Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 901South Africa
Y.M v T.J.M N.O and Others (2022-026526) [2024] ZAGPPHC 901 (5 September 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
5 September 2024
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Y.M v T.J.M N.O and Others (2022-026526) [2024] ZAGPPHC 901 (5 September 2024)
Y.M v T.J.M N.O and Others (2022-026526) [2024] ZAGPPHC 901 (5 September 2024)
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sino date 5 September 2024
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
FLYNOTES:
FAMILY – Divorce –
Accrual –
Joinder
of trust and company – Piercing corporate veil –
Alleged that substantial value hidden – Has access
to
financial means beyond that which is disclosed – Intention
to obtain an order that assets be regarded as assets
of
respondents’ estate – Ought to be taken into account
for purposes of calculating accrual – Relief applicant
intends to obtain will substantially and prejudicially affect
trust and company – Joinder is necessary and granted.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE
NUMBER:
2022-026526
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES.
DATE: 5 September 2024
In
the matter between: -
Y[...]
M[...]
Applicant
and
T[...]
J[...] M[...]
N.O.
First respondent
H[...]
C[...] M[...]
N.O.
Second respondent
RUDI
JANSE VAN RENSBURG N.O.
Third respondent
M[...]
BOERDERY (PTY) LTD
Fourth respondent
T[...]
J[...]
M[...]
Fifth respondent
MASTER
OF THE HIGH COURT
Sixth respondent
JUDGMENT
DELIVERED
:
This judgment was handed down
electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by e mail and publication
on CaseLines. The date
for hand-down is deemed to be 5 September 2024.
M
VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN AJ
:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The applicant and the fifth respondent are
the plaintiff and defendant to a divorce action. The applicant seeks
the joinder of the
first, second, third and fourth respondents as the
second, third, fourth and fifth defendants to the divorce action
under case
number 26526/2022.
[2]
The applicant seeks the joinder of the
first, second and third respondents in their capacities as trustees
of the AP M[...] Family
Trust with registration number IT000147/2017
(“
the trust
”
).
[3]
The first to fifth respondents (“
the
respondents
”
) oppose the relief
sought by the applicant for their joinder.
[4]
The parties were married to each other on
the 17
th
of
September 2016, at Pretoria, out of community of property,
subject to the accrual system, which marriage still subsists.
In the
divorce action the applicant (plaintiff)
inter
alia
claims that the fifth respondent
(the defendant) be ordered to pay to the applicant an amount equal to
half of the difference between
the accrual in the estate of the
parties determined in accordance with the provisions of chapter 1
of the
Matrimonial Property Act, 88 of 1984
.
APPLICANT’S
CONTENTIONS
[5]
The applicant contends that the trust and
the company (fourth respondent) has a substantial interest in the
divorce proceedings
in that she claims that there will be a
substantial accrual in the estate of the fifth respondent, which
de
facto
assets are owned by the fourth
respondent, of which the fifth respondent is a director and which
shares in the fourth respondent
are owned by the AP M[...] Family
Trust, represented by the first to third respondents and of which the
fifth respondent is both
a trustee and a beneficiary.
[6]
The fourth respondent owns the farm on
which the fifth respondent resides, better known as Burgershoop and
Elandspoort and which
is 1 600 hectares in size and is valued,
less the movables, at approximately R12 million (twelve million
Rand), the aforesaid
being the purchase price for the farm. The fifth
respondent is a director of the fourth respondent.
[7]
The farm, owned by the fourth respondent,
which is in turn owned by the AP M[...] Family Trust, is alleged
to be a fully functioning
working farm which owns farming implements,
machinery, tractors, harvesters, several hundred cattle, sheep and
other livestock
which it constantly buys, raises and then sells at
auction. It is the applicant’s contention that the sales from
all cattle
and other livestock purchases and sales are mostly done in
cash, as is the purchase of most farming implements and machinery.
[8]
The
aforesaid does not appear to be in dispute – it is alleged by
the respondents that the fifth respondent, despite being
a director
of the fourth respondent and a trustee and beneficiary of the trust,
is merely a farm labourer on the farm.
