maintenance because the divorce has not
been finalized.
She does not seek interim relief either
as it can only be requested in accordance with Rule 43 of the Uniform
Rules of Court. She
did not request interim maintenance during the
case. The opportunity to do so has come and gone.
[27]
Since there is no agreement under s 7(1) of the Divorce Act for the
Plaintiff's maintenance, the Defendant's support of the
Plaintiff
should be determined based on the principles embodied in s 7(2) of
the Divorce Act.
The parties’ failure to
reach an agreement in terms of s 7(1) of the Divorce Act has left the
door open for the court to exercise
its powers in terms of s 7(2) the
Act, which provides that:
“
In
the absence of an order made in terms of subsection (1) with regard
to the payment of maintenance by one party to the other,
the court
may, having regard to the existing or prospective means of each of
the parties, their respective learning capacities,
financial needs
and obligations, the age of each of the parties, the duration of the
marriage, the standard of living of the parties
prior to the divorce,
their conduct in so far as it may be relevant to the breakdown of the
marriage, and any other factor which
in the opinion of the court
should be taken into account, make an order which the court finds
just in respect of the payment of
maintenance by one party to the
other for any period until the death of remarriage of the party in
whose favour the order is given,
whichever may first occur”
[29]
S 7(2) articulates the principles that a court should apply when it
determines a defendant’s support obligation to his
wife.
All
objectives in s 7(2) must be considered when claiming spousal
support. In most marriages, the wife is still economically
disadvantaged.
It would thus be perverse in the
extreme to assume that the Parliament's intention in enacting the Act
was to penalize the women.
No single objective is paramount. With
these objectives Parliament intended that support reflect the diverse
dynamics of many unique
marital relationships.
[30] The starting point
in the application of the principles set out in section 7(2) of the
Divorce Act No. 70 of 1979(the Divorced
Act) is the existing or
prospective earning capacities of the parties. It is common cause
between the parties that the Plaintiff
is unemployed and has been so
unemployed since 2007. Strictly speaking, it means that apart from
working periods at Tshwane Municipality,
the Plaintiff did not have
any work, formal or informal. It therefore means that the Plaintiff
has not had any income. There is
no evidence on record about the
income she made while working at Tshwane Municipality. In the
circumstances, the conclusion is
inevitable that she does not have
the ability to support herself and secondly that she is entitled to
maintenance by the Defendant.
[31] The Defendant
himself recognized the fact that the Plaintiff had no source of
income and that, in the circumstances, she needed
maintenance from
him. The following evidence manifests that recognition:
[31.1] he allowed the
Plaintiff to use the Honda Ballade motor vehicle and bought her
petrol. As she was unemployed, the Plaintiff
could not put in petrol
in the said motor vehicle. There is no evidence that the Plaintiff
got petrol money from any other source.
[31.2] the Defendant
admitted that he paid the Plaintiff R 8000.00 per month, in other
words, R3000.00 for her own use and R5000.00
for groceries.
[31.3] furthermore he
testified that he and the Plaintiff shared credit cards of which the
Plaintiff had unfettered use.
[31.4] The Defendant can
pay the Plaintiff some form of rehabilitation maintenance.
[32]
Considering each party’s earning capacity in determining
spousal maintenance, it is evident that the Plaintiff has been
unemployed since 2007 and thus has no income.
At
the same time the Defendant is and has been so employed.
[33]
The Plaintiff was born on 7 October 1974, which means that she is 50
years and a few months old. No evidence has been placed
before the
court what influence this age may have on her chance of remarriage.
Naturally, her prospects for remarriage are negligible.
No
evidence was tendered regarding the prospect of being employed again.
She has no skill to rely on. No evidence by an Occupational
Therapist
about the prospect of ever been re-employed has been placed before
court. In these circumstances, the Court is unable
to determine the
future ability of the Plaintiff to be employed again in the open
labour market. The duty was on the Plaintiff
to satisfy the court
that she has no chance of ever being employed again and that she will
need to be maintained indefinitely.
She has some qualifications but
seemingly, those qualifications have not assisted her in the past to
secure any work.
In response to a question from the
Defendant's counsel, the Plaintiff informed the court that, following
the divorce, she plans
to engage in some form of business. She is
confident about finding self-employment. Therefore, despite the
divorce, all will not
be lost.
For as long as she
remains a divorcee and unemployed she may need maintenance. That does
not mean though that the Defendant must
support the Plaintiff
indefinitely. According to
EH v SH
2012
(4) SA 164
(SCA),
a person who seeks
maintenance must prove that she or he needs support from her or his
former spouse.
