Rens and Another v Illegal and Unlawful Occupiers, Invaders and Trespassers of the Properties known as the Remaining Extent of Portion 2 of the farm Hammanskraal 112 JR and Portion 76 of Portion 2 of the farm Hammanskraal 112 JR, Province of Gauteng and Others (2025/234250) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1366 (22 December 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPPHC 1366 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Rens and Another v Illegal and Unlawful Occupiers, Invaders and Trespassers of the Properties known as the Remaining Extent of Portion 2 of the farm Hammanskraal 112 JR and Portion 76 of Portion 2 of the farm Hammanskraal 112 JR, Province of Gauteng and Others (2025/234250) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1366 (22 December 2025) Rens and Another v Illegal and Unlawful Occupiers, Invaders and Trespassers of the Properties known as the Remaining Extent of Portion 2 of the farm Hammanskraal 112 JR and Portion 76 of Portion 2 of the farm Hammanskraal 112 JR, Province of Gauteng and Others (2025/234250) [2025] ZAGPPHC 1366 (22 December 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2025_1366.html sino date 22 December 2025 FLYNOTES: EVICTION – Land invasion – Urgent interdict – Entered land without consent – Removed fenceposts – Demarcated plots and erected structures – Advertised land for sale – Threatened violence when confronted – Conduct constituted unlawful self help – Inability of police to intervene without a court order left no alternative remedy – Clear right as registered owners and ongoing harm requiring protection demonstrated – Application granted. IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA) Case No : 2025-234250 (1) REPORTABLE: NO (2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3) REVISED DATE: 22 DECEMBER 2025 SIGNATURE In the matter between: CHRISTINA ELIZABETH FRANCINA RENS First Applicant TLOTLISO PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD Second Applicant and THE ILLEGAL AND UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS, INVADERS AND TRESPASSERS OF THE PROPERTIES KNOWN AS THE REMAINING EXTENT OF PORTION 2 OF THE FARM HAMMANSKRAAL 112 JR AND PORTION 76 OF PORTION 2 OF THE FARM HAMMANSKRAAL 112 JR, PROVINCE OF GAUTENG First Respondent THE STATION COMMANDER: HAMMANSKRAAL POLICE STATION Second Respondent THE MINISTER OF POLICE Third Respondent MOKGATLHI JAKKALAS KEKANA Fourth Respondent ANNAH MMAPULA MALULEKA Fifth Respondent JACKSON KHETLHA MAWELA Sixth Respondent SYLVESTER THEBE MASENYA Seventh Respondent MASWASEBONA SONAS MATHEBULA Eight Respondent SIPHO NHLENGANI NKUNA Ninth Respondent SIMON MAKAU KEKANA Tenth Respondent JONAS MOTSAMAYI MADISE Eleventh Respondent MOLEFE HARRY KEKANA Twelfth Respondent THABANG MAHLANGU Thirteenth Respondent ARTHUR KHOZA NGWENYA Fourteenth Respondent DINAH MASENYA Fifteenth Respondent DAVIS LETHAMAGA KEKANA Sixteenth Respondent MATSOBANE SIMON MAKHAFOLA Seventeenth Respondent FRANCE RABBIE MOKWALA Eighteenth Respondent SELLO DICKIE MONARE Nineteenth Respondent JOSHUA KHOLISILE TAFENI Twentieth Respondent PETROUS MOTAUNG Twenty-first Respondent ISHMAEL LETEANE Twenty-second Respondent SOLLY PUKANE MADINGWANE Twenty-third Respondent JUDGMENT MINNAAR AJ: INTRODUCTION: [1] The application came before me in the urgent court and concerns the sensitive issues of land ownership and land entitlement. The applicants seek relief in the form of an anti-intrusion interdict. [2] In the founding affidavit, the first respondent was cited as the illegal and unlawful occupiers, invaders and trespassers of the properties known as the Remaining Extent of Portion 2 of the Farm Hammanskraal 112 JR and Portion 76 of the Portion 2 of the Farm Hammanskraal 112 JR, Province of Gauteng (‘the applicants’ properties’). [3] A notice of intention to oppose was filed by the first respondent on 4 December 2025. The first respondent also delivered an answering affidavit. Chief Mokgatlhi Jakkalas Kekana, the presiding chief of the Amandebele A Moletlane Tribal Council, deposed to this answering affidavit. [4] In terms of the applicants’ replying affidavit, the citation of the first respondent was further addressed. In this regard, it is the case of the applicants: a. At the time the founding affidavit was prepared, the first applicant did not have any knowledge of who the illegal and unlawful occupiers, invaders and trespassers of the applicants’ properties were. It was impossible to obtain any personal details of the individuals forming part of the first respondent, and the Sheriff was also unsuccessful in obtaining any details as to these individuals. b. It was only in the answering affidavit that the individuals, forming part of the first respondent, were identified for the first time. This detail was obtained from the first respondent’s answering affidavit and from annexure JK3 thereto. [5] Following the revelation in the answering affidavit, the applicants