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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## SB Guarantee Company (RF) (Pty) Ltd v Nonqane (24569/20)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 1300 (28 November 2025)
SB Guarantee Company (RF) (Pty) Ltd v Nonqane (24569/20)
[2025] ZAGPPHC 1300 (28 November 2025)
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sino date 28 November 2025
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION. PRETORIA
CASE
NO.: 24569/20
(
1) REPORTABLE:
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED
DATE:
28/11/2025
SIGNATURE:
In
the matter between:
SB
GUARANTEE COMPANY (RF) (PTY) LTD
Plaintiff
[Registration
Number: 2006/021576/07)
and
PHENYO
LOYISO BENJAMIN NONQANE
Defendant
[Identity
Number: 6[...])
JUDGMENT
EASTES
AJ:
[1]
This is an opposed application. The Plaintiff gave Notice of
Intention to amend its
Particulars of Claim. The Defendant delivered
a Notice of Objection thereto. The Plaintiff then launched this
application in terms
whereof, it seeks leave to amend its Particulars
of Claim. The application is opposed by the Defendant.
[2]
For the purposes of this judgment the salient chronology are as
follows:
[3]
On 8 June 2020, the Plaintiff instituted an action against the
Defendant and the Plaintiffs
Summons was served on the Defendant's
domicilium citandi et executandi
address by way of sheriff on
22 June 2020; and
[4]
On 12 October 2021, the Defendant entered an Appearance to Defend to
the instituted
action, but failed to deliver a Plea and/or an
Exception and/or Notice to Strike Out within the 20 (twenty) day
period allowed
for doing so; and
[5]
On 24 August 2023, a Notice of Bar was served, calling upon the
Defendant to deliver
his Plea within 5 (five) days from service
thereof, failing which the Defendant shall be in default of filing
such Plea and ipso
facto barred.
[6]
On 19 October 2023 the Defendant served a Plea; and
[7]
On 26 March 2024, the Plaintiff proceeded to serve a Notice of
Intention to Amend
its Particulars of Claim on the Defendant.
[8]
In terms of the Plaintiffs Notice of Intention to Amend, the
Plaintiff indicated that
it intends to amend its Particulars of Claim
as follows:
"1. By
deleting paragraph 3.3 in its entirety and replacing it with a new
paragraph 3.3, to read as follows -
3.3 The Loan
Agreement forming the subject matter of this action was concluded
within the above Honourable Court's area of
jurisdiction."
[9]
On 24 May 2024, the Defendant proceeded to deliver a Notice of
Objection, to the Plaintiffs
Notice of Intention to Amend.
[10]
The Defendant objected to the amendment on the following grounds:
"1. The
Defendant objected to the Plaintiff's first attempt to amend its
Particulars of Claim when it wanted to delete
paragraph 3.3 which
reads as follows:
3.3 The
immovable property forming the subject matter of this action is
situated within the above Honourable Court's area
of jurisdiction.
2.
The Defendant objected to the attempt to amend the Plaintiff's
Particulars of
Claim through a notice delivered on 16 November 2023.
3.
On 26 March 2024, the Plaintiff purported to withdraw its 'Notice of
Intention
Amend in terms of Rule 28 filed on Caselines on 26 October
2023'.
4.
On the same day, 26 March 2024, the Plaintiff issued the second
unsigned Notice
of Intention to Amend the same Particulars of Claim,
an exercise that would entail deletion of paragraph 3.1 and its
replacement
with a new paragraph reading as follows:
'The loan agreement
forming the subject matter of this action was concluded within the
above Honourable Court's area of jurisdiction.'
5.
The Defendant vehemently objects to the amendment of the Plaintiff's
Particulars
of Claim and the reasons given in objecting to the first
attempt still stand.
6.
The Defendant's reasons for objecting to the second attempt to amend
the Plaintiff's
Particulars of Claim are as follows:
6.1
The notice issued by the Plaintiff is unsigned which renders it
invalid. It is invalid because
of the absence of a signature. A copy
is marked "X" and attached to this notice.
6.2
The Plaintiff is trying to cancel the Defendant's special plea issued
on 19 October 2023
by amending its Particulars of Claim dated 2 June
2020 wherein the Defendant argues that the immovable property, which
is the subject
of the Plaintiff's action, is not situated within the
above Honourable Court's area of jurisdiction.
6.3
The Plaintiff is attempting to avoid admitting to the truth that the
location of the immovable
property (Erf 9[...]) is Grahamstown in the
Makana Municipality, Division of Elbony, Province of the Eastern Cape
and it is not
within the area of jurisdiction of the above Honourable
Court.