[34]
In van Wyk v van Wyk (136/05, ECJ27/06)
[2006] ZAECHC 15
(4 April 2006),
the
court stated that “a proper application of s 7(2) of the
Divorce Act “
involves a balanced
assessment of the maintenance needs and the ability to pay.”
First, the court must establish whether
the Plaintiff needs any maintenance and, if so, the next step is to
determine the ability
of the Defendant to provide the Plaintiff with
any maintenance.
As noted in paragraph [31] supra, the
Plaintiff needs maintenance. It is also evident that the Defendant
has the capability to provide
such maintenance.
[35]
The Plaintiff must acknowledge that the circumstances have now
changed and furthermore that she cannot continue
to live as she did
during their marriage. In
Kroon v Kroon
1986 (4) SA 616
(E),
the court emphasized this principle when it stated that:
“
The
parties are no doubt aware that in most cases persons who have become
divorced will be compelled by necessity to reduce their
standards of
living, for where the available means of support are not adequate to
maintain both according to their former scale
of living, each must of
necessity scale down his or her budget. In the case of most of us,
divorce brings a measure of hardship
or at least some degree of
deprivation. To say that two can live as cheaply as one is not true.
The fact of the matter is that
two living together can live more
cheaply than two living apart, for obvious reasons such as the need
for residence plus rate,
maintenance, service charges and all the
rest it; two cars plus the concomitant expenses in: two lots of
household goods to buy
and maintain, and so forth. The problem of
“indivisible” household expenses is a real one
…
...”
[36]
Prior to this divorce action, the parties seem to have lived a simple
life during which, as a family, they neither went on
holidays nor
visited restaurants.
The family visited an eatery only when
the Plaintiff took the children to purchase takeaways at Spurs
restaurants and Cash Bar.
There is no evidence that they visited
cinemas or took the children to any cinema. As shown above, the
Plaintiff drove a Honda
Ballade sedan and other motor vehicles while
the Defendant drove a Jeep and BMW motor vehicles. No evidence that
these three motor
vehicles were all or any of them were flashy motor
vehicles, was placed before court. There is no evidence that these
motor vehicles
were purchased new or second-hand.
[37.1] The evidence by
both parties has since established that after the divorce, the
Plaintiff will not be left destitute. In the
first place, the value
of the Defendant’s pension benefits is R 7.7 million, and he is
prepared to share it with the Plaintiff.
In the result, the Plaintiff
would be entitled to R 3.8 million of the said pension funds.
According to his own evidence,
it would take at least three
months after the divorce for the same amount of our R3.8 million to
be paid to her.
[37.2]
Secondly, the property where the family resides is valued at R1.4
million.
It is fully paid up. I must assume that
the house instalments were all paid up by the Defendant. The parties
were married for twenty-two
years.
The court must consider
this under s 7(2) of the Divorce Act.
The
Plaintiff has expressed a desire to retain the house and to live in
it with her children. Her intention is to pay out
one-half of
the value of the property to the Defendant so that she can retain it.
With such a windfall of R3.8 million, the
Plaintiff should be
able to buy out the Defendant and still have a handsome balance
remaining.
[37.3]
The Defendant still has an annuity.
The annuity's value is
unknown.
What is known, however, is that the
Defendant is prepared to share the value of the annuity with
Plaintiff.
[37.4] Moreover, the
Defendant has tendered payment:
[37.4.1]
of a sum of R5000.00 for groceries.
[37.4.2] of a sum of
R3000.00 for the Plaintiff’s own use.
[37.4.3] of a sum of
R1000.00 deposited into the minor child’s bank account.
[37.4.4] for the minor
child’s clothes.
[37.4.5] for the minor
child’s medical scheme; and,
[37.4.6] for the minor
child’s school fees.
[38] I am of the view
that a rehabilitative maintenance order will be fair to both parties
in this matter.
[39]
No dispute exists between the parties about the maintenance of the
minor child. It will be recalled that the Plaintiff
claimed
maintenance for the two children of the parties at R4500.009 each.
I already have pointed out that I cannot take
their representations
regarding the maintenance of the major child as his voice has not
been heard. The only dispute between the
parties is the amount of
maintenance that is required for the maintenance of the minor child.
The plaintiff claimed R4500.00 per month for the minor child’s
maintenance.
There is no evidential support for
this amount. No reason has been furnished by the Plaintiff why she
claims that amount for the
maintenance of the minor child.
On the other hand, the
Defendant objects to paying the amount of R4500.00 claimed by the
Plaintiff. The Defendant offers only R1000.00
per month. This is
understandable because the Defendant:[39.1] retains the minor child
on his medical scheme.
[39.2] has undertaken to
pay all the minor child’s school fees.
[39.3]
has undertaken to give the Plaintiff an amount of R5000.00 per month
for groceries.
