Case Law[2025] ZAGPPHC 651South Africa
Jordaan and Another v Le Roux and Others (070088/23) [2025] ZAGPPHC 651 (20 June 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
20 June 2025
Headnotes
“There is no onus on the respondents but an evidentiary burden on them to show that the provisional order is resisted on bona fide and reasonable grounds. If the Respondents succeed in doing so, the provisional order should be discharged and the application
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Jordaan and Another v Le Roux and Others (070088/23) [2025] ZAGPPHC 651 (20 June 2025)
Jordaan and Another v Le Roux and Others (070088/23) [2025] ZAGPPHC 651 (20 June 2025)
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case Number: 070088/23
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED: YES/NO
DATE
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
JOHANNES
CHRISTIAAN HERMANUS JORDAAN
FIRST APPLICANT
RUAAN
OOSTHUIZEN
SECOND APPLICANT
and
NICO LE
ROUX
FIRST RESPONDENT
KOBUS VAN DER WESTHUIZEN
N.O.
SECOND
RESPONDENT
SELBY MUSAWENKOSI
NTSIBANDE N.O.
THIRD RESPONDENT
and
JACOLIEN FRIEDA BARNARD
N.O. FIRST INTERVENING APPLICANT
RICHARD MASOANGANYE
N.O. SECOND INTERVENING APPLICANT
JUDGMENT
Moila, AJ
Introduction
[1]
There are two applications before this court. The first application
is an opposed application
for final sequestration of the First
Respondent on the basis that he committed an act of insolvency in
terms of section 8(g) of
the Insolvency Act
[1]
,
as he is unable to pay the first applicant an amount of R8,012,198.00
and the second applicant, R1,824,457.00. The First Respondent's
estate was placed under provisional sequestration on 26 July 2023.
The rule nisi was extended until 10 March 2025 on the opposed
roll.
The second application is an application to intervene by two
intervening applicants. The intervening applicants seek leave
to
intervene in the application for sequestration against the First
Respondent.
[2]
The first Respondent appeared in person and opposed the application.
The first Respondent submitted
that he had never acted in his
personal capacity when he signed the acknowledgement of debt but had
always acted on behalf of the
companies. It is the companies that
were under stress and have been liquidated. He is not insolvent.
[3]
As foreshadowed above, the intervening Applicants are applying to be
granted leave to intervene
in the application for sequestration
against the first respondent. They submitted that an amount of
R3,429,769.42 and R1,734,000.68
was transferred from the third
Respondent, Companies IPG Main Sales and IPG Properties, to the First
Respondent’s bank account.
In total, the First Respondent owes
both companies R5,163,770.10.
The parties.
[4]
The first and second Applicants are creditors and respective
investors of capital into the trade
and business of the first
Respondent pursuant to a verbal agreement and acknowledgement of debt
concluded between the parties.
[5]
The First Respondent is an adult male, married out of the community
of property to Anna Magrieta
Le Roux, residing at 40 Glen Eagle
Drive, Silver Lakes Golf Estate, Pretoria. He was the sole director
of IPG Properties (PTY)Ltd
and IPG Properties main sales and
collectively traded in the name and style of “IPG”.
[6]
The second and third Respondents were appointed as provisional
liquidators of IPG properties.
[7]
The intervening Applicants are appointed liquidators in the insolvent
estate of IPG Main Sales
(Pty) Ltd, duly appointed by the Master and
confirmed on 27 September 2023 at the first meeting of creditors.
Background and facts
[8]
The first Respondent was the sole director of both IPG Properties
(Pty) Ltd and IPG Main Sales
(Pty) Ltd. The first Respondent and the
two companies collectively traded as “IPG” and operated a
Ponzi-type, unregulated,
and unlawful investment scheme. They all
used the same address: 4[…] G[…] E[…] Drive,
Silver Lakes Golf Estate,
Pretoria.
[9]
The first Respondent solicited and accepted investments from the
general public (hereinafter referred
to as "Investors") to
advance the unlawful scheme. The first Respondent entered into verbal
agreements with the first
and second Applicants. The terms of the
agreement were to the effect that the Applicants would deposit money
into the first Respondent's
Standard Bank account number 1[…].
