Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 586South Africa
Osaleye v Minister of Home Affairs and Another (061261-2024) [2024] ZAGPPHC 586 (28 June 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
28 June 2024
Headnotes
as follows:
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Osaleye v Minister of Home Affairs and Another (061261-2024) [2024] ZAGPPHC 586 (28 June 2024)
Osaleye v Minister of Home Affairs and Another (061261-2024) [2024] ZAGPPHC 586 (28 June 2024)
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA)
Case No.
061261-2024
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED
DATE:
28 JUNE 2024
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
KEHINDE
ISAAC OSALEYE
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
First
Respondent
THE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL: DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS
Second
Respondent
This
matter was heard virtually (MS TEAMS) and disposed of in terms of
the directives issued by the Judge President of this
Division. The
judgment and order are accordingly published and distributed
electronically.
JUDGMENT
KUBUSHI
J
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The applicant, who is a Nigerian national, entered the Republic of
South Africa through OR TAMBO
International Airport, with an
intention to apply for asylum. He left Nigeria his country of origin,
due to the constant terrorist
attacks by unknown gunmen, who invaded
their community. Having entered the country, he was issued an asylum
visa which allowed
him to visit the refugee reception office to apply
for asylum. The application was denied and he was arrested in terms
of section
34(1) of the Immigration Act.
[1]
He is currently in detention at the Lindela Repatriation Centre,
awaiting deportation to Nigeria.
[2]
The applicant is before this court on urgency, seeking an order in
the following terms: that the
application be treated as urgent and
the court dispense with the normal forms and services in accordance
with the provisions of
Rule 6(12); that the first and second
respondents (“the respondents”) be interdicted from
deporting him until his status
under the Refugees Act,
[2]
alternatively the Refugees Act as amended by the
Refugees Amendment
Act,
[3
] has been lawfully and
finally determined; that his continuing detention be declared
unlawful; that the respondents be directed
to release him from
detention at Lindela Repatriation Centre, with immediate effect; that
the respondents issue him with a temporary
asylum seekers’
permit pending the finalisation of his judicial review application,
including the exhaustion of his right
to review and appeal the
decision of the Refugee Status Determination Officer (“the
RSDO”); and that the respondents
be ordered to pay the costs of
this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be
absolved, on an attorney and
client scale.
[3]
The application is unopposed. The respondents were properly served
but opted not to participate
in the proceedings.
FACTUAL
MATRIX
[4]
The applicant gained access into the country on 10 March 2016. Having
been issued with an asylum
visa at the port of entry, he is said to
have presented himself, on many occasions to the refugee reception
office in Pretoria
(the Desmond Tutu Refugee Reception Office), but
could not be assisted due to several asylum seekers who had to be
assisted. After
many unsuccessful attempts, he decided to go to Cape
Town with the hope of getting assistance there.
[5]
In August 2023, he was finally assisted by the Refugee Reception
Office in Cape Town. His fingerprints
were taken and he was
interviewed and was told to come back on 18 December 2023. When he
went back on that day, he was informed
that his application was still
being processed and that he should return on 12 February 2024 to
collect the outcome for the good
cause decision.
[6]
On 12 February 2024, when he arrived at the Home Affairs offices, he
was informed that his application
had been denied because his
interviews contradicted each other. He was immediately arrested
and forced to sign documents
which he was not given an opportunity to
read nor were the contents of the documents explained to him.
The documents are
attached to the founding affidavit as annexures C1,
C2, C3, C4, C5, C6 and C7. As reflected in annexure C3, a notice of
decision
adversely affecting right of a person, the applicant was in
terms of section 34(1) of the Immigration Act declared an “illegal
foreigner who failed good cause”, hence the arrest.
[7]
He was taken to Maitland Police Station where he was detained pending
his court appearance. He
appeared at the Bishop Lavis Magistrate
Court on 14 February 2024, where a detention and deportation order
was granted against
him. He was taken back to the Maitland Police
Station and was further detained until 22 February 2024. He was later
transferred
to and arrived on 23 February 2023 at Lindela
Repatriation Centre. He remains currently detained at the Centre.