moved for an amendment to their notice of motion to encapsulate the details of all the individuals forming part of the first respondent. [6] On this aspect, the Full Court of this Division held in Mtshali and others v Masawi and others 2017 (4) SA 632 (GJ) with reference to the judgments in Rabie v De Wit [2013] JOL 30203 (WCC) at paras 15-16 and De Lange and Another v Eskom Holdings Ltd and Others 2012 (1) SA 280 (GSJ) at 27, that: ‘ [196]  In the present case the appellants prevented the owners from identifying who they were or their number. The omission to do so however has repercussions with regard to the effectiveness of service and who actually brought the application for rescission since, save for those who deposed to supporting affidavits, the appellants were not individually identified. [197]   The citation of a group in a generalised manner has the potential for creating uncertainty and can be prejudicial. In matters involving workers in labour disputes or communities, the practice developed of citing the group as the party, presumably on the basis that it was an association of persons as contemplated under rule 14 or was sufficiently analogous to one. However the safeguard in applications brought by the group was to attach to the main affidavit a list of  the individual members which set out their full names, whether they headed a household and if so how many in the household (if applicable), their identity numbers and the individual signatures of all adults. [198]   Moreover service on groups or those who resist personal service is effected by either entering the building in question and affixing the documents served on each individual door to a unit or structure erected and if entry is prevented then by reading the notice or order over a loud hailer and pinning the process to the principal door, the main gate or on a notice board. Service therefore complies with the rules and condonation does not arise. However in such cases it may be preferable to make use of a loud-hailer as well. [199]    Although no point was made of it, I am satisfied that there would have been no difficulty in the court condoning ex post facto the method of citation. Case law recognises that a formal application for condonation may not be necessary and that non-compliance may be condoned even if there is no formal application. ’ [7] The first respondent did not object to the requested amendment, and there would be no prejudice to them if the amendment were granted. In the premises, the amendment sought in this regard is granted. [8] In the answering affidavit, the first respondent raised the following preliminary points: a. The application is not urgent. b. Condonation for the lateness of the answering affidavit. [9] Condonation for the lateness of the answering affidavit is hereby granted, and as such, this aspect needs no further attention. URGENCY: [10] From the applicants’ supplementary affidavit, it is evident that the application was initially set down in the urgent court on 9 December 2025. Due to the late filing of the answering affidavit, the application was adjourned to 11 December 2025 to facilitate a proper exchange of the papers. On 11 December 2025, the court raised a concern that the application might fall within the jurisdiction of the Land Claims Court, and the application was removed from the roll to allow the applicants to obtain proof that there is no land claim over the property. The applicants delivered the supplementary affidavit on this issue and re-enrolled the application for 17 December 2025. Due to the unavailability of the first respondent’s counsel, the application was allocated to be heard on 19 December 2025. [11] In paragraphs 74 to 85 of the founding affidavit, the applicants explicitly dealt with their grounds of urgency. The urgency is premised on threats of violence, the prevention of a potential land grab and invasion, and the marketing of land to which the first respondent is not entitled. The first respondent’s response to these paragraphs is a bare denial. [12] By way of a preliminary point, the first respondent submits that the application is not urgent, as the applicants can still obtain substantial redress in due course. It is further stated that the South African Police Service (‘SAPS’) can address threats of violence. According to the first respondent, the urgency is self-created by the applicants in raising issues of security and unhabitable land. [13] The first respondent provides no undertaking that its members will cease any unlawful actions. There is no pertinent denial that the first respondent is conducting themselves in a violent and threatening manner. On a reading of paragraphs 34 and 35 of the answering affidavit, paragraphs 1 to 31 of the founding affidavit are admitted, and paragraphs 32 to 73 are noted and thus uncontested. These paragraphs address ownership of the applicants’ property and the unlawful acts committed by the first respondent. [14] I