It was agreed that the first Respondent would use this money to
purchase immovable property
at a price below market value and then
immediately sell the property for a profit.
[10]
Generally, the agreement stipulates that the first Respondent, after
selling the immovable properties, will
increase the capital by
approximately 30% within roughly three months and pay out the
capital, along with the predetermined profit,
on a fixed date.
[11]
The payment terms of the verbal agreements were documented through an
acknowledgement of debt. This document
outlined the agreed-upon
capital investment and specified the amount of profit that would be
paid in the future. The acknowledgement
of debt binds both the first
Respondent and IPG as co-principal debtors, making them jointly and
severally liable to the investor.
[12]
The first applicant claims the return of the capital amount of R
8,012,198.00. The second applicant, in the
same manner, made the
respective investments with the first respondent and claims a
cumulative amount of R1 824 457.00.
[13]
IPG Main Sales (Pty) Ltd was placed under final liquidation on 11
July 2023, and IPG Properties (Pty) Ltd
was liquidated on 22 August
2023.
On 17 July 2023, the
applicants launched an urgent application seeking to place the first
respondent in provisional sequestration.
On 26 July 2023, the first
respondent was placed in provisional sequestration. The first
respondent only filed his opposing affidavit
on 25 October 2023.
[14]
The applicants have served the provisional sequestration order to the
following entities: the Master of the
High Court, SARS, on the first
respondent via the sheriff,
on the employees of the
first respondent via the sheriff, on the trade unions of the first
respondent via the sheriff, applicants
published the provisional
sequestration order in the Beeld newspaper and in the Government
Gazette.
[15]
The applicants are seeking the final sequestration of the first
respondent's estate. Liquidators in the insolvent
estate of IPG Main
Sales (Pty) Ltd, duly appointed by the Master of the High Court on 26
July 2023 and confirmed on 27 September
2023 at the first meeting of
the creditors, are applying for leave to intervene in the main
sequestration application brought by
the applicants against the first
respondent. The first Respondent transferred an amount of R
3 429 769.42 and R 1 734 000.68
from the
companies IPG Main sales and IPG Properties to his personal bank
account.
Submissions by
Applicants
[16]
Applicants’ counsel submitted that on 8 May 2023, a letter of
demand was sent to the first Respondent
via e-mail by the Sheriff.
They demanded payment of the money invested. The first Respondent
failed to honour the payment obligation
but instead gave notice of
his inability to pay. Counsel asserted that the first respondent is
factually insolvent.
[17]
Mr. de Leeuw averred that the first Respondent is indebted to eight
known creditors. On the first Respondent's
own version, he is also
indebted to MFC in the amount of R 250,000.00. The first
Respondent does not own any immovable property.
He owns the following
movable property:
17.1
GWM P Series with registration number J[…]
17.2
Kia Sportage with registration number X[…];
17.2
Radical tops future trailer with registration number J[…].
Therefore, the first
Respondent’s liabilities, fairly estimated, exceed his assets,
fairly valued.
[18]
The Applicants’ Counsel argued that once
a
prima facie
case is established, it falls to the first Respondent to rebut it by
drawing a full, true and accurate picture of what his assets
and
liabilities are. Counsel referred the court to
Hannover
Reinsurance Group Africa (PTY) Ltd and another
[2]
, where the court held:
“
There
is no onus on the respondents but an evidentiary burden on them to
show that the provisional order is resisted on bona fide
and
reasonable grounds. If the Respondents succeed in doing so, the
provisional order should be discharged and the application
dismissed.”
[19]
The Applicants’ Counsel further submitted that the first
Respondent’s defence is that he is not
insolvent. However, he
failed to present concrete evidence before the court to fully prove
his financial position, including the
assets he owned and the extent
of his creditors.
[20]
Counsel referred the court to what was stated by Wallis J (as he then
was) in
First
Rand Limited v Evans
;
[3]
“…
where
the conditions prescribed for the grant of a provisional order of
sequestration are satisfied, then, in the absence of some
special
circumstances, the court should ordinarily grant the order. It is for
the Respondent to establish the special or unusual
circumstances that
warrant the exercise of the court’s discretion in his or her
favour.”