DISCUSSION
Urgency
[8]
For all the reasons alluded to by the applicant in his papers, the
application is urgent. The
urgency thereof was triggered when the
applicant was arrested and detained. The applicant has been declared
an illegal immigrant
and an order for his deportation has been issued
by the Magistrate. The date for his deportation has not been secured
but there
is an imminent threat of deportation. The applicant stands
to suffer prejudice should he be deported to a country where he is
likely
to face persecution and possibly death. In particular, when
his status application has not been finally determined.
Whether
the Applicant should be deported
[9]
It is the applicant’s claim that he cannot be deported to his
country of origin because
he remains an asylum seeker as his refugee
status has not been finally determined. In support of this
supposition, the applicant
relies on section 2 of the Refugees Act
which he contends protects aspirant asylum seekers, like him, from
deportation to the country
of their origin where they may be
subjected to persecution.
[10]
In defending himself against the imminent deportation by the
respondents, the applicant invokes the principle
of non-refoulement.
He alleges in his papers that even though his application for asylum
was rejected, his refugee status has not
been fully finalised because
he has not exhausted all his remedies. The applicant alleges that his
rejected application for asylum
was supposed to have been referred to
the Standing Committee
for
Refugee Affairs
for
review in terms of section 24A of the Refugees Act,
[4]
however, to the best of his knowledge this was never done. He submits
further that section 24B of the Refugees Act,
[5]
entitles him to appeal the decision of the RSDO, he must therefore be
given an opportunity to do so before he can be deported.
In addition,
he contends that he has a right to apply to the High Court for
judicial review of the decision rejecting his application
within 180
days after the date that he received the rejection. He laments the
fact that he was not informed about these rights
and has, thus, not
been able to exercise same. Under such circumstances, it is his
contention that his refugee status remains not
fully determined and
he cannot, therefore, in accordance with the principle of
non-refoulement, be deported.
[11]
Non-refoulement is a well-established international law principle
that forms the cornerstone of international
law on refugees. The
principle has been adopted and legislated for in our law. The
principle has also been a subject of many cases
on the determination
of the status of refugees, and has been found to apply in many of
those cases. The principle of non-refoulment
in South Africa is
legislated for in the Refugees Act. In section 2 of the Refugee Act
it is provided that:
"Notwithstanding
any provision of this Act or any other law to the contrary, no person
may be refused entry into the Republic,
expelled, extradited or
returned to any other country or be subject to any similar measure,
if as a result of such refusal, expulsion,
extradition, return or
other measure, such person is compelled to return to or remain in a
country where-
(a)
he or she may be subjected to
persecution on account of his or her race, religion, nationality,
political opinion or membership
of a particular social group; or
(b)
his or her life, physical safety or
freedom would be threatened on account of external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination
or other events seriously disturbing
or disrupting public order in either part or the whole of that
country."
[12]
The Constitutional Court in
Ruta
,
[6]
one of its many cases where the principle of non-refoulement was a
subject matter for determination, held as follows:
"[28]
The right to seek and enjoy asylum means more than merely a
procedural right to lodge an application for
asylum - although this
is a necessary component of it. While States are not obliged to grant
asylum, international human rights
law and international refugee law
in essence require states to consider asylum claims and to provide
protection until appropriate
proceedings for refugee status
determination have been completed.
[29]
In sum, all asylum seekers are protected by the principle of non-
refoulement, and the protection applies
as long as the claim to
refugee status has not been finally rejected after a proper
procedure."
[13]
In another Constitutional Court judgment in
Ashebo
,
[7]
it was held that
"[29]
until an applicant's refugee status has been finally determined, the
principle of non- refoulment protects
the applicant from
deportation."
[14]
Furthermore, at paragraph 31 of that judgment, the court expressed
itself as follows:
“
The
[non-refoulement] protection applies as long as the claim to refugee
status has not been finally rejected after a proper procedure.