am satisfied that the applicants have made out a case for urgency and that they would not be able to obtain substantial redress in due course. The SAPS attempted to assist, but their legal department ultimately informed the applicants that they needed a court order to remove the trespassers from the applicants’ properties. Accordingly, the application is treated as urgent. JURISDICTION: [15] In the first respondent’s heads of argument, and during the oral submissions, the aspect of jurisdiction was raised. The first respondent submits that this court lacks jurisdiction because the application involves a dispute over land ownership relating to historical facts, which can only be determined by the Land Claims Court. The applicants cannot obtain an interdict without first addressing, historically and legally, the disputed ownership of the land. [16] The challenge to the jurisdiction of this court was not raised by the first respondent in the answering affidavit, nor by way of a Rule 6(5)(d)(iii) notice. On the contrary, the jurisdiction of this court to entertain this application was explicitly admitted in the answering affidavit. [17] It is not proper for a party to raise jurisdiction through its heads of argument or by way of oral submissions. [18] In the premises, on the first respondent’s own admission, this court has jurisdiction to entertain this application. RELIEF SOUGHT: [19] From a reading of the affidavits, it is common cause that the applicants’ properties are lawfully owned and registered in the name of the first applicant. [20]               As stated, the applicants seek an urgent anti-intrusion order to halt the respondents’ (excluding the second and third respondent): a.    Imminent land invasion. b.    Acts of unlawful self-help; and c.    Violent obstructionism and further threats of violence. [21] The material facts giving rise to the relief sought are undisputed . The first respondent admits that: a.    They entered upon the properties without the consent of the owners. b.    They demarcated stands, erected structures, and advertised the properties for sale. c.    No one is currently occupying any of the properties permanently; however, there is a clear intent to do so in the future. d.    Attempts by the applicants to secure and protect the properties were met with threats of violence and intimidation; and e.    The members of the first respondent persisted in these acts despite warnings and despite the intervention of the South African Police Service (‘the SAPS’). [22] It is the applicants’ undisputed case that the events that led to this urgent application are: a. In September 2025, an advertisement wall was erected, purportedly marketing the applicants’ properties for sale. b. On 5 November 2025, a TLB operator was unlawfully working on properties. c. The matter was reported to the SAPS, and between 5 and 11 November 2025, Warrant Officer Motswene was in contact with the applicants. d. On 12 November 2025, 40 of the applicants’ fenceposts were unlawfully removed, painted white, and used to demarcate ‘plots’ on Portion 2.  This was again reported to the SAPS. e. When the SAPS arrived at the site, an altercation developed between the unlawful trespassers, the applicants’ security, and the police.  The SAPS informed the applicants’ security not to pursue the matter further, and the applicants then desisted from further engagement. f. On 17 November 2025, the applicants were informed by Warrant Officer Motswene that the unlawful trespassers were even shown documents reflecting the applicants’ ownership and the 2016 order, yet they still refused to vacate. g. The applicants were then advised to erect a fence to demarcate the boundaries clearly. The applicants attempted to arrange for a fence to be erected and for the unlawful trespassers to be peacefully removed from the property, all with the assistance of the SAPS.  Since 20 November 2025, the applicants have attempted to arrange with the SAPS to do so. h. Arrangements were finally made to erect a fence and to remove the individuals peacefully with the assistance of the SAPS on 27 November 2025 . i. The removal of the unlawful structures and trespassers and the erection of a new fence was set to commence on 28 November 2025, with the blessing and assistance of Sergeant Kotu, SAPS, and the Public Order Policing.  