[1]
[9]
Insofar as the fifth respondent’s
earnings and/or financial strength are concerned, it is alleged by
the applicant that the
fifth respondent effectively lives out of the
company and/or the trust. The applicant states that this has been
extensively dealt
with in
rule 43
proceedings. The fifth
respondent allegedly earns a meagre salary of R6 000.00 per
month from the fourth respondent as a farm
labourer. The fourth
respondent thereafter pays for the remainder of the fifth
respondent’s expenses, lifestyle, expensive
hobbies,
entertainment and the maintenance of the applicant and the
fifth respondent’s children.
[10]
The applicant alleges that the fifth
respondent pleads poverty. The fifth respondent denies that he owns
any assets, which could
be taken into consideration for the
determination of the value of his estate for the purposes of
calculating the accrual.
[11]
The applicant contends that
prima
facie
there is a likelihood that the
fifth respondent is hiding behind the veil of the company and/or the
trust and hence hides the true
value of his estate for the purposes
of calculating the accrual in the divorce action.
[12]
The aforesaid was also highly contested in
rule 43
proceedings before this court and in that regard the
rule 43
court has ordered that an amount of R805 903.00 be paid by the
fifth respondent to the applicant for the purposes of conducting
an
audit into the financial relationship between the fifth respondent,
the trust and the fourth respondent company.
[13]
The fifth respondent allegedly has expenses
of R30 000.00 per month. However, when one considers the fifth
respondent’s
bank statements there is no record of such
expenses being paid by the fifth respondent.
[14]
Further, despite only earning R6 000.00
per month and his expenses being R30 000.00 per month, the fifth
respondent personally
owns cattle to the value of R538 594.00,
which has allegedly been sold and which funds have allegedly been
borrowed to his
father. The applicant contends that there is no
explanation as to where such funds were obtained and as such, it is
argued that
the fifth respondent has access to financial means beyond
that which he discloses.
[15]
The applicant argues that regardless of
where the company and trust obtained the assets, it is apparent that
during the course of
the applicant and the fifth respondent’s
marriage, the company became and is the owner of the farm properties.
The fifth
respondent’s father is no longer the owner of any of
the property sold and/or transferred to the company and save for
being
a beneficiary of the trust, has no involvement in the running
of the trust, nor any involvement in the running of the company.
[16]
The applicant argued that there is no
possible basis that the transactions described by the respondents in
their answering affidavit
could possibly be estate planning on the
part of the fifth respondent’s father when he has no stake,
save for a reduced and
limited benefit as a beneficiary in the trust,
in the property concerned and further has no control over his “
own
purported estate”
.
COMMON CAUSE FACTS
[17]
The following facts and/or circumstances
are common cause between the parties: -
[17.1]
The fourth respondent company owns the farm, which
in turn is owned by the trust;
[17.2]
The
fifth respondent is a director of the fourth respondent
[2]
and is furthermore a trustee of the trust;
[3]
[17.3]
The fifth respondent is a trustee of the trust,
which owns the company of which the fifth respondent is a director
and which trust
in turn owns the company.
[18]
The applicant and the fifth respondent were
married to each other on 17 September 2016.
[19]
The farm properties were sold and/or
transferred to the company during or about 2019.
[20]
The trust was established during the course
of the marriage between the applicant and the fifth respondent during
or about July 2017.
[21]
The fourth respondent company was
incorporated during the course of the marriage, on or about the 17
th
of November 2017.
[22]
The fifth respondent’s father is: -
[22.1]
no longer a director of the company, having
resigned in May 2022;
[22.2]
not a shareholder of the company;
[22.3]
not a trustee of the trust.
RESPONDENTS’
CONTENTIONS
[23]
The respondents contend that the trust and
company are not even informed what the nature and extent is of the
relief that the applicant
intends to seek against them in the event
that they are all joined in the divorce action – more
particularly in that a draft
amended particulars of claim has not
been attached to the application.
[24]
The respondents contend that the applicant
has miserably failed to demonstrate that the trust and company have a
direct and substantial
interest in the divorce action and has failed
to satisfy the requirements for an application for joinder. The
respondents contend
that the entire application is predicated on the
applicant’s subjective belief and speculation, which are not in
any respect
supported by any evidence.