This
means that the right to seek asylum should be made available to every
illegal foreigner who evinces an intention to apply
for asylum and a
proper determination procedure should be embarked upon and
completed. The shield of non-refoulement may
only be lifted
after that process has been completed.”
[15]
The law as it stands is that
until an applicant’s
refugee status has been finally determined, the principle of
non-refoulement protects her/him from deportation.
[16]
In the premises, the relief sought by the applicant not to be
deported at this stage, holds sway. The
applicant has evinced
an intention to apply for asylum. There is ample, uncontroverted
evidence, that points to the fact that the
applicant’s refugee
status has not been finally determined. He is protected by the
principle of non-refoulement from deportation
until the process for
determining his status has been completed.
Whether
the Applicant should be released from detention with immediate effect
[17]
As regards the release from detention, the applicant seeks an order
declaring his continued detention to
be unlawful. He is, furthermore,
seeking an order that the respondents be directed to release him from
detention at Lindela Repatriation
Centre with immediate effect. This
in order to be given an opportunity to exhaust the internal remedies
afforded to him in terms
of sections 24A and 24B of the Refugees Act.
[18]
From the papers filed of record, it appears as if the applicant does
not know why he was arrested and made
to appear before the
Magistrate. In the heads of argument, it is stated that the applicant
appeared in the Magistrates Court in
terms of section 34(1) of the
Immigration Act. This is also apparent from annexure C3 attached to
the founding affidavit which
states that the applicant is in terms of
section 34(1) of the Immigration Act declared an “illegal
foreigner who failed good
cause”.
[19]
Section 34(1) of the Immigration Act provides that
“
w
ithout
the need for a warrant, an immigration officer may arrest an illegal
foreigner or cause him or her to be arrested, and shall,
irrespective
of whether such foreigner is arrested, deport him or her or cause him
or her to be deported and may, pending his or
her deportation, detain
him or her or cause him or her to be detained in a manner and at a
place determined by the Director-General.”
[20]
It thus appears that upon arrest without a warrant, the applicant was
taken to the Magistrates’ Court
for the confirmation of his
status as an illegal foreigner and an order for his continued
detention and subsequent deportation.
[21]
The question, therefore, is whether the applicant is entitled to be
released from detention upon expressing
an intention to appeal the
decision of the RSDO whilst the order of the Magistrate that declared
him an illegal immigrant to be
detained and subsequently deported, is
still standing.
[22]
During argument in court it was brought to the attention of the
applicant’s counsel that there is no
relief on the papers
against the order of the Magistrate which confirmed the status of the
applicant as an illegal immigrant and
further ordered his detention
and eventual deportation. Which means that the applicant is detained
in terms of a valid court order.
Counsel was also made aware that
even if such relief had been sought, this court, as constituted, has
no authority to set that
order aside.
[23]
The question of whether a person held in detention for deportation in
terms of section 34(1) of the Immigration
Act should be released
pending the finalisation of his/her refugee status, was finally
settled in the Constitutional Court judgment
in
Ashebo
,
[8]
where at para 39 of that judgment the court remarks as follows:
“
Importantly,
regulation 2(2) of the Old Regulations, which perished with the rest
of those regulations when the new Regulations
came into force on 1
January 2020, gave an illegal foreigner who intended seeking asylum
an automatic right to so apply and made
provision for the temporary
release of an illegal foreigner pending the making of an asylum
application. The new Regulations do
not contain a comparable
provision. . .”
[24]
According to the court in its judgment, the ordinary wording of
regulation 2(2) was clear. Read with section
22 of the unamended
Refugees Act, once the intention to apply for asylum was expressed,
the person was entitled to be freed subject
to further provisions of
the Refugees Act. The court found that there are no provisions
similar to the old regulation 2(2) in the
new Regulations which came
into operation on 1 January 2020.
[9]
[25]
According to the court in
Ashebo
,
there are two sections in the Immigration Act regulating the arrest
and detention of illegal foreigners, namely, sections 34 and
49. Both
sections regulate the illegal entry and stay by non-South African
citizens in the country. But, each has a distinct purpose.