However, and quite alarmingly, on this day, a wooden structure (commonly known as a ‘Wendy House’) was found on site. On the structure was a sign: ‘Site Office’. j. On 28 November 2025, four extremely aggressive individuals emerged from this ‘site office’ who informed the SAPS and the applicants’ security that if anything is removed from the property, such conduct will be met with violence. It was made clear, in no uncertain terms, that if any person even attempts to remove the ‘site office’ or any of the unlawful trespassers, there will be violent retaliation . k. On Friday, 28 November 2025, the legal representatives of the SAPS informed the applicants that the SAPS will not proceed with the removal of these trespassers from the site without a ‘fresh’ court order. The applicants then consulted with counsel, and the urgent application was issued. [23]               The conduct of the respondents (excluding the second and third respondent) constitutes classic unlawful self-help, which our courts have repeatedly held cannot be tolerated in a constitutional democracy. [24]               In the matter of City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Unknown Individuals Trespassing and Others (2019/25865) [2023] ZAGPJHC 265; [2023] 2 All SA 670 (GJ) (22 March 2023), with reference to the reported judgment of Mbangi & Others v Dobsonville City Council 1991 (2) SA 330 (W), his Lordship Justice Spilg J held that: “ The rule of law decries the use of power or force whether it is to take the property of another or to take the law into one’s own hands without due process. In short no-one is above the law, neither the spoliator who acts unlawfully and commits a criminal offence or an owner who without a court order evicts a person who is in possession of his or her property. The keeping of public order is threatened in both instances and in both instances the conduct is unlawful in the broader sense. It cannot be correct that the least violent outcome wins the day because that would undermine the foundation of the rule of law and invite a state of lawlessness. The rule of law requires compliance with the law not an abdication to power or anarchy; whether its source be government or individual groups. Moreover the Preamble to the Constitution adopts the foundational principle that “every citizen is equally protected by law”, s 1(c) provides for the “(s)upremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law”. and s 12(1)(c) expressly protects the right to freedom and security of person which includes the right to be free from all forms of violence “from either public or private sources” [25] The first respondent’s principal answer is not a factual dispute about the invasion or the unlawful conduct. Instead, they raise historical allegations relating to a land claim purportedly lodged under the Restitution of Land Rights Act, 22 of 1994 (‘the Restitution Act’) . [26]               These allegations neither establish a competing title nor alter the applicants’ present, registered ownership. [27] For the present purpose, the land claim issues are not just irrelevant to this urgent interdict ; they are legally incapable of assisting the first respondent.  Section 11(7) of the Restitution Act is clear: A pending land claim does not: a.    Divest the applicants of ownership. b.    Effect a transfer of rights. c.    Entitle anyone to take occupation pending adjudication; or d.    Authorise trespass, invasion, or obstruction. [28]               The first respondent’s reliance on historical claims, therefore, does not give rise to any defence to the relief sought. [29]               The applicants are not seeking to pre-empt, undermine, or decide any issues under the Restitution Act. [30] If a land claim exists, it must follow its own statutory process before the Commission or the Land Claims Court. The only purpose of this application is to ensure that the rule of law is upheld while that separate process runs its course. [31]               The applicants seek nothing more than to: a.    Preserve their property from unlawful occupation. b.    Prevent further self-help and unlawful construction. c.    Restore the status quo ante . d.    Prevent the first respondent from marketing the properties as being for sale to unsuspecting members of the public; and e. Ensure that disputes about historical land restitution are adjudicated in the correct forum: not through force, threat, or unilateral action on the ground. REQUIREMENTS FOR A FINAL INTERDICT: [32]  The requirements for a final interdict are well settled: a.    a clear right. b.    an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended. c.    absence of an alternative remedy. Clear right: [33]  The first applicant is the registered owner of the properties, and the second applicant is the incumbent owner of Portion 76. [34] Section 25(1) of the Constitution states that “ no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property” and consequently the occupation of another person’s property would constitute an arbitrary deprivation of one’s property which is not permitted in terms of the Constitution. [35]  Even if a land claim exists, the Supreme Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that title remains vested in the registered owner until a court orders restoration or compensation. A pending claim does not authorise trespass. This is also echoed in the provisions of section 7 of the Restitution Act, which provides: “ (7) Once a notice has been published in respect of any land- (a)       no person may in an improper manner