Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 1392South Africa
Mokumo v Semosa and Others (2023/054043) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1392 (19 December 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
19 December 2024
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Mokumo v Semosa and Others (2023/054043) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1392 (19 December 2024)
Mokumo v Semosa and Others (2023/054043) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1392 (19 December 2024)
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sino date 19 December 2024
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
Number: 2023-054043
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
19/12/24
SIGNATURE:
In
the matter between:
MOSIBUDI
NURSE MOKUMO
APPLICANT
and
RAMAILA
FRANK SEMOSA
FIRST RESPONDENT
NTHABISENG
PHILLIP RAMASELELE
SECOND RESPONDENT
RIKA
LOTIE BHUDA
THIRD RESPONDENT
ETIENNE
CHAMPION
FOURTH RESONDENT
JUDGMENT
Ramawele
AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an application whereof the Applicant seeks the following
relief:
[1.1] An order setting
aside the sale of immovable property ERF 8[...], QUARTZ STREET,
NELLMAPIUS, EXTENSION 7 to the Second and
Third Respondents.
[1.2] The sale agreements
that led to the transfer of the immovable property referred to in
prayer 1 to the Second and Third Respondents
be declared null and
void.
[1.3]
The Fifth Respondent is directed to transfer the property to the
Applicant.
Facts
[2]
The Applicant and the First Respondent ("the parties") were
never married
but lived together as husband and wife since 3 February
1984. Out of this union six children were born and one of them has
since
passed away. All the other children are now adults.
[3]
During the subsistence of the union, the parties acquired an RDP
(Reconstruction and
Development Programme) house. On 10 December 2012
the Metropolitan City of Tshwane transferred the immovable property
into the
names of the parties. The parties then became the joint
owners of immovable property.
[4]
The parties separated from each other in March 2021.
[5]
After the death of one of the parties' children, namely, Mapula Lucy
Semosa, the Applicant
moved out of the RDP house and went and lived
at her deceased daughter's house together with the deceased
daughter's children.
[6]
One of the parties' sons, Phonkie Moxe Semosa moved into the RDP
house during 2014
but later moved out when he found work in
Soshanguve. The other son Nemest Meshack Semosa then later moved into
the house in 2019.
For reasons not important for the determination of
the issues herein, the two sons subsequently moved out of the
property.
[7]
During August 2021 the Applicant came to Pretoria to address the
First Respondent's
habit of forbidding his children from staying in
the RDP house. Upon her arrival, the Applicant found the Second
Respondent in
the RDP house who informed her that he had purchased
the immovable property from the First Respondent and that the
property now
belonged to him.
[8]
Upon further inquiry, the Applicant discovered that the property was
in fact transferred
into the name of the Second Respondent on 5 July
2021. There is also a power of attorney to pass transfer dated 23
June 2021, purportedly
signed by the Applicant given to the
conveyancer when the Applicant was no longer living with the First
Respondent. The Applicant
denies that she ever signed such a power of
attorney and alleges that it is fraudulent.
[9]
Only the Second Respondent opposes this application, and he was
represented by Mketsu
& Associates, but the application later
proceeded without the attorney's appearance. I return to this issue
below.
[10]
Although the purchase agreement makes provision for the signature of
both parties and witnesses,
there is no corresponding witness'
signature with the signature purporting to be that of the Applicant.
I must add that the purchasers
also do not have corresponding
witness' signatures to their signatures. Nothing really turns on this
issue and I do not intend
to pursue it further.
[11]
In reply, the Applicant states that the purchase price was paid
directly to the First Respondent
and that conceivably, the Second
Respondent ought to have known that he was dealing with one party
only.
Application
for postponement
[12]
At the hearing of the application, Adv Phanduka appeared on behalf of
the First Respondent and
informed the court that the Second
Respondent's attorney, Mr Mketsu, who was acting pro bono on behalf
of the Second Respondent,
was ill. Upon further inquiry, Adv Phanduka
informed the court that Mr Mketsu only called him at or about 09H15
that morning to
request a postponement. Mr Mketsu did not know that
Adv Phanduka would be appearing in court but had assumed that Adv
Phanduka
might be appearing. The Applicant opposed the application
for a postponement.
[13]
Having heard the parties I was of the view that the application for a
postponement had no merit
and stood the matter down until 12h00
hoping that some sanity might prevail, and more facts might be
brought forward in respect
of the matter. At twelve o'clock there was
no appearance on behalf of the Second Respondent, not even Adv
Phanduka bothered to
attend court. However, I have taken the facts as
contained in the Second Respondent's answering affidavit as well as
his Heads
of argument into account in arriving at my conclusion.
[14]
During her submissions, Adv Ramela (for the Applicant) conceded that
the Second Respondent was
initially a bona fide purchaser but that he
ceased being a bona fide purchaser after being informed in August
2021 that the Applicant
was the joint owner of the immovable
property. Apparently, the First Respondent sold the property to
another person. This third
person, so argues Adv Ramela is the real
bona fide purchaser.
[15]
This third person who purchased the property is unknown and not much
is said about this person
in the application. Accordingly, this
person has not been served with the papers.
Analysis
[16]
This case is about the rights of a joint owner whose property was
sold without her knowledge
or consent and the rights a bona fide
purchaser, the Second and Third Respondents or any other party that
may have purchased the
immovable property from the Second Respondent.