[25]
The applicant’s application for
joinder is based on an unsubstantiated subjective belief that there
will be “
a substantial accrual”
in the estate of the fifth respondent, which she
alleges to be “
hidden behind the
veil
”
of the company and the
trust.
[26]
The
respondents allege that the applicant has not met the requirements to
“
pierce
the corporate veil
”
.
With reference to the matter of
NJK
v IIK
[4]
the
respondents contend that it must be shown that the person has placed
his own assets which originate from him, in a different
entity to
evade liability or escape an obligation – which the applicant
has failed to show.
[27]
With
reference to
W
v W N.O. and Others
[5]
the
respondents aver that the allegations in the founding affidavit don’t
support any cause of action against the trust or
the company and even
if the applicant’s averments were accepted as true, it was
insufficient and incompetent to support a
cause of action against the
trust and that the application for the joinder sought ought to be
dismissed.
DELIBERATION
[28]
It
is trite that it is open to a party to join any party against whom
he/she believes a cause of action arises. The test is whether
the
party to be joined has a direct and substantial legal interest in the
order the court might make. The interest will be direct
and
substantial if such order cannot be sustained or brought into effect
without prejudicing the interests of the parties sought
to be
joined.
[6]
[29]
The
issue of joinder should not be conflated with the issue whether the
party seeking joinder has a good case against the party
sought to be
joined. The court is not at this point required to assess the merits
of the applicant’s claim against the trust
and/or company. It
is sufficient for the applicant at this point to set out the reason
for the joinder.
[7]
[30]
The
respondents’ defence that no case is made out at this stage
that the fifth respondent is using the company and/or trust
as a
vehicle to accumulate personal wealth to the exclusion of the
applicant and in so doing, has placed such assets outside of
his
estate for the purposes of calculating the accrual in the divorce
action, does not have to be considered at this stage.
[8]
[31]
Should
the applicant succeed at trial in proving that the farm and its
assets, ostensibly owned by the company and which company
is
ostensibly owned by the trust, are the
de
facto
property
of, or a portion thereof, is the
de facto
property
of the fifth respondent, then those values should be taken into
account in determining the extent of the accrual of the
estate of the
fifth respondent.
[9]
The
approach at this stage is to accept the applicant’s allegations
as correct.
[10]
[32]
The
court at this stage must decide only whether on the allegations
before it, if proven at trial, the applicant would be entitled
to the
relief it would ultimately seek.
[11]
[33]
In
The
South African Riding for the Disabled Association v Regional Land
Claims Commission and Others
[12]
the Constitutional Court confirmed that: -
“
The
applicant does not have to satisfy the court at the stage of
intervention that it will succeed. It is sufficient for such
applicant
to make allegations which, if proved, would entitle it to
the relief.”
[34]
Although
the applicant has not yet commenced with amending her particulars of
claim and the fact that the applicant has not annexed
such proposed
amendment, it is evident that she intends to request the court to
pierce the trust and corporate veil. It is evident
from the founding
affidavit that the applicant seeks to join the trust and the company
in the divorce proceedings with the intention
to obtain an order that
the assets of the trust and/or company (or portion thereof) be
regarded as assets of the respondents’
estate and ought to be
taken into account for purposes of calculating the accrual. The
relief the applicant intends to obtain will
substantially and
prejudicially affect the trust and/or the company and the joinder is
necessary.
[13]
COSTS
[35]
It is fair towards all parties that the
costs of the joinder application are costs in the divorce action.
ORDER
In the result, I make the
following order: -
1.
The first, second, third and fourth respondents
are hereby joined as the second, third, fourth and fifth defendants
to the divorce
action under case number 26526/2022.
2.
The applicant/plaintiff is directed to serve her
amended summons and particulars of claim with annexures on the
respondents within
fifteen (15) days from date of serving of this
order.
3.
The first, second, third and fourth respondents
are directed to deliver their notices of intention to defend within
ten (10) days
from date of service of the amended summons and
particulars of claim on the first, second, third and fourth
respondents, insofar
as they intend to defend the proceedings.