obstruct the passage of the claim; (aA)     no person may sell, exchange, donate, lease, subdivide, rezone or develop the land in question without having given the regional land claims commissioner one month's written notice of his or her intention to do so, and, where such notice was not given in respect of- (i)                  any sale, exchange, donation, lease, subdivision or rezoning of land and the Court is satisfied that such sale, exchange, donation, lease, subdivision or rezoning was not done in good faith, the Court may set aside such sale, exchange, donation, lease, subdivision or rezoning or grant any other order it deems fit; (ii)                    any development of land and the Court is satisfied that such development was not done in good faith, the court may grant any order it deems fit; (b)       no claimant who occupied the land in question at the date of commencement of this Act may be evicted from the said land without the written authority of the Chief Land Claims Commissioner; (c)        no person shall in any manner whatsoever remove or cause to be removed, destroy or cause to be destroyed or damage or cause to be damaged, any improvements upon the land without the written authority of the Chief Land Claims Commissioner; (d)       no claimant or other person may enter upon and occupy the land without the permission of the owner or lawful occupier.” [36]  In the Full Court of City of Cape Town v Johannes Rooyen and Another (Case No A23/2025) [2025] ZAWCHC (31 October 2025), it was held as follows: ‘ [29]      It is common cause that the City’s ownership of the impugned properties is not in dispute. The respondents did not challenge the City’s’ ownership. The City has a right to protect its properties. A landowner is entitled to protect its property from being intruded upon by way of seeking an interdict. The interdict dismissed by the Court a quo was intended to protect the clear right of ownership that vests in the City. The City contended that the respondents’ conduct, if allowed to continue unabated and in the absence of a Court order, will render it unable to utilise the properties in furtherance of its mandate, inter alia, to provide housing to its Citizens. [30] ... [31]      This repossession of land led the City to apply for an anti-intrusion interdict against the respondents. The first respondent seems to proceed from the assumption that these erven belong to the Khoi-San people by virtue of an alleged historical dispossession. I appreciate the respondents' plight; however, if the respondents are allowed to continue repossessing land as they do, they are likely to slow down, or even halt, the orderly planning and development of housing and the provision of other services that the City is constitutionally mandated to provide. [32]      The City has a constitutional obligation to realise housing rights progressively, subject to available resources. Self-help of this nature cannot be tolerated. The City has a responsibility to identify beneficiaries for the housing opportunities in a fair and equitable manner in accordance with its allocation. [33]      Importantly, for as long as the City’s properties remain threatened by unlawful occupation, the City’s plans to develop the area and realise the rights to housing for its citizens are accordingly at risk. The Court a quo's finding that interdicts of this nature usurp the Court's power is erroneous and unsustainable. Anti-intrusion interdicts are granted by the Courts exercising judicial oversight in deserving cases. Such interdicts aim to prevent further unlawful invasions. Crucially, such interdicts can only be granted where the requirements of a final interdict have been established. [34]      The order that the City sought did not authorise evictions. It explicitly prohibited the City from evicting any person or demolishing any occupied structures after the order was granted. The purpose of the order was to protect a constitutionally entrenched right to property. The Court’s power is not usurped by granting an anti-land intrusion interdict, nor does granting such an order undermine constitutional protection. The Court a quo's finding that the order the City's sought empowered it to evict without judicial oversight is completely misplaced and untenable. The City approached the Court to protect its rights. Ownership of land is protected by several common law remedies available to owners, including a prohibitory interdict, which the City sought. [35]     In Chief Lesapo v Northwest Agricultural Bank and Another [1999] ZACC 16 ; 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC) at para 22 , Mokgoro J pointed to some of the consequences that section 34 and the rule of law seek to avoid when she stated: ‘ The right of access to Court is indeed foundational to the stability of an orderly society. It ensures the peaceful, regulated and institutionalized mechanism to resolve disputes, without resorting to