6.4
It is worth noting that the Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that
the immovable property
is situated outside the area of jurisdiction
of the above Honourable Court as it has provided the property's
description in its
Particulars of Claim.
6.5
The Plaintiff's Summons was signed on 2 June 2020 and it only raised
the issue of amending
its Particulars of Claim for the first time
three (3) years and four (4) months later and this happened after the
Defendant raised
the issue of a lack of jurisdiction of the above
Honourable Court.
6.6
The Defendant vehemently objects to the Plaintiff's attempt to
incorrect position the above
Honourable Court as having jurisdiction
to hear its case through the backdoor.
6.7
Since the immovable property does not fall within the Jurisdiction of
the above Honourable
Court, the Plaintiff has to take its case to the
correct court which is the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court of
the Republic
of South Africa which is situated in
Grahamstown/Makhanda.
6.8
The Plaintiff has not issued a Notice of Withdrawal of the first
Notice of Bar it issued
and yet wants the Defendant to agree to the
amendment of its Particulars of Claim when he is already said to be
ipso facto barred.
7.
The Plaintiff is abusing court process by attempting to amend,
withdrawing the
Notice of Intention to Amend when challenged and
attempting to amend the same page again.
8.
It appears the Plaintiff is on a desperate mission to disregard the
Uniform Rules
of the Court."
NO
VALID OBJECTION TO THE AMENDMENT:
[10]
From the chronology the Defendant was barred from pleading. This is
confirmed by the Defendant
in paragraph 6.8 of his Notice of
Objection to the amendment. There were some debate in Court whether
or not the Defendant was
barred or whether the bar was uplifted by
agreement. The debate was based on a letter that was written by the
Plaintiff's attorney
shortly after receiving the plea. In terms of
this letter it was indicated that the Plaintiff was willing to
"suspend"
the bar whatever that means. It appears that no
agreement was reached to the effect that the bar be uplifted by
agreement and,
accordingly the Defendant remained barred from
pleading, because the Plaintiff did not consent to the upliftment of
the bar. The
Defendant also did not obtain an order in terms if
Uniform Rule 27 that uplifted the bar.
[11]
In
Manufacturing Engineering & Related Services Sector
Education and Training Authority v Dr Joseph Qhinaphi Mhlaba
(033076/2022)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1039 (18 September 2023),
the court
held to the effect that after a party is barred, that party must if
the other party does not consent, apply to court
in terms of Uniform
Rule 27 to uplift the bar and, only once that is done, will that
party be given an opportunity to be allowed
back and participate in
the case.
[12]
In
Ntoko Charmaine Petunia N.O. v Road Accident Fund
(2024/073741) [20241 ZAGPJHC 1042 (16 October 2024)
, the
court, held to the effect that where a Defendant did not launch an
application to have a bar uplifted, and neither applied
for
condonation for the delivery of a Plea, but instead relied upon the
mistaken proposition that a bar is automatically lifted
with the
filing of a Notice of Intention to Amend, such a Defendant made such
an election at his, her or its own peril.
[13]
If the Defendant, or any Defendant for that matter was barred, and
such a Defendant has not successfully
applied for relief uplifting
the bar in terms of Uniform Rule 27, then such Defendant is barred
from participating in the case
further. Such a Defendant will be
disqualified from pleading and, in this matter before the Court, from
objecting to the Plaintiff's
proposed amendment, whilst barred.
[14]
In
Qhamakoane v Road Accident Fund (19131/2020) /20241 ZAGPPHC
795 (12 August 2024),
the court reasoned differently. The
Court
inter alia
found the following:
"If a party has
been barred from pleading, they have the option of bringing an
application in terms of Rule 27 to uplift the
bar, but same can also
be 'uplifted' by agreement between the parties. In my view, this does
not pertain to a situation where the
Plaintiff, by his conduct,
through amending the Particulars of Claim, 'invites' the Defendant
back into litigation by re-opening
the pleadings, as the Defendant
had been barred to the pre-amendment pleadings and not to the
re-opened and amended pleadings.
Therefore, in my view, it is not
necessary for the Defendant to bring an application to uplift the
bar, but through the amendment,
attains the right to plead to the
amended Particulars of Claim."
[15]
I do not agree with the finding of the court in
Qhamakoane
.
In my opinion the judgment is wrong on the point in question. If the
opposition party does not consent to the upliftment of the
bar, then
the only manner in which the barred party can achieve the upliftment
of a bar is by way of a successful application in
terms of Uniform
Rule 27(3).