[21]
Mr. de Leeuw further argued that the first Respondent made
allegations that he sold the GWM P Series motor
vehicle, but did not
explain when and how it was sold. The more likely scenario might be
that the first Respondent is attempting
to dispose of his assets.
That also constitutes an act of insolvency in terms of section 8 (c)
of the Insolvency Act.
[22]
Counsel further averred that the first Respondent does not deny that
the applicants invested money in his
business. The first Respondent
signed the acknowledgements of debt stating that they were jointly
liable to Mr JCH Jordan.
[23]
The Applicants’ Counsel referred this court to a WhatsApp
message sent by the first respondent to the
first applicant which was
confirmed by the first respondent’s legal representative (the
passage translated from Afrikaans
to English) reads as follows:
“
Good
afternoon, client. As you know, many of my payments are behind, and I
am struggling to pay on time. My business is going through
a lot of
stress at this stage, but I want to reassure everyone that I will
settle all the arrears, as well as people who want their
capital back
by the end of May. My legal advisor and I are sorting things out.
Rest assured that the payments will be made.”
[24]
Counsel concluded that if the court grants final sequestration, it
will be to the advantage of all creditors.
The requirements of
granting a final sequestration have been satisfied by the Applicants.
First Respondent’s
submissions
[25]
The first Respondent submitted that he acted on behalf of the
companies when the acknowledgement of debt
was signed. He never bound
himself as a co-principal debtor. The Standard bank accounts belonged
to the companies and were not
his personal bank accounts. The
WhatsApp messages are not of a personal nature.
[26]
The Applicants must claim against the second and third Respondents as
the companies have been liquidated.
The first Respondent is not
indebted to the applicants, nor did he sign or conclude any
agreements with the Applicants. No court
of law found that the first
Respondent conducted a Ponzi scheme. The first Respondent submitted
that the Applicants contracted
and signed agreements with the
companies.
[27]
The first Respondent further submitted that he does not own any
immovable properties, and his companies are
liquidated. Consequently,
there is no discernible benefit for creditors, nor is there a valid
reason to believe that the sequestration
of the first Respondent‘s
estate would serve to their advantage.
[28] He
concluded that there is absolutely a real and bona fide dispute of
facts in this matter, and the parties
must orally explain the terms
of the AOD and the WhatsApp message. The application must be
dismissed with costs or referred
for oral evidence.
Intervening Applicants
submissions
[29]
Intervening Applicants request that the first Respondent's affairs be
liquidated and be placed under the
supervision of the Master because
the first Respondent is unable to pay his debts and is, in fact,
insolvent. Alternatively, the
first Respondent has committed an act
of insolvency as defined in section 8 of the Insolvency Act.
[30]
Counsel averred that they have locus standi because they were duly
appointed liquidators in the insolvent
estate of IPG Main Sales (Pty)
Ltd, duly appointed by the Master of the High Court on 26 July 2023
and confirmed on 27 September
2023 at the first meeting of the
creditors.
[31]
Counsel for the intervening parties further submitted that they
support the Applicants’ application
that the first Respondent
be finally sequestrated and his estate be placed in the hands of the
Master. It will be to the advantage
of the creditors to secure and
protect the remaining assets therein.
[32]
Counsel also argued that the first Respondent had opposed the
intervening application but failed to file
an opposing affidavit.
They have served the application on the first Respondent’s
employees, the first and second applicants,
SARS, and the Master of
the High Court and obtained security from the Master. The first
respondent owes both companies, the creditors,
a total of R
5,163,770.10.
[33] In
conclusion, Counsel submitted that the court grants them leave to
intervene in the first and second applicants’
application for
sequestration against the first respondent.
Issues in dispute
[34]
From the above discussions, this court is enjoined to determine the
following disputed issues:
(a)
Whether the applicants had provided sufficient evidence to satisfy
the requirements of section
12 of the Insolvency Act to declare the
first respondent insolvent?
(b)
Should leave be granted to the intervening applicants to intervene in
the application to declare
the first Respondent insolvent?