self-help. The right of access to Court is a bulwark against vigilantism, and the chaos and anarchy which it causes. Construct in this context of the rule of law and the principle against self-help in particular, access to Court is indeed a cardinal importance. As a result, very powerful considerations will be required for its limitation to be reasonable and justifiable’ (footnote omitted). [36]      Furthermore, the effect of the Court a quo’s finding that there is a fundamental conceptual, legal and constitutional difficulty with anti-land-intrusion interdicts effectively precludes any landowner from seeking to protect its property from intrusion by way of an interdict. This finding, with respect, is at variance with the right envisaged in section 25, read with section 34, of the Constitution. In the absence of an anti-land invasion interdict, the owner will not have recourse against the arbitrary deprivation of his property. If the City is denied the right to approach the Courts for relief in similar circumstances, it would be denied the rights of access to the Court as envisaged in the Constitution. Expressed differently, the City, as the owner of the land, has the right to free and undisturbed possession and not to be deprived of possession without a Court order. ( City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Unknown Individuals Trespassing and Others [2023] 2 All SA 670 (GJ) para 38.) [37]      In summary, courts are routinely faced with urgent applications concerning mass land invasions that significantly affect both state-owned and private land. Addressing these issues is crucial for upholding property rights and ensuring the rule of law. In such cases, Courts normally grant anti-land intrusion interdicts provided that the requirements for interim or final interdicts have been established. The applicant is the owner of the impugned properties. As owner, the applicant is entitled to the exclusive use of its property and to provide housing in terms of its constitutional obligations. This is a right not lightly to be interfered with by a Court, even where a statute authorises this ( Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) at 390H-I). [38]      In my view, unlawful invasion of property results in a deprivation of property under section 25(1). The preamble of the PIE Act underscores the provisions of section 25(1) of the Constitution. It acknowledges that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. The preamble also recognises that no one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished without an order of Court made after considering all the relevant circumstances.’ [37]  Our jurisprudence strictly prohibits self-help. The Constitutional Court confirmed in Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security 2014 (5) SA 112 (CC) that private individuals may not resort to self-help and must follow lawful processes. At paragraph 17, Madlanga J wrote: “ Specifically on self-help and thus more on point, in Vena Milne JA expressly approved a statement by Friedman J in the court of first instance, which read as follows: “ It is a fundamental principle of our law that a person may not take the law into his own hands, and a statute should be so interpreted that it interferes as little as possible with this principle.” [38]  The respondents’ conduct of invading land, pegging stands, erecting structures, threatening violence, and purporting to sell land is a textbook example of unlawful self-help. [39]  The first respondent seems to suggest that their land claim justifies their conduct. There are numerous fundamental difficulties for the first respondent on the pleadings: a.    There is no convincing proof attached to the actual land claim. b.    The title deed, annexed as annexure JK1, considered in light of the judgment of Amandebele-Ba-Lebelo Traditional Council v Kekana 2014 JDR 0792 (GNP), casts serious doubt over the first respondent’s locus standi in relation to the title deed. c. The documents annexed as Annexure JK2, at best, relate to Portion 14 Farm Hammanskraal 112 JR – not once is Portion 2 or Portion 76 mentioned in these documents. [40]  But even on a benevolent interpretation of the pleadings, assuming there is a land claim under the Restitution Act, it does not confer: a.    any right to occupy land; b.    any interim possessory rights; c.    any suspension of ownership; or d.    any right to prevent the lawful owner from protecting its property. [41]  Even if a valid land claim exists, section 11(7)(d) explicitly prohibits the first respondent’s members from entering the properties without the permission of the owners. [42]  Accordingly, even if the respondents had shown a valid claim (which they have not), the Restitution Act provides no defence to an application to restrain unlawful conduct. An Injury Actually Committed or Reasonably Apprehended: [43]  It is common cause that there is ongoing unlawful trespassing, threats of