Section 34 authorises the detention of an illegal foreigner solely
for the purpose of deportation whilst section 49 authorises
the
detention of a person where he/she has been charged with a criminal
offence. Section 34 is primarily intended for deporting
illegal
foreigners and detaining them for that purpose whereas section 49
criminalises certain conduct.
[10]
[26]
When addressing the issue of the unlawfulness of such detention,
[11]
the court in its reasoning, presumed that as an illegal foreigner
awaiting deportation or criminal trial for his contravention
of the
Immigration Act, the applicant would have been lawfully detained
under the auspices of section 34 and 49(1)(a) of the Immigration
Act
read with the Criminal Procedure Act.
[12]
[27]
The court went further to state that whether the detention was in
terms of section 34 or pursuant to a criminal
charge in terms of
section 49, the same question of whether the applicant’s
expression of an intention to apply for asylum
entitled him to be
released from such detention, would arise. The court held that the
answer to such a question must be answered
in the negative.
[13]
[28]
This the court reasoned was so, because
“
The absence in the
legislation of provisions similar to regulation 2(2) poses an
anomalous and highly undesirable scenario that
could result If an
illegal foreigner in the applicant’s position were simply
allowed to remain at large on the mere-say-so
that they seek asylum.
That person would remain undocumented and there would be absolutely
no means of checking whether they indeed
promptly applied for asylum.
There would be nothing to stop them from making the same claim to the
next immigration officer who
encounters them, thus repeatedly
preventing their detention. That is not a result the legislature
could have intended.”
[14]
[29]
A submission was made on behalf of the applicant that his continued
detention in terms of section 34(1) is
unlawful. This assertion was
supported by referring to the judgment in
Ashebo
whereat the
court alluded, at paragraph 58 of that judgment, that
"Section
34 does not create or refer to any criminal offence. Section 34 is
primarily intended for deporting illegal foreigners
and detaining
them for that purpose."
[30]
The court elaborated further on how the said section may be applied
in instances where an applicant is in
detention by stating that to
the extent that the detention may rest on section 34 it may become
unlawful at some point, once a
reasonable period elapsed with no
effort made on the respondents' part to bring the applicant before a
RSDO for the process envisaged
in
section 21(1B)
of the
Refugees
Amendment Act, read
with
regulation 8(3).
[31]
Ashebo
is distinguishable from the present matter in that firstly, in
Ashebo
,
unlike in this matter, the court was dealing with an asylum seeker
who had not as yet applied for the determination of his status,
whereas in the current matter the applicant’s status
application had been rejected. It is in that regard that the court
was of the view that the detention would lapse once a reasonable
period has lapsed with no effort by the respondents to bring the
applicant before a RSDO. Secondly, it does not appear that in
Ashebo
the detention in terms of
section 34
that was considered by that
court, was in terms of a court order, hence its finding that the
detention would become unlawful at
some point. In this instance, the
applicant’s status as an illegal foreigner was confirmed by the
Magistrate a
t the
Bishop Lavis
Magistrate Court who further ordered the applicant’s detention
and subsequent deportation.
[32]
It is trite that an order of court, which is valid, remains in effect
until set aside by a proper forum.
Furthermore, it was held in the
Constitutional Court decision in
Abore
[15]
that
the detention of an illegal foreigner pending the submission of an
application for asylum that is authorised by a court’s
warrant
of detention is valid as the court order must be obeyed until set
aside. This principle will, similarly, find application
in the
circumstances of this current application where the applicant, who
seeks to pursue the internal processes to finally determine
his
refugee status, is detained by an order of a Magistrate’s
Court. Until that order is set aside, the applicant cannot
be
released from detention as he has been lawfully detained.
[33]
In order to avert an impasse, where an applicant who seeks to follow
the process of establishing whether
there was good cause for the
absence of a visa and an asylum application is yet to occur, is
languishing in detention unable to
present himself for such a
process, the Constitutional Court in
Ruta
[16]
and
Ashebo
opted to issue an order in terms of section 172(1)(b) of the
Constitution. In terms of the said section, the court found it a just
and equitable remedy to compel the respondents (in that matter) to
facilitate the applicant’s application for asylum, failing
which to release him from detention unless he may be lawfully
detained under the Criminal Procedure Act.