Legal principles and
discussions
[35]
Section 12 of the Insolvency Act deals with the final sequestration
or dismissal of a petition for sequestration. It
outlines the
procedures after a provisional sequestration order is made,
determining whether to proceed with final sequestration
or dismiss
the petition. Section 12 of the Act provides as follows :
Final
Sequestration
(a) If the
court is satisfied that the estate should be sequestrated, it will
issue a final sequestration order. This
order makes the
sequestration official and irrevocable.
Dismissal of Petition
(b) If the
court is not satisfied that the estate should be sequestrated, it
will dismiss the petition. This means
the sequestration
proceedings are terminated, and the debtor's estate remains
unaffected.
Requirements for a
final order of sequestration
[36] In
terms of section 12(1) of the Act, the applicants must satisfy this
court that:
(a) they have
established a liquidated claim against the respondent of not less
than R100,00;
(b) the respondent
has committed an act of insolvency or is, in fact, insolvent; and
(c) there is reason
to believe that it will be to the advantage of creditors if the
respondent’s estate should be sequestrated.
[37
It is trite that the applicants bear the
onus
of proof in
respect of each of these requirements.
[38]
Section 8 of the Insolvency Act serves as a tool for creditors to
compel the sequestration of
a debtor's estate, even without proving
the debtor's actual inability to pay their debts. In terms of section
8, the debtor commits
an act of insolvency if:
a)
The debtor leaves the Republic with the intent to delay or evade
payment of debts.
b)
The debtor cannot satisfy the judgment granted against them, and the
Sheriff finds no property
to attach and execute to satisfy the
judgment.
c)
Debtor conceals or disposes of property with the intent to defraud
creditors.
d)
Debtor removing property with the intention of prejudicing creditors
e)
Debtor fails to comply with a court order for the surrender of their
estate, even if they
are capable of doing so.
f)
Debtors give written notice to creditors that they are unable to pay
their debts.
g)
The debtor is a trader who has given notice in the Gazette in terms
of section 34(1) and
is, therefore, unable to pay all his debts.
h)
The Debtor, being a trader, unable to pay debts after notice of
transfer of business.
[39]
In
Meskin
& Co v Friedman
the
court held that
[4]
the
degree of proof necessary to satisfy this requirement was considered.
Roper J, as he then was, stated the following;
“
Under
sec. 12, which deals with the position when the
rule nisi
comes up for confirmation, the Court may make a
final
order of
sequestration
if it ‘is satisfied’ that there is
such reason to believe. The phrase ‘reason to believe’,
used as it is
in both these sections, indicated that it is not
necessary, either at the first or the
final
hearing, for the
creditor to induce in the mind of the Court a positive view that
sequestration
will be to the financial advantage of creditors.
At the
final
hearing, though the Court must be
‘satisfied’, it is not to be satisfied that
sequestration
will be to the advantage of creditors, but only that there is
reason to believe that it will be so. In my opinion, the facts put
before the Court must satisfy that there is a reasonable prospect -
not necessarily a likelihood, but a prospect which is not too
remote
- that some pecuniary benefit will result to creditors. It is not
necessary to prove that the insolvent has any assets.
Even if there
are none at all, but there are reasons for thinking that as a result
of enquiry under the Act, some may be revealed
or recovered for the
benefit of the creditors, that is sufficient.” (my emphasis).
[40]
The first requirement for granting the relief is that the unpaid part
of the liquid claim must exceed R100.00.
The first respondent
was unable to pay the first Applicant an amount of R8,012,198.00 and
the second Applicant R1,824,457.00. The
Applicants have satisfied the
first requirement. They demanded payment, but nothing was
forthcoming.
[41]
The first Respondent committed an act of insolvency contained in
section 8(f) of the Insolvency Act by giving
a notice in writing to
his creditors that he was unable to pay any of his debts as per the
WhatsApp message relied on by both the
first and second
Applicants.
[5]
[42]
The first Respondent also committed another act of
insolvency in terms of section 8 (c) of the Insolvency Act. He made
allegations
that he sold the GWM P Series motor vehicle but did not
provide an explanation on when and how it was sold. It seems to me
that
he was attempting to dispose of his assets.