violence, demarcation of stands, and attempts to sell or allocate land which demonstrate actual and continuing injury. No alternative remedy: [44]  SAPS was willing to assist the applicants, but their intervention has proven insufficient. [45]  The applicants had no other remedy available to them. They are forced to obtain an order to restrain self-help on this scale. COSTS: [46]  The applicants seek a costs order against the respondents (excluding the second and third respondents), jointly and severally. [47]  The court must unequivocally condemn unlawful self-help and threats of violence to prevent anarchy in the sensitive matter of land. No undertaking was given to desist until the alleged claim for the land was finalised. The conduct of the respondents (excluding the second and third respondents) is in direct breach of the provisions of section 11(7) of the Restitution Act. Punitive costs would be justified under these circumstances. CONCLUSION: [48]  The applicants have made out a case for a final interdict. [49]  The first respondent and its members have no lawful basis to interfere with the applicants’ properties. Their conduct constitutes ongoing unlawful self-help, which must be decisively restrained. ORDER: In the premises, the following order is made an order of court: 1. The first, fourth to twenty-third respondents and all unlawful invaders and/or occupiers of THE PROPERTIES KNOWN AS  THE REMAINING EXTENT OF PORTION 2 OF THE FARM  HAMMANSKRAAL 112 JR AND PORTION 76 OF  PORTION 2 OF THE FARM HAMMANSKRAAL  112 JR, PROVINCE OF GAUTENG are to remove markings demarcating vacant stands and to break down and remove building material from stands on which building work has not commenced and/or is not complete within 24 hours of this order being granted. 2. In the event that the above materials are not removed voluntarily, the Sheriff is authorised to break down and remove the following within 48 hours from the date in paragraph 2 above: 2.1. The wooden structure designated as a ‘site office’; 2.2. The advertisement wall purportedly advertising stands for sale; 2.3. Material demarcating vacant stands; 2.4. Any and all other unlawful structures erected on the property; and 2.5. Building material on stands on which building work has not commenced and/or where building work is incomplete. 3. The first, fourth to twenty-third respondents and all unlawful invaders and/or occupiers of THE PROPERTIES KNOWN AS THE REMAINING EXTENT OF PORTION 2 OF THE FARM  HAMMANSKRAAL 112 JR AND PORTION 76 OF  PORTION 2 OF THE FARM HAMMANSKRAAL  112 JR, PROVINCE OF GAUTENG are ordered to vacate the said properties within 24 hours of this order being granted. 4. In the event of the first, fourth to twenty-third respondents and all occupiers not having vacated the properties by the date set above, and in the event of the Sheriff or his Deputy or sub­contractor having been tasked to carry out this order, the Sheriff or his Deputy or sub-contractor, with the assistance of the South African Police, if necessary, is authorised and ordered to: 4.1. Effect a r emoval of the occupiers from the properties; 4.2.          Demolish and remove any and all unlawful structures found on the properties; 4.3.          After the removal of each such structure, the Sheriff is ordered to secure and store such materials for a period of 30 days to enable the remainder of the occupiers to collect same from the sheriff's office, failing which the sheriff or his deputy or sub­ contractor may dispose of same to defray expenses; 4.4. The Sheriff of this Court, or his lawfully appointed Deputy or sub-contractor, is authorised to remove any person from the properties, prevent any construction fro m taking place at the properties, prevent any building materials from being delivered to the properties and removing any structures erected at the properties. 5. The Sheriff or his lawfully appointed Deputy or sub-contractor is authorised to approach the South African Police Service for whatever assistance he may require in the circumstances, and the South African Police Service is required to give whatever assistance that may be required by the Sheriff. 6. That the applicants are granted leave, with supplemented papers, to approach this Court for an order seeking the variation of any terms of this order, if it is equitable to do so. 7. Costs to be paid by the first, fourth to twenty-third respondents, jointly and severally,  on an attorney and client scale. Minnaar AJ Acting Judge of the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria Heard on                                      : 19 December 2025 For the Applicants                        : Adv. M Louw Instructed by                                : Barnard Inc Attorneys For the First Respondent             : Adv. BMWM Maila Instructed by                                : Morero & Moeketsi Inc Date of Judgment                        : 22 December 2025 sino noindex make_database footer start