Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 1218South Africa
Sayed N.O obo S.M v Road Accident Fund (38860/2021) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1218 (27 November 2024)
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Sayed N.O obo S.M v Road Accident Fund (38860/2021) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1218 (27 November 2024)
Sayed N.O obo S.M v Road Accident Fund (38860/2021) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1218 (27 November 2024)
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sino date 27 November 2024
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION
PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 38860/2021
HEARD:
26 NOVEMBER 2024
DECIDED: 27 NOVEMBER
2024
In the matter between:
ADV SAYED N.O. CURATOR
AD LITEM,
obo
S[...]
M[...]
Applicant
And
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND
Respondent
This judgment has been
handed down remotely and shall be circulated to the parties by way of
email / uploading on caselines. The
date of hand down shall be deemed
to be 27 November 2024
ORDER
1.
The application for leave to appeal is
dismissed.
RULING
BAM J
Introduction
1.
This
is an application for leave to appeal the order of this court of 24
February 2024, the reasons having been provided on 14 May
2024.
The defendant did not participate during the hearing, its defence had
been struck off following its failure to comply
with this court’s
order
[1]
.
The applicant’s grounds, extracted from her Notice of Appeal,
are set out in paragraph 6 of this ruling.
2.
The applicant is dissatisfied with this
court’s award of R 3 000 000.00, in respect of the minor’s
loss of earnings/earning
capacity, as opposed to the amount sought of
R5 774 802.00. It is apparent from the applicant’s Heads of
Argument that the
amount has since been reconsidered as the applicant
now seeks the reduced amount of R4 685 018.50. That in a nutshell is
the nub
of the plaintiff’s challenge, characterised as it is in
her Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal as,
inter
alia
, errors of fact and law made by
this court.
3.
It will soon be shown, as the
Constitutional Court has laid down the law in
Trencon
Construction (Pty) Limited
v
Industrial
Development Corporation of South Africa Limited and Another
that,
in making the award, this court exercised a discretion in the true
sense. In this regard, it is worthwhile setting out the
court’s
reasoning:
‘
[83]
In order to decipher the standard of interference that an appellate
court is justified in applying, a distinction between two
types of
discretion emerged in our case law. That distinction is now
deeply-rooted in the law governing the relationship between
appeal
courts and courts of first instance. Therefore, the proper approach
on appeal is for an appellate court to ascertain whether
the
discretion exercised by the lower court was a discretion in the true
sense or whether it was a discretion in the loose sense.
The
importance of the distinction is that either type of discretion will
dictate the standard of interference that an appellate
court must
apply.
[84] In Media Workers
Association, the Court defined a discretion in the true sense:
“
The
essence of a discretion in [the true] sense is that, if the
repository of the power follows any one of the available courses,
he
would be acting within his powers, and his exercise of power could
not be set aside merely because a Court would have preferred
him to
have followed a different course among those available to him.”
[85] A discretion in the
true sense is found where the lower court has a wide range of equally
permissible options available to
it. This type of discretion has been
found by this Court in many instances, including matters of costs,
damages and in the award
of a remedy in terms of section 35 of the
Restitution of Land Rights Act. It is“true” in that the
lower court has an
election of which option it will apply and any
option can never be said to be wrong as each is entirely permissible.
[88] When a lower court
exercises a discretion in the true sense, it would ordinarily be
inappropriate for an appellate court to
interfere unless it is
satisfied that this discretion was not exercised—
“
[judiciously],
or that it had been influenced by wrong principles or a misdirection
on the facts, or that it had reached a decision
which in the result
could not reasonably have been made by a court properly directing
itself to all the relevant facts and principles.”
An
appellate court ought to be slow to substitute its own decision
solely because it does not agree with the permissible option
chosen
by the lower court.’
[2]
Legal Framework
4.
Applications
for leave to appeal are governed by Section 17 of the Superior Court
Act
[3]
.
The relevant provisions for present purposes read:
‘
17.
(1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges
concerned are of the opinion that:
(a) (i) the appeal would
have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(ii) there is some other
compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including
conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration;’
5.