[16]
Therefore, I find that if a Defendant is barred from pleading, and
whilst being barred, a Plaintiff
proceeds to give notice of its
intention to amend its Particulars of Claim, that does not
automatically uplift the bar, or give
the Defendant a right to
participate in the litigation. The parties in this matter appears to
have been unaware of this and proceeded
with the litigation, and not
addressing the bar issue.
[17]
There was never a valid lawful objection to the amendment and.
therefore no reason for the application.
In my view the Plaintiff can
proceed to apply for judgment by default. To dismiss the application
on that basis will not do justice
to the parties in this matter.
There has already been lengthy delays in this matter. The Defendant
appeared in person and he is
a lay person. He travelled from the
Eastern Cape to come and argue the application. This Court therefore
proceed to deal with the
application on the basis that the Defendant
was not barred, but by doing so, it does not mean the Defendant is
not barred.
THE
PLEADING OF JURISDICTION:
[18]
In paragraph 3 of the initial Particulars of Claim the Plaintiff
averred facts why this Court
has jurisdiction. Based on the specific
averred facts, the Defendant delivered the Defendant's Plea despite
being barred as indicated
above. In terms of the plea, the Defendant
inter alia
attacked the jurisdiction of this Court based
squarely on the facts as averred by the Plaintiff in paragraph 3 of
the initial Particulars
of Claim.
[19]
The Plaintiff then indicated its intention to amend paragraph 3 of
its Particulars of Claim.
The Defendant delivered a Notice of
Objection to the proposed amendment. This ultimately culminated in
the opposed application
before this Court. The claim is a contractual
claim and the amendment relates only to the pleading of jurisdiction
in the self-standing
paragraph 3 of the initial Particulars of Claim.
[20]
In High Court litigation there is no obligation on a litigant to in
its Particulars of Claim
aver facts in support of jurisdiction as one
must do in Magistrates Court litigation to disclose a cause of
action. A High Court
is empowered to exercise jurisdiction over a
matter, or to assume jurisdiction over a matter based upon the
averred particularity
in a Particulars of Claim. When dealing with a
contractual claim as in this matter, Uniform Rule 18(6) dictates that
the Particulars
of Claim must contain specific particularity, failing
which it will be deemed to be an irregular step as envisaged in
Uniform Rule
18(12).
[21]
In this case, the Particulars of Claim in paragraphs 4 and 5 complies
with Uniform Rule 18(6)
in that it averred what is required by the
aforesaid rule and a copy of the agreement was annexed. It was
expressly averred that
the loan agreement was concluded at Pretoria.
Ex facie
the annexed loan agreement it is evident that it was
signed and concluded by the Defendant in Pretoria. The Defendant in
court
during argument also conceded that he signed the loan agreement
in Pretoria. There is no objection by the Defendant to the averments
in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Particulars of Claim.
[22]
The agreement was concluded at Pretoria. Pretoria is within this
court's territorial area of
jurisdiction. Consequently, this court
has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the contractual claim in this
matter by virtue of Section
21(1) of the Superior Court Act, Act 10
of 2013, on the basis that the cause of action arose within this
Courts territorial area
of jurisdiction [See.
Moodley v Nedcor
Bank Ltd
[
2007
]
SCA 27
(RSA)
].
[23]
The averred allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Particulars of
Claim is and was sufficient
for jurisdiction, or for this Court to at
this stage assume jurisdiction over the matter. It was not necessary
for the Plaintiff
to have embarked upon giving notice of its
intention to amend paragraph 3 of its Particulars of Claim. Paragraph
3 of the Particulars
of Claim is superfluous because of paragraphs 4
and 5 thereof. It is not the Defendants objection in his plea or in
this application
that the Particulars of Claim is vague and
embarrassing.
AN
UNSIGNED NOTICE OF INTENTION TO AMEND:
[24]
The Defendant also objected to the amendment on the basis that the
Notice of Intention to Amend
that was served and received by him from
the sheriff was an unsigned Notice of Intention to Amend. The
Plaintiff has a different
view and is of the view that the Notice of
Intention to Amend was indeed signed by the Plaintiff. This is a
trivial issue. It does
not take the matter any further. To bring such
trivial matter into play after the lengthy delays already in this
matter, will be
in neither party's interest. There is no prejudice to
the Defendant.
THE
AMENDMENT WILL DEPRIVE THE DEFENDANT OF A DEFENCE:
[25]
The Defendant also objected to the amendment on the basis that if it
to be granted, it will render
the Defendant's defence being the
attack on the jurisdiction of this court academic. This is not so.