[43] I
am satisfied that the Applicants have met the second requirement. The
first respondent committed acts of
insolvency in terms of sections
8(c) and 8(f) of the Insolvency Act.
[44] In
terms of section 12(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act, the court must be
satisfied that there is reason to believe
that it will be to the
advantage of creditors of the debtor if his estate is sequestrated.
[45]
Actual advantage to creditors need not be established. All that has
to be established is that there is reason
to believe that there will
be an advantage. This belief must be predicated upon facts which
engender that belief and does not need
to be established on a balance
of probabilities.
[46]
The Applicants are not the only creditors. The first Respondent also
owes his companies, which are liquidated,
and eight other known
creditors.
In
Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v Hawker Air Services
(Pty) Ltd and Hawker Aviation Partnership and others
[6]
Held that the court need not be satisfied that there will be
advantage to creditors in the sense of immediate financial benefit
but that the court need be satisfied only that there is reason to
believe-not necessarily a likelihood, but a prospect not too
remote
-that as a result of investigation and inquiry assets might be
unearthed that will benefit creditors.
[47]
The first Respondent was the sole director
of both IPG Properties (Pty) Ltd and IPG Main Sales (Pty) Ltd. The
first respondent and
the two companies collectively traded as “IPG”
and operated a Ponzi-type unregulated and unlawful investment scheme.
[48]
The first Respondent entered into verbal
agreements with the first and second Applicants. The Applicants would
deposit money into
the first Respondent's Standard Bank account. The
first Respondent will use this money to purchase immovable property
at a price
below market value and then immediately sell the property
for a profit.
[49]
The first Respondent signed the
acknowledgements of debt stating that they were jointly liable to Mr
JCH Jordan, the first applicant.
The fact that he is not personally
liable is hereby rejected
.
I
now turn to consider the application to intervene
[50] A
party seeking to intervene in a final sequestration application must
demonstrate that it has a direct or
substantial interest in the
subject matter. The intervening parties have
locus standi
to
intervene in the application because they were appointed as
liquidators of IPG Main Sales (Pty) Ltd. The second and third
respondents
also support the sequestration application. The first
respondent owes both companies a total of R 5 163 770.00.
[51]
The first Respondent had opposed the intervening application but
failed to file an opposing affidavit. The
intervening parties have
served the application on the first Respondent’s employees, the
first and second Applicants, SARS,
and the Master of the High Court
and obtained security from the Master.
[52] In
my view, the interest of justice demands that leave be granted to the
intervening applicants. Consequently,
leave is hereby granted to the
intervening parties to join the applicants’ application to
declare the first respondent insolvent.
[53] I
am satisfied that the first Respondent committed acts of insolvency,
and there is a reasonable prospect
that some pecuniary benefit will
result to creditors and that, as a result of the enquiry, some assets
may be revealed or recovered
for the benefit of the creditors.
Costs
[54]
Costs will be costs in the sequestration.
Order
[55] I
therefore make the following order:
1.
Leave to intervene is granted to the first
and second intervening Applicants.
2.
The Provisional sequestration order dated
26 July 2023, the
rule nisi
is confirmed, and the first respondent is finally sequestrated,
3.
The applicants’ and intervening
applicants' costs to be cost in the first respondent's insolvent
estate on scale C
N.L
MOILA
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
Delivered:
20 June 2025. This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge
whose name is reflected and is handed down electronically
by
circulation to the parties and their legal representatives via email,
as well as by uploading it to the electronic file of this
matter on
Caselines.
Counsel for the
applicant: R de Leeuw
Instructed by: CDJ INC
Counsel for the
intervening applicants: Z Schoeman
Instructed by: Mathys
Krog Attorneys
Counsel/attorney for
first respondent: CAVR Inc. Attorneys
Counsel/Attorney for
second and third respondent: Matthys Krog Attorneys
[1]
Act
24
of 1936 (as amended).
[2]
2012
(1) SA 125
(GSJ) para 58.
[3]
2011
(4) SA 597
(KZD) at para 28.
[4]
1948
(2) SA 555
(W)
at
558-559
.
[5]
See
above at paragraph 23.
[6]
[2006] ZASCA 51
;
2006
(4) SA 292
(SCA) at para 29.
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