In
Smith
v
S,
the
court, elaborating on the test for reasonable prospects of success,
had the following to say:
‘
What
the test of reasonable prospects of success postulates is a
dispassionate decision, based on the facts and the law, that a
court
of appeal could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that
of the trial court.11 In order to succeed, therefore,
the appellant
must convince this court on proper grounds that he has prospects of
success on appeal and that those prospects are
not remote but have a
realistic chance of succeeding. More is required to be established
than that there is a mere possibility
of success, that the case is
arguable on appeal or that the case cannot be categorised as
hopeless. There must, in other words,
be a sound, rational basis for
the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal.’
[4]
The
applicant’s grounds
6.
The
applicant’s grounds are set out in her Notice of Application
[5]
for Leave to Appeal, supported by her Heads of Argument. I commence
by setting out the grounds:
6.1 The court is said to
have ‘in general’ erred by not accepting the findings and
conclusions of the experts, in particular
those of the Industrial
Psychologist.
6.2 The court is said to
have erred in relying in its own interpretation of the value of the
Glasgow Coma Scale in determining the
existence of a brain ‘injury
in patients’. It is said that there was no such finding
before the court and the
court preferred its own interpretation.
6.2 The court referred in
its reasons to the ‘projections of the Industrial Psychologist’
rather than the ‘reflection
of the minor’s injuries’.
In this regard, the court is said to have erred.
6.3 The court erred in
law and in fact in its ‘analysis of the nature and extent
[sic] discretion of a court in making
a finding as to the quantum of
loss of earnings, alternatively there was no sound basis for the
award of R3 000 000 made by ‘the
court a quo’.
6.4 The court relied on
factual errors, alternatively incorrectly interpreted and/failed to
properly consider the evidence of the
expert, in making her
determination.
6.5 The court is further
said to have erred in its reasoning in stating the trite principle
that previously decided cases serve
as guidelines and are not to be
followed slavishly. It is said that there were no such comparisons in
the plaintiff’s Heads
of Argument.
6.5 The court irregularly
disregarded expert evidence.
6.7 Finally, the
applicant states that there is a striking disparity between the award
of R 3 000 000. 00 made by the court on the
basis of its broad
discretion, and the award which would be made by a court hearing the
appeal on the basis of the actuarial calculation.
Discussion
7.
The
applicant disregards that in the hospital records placed before the
court,, the then 12 year old claimant, S[...] M[...], was
referred to
a physician in Madadeni Hospital on 16 January 2019, five days from
the date of accident; that the physician Dr Naidoo,
who interpreted
the results of the CT scan, noted in his report dated 20 February
2019 that the brain is normal.
[6]
The plaintiff’s own neurologist’s report concluded that
the minor suffered ‘non-serious injuries’
[7]
.
8.
It is plain from the grounds summarised in
paragraph six of this ruling that the true issue is the applicant’s
dissatisfaction
with the award of R3 million. Applying the law set
out in
Trencon Construction
,
this court exercised a true discretion in making the award for
damages. Except where the court of appeal were to find that such
discretion was not exercised judiciously, there is no basis upon
which a court hearing the appeal would come to a different conclusion
on the issue. I should add that despite the introductory remarks in
the notice of appeal, there is no case made out to sustain
the claims
of errors of law and fact that would lead to another court coming to
a different conclusion on the facts of this case.
On this basis,
leave to appeal must be refused.
Order
1.
The application for leave to appeal is
dismissed.
N.N
BAM
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT, GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Date
of Hearing
:
26 November
2024
Date
of Judgment:
27 November 2024
Appearances
:
Counsel
for the Applicant:
Adv K Strydom
Instructed
by:
Ehlers Attorneys
Centurion, Pretoria
[1]
The
order was made on 6 October 2023.
[2]
(CCT198/14)
[2015] ZACC 22
;
2015 (5) SA 245
(CC);
2015 (10) BCLR 1199
(CC) (26
June 2015), paragraphs 83-,85, & 88.
[3]
Act
10 of 2013.
[4]
(475/10)
[2011] ZASCA 15
;
2012 (1) SACR 567
(SCA) (15 March 2011), paragraph
7.
[5]
Paragraphics
1-8.
[6]
Caselines
008-1.
[7]
See
009-11, the plaintiff’s own neurologist’s report that
the minor suffered ‘non-serious injuries’.
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