There is no challenge to paragraph
4 and 5 of the Particulars of
Claim as above.
CONCURRENT
JURISDICTION:
[26]
The Defendant further objected to the amendment on the basis that
this court does not have jurisdiction,
by virtue of the fact that the
relevant immovable property forming the subject matter of the
execution order, falls within the
territorial area of jurisdiction of
another court. It is common cause that the immovable property is
situated in the Eastern Cape
Province.
[27]
However, the fact that the immovable property is situated in the
Eastern Cape Province and, therefore
within the jurisdiction of
another Court, does not mean that this Court does not have
jurisdiction. It is reported in
Moodley
above that the
Supreme Court of Appeal at paragraph [4] held as follows:
"[4]
Following the rescission of the order, the Appellant filed a plea and
counterclaim on 2
February 2004. In his special plea, he alleged that
the Pretoria High Court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because
the property
was situated within the province of KwZulu-Natal
and also because his chosen domicilium
citandi et executandi was there. The special plea was clearly
bad because the Pretoria High Court obviously had jurisdiction
over
the matter on the basis that the
cause of action
arose there - inexplicably however, on 31 May 2004, the Respondent
withdrew the action and paid the Appellant's wasted cost."
This is therefore also not a basis for opposing the amendment. (Own
Emphasis)
THE
LATENESS ISSUE:
[28]
Lastly, the Defendant objected to amendment because of the lateness
of the amendment. The action
has been ongoing for three years and
four months at the time the objection was delivered. A delay on its
own is not necessary a
ground for the refusal of an amendment (see
Mabaso v Minister of Police,
1980 (4) SA 310
(W)
]. The
delay in this matter is not such that the amendment should be refused
on that basis.
CONCURRENT
JURISDICTION:
[29]
In this matter, another court may have concurrent jurisdiction with
this Court. In
Standard Bank of SA Ltd & Others v Thobejane
& Others; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Gqurana N.O. & Another,
2021 (6) SA 403
(SCA),
the Supreme Court of Appeal held to
the effect that a court is obliged by law to hear any matter that
falls within its jurisdiction
and, a court has no power to exercise a
discretion to decline to hear a matter on the ground that another
court has concurrent
jurisdiction. A Plaintiff as the
dominus
litis
party choose whichever forum may have jurisdiction and, he,
she or it cannot be faulted for exercising that available election.
CERTAIN
GENERAL PRINCIPLES:
[30]
A court hearing an application for an amendment has a discretion
whether or not to grant it and,
that discretion must be exercised
judicially. The primary object of allowing an amendment is to obtain
a proper ventilation of
the disputes between the parties, to
determine the real issues between them, so that justice may be done.
[31]
An amendment will
inter alia
not be allowed if the application
to amend is made
mala fide
or if the amendment will cause the
other party such prejudice or injustice as cannot be cured by an
order or costs and, where appropriate,
a postponement. [See
MacSteel Tube & Pipe, a division of MacSteel Service
Centres SA (Pty) Ltd v Vowles Properties (Pty) Ltd (680/2020)
[
2021
]
ZASCA 178 (17 December 2021)
].
[32]
In conclusion, the loan agreement relied upon was concluded in
Pretoria, and therefore within
this Courts territorial area of
jurisdiction. To dismiss the application at this late stage, on the
basis that it was never necessary
to have brought the application,
will be in neither parties interest, and accordingly the Plaintiffs
application is granted.
COSTS:
[33]
Turning to the aspect of costs. Uniform Rule 28(9) of the Uniform
Rules of Court
inter alia
indicates that a party giving notice
of amendment in terms of subrule (1) shall, unless the court
otherwise directs, be liable
for the costs thereby occasioned to any
other party. The court has a discretion when it comes to matters of
costs. The grant of
an amendment is an indulgence to the party
requiring it and, therefore generally that party is liable to pay the
costs.
[34]
In this matter the Plaintiff was legally represented. The Defendant a
lay person appeared in
person. Because of what transpired in this
matter as dealt with above it is just and equitable that there be no
order as to costs.
[35]
The following order is issued:
[35.1] The Plaintiff is
granted leave to amend its Particulars of Claim as set out in its
Notice in terms of Uniform Rule 28(1)
dated and signed 26 March 2024
(Annexure "FA5" to the Founding Affidavit).
[35.2] There will
be no order as to costs.
J
EASTES
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
PRETORIA
For
Plaintiff:
Adv
M Rakgoale
Instructed
by: Van Hulsteyns Attorneys
In
Person the Defendant:
Phenyo
Loyiso Benjamin Nonqane
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