[17]
According to the Applicant she had no knowledge of the sale of
property and that the signature
on the power of attorney to transfer
was forged.
[18]
Although served with this application, the seller of the property,
the First Respondent who is
also the Applicant's ex-partner, has
elected not to participate in these proceedings.
[19]
The question arises whether the Applicant is entitled to the relief
that she seeks.
The
law
[20]
It is not in dispute that the primary house of the Applicant has been
transferred into the name
of the Second and Third Respondents, and
possibly a third person or party.
[21]
The material facts in this application are that when the immovable
property was sold or when
the power of attorney to transfer was
allegedly signed by the Applicant, the parties were no longer living
together and there was
also acrimony between the parties. Such
circumstances lend credence to the Applicant's version that she was
not aware that her
property was sold or that she had not consented to
such sale of the property.
[22]
I have doubts that the Second Respondent did not know that the
Applicant, although being the
joint owner of the property, was not a
party to the sale agreement. In the circumstances leading to the
signing of the purchase
agreement, one would reasonably expect that
the Second Respondent would have realized that the co-owner of the
property was not
a party to the negotiations. I therefore have my
reservations whether the concession made by Counsel for the Applicant
that the
Second Respondent is a bona fide purchaser was properly
made.
[23]
Be that as it may, even if I am wrong that the Second Respondent is
not
a bona fide
purchaser,
the conclusion that I have arrived at is still the same.
[24]
Of importance is the fact that if there is a defect in the real
agreement, no transfer of ownership
will take place. See:
Legator
Mckenna Inc and Another v Shea and Others
[1]
where the court stated
that "
Although
the abstract theory does not require a valid underlying contract e.g
sale, ownership will not pass-despite registration
of transfer-if
there is a defect in the real agreement
"
[2]
.
[25]
The Court in Legator thus confirmed that the abstract theory of
ownership also applies in the
case of transfer of immovable property
by holding that "
in
view of this body of authority I believe that the time has come for
this Court to add its stamp of approval to the viewpoint
that the
abstract theory applies to the immovable property
"
[3]
.
[26]
As I have indicated above, the probabilities are overwhelmingly in
favour of the Applicant's
version that she did not sign the power of
attorney to transfer the immovable property. The parties were no
longer living together
and the First Respondent had obtained a
protection order against his own children to force them out of the
house. One can hardly
expect that under these circumstances, the
Applicant and the First Respondent would come together and negotiate
the selling of
the house.
[27]
In any event, the Applicant alleges that she has never received her
portion of the proceeds of
the sale of the property, and
notwithstanding such allegations, the First Respondent has decided
not to participate in these proceedings
and put his version across.
[28]
It is also so that the mere fact that the property was registered in
the name of the Second Respondent
or any other person or entity, does
not solidify the validity of the transfer. In the case of
Meintjies
No v Coetzer and Others
[4]
the court stated that "
in
any event, the mere registration does not afford proof of
ownership
"
[5]
.
[29]
In
Nedbank
Ltd v Mendelow and Another NNO
[6]
the court stated that
"
However,
if the underlying agreement is tainted by fraud or obtained by some
other means that vitiates consent (such as duress or
undue influence)
then ownership does not pass
"
[7]
.
[30]
The evidence is overwhelming that there was fraud committed by the
First Respondent in selling
the immovable property. The sale
agreement is accordingly tainted by fraud and cannot be allowed to
stand. However, since this
is joint property, the order that I
propose to make is for the transfer of the property into the names of
both the Applicant and
the First Respondent. The Applicant is not
entitled to have the immovable property registered in her name only
because she is a
joint owner and not a sole owner of the property.
[31]
What the parties do about the immovable property is not for this
court to decide. Similarly,
how the First Respondent would account to
the Second and Third Respondents is for him alone to grapple with.
The First Respondent
made his bed and must lie in it.
[32]
In my view, where a property which is jointly owned by two parties
and the other party sells
the property without the knowledge or
consent of the other party, ownership will not pass to the purchaser.
Order
In
the result I make the following order:
[1]
The sale of immovable property
ERF 8[...], QUARTZ STREET,
NELLMAPIUS, EXTENSION 7
to the Second and Third Respondents or
any other third party is declared invalid and set aside.
[2]
The sale agreements that led to the transfer of the immovable
property, being
ERF 8[...], QUARTZ STREET, NELLMAPIUS, EXTENSION 7
to the Second and Third Respondents and any other third party is
hereby declared null and void.
[3]
The Fifth Respondent is directed to transfer the immovable property
to wit
ERF 8[...], QUARTZ STREET, NELLMAPIUS, EXTENSION 7
into
the names of both the Applicant and the First Respondent.
[4]
No order as to costs.
RATHAGA
RAMAWELE
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
Date
of hearing: 26 November 2024
Date
of judgement: 19 December 2024
Appearances:
For
the Applicant: Boipelo Ramela instructed by Jenkins Attorneys INC
[1]
2010 (1) SA 35 (SCA)
[2]
Id paragraph [22]
[4]
2010 (5) SA 186
(SCA)
[5]
Id paragraph [13]
[6]
2013 (6) SA 130 (SCA)
[7]
Id paragraph [14]
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