4.
In the event that the first, second, third and
fourth respondents provide their notices of intention to defend the
proceedings,
then they are directed to deliver their pleas to the
amended summons and particulars of claim, if any, within twenty
(20)
days from date of service of their notices of intention to
defend.
5.
The costs of this application are costs in the
divorce action.
M VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN
ACTING JUDGE OF
THE HIGH COURT
DATE OF
HEARING:
23 JULY 2024
DATE OF
JUDGMENT:
5 SEPTEMBER 2024
APPEARANCES:
On
behalf of applicant:
Adv
Brook Stevens
brookstevens@lawcircle.co.za
Instructed
by:
Boshoff
Smuts Incorporated
nadia@boshoffsmuts.co.za
/
stephanie@boshoffsmuts.co.za
On
behalf of respondents:
Adv
U van Niekerk
ulrike@uvnlaw.co.za
Instructed
by:
De
Oliveira Serrão Attorneys
line@deoliveiraserrao.com
/
info@deoliveiraserrao.com
[1]
The fifth
respondent in his confirmatory affidavit refers to himself as
a
“
farm
labourer”
and
in his plea and counterclaim as a “
farm
worker”
.
[2]
Two of the
fifth respondent’s siblings are co-directors with the
fifth
respondent of the fourth respondent.
[3]
The second
respondent is a sibling of the fifth respondent and the third
respondent is a chartered accountant and registered auditor.
[4]
2023 (2) SA 158 (SCA).
[5]
(37634/2017) [2021] ZAGPJHC 710 (1 July 2021).
[6]
VW
v VW and Others
(627/2016)
[2017] ZANCHC 26
(31 January 2017) at paragraph [8];
Amalgamated
Engineering Union v Minister of Labour
1949
(3) SA 637
(A);
MLJ
and AJ N.O. and Others
Unreported
judgment of Van der Schyff in this division issued on 20 May 2022
under case number 50044/2011 at paragraph
[10].
[7]
MLJ
& AJ N.O. and Others
ibid
paragraph 10.
[8]
RP
v DP and Others
2014
(6) SA 243
(ECP) where the court held: -
“
It
is unnecessary for the purposes of this application to make any
factual findings in this regard – this is the function
of the
trial court and the less said the better. I believe the correct
approach in considering the application for joinder and
amendment,
is to decide whether, if applicant’s allegations are found to
be proven by the trial court, she has met the
legal requirements for
a joinder and amendment.”
See
also
EEVW v PJVW
case number 627/2016, NC (31 January 2007);
Gordon v Department of Health, KwaZulu-Natal
2008 (6) SA 522
(SCA).
[9]
BC
v CC and Others
2012
(5) SA 562
(ECP) at paragraph [18].
[10]
BC
v CC and Others (supra)
at
paragraph [11].
[11]
International
Pentecost Holiness Church In re: MBS v BMS and Another
(63920/2020)
[2022] ZAGPPHC 296 (5 May 2022) at paragraph [14] where
the court held that the applicant “
does
not have to satisfy the court at the stage of intervention that it
will succeed. It is sufficient, if such application make
allegations
which, if proven, would entitle it to the relief”
.
And further: “
It
should be noted that it is not necessary for the applicant to
satisfy the court that it will succeed in this case. It is
sufficient for the applicant to rely on the allegations made which,
if established in the action, would entitle the applicant to
succeed. In assessing the applicant’s standing, the court must
assume that the allegations made by the applicant are true
and
correct. Further, the possibility that the applicant’s legal
interest exists is sufficient. It is not necessary for
the court to
determine positively that it does indeed exist.”
(at paragraph [23]).
[12]
CCT1172/16 [2017]
ZACC4;
2017 (8) BCLR 1053
(CC);
2017 (5) SA 1
(CC)
(23 February 2017) at paragraph [9].
[13]
MLJ
and AJ N.O. and Others
Unreported
judgment of Van der Schyff in this division issued on 20 May 2022
under case number 50044/2011 at paragraphs
[11] and [12].
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