[34]
The difference in the current application is that the applicant is
not required to appear personally before
anyone for the remedies that
he seeks to pursue to finalise his asylum application. Section 24A
provides that the rejected application
should be brought before the
Standing Committee. This actually, is a process that should be
undertaken internally without anything
expected from the applicant.
From the papers on record it is not apparent whether this process has
already taken place or not.
If it has not taken place a letter
addressed by the applicant or his legal representatives will suffice.
Similarly, in terms of
section 24B which entitles the applicant to
appeal the decision of the RSDO, the applicant can with the
assistance of his legal
representatives file the appeal.
[35]
It is also evident that the applicant’s legal representatives
have already filed a judicial review
against the decision of the
RSDO. There is thus no need to issue an order in terms of section
172(1)(b) of the Constitution like
the court in
Ruta
and
Ashebo
did.
COSTS
[36]
The applicant has sought a punitive costs order against the
respondents. This, under circumstances where
the respondents have not
participated in the application. There is no submission on the papers
why a cost order should be granted
against the respondents, let alone
a punitive cost order. No order as to costs is made.
ORDER
[37]
Consequently, the following order is made:
1.
The application is declared urgent.
2.
It is declared that the applicant is, in
terms of
section 2
of the
Refugees Act 130 of 1998
, entitled to
remain lawfully in the Republic of South Africa.
3.
The respondents are ordered to refrain
from deporting the applicant until his status has been determined and
finalised.
M
KUBUSHI J
Judge
of the High Court
Gauteng
Division
Appearances
:
For the applicant:
Adv S A Masokoameng
Cell: 079 950 8858
Email:
sellomasokoameng@gmail.com
Instructed by:
Mashimbye Pamela
Attorneys
Tel: 012 001 0108
Email:
pamela@mashimbyepamelattorneys.co.za
For the respondent:
No appearance.
Date of argument:
20 June 2024
Date of judgment:
28 June 2024
[1]
Act 13 of 2002.
[2]
Act 130 of 1998.
[3]
Act 11 of 2017.
[4]
Section 24A provides as follows:
(1)
The Standing Committee must review any
decision taken by a Refugee Status Determination Officer in
terms of
section 24(3)(b) and may act in terms of section 9C (1) (c) in
respect of any decision taken in terms of section 24(3)(a)
or (c).
(2)
A review contemplated in subsection (1)
must be determined by a single member or, in particular matters,
such number of members of the Standing Committee as the chairperson
may consider necessary.
(3)
The Standing Committee may, after having
determined a review, confirm, set aside or substitute any
decision
taken by a Refugee Status Determination Officer in terms of section
24(3)(b).
(4)
The Standing Committee must inform the
Refugee Reception Office, where the application for asylum
was
lodged, of its decision within five working days of such decision,
where after the Standing Committee is
functus officio
.
[5]
Section
24B provides as follows:
(1)
Any asylum seeker whose
application has been rejected in terms of section 24 (3) (c)
may
lodge an appeal with the Refugee Appeals Authority in the prescribed
manner and within the prescribed period.
(2)
The Refugee Appeals Authority
may, after having determined an appeal, confirm, set aside
or
substitute any decision taken by a Refugee Status Determination
Officer in terms of section 24 (3) (c).
[6]
Ruta
v Minister of Home Affairs
[2018] ZACC 53
paras 28 and 29.
[7]
Ashebo
v Minister of Home Affairs and Others
[2023] ZACC 16
para 29.
[8]
Ashebo v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [2023] ZACC 15.
[9]
Para 40.
[10]
Paras 47 and 48.
[11]
Para 56.
[12]
Act 51 of 1977.
[13]
Para 50.
[14]
Para 54.
[15]
Abore v Minister of Home Affairs and Another
2022 (4) SA 321
(CC).
[16]
Ruta v Minister of Home Affairs
[2018] ZACC 52.
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