This amount should also cover the minor child's
groceries.
[39.4] has undertaken to
pay an amount of R1000.00 per month into the minor child’s bank
account.
[40] In this case the
parties have properly not suggested that the conduct of either of the
parties in relation to the breakdown
of the marriage is relevant to
the maintenance issue.
I therefore make the
following order:
[1] A decree of
divorce is hereby granted.
[2] There shall be a
division of the joint estate.
[3] Both parents share
parental rights and responsibilities regarding the minor child.
[4] The primary care
and residence of the minor child, as contemplated in
section 18(2)(a)
of the
Children's Act 38 of 2005
are hereby awarded to the Plaintiff,
subject to the following conditions:
[4.1] The Defendant
shall have the right to remove the minor child every alternative
weekend commencing at 17h00 on Friday and ending
at 17h00 on Sunday
afternoon.
[4.2] The Defendant
may collect the minor child and take her to school and collect her
after school at her school, if so, arranged
between the parties.
[4.3] The Defendant
may collect the minor child from school every Wednesday for her to
stay over at the Defendant’s home,
in which case the Defendant
shall see to it that the child's homework is attended to and that the
Defendant takes the minor child
back to school every Thursday
morning.
[4.4] The short school
holidays to alternate between the parties. For the purposes hereof,
short school holidays shall refer to
the school holidays which take
place during March/April and September/October each year.
[4.5] The long school
holidays to be shared equally between the parties with Christmas and
New Year to alternate between the parties.
For purposes hereof, long
school holidays shall refer to the school holidays which take place
during June/July and December/January
each year.
[4.6]. The long
weekend and public holidays which do not form part of a school
holiday to alternate between the parties.
[4.7]
The minor child's birthday is to be alternated between the parties.
Alternatively, the parties should arrange practical measures.
[4.8] The Defendant
shall be entitled to regular, structural, predictable and unfettered
telephonic/ electronic contact with the
minor child.
[4.9] Any further
contact can be mutually arranged between the parties, provided that
such contact shall not interfere with the
minor child’s
scholastic, religious and extracurricular and/or extra-mural
activities.
[5] The Defendant is
hereby ordered to pay the Plaintiff's spousal R7500.00 (Seven
Thousand Five Hundred Rand) per month for a period
of five years
commencing from the date of this order.
[6] The Defendant is
hereby ordered to pay an amount of R1000.00(One Thousand Rands) per
month into the minor child’s bank
account. Payment of this
amount into the manual child’s bank account shall cease on the
said child becoming a major.
[7]
The sums of R7500.00 and R1000.00 mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6
must be paid by the 7th day of the month after the final divorce
is
granted, and then on the 7th day of every subsequent month.
[8] Payment of the
amounts mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 supra shall be made directly
into the bank accounts of the relevant recipient.
[9] The spousal
maintenance for the Plaintiff, as set out in paragraph 5 above, shall
increase by 8% a year as from the anniversary
date of the final order
of divorce and shall be discharged in terms of clause five (5) above.
[10] The Plaintiff
shall obtain her own medical aid with the same plan and benefits of
the defendant and the very liable to pay
for such medical aid sweet
for a period of five years from the date on which this Order is made.
[11] The minor child
shall remain on the Defendant's medical aid until the minor child
reaches the majority.
12] The Defendant
shall be responsible for all school and tertiary costs for the minor
child’s education until the said child
becomes a major.
[13] The Plaintiff is
entitled to 50% of the Defendant’s Tshwane Municipality Pension
Fund Number(unknown) in terms of
section 1
of the
Divorce Act No. 70
of 1979
. Tshwane Municipality Pension Fund is hereby ordered to pay
the Plaintiff an amount equal to 50% of the value of the Defendant’s
pension interest calculated up to the date of this Order.
[14] The Defendant is
a member of the Central Retirement Annuity Fund Plan Number: 0[...]
The Plaintiff is, by virtue of the provisions
of
s 1
of the divorce
Act 70 of 1979, entitled to 50% of the Defendant’s Retirement
Annuity with the Central Retirement Annuity
Fund Plan. The Central
Retirement Annuity Fund is hereby ordered to pay Plaintiff an amount
equal to 50% of the Defendant’s
Retirement Annuity interest
calculated as at the date of divorce.
PM
MABUSE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT, PRETORIA.
Appearances
:
Counsel for the
Plaintiff:
Adv C van Der Merwe
Instructed by
Messrs J W Wessels
& Partners.
Counsel for the
Defendant:
Adv A Botes.
Instructed
by
:
Messrs Shapiro &
Ledwaba Inc;
Dates heard:
2-3 September 2024:
10 October2024.
Date of Judgment:
26 February 2025.
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